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Abstract
This study contributes a decolonial critique of the world-system from the longue durée
perspective of the Muslim Atlantic. It connects contemporary Traditionalist Islamic discourse in North
America to human networks developed since the long sixteenth century. Traditionalist Islam can be
described as a discourse about traditional Islam. Genealogically, it draws upon many sources. Two
important ones are (1) the oeuvre of French metaphysician and Sufi René Guénon, and (2) the Shâdhilî
school of Sufism born in North Africa. Traditionalist Islam distinguishes itself from what it depicts as
fundamentalist (or Salafist) and modernist (or progressive) currents, representing two extremes of the
same modern ideological spectrum positioned in violent opposition to tradition. In contrast, it portrays
traditional Islam as perpetuating sacred lineages which date back to the early Islamic era. These include
Sufi lineages dedicated to transmitting metaphysical knowledge depicted within Traditionalist discourse
as the essence of Islamic sacred sciences.
Many North American Muslim scholars associated with Traditionalism are connected to Islamic
lineages from Northwest Africa. When they critique modernity by drawing upon Islam as a dynamic,
diverse, and holistic tradition, they build upon a transatlantic history of metaphysically centred
resistance to modernity/coloniality. Since the Portuguese first invaded the Moroccan city of Ceuta
(Sabta) in 1415, Northwest Africans have played a key role in anti-colonial resistance which involves
more than a military, political, or economic fight. It is a struggle to protect the spiritual and cultural
traditions of Muslims, as well as other religious communities living with Muslims.
This dissertation joins a nascent conversation between Traditionalist Islam and decolonial worldsystems analysis. It endorses the call made by decolonial theorists such as Ramón Grosfoguel for
multiple inter-epistemic conversations about how to move ahead and beyond the modern/colonial
system. And it focuses on the anti-colonial or decolonial aspects of Traditionalist Islam. Two main
ii

contentions are advanced: (1) that traditional Islam still needs to be decolonized, and (2) that
Traditionalist Islamic perspectives should contribute more to the global conversation on decolonization.
Three other arguments based on historical evidence support these main contentions: (1) that a specific
type of traditional Islam developed in the Western Islamicate between the eighth and fifteenth
centuries; (2) that the disruption and colonization of traditional Islam by European powers was a
constitutive aspect of the early modern/colonial world-system born in 1492; and (3) that traditionalism
developed as a response to this disruption. These long-term historical processes can be summarized as
progressing through three stages: tradition, disruption, and traditionalism. Sections One to Three of this
dissertation examines these stages, whereas Section Four is devoted to decolonization (and
decolonialization), which represents a fourth stage, concerned with the present and future. In this
context, tradition can be understood as an inspired dynamic flow from the past into the present and
future. Explicitly affirming the value of the diverse traditions disrupted by the modern/colonial project is
itself a decolonial act. A new theoretical framework proposed here is “Traditionalist Islamic
decolonization.” Intended as one of many scholarly discourses contributing to global decolonial
conversations, this framework begins from the premise that Muslims must revisit their tradition to
counter the modern/colonial forces which for centuries have threatened to annihilate their unique ways
of being, knowing, and behaving.
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The Compassionate One has taught the Qur’ân. He created man, teaching him the [coherent]
speech. The sun and the moon follow a reckoning, and the grass1 and the trees prostrate. And He
has raised the heaven and set up the balance, [declaring] that you should not contravene with
regard to the balance. And observe the weights with justice and do not skimp the balance. And
the earth, He placed it for [all] creatures. In it are fruits and date-palms with sheaths, and grain
with husk, and fragrant herb. So which of your Lord’s favours will you deny? (Qur’an 55:1-13)
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Grass is chosen here to translate to translate najm, which can also refer to a star. This passage is often translated
as “the stars and the trees […]”

v

Thank you to Michel Desjardins for telling me to keep it complex if I wanted to.
Thank you to Jason Neelis and all the other faculty and staff members at Laurier and Waterloo who
engaged me with respect and honesty.
Thank you to Sahver Kuzucuoglu and all the others who journeyed with me through graduate studies.
Thank you to my friends from the MSA for being Muslim on campus and respecting this elder.
Thank you to all my teachers, friends, and family.
Thank you to the Ontario Government for providing crucial funding for this project.

vi

Land Acknowledgement
Let me begin by acknowledging that I am part of a colonial settler community in Waterloo,
Ontario, which is situated on the traditional territory of the Neutral, Anishnawbe, and Haudenosaunee
peoples. Although this dissertation focuses on Muslim communities within broad world-systems, I
consider it my duty to work towards decolonization, both locally and globally. In other words, I am
against the broader settler colonial project of replacing Indigenous communities on this land.
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Notes on Language Usage
Unless specified otherwise, any foreign term is a transliteration of Arabic, which is translated the
first time it appears in the text. These terms often appear in parentheses beside an English term, for
example the name of a city in Arabic. All Arabic terms are transliterated into Roman characters, in italics,
using a simplified version of the Library of Congress System (The Library of Congress 2012). However,
proper names are given without italics, and words now incorporated into the common English lexicon
are spelt using their English form. This applies to certain proper nouns which are commonly
transliterated differently. For example, when citing an author, I favour the transcription used in the
official citation—e.g.: ‘Zakia Zouanat’, not ‘Zakiyyah Zuwânât’. Furthermore, the article al is omitted in
proper names after their first mention in the text—e.g. al-Junayd is subsequently referred to as Junayd.
Scholars are referred to by their full name the first time they are mentioned, but last names are used
thereafter.
Because the Qur’an is considered by Muslims to be the word of God in its original Arabic version,
all direct quotations from it are provided in Arabic first. The translation used is that of the Royal Aal alBayt Institute for Islamic Thought (Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought 2019)2 with the chapter
and verse indicated between parentheses, separated by a colon. No in-text citation is given for these
translated verses. In the case of hadiths, since they come from a variety of sources, a regular citation is
provided for each translated passage. Many passages of the Qur’an are provided without explanation,
especially at the beginning of chapters. Such passages remind that the Qur’an often serves as a point of
reference, inspiration, or indeed an underlying presence for Muslims. Although this presence is not

2

This translation is appropriate as it is provided by the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought.
Headquartered in Amman, Jordan, this institute is endorsed by Muslim scholars of highly diverse schools of
thought and cultural heritages, including North American Traditionalists such as Joseph Lumbard, Sulayman
Abdallah Schleifer, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr.
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always manifest through exegesis or other modes of discursive interpretation and explanation, it
accompanies many Muslims everywhere. And it certainly informs the thoughts and actions of the
Muslim scholars introduced throughout this dissertation.
I would also like to point out that I enthusiastically endorse the general trend to favour gender
inclusive language in academic writing. For instance, referring to Allah as ‘Him’ could be considered
problematic. However, in Arabic, Allah is a masculine proper noun and to my knowledge is never
referred to in the feminine. This does not imply any anthropomorphic depiction of the Supreme Being as
gendered, just as referring to the sun (shams) in the feminine and the moon (qamar) in the masculine
does not attribute anthropomorphic gender to celestial bodies. Therefore, my intention has been to use
gender-inclusive language except when it would seem to distort the subject matter. My own decolonial
approach also leads me to be as respectful as I can to the conventions used by Muslims for centuries,
while being sensitive to the multiple layers of meaning behind their language constructions.
One linguistic convention important to Muslims is the traditional practice of including a prayer
for the Prophet Muḥammad every time his name is mentioned, even in writing. Although this practice is
dear to me, it is not conventional in non-confessional English academic texts. Therefore, the reader will
find in this dissertation the result of my own personal compromise on this point: I pray here once that
the blessings and peace of Allah be upon the Prophet Muḥammad every time his name is mentioned in
this document and elsewhere. Furthermore, may these blessings and peace be bestowed upon all other
holy women and men in all times and places. 3

3

Inserting even one prayer into a non-confessional scholarly text can be controversial. While I think religious
studies and theology should remain distinct disciplines, I reject the widespread notion that any trace of discourse
understood as theological automatically contaminates scholarship in religious studies. Drawing on numerous
sources (e.g. Asad 1993, 2003, Maldonado-Torres 2008b, Masuzawa 2005, Mahmood 2015, Salvatore 2006, 2007),
I seek to decolonize the secular/religious binary, in the Preface and more thoroughly in Chapters Five and Nine.
Moreover, the transdisciplinary approach (see Appendix One) espoused in this dissertation challenges the rigid
separation between disciplines.
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Preface
ٰ ضغَةَ ع
ۡ ضغَ ۬ةً فَ َﺧلَ ۡقنَا ٱ ۡل ُم
ۡ س ٰللَ ٍة ِ ّم ۡن طِ ۡي ٍن ث ُ ﱠم َجعَ ۡل َن ٰـهُ نُ ۡطفَ ۬ةً فِﻰ قَ َر ٍار ﱠمك ِۡي ٍن ث ُ ﱠم َﺧلَ ۡقنَا ٱل ﱡن ۡطفَةَ َعلَقَ ۬ةً فَ َﺧلَ ۡقنَا ٱ ۡلعَلَقَةَ ُم
س ۡونَا
ُ س ٰـنَ مِ ن
َ ِظ ًما فَ َك
َ َو َلقَ ۡد َﺧلَ ۡقنَا ٱ ۡ ِﻹن
َ ٱ ۡل ِع
ۚ َ ظ ٰـ َم لَحۡ ًما ث ُ ﱠم أَنش َۡأ َن ٰـهُ ﺧ َۡلقًا َءاﺧ
َس ُن ٱ ۡل َﺧ ٰـ ِلقِينَ ث ُ ﱠم ِإ ﱠن ُكم َبعۡ َد ذَٲلِكَ لَ َم ِّيتُون
َ اركَ ٱ ﱠ ُ أ َ ۡح
َ َر فَتَ َب
And We certainly created man from an extraction of clay. Then We made him a drop in a
secure lodging. Then We transformed the drop [of semen] into a clot. Then We
transformed the clot into a [little] lump of flesh. Then We transformed the lump of flesh
into bones. Then We clothed the bones with flesh. Then We produced him as [yet] another
creature. So blessed be God, the best of creators! Then indeed after that you die. (Qur’an
23: 12-15)
This dissertation is the fruit of over three decades of reflection on non-Western worldviews and
global coloniality. Although this is not the terminology I used as a teenager and young adult in the late
1980s4 and early 1990s, my intellectual passions did fit these categories. My social milieu in Montreal at
the time comprised close family and friends from immensely diverse origins, including many from Latin
America, the Caribbean, and West Africa. My elders trained and involved me in musical and theatrical
performances as well as community radio shows on the themes of multiculturalism, anti-racism and
Third World liberation. I learned the essentials of decolonial thought through protest songs in Spanish,
French, Creole, and English. Haitian rice and beans (créole: diri Kolé ak pwa) was on my plate more often
than hamburgers and fries, or macaroni and cheese. To fully enjoy celebrations with family and friends, I
learned the basics of percussion and dance in a variety of styles, from salsa to soukous. As a member of
this cosmopolitan community, I felt concerned by the problems of its other members, including those
from racialized minorities. However, my white privilege also made me insensitive or oblivious to many of
these problems. At first, I tended to see racism in terms of innocence and guilt, but over time I came to
focus on the work that needs to be done against racist thought and behaviour. In fact, it took me many

4

Dates are given here using the Common Era system based on the Gregorian Calendar. Although this is a
Eurocentric system, it is much more widely used than the Islamic lunar calendar; therefore, it is the most practical
dating system to use in a scholarly work produced in a Western university and intended for audiences from diverse
religious and cultural heritages.
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years just to realize how long and difficult a process antiracist decolonization is for societies and for the
individuals who inhabit them.
But my circumstances did encourage me to undertake this process. The first serious essay I wrote
in high school was about neocolonialism in Haiti. And my bookshelf was filled with writings on
spirituality as well as social justice. As I devoured the writings of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., I
became increasingly fascinated with diverse worldviews from around the world. Without much
discernment, I would often raid the spirituality and world religions sections of bookstores. Moreover, I
participated in several types of individual and group rituals, directed by my readings and various spiritual
guides in Montreal. When I began my undergraduate studies at Concordia University in 1990, I thought
philosophy might be a good field of study, but I was quickly put off by the Western exclusivism of the
curriculum in an introduction class. At the same time, I discovered that I could learn about diverse
approaches to reality by specializing in comparative religious studies and taking elective courses in
history, literature, political science, philosophy, languages, and culture.
Among the excellent professors from the Department of Religion at Concordia University, who
introduced me to the field, Sheila McDonough stands out.5 Her fair, compassionate, and erudite
approach impressed me from the start and she was instrumental in helping me challenge the
stereotypes about Islam and Muslims to which I was confronted. But McDonough was not only a mentor
to me in class. She has stayed in touch with me ever since, even in retirement, inviting me to attend
lectures and community events with her; tutoring me in Arabic in her living room over a cup of tea;
accepting my invitations to religious and family celebrations; and constantly encouraging me to continue
studying Islam.

5

Biographical notes are provided in Appendix Two for scholars mentioned in the text. Moreover, the names of
scholars are introduced progressively throughout the dissertation, in passages directly related to their work, rather
than in the type of exhaustive and decontextualized list sometimes presented in literature reviews.

2

In my early years at Concordia, I became increasingly fascinated with Islam, to the point that I
became Muslim at the age of 21 and joined the transnational Burhaniya Sufi Order (Sparkes 2013, 2016).
Founded by the Sudanese Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Uthmân ‘Abduh al-Burhânî (c. 1902-983), this order
traces its lineage back to the Moroccan Shaykh Abû al-Ḥasan al-Shâdhilî (c.1196/1197-1258) and is a
contemporary example of the Western Islamic tradition discussed below in Section One. Soon, I found
myself spending most of my time with Muslim immigrants from Sudan, Egypt, and the Maghrib. They
welcomed me as a brother and taught me many of their traditions. We were all part of the same global
Muslim Umma (community or nation). But at the same time, I was becoming increasingly immersed in
the specific cultural traditions and customs of my friends from Northern Africa, including a variety of
Arabic dialects. Over years and eventually decades, we shared weddings, births, conflicts, funerals,
businesses, travels, and other experiences. Once again, I came to share many of their problems as well
as their aspirations.6
Although I had thought that the comparative study of religion might provide some useful
knowledge for me to apply to the challenges facing my multicultural and cosmopolitan community, I
soon felt rather disappointed. In the early 1990s, it seemed to me that the academic study of Islam
could only be performed from an agnostic external position, rather than an internal pious one. These
two perspectives could very well coexist in the same person as long as they did not mix. My impression
was that while many academic specializations welcomed scholars promoting and defending their
positionality (e.g. musicians in music departments, women in women’s studies, Jews in Jewish studies,
or Canadians in Canadian studies), being accused of promoting community interests could be lethal for
the careers of Muslims studying Islam. Unfortunately, it felt like I was being asked to develop a minor
form of multiple personality disorder. This was one of the reasons I left the program and went to work
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As I write these lines decades later, I realize that many of these problems were linked to what I now
conceptualize as global coloniality and many of these aspirations to traditional Islam.

3

as a language teacher, although I had been intending to become a professional historian of religion. Yet
the desire to study religion with a focus on Islam never left me.
Over a decade later, in 2006 I returned to university firm in my decision to find a solution to this
problem. For a variety of reasons, it was a lot easier the second time around. First, I was obviously much
more mature. I had become more comfortable with tensions and apparent contradictions within and
around me. Second, after completing my Bachelor of Arts with a Major in Religion and a Minor in Arabic
Language and Culture, I started a Master’s in Religious Studies at the Faculty of Theology and Religious
Studies at Université de Montréal, where theology and religion were generally seen to complete one
another rather than to be at odds. The two approaches were distinct, taught in separate programs, but
they were allowed to interact. Bridges could be built. When I studied at Concordia, religious studies and
theology are taught in two very separate departments. Many of my professors made it clear that any
influence of theology within the scientific study of religion was to be avoided at all costs.
When I returned to university, the third reason it was easier to study religion in a more holistic
manner, drawing from all aspects of my being including my Islamic faith, is that times had changed in
the academy. Cooperation and crossbreeding among various disciplines had become a popular trend.
Moreover, the postmodern attack on objectivity had somewhat belatedly spread within religious
studies, and seriously chipped away at the edifice of rationalism and scientism. Most scholars of religion
I encountered now recognized the conclusions of such renowned scholars as the French sociologist and
philosopher Edgar Morin, according to whom complete neutrality is impossible.7 Everyone has a position

7

Morin (2002, 17-34), who is UNESCO Mobile Chair in Complex Thought, argues that in the humanities and social
sciences the subject and observer cannot and must not be excluded, whereas in natural sciences only the observer
(not the subject) need be considered. For instance, since sociological problems are inherently intersubjective,
sociologists are subjects dealing with other subjects. He further argues that sociologists must at once fully utilize
their subjectivity and their will to produce somewhat objective results, in the sense of assuming a critical distance
and consciously fighting tendencies to be ethnocentric or egocentric. This entails sociologists embracing a constant
“dialectic of exclusion and inclusion” for themselves and their “vision of society,” and thereby engaging in a
“complementary and conflictual” balancing act between objectivity and subjectivity (34).
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towards what they observe. In this mindset, honesty about one’s position, fairness, empathy, and openmindedness protect the academic from flagrant bias—not objectivity or neutrality. I was relieved to
discover that rationalism as a rigid ideology was now seen by many scholars as a potential threat to
rationality. Representations of religion and secularism as a clearly defined binary were increasingly
rejected, and anti-racist approaches to Islamophobia were in vogue. There seemed to be hope for
Muslims to study Islam in a religion department without leaving their positionality at the door.
At Université de Montréal, I was fortunate to find a mentor who embodies a holistic, openminded, and dialogical approach to the study of Islam and other worldviews. Patrice Brodeur supervised
my master’s research with finesse, enthusiasm, and intellectual rigour. He encouraged me to explore a
variety of theoretical approaches, including marginal and controversial ones. In the classroom, during
conferences, in discussions about my writing, and over coffee, he always welcomed engagement from
every aspect of my person, including my faith. This goes without saying for Brodeur, an internationally
renowned expert on intra-religious, inter-religious, inter-cultural, inter-civilizational and inter-worldview
dialogue. Happily, this is also the case with my doctoral supervisor, Meena Sharify-Funk, as well as all my
mentors at Wilfrid Laurier University.8 Yet, such holistic and dialogical methods represent only one trend
within the academy. For instance, many contemporary scholars still espouse staunchly rationalist views
and remain opposed to any influence of theology on the academic study of religion. There exist a great
variety of approaches.
Since the turn of the millennium, the academic study of Islam has evolved in an extremely
dynamic but controversial environment, which has resulted in “a new abundance in colleges and
universities of faculty openings and curriculums that deal with the Islamic religious tradition” (Ernst and
Martin 2010, 1). Anti-racist studies about Muslims have been undertaken in a tense atmosphere, as
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All the members of my current Dissertation Advisory Committee at Wilfrid Laurier University are equally open to
holistic and dialogical approaches. Their biographical summaries are given in Appendix Two.
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racist representations of Islam often dominate public perception, government policy, and even
academic research, pitting “good” modernist Muslims against “bad” fundamentalists (Birt 2006,
Mamdani 2004, Grosfoguel 2010). This exacerbates an already Islamophobic social climate in the
context of the “Global War on Terrorism” (Norton 2013, Sayyid and Vakil 2010). A well-financed
Islamophobic network of experts has arisen, in the academy and Western societies at large, with the aim
of spreading suspicion and hatred of Muslims (Wajahat, et al. 2011). Scholars such as Jasmin Zine (2012)
from Wilfrid Laurier University are committed to examining and exposing such systemic Islamophobia.9
During my master’s degree, it became clear to me that to pursue my intellectual interests as an
engaged Muslim scholar, I needed to find theoretical approaches with some academic legitimacy which
could allow me to bridge internal and external approaches to religion. This led me to decolonial theory,
which has provided me with the academic framework within which to produce knowledge from a
Muslim and Sufi perspective. It has prompted me to value transparency concerning my positionality as
an academic. I now feel it is pertinent to affirm that I like Islam and Sufism. I like North Africa and West
Asia. I like the Arabic language. I would not be less positioned towards these subjects if I disliked them
or felt indifferent about them. Every position is a position. Being transparent need not entail being
obstinate or proselytizing. In fact, I believe it is a necessary precondition for open and critical exchanges.
I was introduced to decolonial theory in 2011, during the first summer school entitled Critical
Muslim Studies: Decolonial Struggles and Liberation Theologies, held at the Escuela de Estudios Árabes
(School of Arabic Studies) in Granada, Spain. The aim of this summer school is presented as follows on
its website:
Critical Muslim Studies is inspired by a need for opening up a space for intellectually
rigorous and socially committed explorations between decolonial thinking and studies of

9

Zine is Lead Researcher of the Canadian Islamophobia Industry Research Project. See Appendix Two for
bibliopgrahical notes.
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Muslims, Islam and the Islamicate.10 Critical Muslim Studies does not take Islam as only a
spiritual tradition, or a civilization, but also as a possibility of a decolonial epistemic
perspective that suggests contributions and responses to the problems facing humankind
today. It offers an opportunity to interpret and understand Muslim phenomena in ways
that does not [sic] reproduce Eurocentrism,11 Islamophobia or takfiri12 exclusivism.”
(Dialogo Global 2018)
This ambitious endeavour resonated deeply with me in 2011, and still does. I discovered that
decolonial world-systems analysis, which builds on the work of U.S. American sociologist Immanuel
Wallerstein (1930-2019), is both sympathetic to postcolonialism and distinct from it. 13 It starts from the
premise that it is too early to speak of postcolonialism when the global world-system remains organized
around colonial power dynamics. Moreover, it seeks to avoid the tendency to frame critiques of
Eurocentrism mainly in theoretical models developed by Western academic ‘giants’ such as Michel
Foucault (1926-1984) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)14—a tendency often observable in postcolonial
scholarship and subaltern studies from the Global South (Grosfoguel 2011, 2-5). To be perfectly clear,
this does not mean ignoring all contributions from the West. Like postcolonialism, decolonial thought
simply seeks to decentre the West without destroying it or replacing it by a new hegemon (Dussel 1996).
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The term Islamicate was coined by Marshall Hodgson. He explains that the term refers to “a culture, centred on
a lettered tradition, which has been historically distinctive of Islamdom the society, and which has been naturally
shared in by both Muslims and non-Muslims who participate at all fully in the society of Islamdom.” This usage
restricts “the term 'Islam' to the religion of the Muslims, not using that term for the far more general phenomena,
the society of Islamdom and its Islamicate cultural tradition” (Hodgson 1974a, 58). Here, the term Islamicate is
used “in its most inclusive sense, to refer to the dynamic mosaic of social and cultural life forms that exist not only
in Muslim-majority societies, but also in diasporic Muslim communities” (Siavash, Akhbari and Abdolmaleki 2017,
2).
11
Eurocentrism refers to the ideologies which present Europe or the West as normative and superior to other
regions of the world, in terms of history, culture, and values (Amin 1988).
12
“Takfiri exclusivism” refers to the practice, associated with hardline exclusivist currents within Islam, of declaring
other Muslims unbelievers (takfîr).
13
Although Wallerstein is the most influential world-systems analyst (Derluguian 2015), especially among the
decolonial thinkers whose work is discussed in this dissertation, he developed this approach in collaboration with
other scholars, including Egyptian-French Marxist scholar Samir Amin (1931-2018), Italian sociologist Giovanni
Arrighi (1937-2009), and German-American economic historian Andre Gunder Frank (1929-2005), with whom he
co-authored two books (Amin, Arrighi, et al. 1982, 1990).
14
Derrida, who studied with Foucault for a time, is a good example of a thinker from the Global South deeply
immersed within the very Western discourses he critiques. His liminal identity as an Algerian-born Jew and French
intellectual celebrity makes him a fascinating case to consider from a decolonial perspective. He came to the
Western academy from the colonial periphery, and developed a theoretical approach called "deconstruction,"
which seeks to expose and subvert dominant thought patterns underlying Western philosophy and literature.
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However, it differentiates itself from postcolonialism by insisting on the production of knowledge from
or with peripheral epistemologies rather than about them. It neither rejects nor ignores Western
theoretical frameworks, but it does radically decentre them. This is different than simply producing
knowledge from peripheral bodies and locations while drawing mainly upon Western theory.
Furthermore, it does not entail particularism since people in the core of the world-system can adopt
peripheral perspectives, just as people on the periphery regularly adopt Eurocentric ones. Decolonial
theorist Ramón Grosfoguel (2011) explains:
The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations does not
automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic
location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consists in making
subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think
epistemically like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are
knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic
knowledge in the power relations involved. (6).
Decolonial theory raises serious questions about positionality. It challenges me to produce
critical scholarship as a Muslim, rather than about Muslims, and in partnership with (not about) other
thinkers from the global periphery, such as racialized minorities in North America. 15 This does not
require interpreting Islamic scriptures for other Muslims, an activity for which I am decidedly
unqualified—I am no theologian. But it does involve participating in a broad inter-epistemic
conversation on decolonization and contributing knowledge from my own perspective. Therefore, it
seems relevant to formally acknowledge that I am a Canadian Muslim who is both engaged in the
academic study of religion and committed to traditional North African lineages of jurisprudence,
theology, and Sufism. Intellectually, I am indebted to many scholars, including Western Muslims, such as
U.S. American scholar of Islamic Studies Vincent Cornell (2004), who coined the term “critical
traditionalism.”

15

The notion of racialization presents race as an unstable social construction, thereby rejecting any contention
that it is a firm biological category (Omi and Winant 1994 [1986], Grosfoguel 2004).
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Affirming my positionality does of course raise some concerns, which I am addressing here to
avoid any misinterpretations, although this dissertation is not autobiographical. Hopefully, such
misunderstandings will not be possible for those who carefully read the whole dissertation, but in my
experience, it is always wise to clarify one’s positions and intentions from the outset. I end this preface
with five such clarifications about the positionality, scope, and limitations of this dissertation.
First, decolonial world-system analysis has the flaws of any metanarrative. By focusing on
macro-level patterns, it does not sufficiently address the messiness of existence at the micro-level. This
can lead to reductionism. But different methods serve different purposes and should complete one
another in the end. Decolonial world-system analysis does not replace research at smaller scales—
region, nation, society, community, individual. But it is very difficult to focus on two scales at once.
Second, this dissertation may seem anti-European or anti-Western. Rest assured; I am aware of
my European origins. I neither hate Europeans nor do I wish to be hated. But, as Aimé Césaire (1955, 18)
(1913-2008) explains, the first victims in a dehumanizing power dynamic are the oppressors. Therefore,
trying to undo oppressive power dynamics is necessary to preserve and improve my own humanity. I did
not choose to be born with privilege, and I do not seek to simply abandon my privilege to become
oppressed myself. What good would that do? But it is both moral and useful to take strategic risks with
one’s privilege to help others. Indeed, privilege can be used both to perpetuate or fight oppression. As a
Muslim, I believe that all situations are divine tests, including wealth, poverty, health, illness, power, and
weakness. The question is what we do with our circumstances.
Third, this dissertation may seem anti-modern. It is not so simple. We are all born into the
modern world through no choice of our own. Recognizing the problematic aspects of our world does not
mean opposing it completely. The decolonial project is to transcend—not destroy—modernity. A
decolonized future would not remove all traces of modernity. But it would no longer be modern in the
current sense of the term. And there is reason to hope for such a change. Wael Hallaq (2018) writes:
9

It is often argued (in what has become received wisdom among university students and
most scholars) that a critique of modernity is ineluctably bound with modernity and cannot
escape or transcend its epistemological framework. Every critique is thus destined to
reenact or at best revise an aspect of modernity, but modernity nonetheless. Of course, the
ramifications of such views are serious, not only because of the sense of epistemological
resignation that it signifies, but also because it is profoundly erroneous. It is also serious, if
not dangerous, because it fortifies the ideological discourse of modernity, validating the
status quo, the desideratum of the modernists. (66)
Optimism can be healthy. I look forward to a day in which what we now categorize as religious or
secular, black or white, Western or non-Western, and core or periphery would be organized and
perceived differently. To use one example, my complexion would not change if it were called light beige
instead of white—as my young daughter used to think—or if skin colour stopped being considered a
relevant identity marker. In the end, decolonization should be a process of healing and a celebration of
life in its diversity, not a process of death and destruction.
Fourth, some of my colleagues in the academy may see this dissertation as a theological attack
on secularism which is inappropriate in the secular discipline of religious studies. I challenge the
premises of such a position, and build upon the considerable scholarship which has already convincingly
rejected the secular/religious binary and contested secular hegemony (Asad 1993, 2003, Masuzawa
2005, Mahmood 2015). Once again, my aim is not to destroy what is commonly identified as secular, but
to contest its hegemonic status, including in the production of scientific knowledge. I concur with
Grosfoguel (2013) that secular hegemony in the academy is one manifestation of the “epistemic racism”
motivating “epistemicide” (elimination of epistemic diversity) on a global scale. Yet, other models are
being imagined by scholars such as Armando Salvatore (2007). He argues that neither the “triumphant
Anglo-American tradition” of liberalism nor other traditions entering a conversation in the public sphere
should have to translate their discourse to meet the other’s presuppositions about what is rational.
Salvatore calls for the reconstruction of the public sphere “by drawing on the conceptual resources of a
plurality of partly overlapping and partly conflicting discursive traditions” (258). In Salvatore’s (2006)
conception of dialogue, each interlocutor can engage in a pluralistic public sphere while speaking within
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the reasonable parameters of a given tradition. Different expressions of rationality are to be expected
when parties come together with the intention of defining the common good. If this is indeed the
intention, assuming one’s positionality is intellectually healthy since it promotes intellectual
transparency. Salvatore’s approach seems considerably more productive than any tired defense of
secular objectivity.
Fifth, it can be argued that most other civilizations have been guilty of colonialism and the same
sort of terrible acts committed by modern Western powers. This is certainly true of Islamicate polities.
Would any student of history deny that everybody is capable of being oppressive? The Ottomans, the
pre-Columbian Aztecs and countless other empires would be fascinating to study. Yet my focus is on the
modern/colonial world-system initially developed in the Atlantic world. While atrocities have been
committed throughout history and around the world, there are particularities as well. Just as the
modern/colonial world-system has produced some uniquely positive achievements in a huge variety of
fields, it has been uniquely destructive. I don’t see how this can be denied. Hallaq (2018) argues:
A strong penchant for violence was the lot of humanity since time immemorial, and to this
extent the moderns, Nazis included, have not distinguished themselves over their
predecessors. What is new is an added layer of cataclysmic violence that created a new
quality. Modern sovereign will, including will to violence, is an epistemology and a way of
seeing the world that commensurately created the new atrocious weapons. To argue that
such weapons are incidental to this emerging European reality and that they are, because
they “happened to be available,” responsible for genocide and atrocities is to ignore this
contingency with a view to universalizing, in typical European discursive fashion, the burden
of sovereign, genocide-inducing violence. (126)16
Besides, just as the universal human potential to commit crimes is irrelevant when an actual
criminal is on trial, I do not see the relevance of struggling against dead or potential systems. The
challenges of the age are too serious to get lost in speculation about how other systems might or
might not have been as bad. Of course, we should learn about the past and build the future, but
each generation has its challenges. In today’s global world-system, Muslims and most of humanity
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Hallaq’s position is more thoroughly examined in the final pages of Chapter Ten.
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are positioned in the colonial periphery, not the core, even when we live in the West or work in
Western universities. We have unique contributions to make to the academy, even when—in fact
especially when—our voices make the gatekeepers of Western knowledge uncomfortable.
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Introduction
ؕ ۡسانَ َما لَمۡ َيعۡ لَم
ِ ۡ علﱠ َم
ۡ ٱ ۡق َر ۡأ َو َربﱡكَ ٱ ۡﻷ َ ۡك َر ۙ ُم الﱠذ
َ ۙ علﱠ َم ِب ۡالقَلَ ِم
َ ِی
َ اﻻ ۡن
Recite: and your Lord is the Most Generous, Who taught by the pen—taught man what he
did not know. (Qur’an 96: 3-5)
Barely out of childhood, a young Muslim man comes home completely transformed after having
read a few books and attended some lectures by an opinionated and charismatic teacher. The young
man’s appearance has changed, as has his attitude towards his family. He seems especially impatient
with his grandmother and what he sees as her ignorance and superstition. She insists on visiting the
graves of saints and citing oral folktales rather than authoritative written texts. Her regional dialect is
composed of strange images and arguments based on seemingly irrational premises. In short, his
grandmother represents everything he thinks is wrong with Islam and Muslims today. She is weak in a
world filled with strong enemies. To a degree, the same can be said of his grandfather, mother, father
and sister. They were all so happy to make sacrifices for him to continue his studies and help his
community. But now he is angry, and nobody is happy around him anymore. This all-too-familiar story
for Muslims has been repeating itself for generations. Perhaps the boy could be replaced by a female
character, but I have chosen the gender of my characters to reflect the misogyny and unhealthy
affirmations of masculinity which generally inform such situations. Moreover, the boy could be in
Canada, Morocco, Indonesia or anywhere else around the world. His grandmother could speak
dialectical Arabic, Wolof, or Urdu. The basic plot remains. What many non-Muslim Western readers
might find more surprising is that this plot would not be altered whether the boy comes home as a
hardline Muslim revivalist or a zealous convert to modernism. It does not matter if he is studying in
classical Arabic or a European language such as English or French. Nor does it matter if he has grown a
beard and bought clothes worn by Muslims from other lands, or if he is adopting the styles of New York
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and Paris. What remains is his angry rejection of the traditions dear to his immediate community. He is
not respecting his elders.
This tragic story speaks of Muslim crises in modern times. It illustrates fundamental difficulties
Muslims have faced as Western Europeans and their descendants have come to dominate the world. 17 It
is the story of understandable but ultimately unhealthy reactions to an enormous civilizational
challenge. Many non-Muslims might also find this story familiar. With some variations, this story could
work with a grandmother speaking Creole, Mâori, Quechua, Anishnawbe or any of the thousands of
languages spoken on the periphery of the modern/colonial world-system. This dissertation explores the
underlying historical forces behind this story, and how they are presented in North American
Traditionalist Islamic scholarship.
In a general sense, Traditionalist Islam may seem like a problematic designation since it could
point to a huge array of heterogenous phenomena, but the reference here is to a specific intellectual
current, particularly influential among Western Muslims, in conversation with other contemporary
intellectual currents. When written with initial capital letters, terms such as Traditionalist or
Traditionalism are being used as proper nouns, although they are often used as common nouns, without
initial capitals. Both usages are somewhat interchangeable in textual sources. In this dissertation, initial
capitals are used when Traditionalism is being referred to as historically specific discourse about
tradition, rather than a vague adherence to tradition.18 However, contributors to this discourse are not
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One may object that in such passages this dissertation is maintaining a reductionist binary between Western
Europeans and Muslims, the West and the Rest, or the West and Islam. Clearly, there are Muslims in Western
Europe today, as there were thirteen centuries ago. As a Muslim descendant of Western Europeans, my own
experience attests to the interdependence and inter-relatedness of the West and Islam. However, a decolonial
world-systems analysis examines historical forces, over long periods of time, and across vast geographical spaces.
It examines the overall impact of how human communities, such as Western Europeans, have evolved in relation
to other communities. Just as the big picture must not conceal the complicated realities experienced on the
ground level, the astounding complexities of history must not conceal the big picture. Sometimes we need to see
the trees, and sometimes the forest.
18
The multiple layers of meaning conveyed by the term tradition, in a variety of discourses including
Traditionalism, are discussed later in the Introduction and throughout the dissertation.
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considered as adherents to a formal institution or organization, but as participants in an informal
discourse community. This is important. While some scholars identify as Traditionalists or Perennialists,
others may not feel comfortable being labeled this way. Rather than firm identities, these categories
serve my methodological purpose as ideal types in a somewhat Weberian sense.19 Engaging in a type of
discourse does not always indicate full adherence to a given school of thought. Indeed, it is often the
case that only certain aspects of a scholar’s work may be described as Traditionalist.
In short, Traditionalist Islam can be described as a discourse about traditional Islam.
Genealogically, this discourse draws upon many sources. Two important ones are (1) the oeuvre of
French metaphysician and Sufi René Guénon (1886-1951), also known as ʿAbd al-Wâḥid Yaḥyá; and (2)
the Shâdhilî school of Sufism born in North Africa (É. Geoffroy 2005, Maḥmûd 1968). The two most
influential North American scholars associated with Traditionalist Islam are Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and
Hamza Yusuf (Yuskaev 2013). However, this dissertation also introduces many scholars who are less
renowned than Nasr and Yusuf but participate in the same informal discourse community.
Traditionalist Islamic scholarship positions itself as part of a holistic tradition which rigorously
distinguishes itself from Islamic currents it presents as modernist or fundamentalist (Lumbard 2004a). 20
In this discourse, traditional Islam is to be found in the continuation of lineages through which sacred
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The notion of ideal types was developed by German social theorist Max Weber (1864-1920) as a tool to examine
historical trends by deliberately simplifying complex data.
20
Such categorizations, which are critically examined in Sections Three and Four, have specific connotations within
Traditionalist discourse. For instance, fundamentalism does not refer here to the current which emerged within
early twentieth century U.S. American Protestantism, in opposition to liberal theological trends, and from which a
politically militant form of American evangelicalism developed later in the century (Marsden 2006 [1980], Harding
2001). Rather, it encompasses many movements, often hostile to one another, from diverse religions, but which
seem to share certain characteristics, such as rigid exclusivism and scriptural literalism. In French, fundamentalism
in its broader usage is commonly referred to as intégrisme, a term which initially described a movement born
within French Catholicism in the late nineteenth century, in opposition to liberal currents within the Roman
Catholic Church (M. Geoffroy 2010). The tendency to apply terms initially coined within one’s own cultural,
religious, and linguistic context to a variety of other contexts is problematic. It can be both ethnocentric and
excessively vague. However, it is extremely difficult to describe broad trends, observable in many contexts,
without borrowing such terms. One always approaches the universal from a particular starting point. To
compensate for this lacuna, it can be useful to mention two or more terms used to describe the same reality and
examine their connotations.
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knowledge and blessings have been transmitted from the Prophet Muḥammad down to contemporary
Muslims. These include the family lineage embodied by descendants of the Prophet, considered vehicles
of his spiritual blessings. Furthermore, they include lineages of teachers and students in numerous
fields, such as law, Qur’anic recitation, and medicine, as well as lineages transmitting spiritual
knowledge and blessings, related to Sufism. Traditionalists are often emphatic about the importance of
Sufism among the sacred sciences. They argue in response to major condemnations of Sufism by
“puritanical reformism, what we now call ‘fundamentalism,’ and intellectual capitulation in the form of
almost every modern ‘ism’” (Lumbard 2004b, xiii). From the Traditionalist perspective, fundamentalism
is actually a thoroughly modern reaction to Eurocentric modernism; both are extremes on the same
ideological spectrum positioned in violent opposition to tradition (Nasr 2010, 1987b, Lumbard 2004a).21
When North American Traditionalist Islamic scholarship critiques modernity by drawing upon
Islam as a dynamic, diverse, and holistic tradition, it builds upon a transatlantic history of metaphysically
centred resistance to modernity/coloniality. Indeed, since the Portuguese first invaded the Moroccan
city of Ceuta (Sabta) in 1415, Northwest Africans have played a key role in anti-colonial resistance
(Cornell 1998, Julien 2011 [1978], Diouf 2013 [1998]). In this context, anti-colonial resistance involves
more than a military, political or economic fight—it is a struggle to protect the spiritual and cultural
traditions of Muslims, as well as other religious communities living with Muslims, such as Andalusian
Jews. Therefore, it is no coincidence that many North American scholars associated with Traditionalist
Islam are connected to the Northwest African intellectual and spiritual lineages discussed in Chapter
Eight.
This dissertation traces Traditionalist intellectual genealogies back to the fifteenth century, with
the intention of examining critiques of coloniality/modernity within contemporary North American
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According to another analysis, “Islamism” Western political and cultural hegemony and represents an effort to
decolonize the global order (Sayyid 2003 [1997]).
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Traditionalist Islamic scholarship, using a longue durée decolonial world-systems approach. Whereas
much has been written about Traditionalist critiques of modernity (Sedgwick 2004, Legenhausen 2002,
Laude 2010), no academic study has focused as this dissertation does on the anti-colonial and decolonial
aspects of these critiques. The main research question asks what a critique of the modern/colonial
world-system looks like from a North American Traditionalist Islamic perspective. Traditionalists such
as Nasr (1987b, 2010) and Yusuf (2018) portray modernity as the symptom of an unprecedently violent,
anti-metaphysical, and anti-traditional spiritual illness incubated in Western Europe and spread globally
through colonialism and imperialism. Younger scholars such as Joseph Lumbard (2004) concur. This
dissertation establishes that Traditionalist Islamic anti-modernism is situated in a long tradition of
Muslim anti-colonialism and decolonization in the modern/colonial world-system. It proposes two main
contentions: (1) traditional Islam still needs to be decolonized, and (2) Traditionalist Islamic
perspectives should contribute more to the global conversation on decolonization.

Decolonial World-Systems Analysis: Themes and Terminology
This research joins a conversation with a growing number of scholars engaged in decolonial
thought from a Muslim perspective. Grosfoguel is a pioneer in this field. He has built an epistemic bridge
between Muslim thought—though not explicitly Traditionalism—and the decolonial world-systems
analysis developed mostly by Latin American scholars working in North America. Since 2011, faculty
members from the Critical Muslim Studies summer school, in Granada, have become actively involved in
publications, including two journals22 and a book series.23 In January 2018, Farid Esack launched another
Critical Muslim Studies summer school, in Cape Town, South Africa (University of Johannesburg 2017).
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Islamophobia Studies Journal and ReOrient: The Journal of Critical Muslim Studies are both published in London,
England, by Pluto Journals. Their editorial and advisory boards include Granada faculty members such as Hatem
Bazian and Ramón Grosfoguel; and other prominent scholars of Islam such as Talal Asad and Jasmin Zine.
23
Grosfoguel is one of the three editors of the book series entitled Decolonial Studies/ Postcolonial Horizons,
published in London, England, by Pluto Press, a leading international publisher of politically radical, anti-capitalist
scholarship from the Left, by authors such as Noam Chomsky, Frantz Fanon and bell hooks.
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The two associate summer schools share many instructors, including Esack and Grosfoguel.
Interestingly, some of the North American Muslim scholars engaging with decolonial thought, like
Californian Zaid Shakir (2018, 2010), are drawing upon Traditionalist discourses. Lumbard (2016) has
argued for a decolonial approach to Qur’anic studies. From Moscow, Madina Tlostanova analyses
Eurasian histories from a decolonial perspective. And Hallaq (2018) has recently written a thorough
critique of modern knowledge, discussed in Chapter Ten, which draws considerably from both Guénon
and decolonial world-systems analysts such as Walter Mignolo and Enrique Dussel. However, Hallaq’s
monograph is not principally intended as a dialogue between Traditionalist Islam sources and decolonial
thought. In fact, such an extensive dialogue has yet to be undertaken. This presents an opportunity to
make a unique contribution to an emerging scholarly conversation on themes of mutual interest.
One such theme is fundamentalism. Despite their completely different intellectual genealogies,
scholars such as Lumbard and Grosfoguel both consider religious fundamentalism one of many deeply
problematic modern ideologies. Grosfoguel (2010) writes:
Those Third Worldist fundamentalisms (Afrocentric, Islamist, Indigenist, etc.) that emerge in
response to the hegemonic Eurocentric fundamentalism […] are subordinated forms of
Eurocentric fundamentalism insofar as they reproduce and leave intact the binary,
essentialist, racial hierarchies of Eurocentric fundamentalism. (31)
Yet Grosfoguel’s arrives at his conclusion not after consulting traditional Islamic sources but rather after
conducting a decolonial analysis of the modern world-system.
Decolonial world-systems analysis is a scholarly discourse critical of modernity as a Westerncentric colonial world-system. Latin American scholars working in North American universities, such as
Grosfoguel, have expanded on Wallerstein’s (1974, 2004) world-systems analysis by delving more deeply
into the epistemologies of Indigenous Americans, liberation theologians, black feminists and other
antisystemic thinkers from the North and South American peripheries (Grosfoguel and CervantesRodriguez 2002, Grosfoguel 2003, 2011). They situate the birth of modernity in 1492, with the defeat of
the last Muslim polity in Iberia, and the initial European expansion into America (Dussel 1995 [1992]). At
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that time, Western Europe was becoming the centre of a new world-system. According to these
scholars, interactions between the core and peripheries of this colonial system produced modernity. For
instance, the historically unprecedented transfer of wealth from the peripheries to the core, produced
by coerced labour in the peripheries, set in place the conditions in which Europeans and their
descendants outside Europe could envision and pursue a future of endless progress, understood as
emancipation from material and social constraints. Modern/colonial freedom needed a lot of free time
to develop.24 What began as basically an Atlantic world-system, eventually spread across the entire
globe militarily, politically, economically, culturally, and in a variety of other ways.
The ambitious and controversial contention that modernity is the product of early modern
colonialism ostensibly neglects the crucial role in this process of premodern internal developments in
Western European philosophy, art, and literature. It may also appear to reduce all of modernity to its
colonial dimension. Indeed, as discussed in Sections Three and Four, the critique of modernity proposed
by Guénon and his intellectual successors focuses more on such aspects as Italian humanism in the
thirteenth and fourteenth century. However, decolonial critique does not reject these aspects. Clearly,
the quarrel between the Ancients and Moderns, which raged in seventeenth-century France and
England, was a continuation of debates started at least as far back as the classical era (Black 1982). Yet,
in the last five or six centuries the word modern has acquired very different connotations than the late
Latin modernus and the Latin modo, which were much closer to the term contemporary. One of these
newer connotations is the association of what is modern with what is Western. This critically important
nuance can only be understood in relation to the events of 1492. Modernity in its modern sense is
inescapably colonial. However, it is not solely colonial. The beauty of Vivaldi’s Four Seasons or the
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Foucauldian analyses of the disciplinary society reveal that the alleged freedom of modern Western societies is
debatable, at least on the level of individual psychology. Although I concur that individuals in the core of the worldsystem are subject to immense coercion in the name of liberation, the focus of world-systems analysis is not on
individual psychology. It is safe to say that rather than being contradictory, these two types of analysis are simply
examining different levels of reality.
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efficiency of a smart phone cannot be reduced to colonial expressions of Western might. But the
modern/colonial context in which such manifestations occur, and which necessarily affects them in
some manner, is the focus of decolonial world-systems analysis. Dussel (1995 [1992]) writes:
Modernity began in certain medieval European cities under the impetus of the Renaissance
proponents of the Quatrocento.25 But modernity could only take off when sufficient
historical conditions were in place: 1492, its empirical spreading over the world, its
organization of colonies, and its usufruct over the pragmatic, economic lives of its victims.
Modernity came to birth in 1492—that is our thesis. (138)
One of the most important theoretical contributions of the Latin-American decolonial school is
the notion of “coloniality” (Spanish: colonialidad). Coined by Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano (1991,
2000) (1928-2018), this neologism designates the complex colonial power dynamics established by
modern Europe. These dynamics are still in place despite the end of most colonial administrations in the
mid-twentieth century. Thus, colonialism is the administrative system of foreign occupation which gave
birth to coloniality. This linguistic nuance provides a conceptual tool for decolonial scholars to observe
that, although many of the world’s peoples still live under direct colonial rule, we have now moved from
a regime of global colonialism to one of global coloniality (Grosfoguel 2011). Today’s regime remains a
totalitarian hegemonic system which supports political, economic and cultural domination of subaltern
peripheries (including racialized minorities in the West) by a Western colonial centre (including
Westernized elites outside the West). While the world-system appears as modern from the centre, it
appears as colonial from the periphery. This entails that modernity and coloniality are two sides of the
same coin. Decolonial thinkers insist that only adopting a peripheral perspective can reveal coloniality as
the underside of modernity (Dussel 1996, Mignolo 2011). However, the optimal position for a critical
understanding of modernity/coloniality is not on the peripheral extremes, but on the border of the core
and the periphery (Mignolo 2012 [2000], Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012). Too far from this border it
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In Italian, Quatrocento is short for millequattrocento (1400), and refers to the cultural transformations in Italy
from 1400 to 1499.
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becomes difficult to see the power dynamics between them. For instance, the harsh realities
experienced by enslaved Africans in America could often be difficult to fathom for West African villagers.
Similarly, many contemporary Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries have a less direct perspective
on core/periphery dynamics than those living in North America or Western Europe. I consider decolonial
theory a major epistemic shift which can open unexplored avenues for religious studies and Islamic
studies.26
Yet, the challenges presented by global coloniality are too great to be addressed from only one
subordinate location. Global responses are necessary which do not reproduce the false universalism of
Eurocentric thought. Such responses can only emerge through multiple conversations on the margins of
the modern/colonial core. Grosfoguel (2011) describes these conversations as follows:
It is from the geopolitics of knowledge of this relative exteriority, or margins, that “critical
decolonial thinking” emerges as a critique of modernity towards a pluriversal transmodern
world of multiple and diverse ethico-political projects in which a real horizontal dialogue
and communication could exist between all peoples of the world. (28)
Many of the terms contained in this theoretically dense passage are technical terms developed by
decolonial analysts. For instance, the notion of transmodernity was developed by Dussel (1995 [1992])
as a utopian27 project to surpass—not destroy—modernity:
In transmodernity, the alterity, coessential to modernity, now receives recognition as an
equal. Modernity will come into its fullness not by passing from its potency to its act, but by
surpassing itself through a corealization with its once negated alterity and through a
process of mutual, creative fecundation. The transmodern project achieves with modernity
what it [modernity] could not achieve by itself—a corealization of solidarity, which is
analectic, analogic, syncretic, hybrid, and mestizo, and which bonds center to periphery,
woman to man, race to race, ethnic group to ethnic group, class to class, humanity to earth,
and occidental to Third World cultures. […] This subsumption intends neither a premodern
project, nor a folkloric affirmation of the past, nor the antimodern project of conservatives,
26

I have used this approach in previous publications (Sparkes 2013, 2015, 2016).
By definition, utopian projects are aspirational ideals. For instance, working towards a “real horizontal dialogue”
free of power dynamics may be useful even if the result falls short of the ideal. However, as discussed in Sections
Three and Four, Traditionalist Islamic discourse tends to present utopianism as one of the most devastating
aspects of modernity. These different attitudes towards utopianism represent one theme Traditionalistic Islamic
scholars and decolonial world-systems analysts could examine during the inter-epistemic and pluriversal
conversation proposed in Chapter Ten.
27
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rightists, Nazis, fascists, or populists. Nor does it envision a postmodern project negating
modernity and all rationality only to topple into nihilist irrationalism. This transmodern
project really subsumes modernity's rational emancipative character and its negated
alterity even as it rejects modernity's mythic character and its irrational exculpation of self
and inculpation of its victims. (138)28
Another key concept alluded to in the above passage by Grosfoguel is “pluriversality” (Mignolo
2012 [2000]), which can be described as a decolonial middle way between exclusive universalism, such
as Eurocentric science or Islamic fundamentalism, and the postmodern attack on rationality. It is a call
for epistemic pluralism, in which people drawing upon diverse types of rationality communicate and
work towards a future beyond Western-centric modernity. Dussel (1995 [1992]) describes the
conditions for a decolonial conversation:
Such a dialogue endeavors to construct not an abstract universality, but an analogic and
concrete world in which all cultures, philosophies, and theologies will make their
contribution toward a future, pluralist humanity […] Such a theory should not (1) fall into
the facile optimism of rationalist, abstract universalism that would conflate universality
with Eurocentrism and modernizing developmentalism, as the Frankfurt School is inclined
to do; nor should it (2) lapse into the irrationality, incommunicability, or
incommensurability of discourses that are typical of many postmoderns. The philosophy of
liberation affirms that rationality can establish a dialogue with the reason of the Other, as
an alterative reason. (132)
This dissertation contributes one voice to this pluriversal conversation, to which Chapter Ten is entirely
devoted. In fact, several decolonial conversations are weaved throughout all the sections and chapters,
and I purposely allow them space by providing long quotes by numerous scholars. Mine is only one of
many voices which need to be heard, and much of my work is to make connections among discourses.
Naturally, drawing simultaneously upon Traditionalist Islam and decolonial world-systems
analysis is challenging because of their considerable differences; yet, the two discourses propose
complementary critiques of coloniality/modernity. One challenge is to put these discourses into

28

The strongly leftist bent of this passage is indicative of another potential obstacle for a conversation between
decolonial world-systems analysis and Traditionalist Islam: contrasting understandings of conservatism and
progressivism. This is related to the differences regarding utopianism, mentioned in the previous footnote. As
discussed in Section Four, the very binary of Left and Right needs to be decolonized.

22

conversation without taking on the voice of a modern/colonial academic authority, qualified to
objectively compare and evaluate both positions. The aim is to be part of the conversation, not to
manage it. Moreover, both discourses are produced in the context of the same “colonial matrix of
power” and one should not consider them “delimited by their local histories and ignore that they are
interconnected by global designs” (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012, 11). Another challenge is to avoid
reducing one discourse to how it might be conceptualized by the other—for instance considering
Traditionalist Islamic discourse only as a source of critique towards modernity/coloniality, or decolonial
world-systems analysis solely as a utopian political project.
To discover their complementarity, it is important to consider both discourses on their own
terms as well as dialogically. Decolonial world-systems analysts offer broad and systemic critiques,
infused with a deep concern for social justice. Traditionalist Islamic scholarship draws upon a unique
heritage of spirituality and compassion. As noted by Abderrahman Beggar (2016), the Arabic word for
compassion, raḥma, is related to the word for uterus, raḥm, whereas the latin word compassio,
signifying ‘’suffering with,’’ refers to an entirely different universe of meaning (37). Within the Islamic
tradition, compassion involves avoiding or constructively channeling anger even in situations of conflict.
In scholarly discourse, it entails giving the best possible interpretation to the words of others and always
remaining courteous. Discussion is to be sought rather than debate. I contend that thinkers from both
currents can benefit from each other. While critical theorists seeking justice in the face of systemic
oppression could learn from Traditionalist Islamic notions of compassion towards rivals, Traditionalist
Muslims could sharpen their analyses of political power dynamics. For instance, the term coloniality
concisely articulates concepts which are presented more diffusely in Traditionalist texts.
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Summary of Sections and Chapters
In North America—which of course includes the Caribbean and Central America—Muslim
resistance to colonial modernity has taken place in conversation with Indigenous peoples as well as
descendants of enslaved Africans (many of whom were Muslim) and other racialized minorities, in a
colonial context dominated by European settlers. Each of these marginalized communities was affected
in unique ways by colonialism. Sections One to Three explore the genealogies of the unique positionality
of Muslims. Three important contentions are progressively established in these sections: (1) that in the
premodern/precolonial period, a specific type of traditional Islam developed in the Western
Islamicate; (2) that the disruption and colonization of traditional Islam by European powers was a
constitutive aspect of the early modern/colonial world-system; and (3) that traditionalism developed
as a response to this disruption. These contentions are based on a longue durée historical analysis
(Braudel 1958) that sets the context for the fourth and final section, which argues that Traditionalist
Islamic scholarship in North America can contribute significantly to the unfinished process of
decolonization of both traditional Islam and the broader modern/colonial world-system. Only in the
fourth section are the main contentions of this dissertation thoroughly elaborated. Building up towards
the main arguments in this manner may seem unnecessarily slow and convoluted; however, both
Traditionalist Islamic and decolonial scholarship present metanarratives which can only be appreciated
when examining the big picture of global history over the past several centuries. The theoretical
implications of the first sections only clearly emerge once a long-term historical process in three phases
has been described. This process involves three stages: tradition, disruption, and traditionalism.
Hopefully, decolonization is the fourth stage. Tradition is understood as complex, dynamic and holistic;
disruption as colonial and modern; and traditionalism as a response to modernity/coloniality.
Sections One to Three follow a periodization developed here uniquely for the purpose of
analysing the modern/colonial world-system from the perspective of North American Muslims. For
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centuries, Muslims came to North America primarily by crossing—or being forcefully taken across—the
Atlantic from Africa, and were the inheritors of traditional ways of being, knowing, and behaving
developed in the Western Islamic world. There is some debate surrounding periodization of the
modern/colonial world-system. Like most decolonial theorists, I situate the birth of this system in or
around 1492. Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008b, 363, 366, 382) suggests that the secular ideology of the
second phase of modernity only became dominant after 1789, with the French Revolution, although it
had been developing since at least the seventeenth century. However, I follow Grosfoguel (2003, 23) in
situating the start of the second phase of modernity/coloniality in or around 1650. But while he extends
this second phase until 1945, I insert a third phase from 1865 to 1965.29 Since the focus here is on North
American Muslims, 1865 can be given as the symbolic start of the third phase, with the end of the U.S.
American Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which officially
abolished slavery throughout the nation. During this phase, every region of the globe became integrated
into the Eurocentric world-system. 1965 symbolically opens the fourth phase with the signing of the
American Immigration and Naturalization Act, which opened the way for massive immigration from nonEuropean countries, including Mexico and the Caribbean.30 This was a significant event in the transition
of the world-system from a regime of global colonialism to one of global coloniality (Quijano 1991,
Grosfoguel 2011). The fourth phase is probably still ongoing, but in a few more years it may be possible
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The first and second phase of modernity have also been periodized as the “first wave” of global imperialism,
described as “the Age of Sail.” My third phase corresponds to the “second wave” of this alternate periodization,
which is the “Age of Steam,” prompted by the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, and symbolized by the steam engine (Nester 2010, 27).
30
Similar immigration policies were being adopted elsewhere in the core of the world-system during the same
decade. For example, Canada established the “point system” in 1967, which assessed immigrants applying as
skilled workers and professionals according to their abilities and qualifications, rather than their race. In 1965, the
Canadian flag was changed, abandoning the Red Ensign with the Union Jack, and replacing the cross with a maple
leaf, in an effort to represent Canada as ethnically and religiously inclusive. In 1967, during the Centennial
Celebrations of Canadian Confederation, and the Universal and World Exhibition in Montreal, commonly known as
Expo 67, the Canadian government made a concerted effort to present Canada as an inclusive and pluralistic,
rather than Christian and white society (Miedema 2005). And multiculturalism was a major policy priority for Pierre
Elliot Trudeau (1919-2000), who was elected Prime Minister of Canada in 1968.
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to have enough distance to argue for a fifth phase beginning with the end of the Cold War in 1991, or
the start of the Global War on Terror in 2001.
However, to understand the deeply disruptive emergence of the modern/colonial world-system
from the perspective of Muslims, and their diverse forms of resistance to this process, it is first
necessary to consider the traditions they have been fighting to preserve. This requires exploring various
Muslim understandings of beauty and goodness to appreciate the qualitative value of these evolving
traditions. Section One of this dissertation, entitled “Tradition: Muslim Ways of Being, Knowing, and
Behaving in the Premodern Western Islamic World (682 to 1415),” is devoted to the Western Islamic
tradition developed in Iberia and Northwest Africa long before the modern/colonial era. Chapter One
traces the historical emergence of this tradition after Muslims reached the Atlantic in the seventh
century. Several conflicting Islamic currents gradually gave way in the eleventh century to a dominant
regional tradition which converged around four central currents: (1) veneration of the Prophet
Muḥammad’s descendants (sharifism); (2) Mâlikî jurisprudence (fiqh); (3) Ash‘arî theological doctrine
(‘aqîda); and (4) Junaydî Sufism (taṣawwuf). Multiple sciences, occupations, behaviours, and ways of
being organized themselves as flows, currents, and countercurrents in relation to these four central
currents. Furthermore, the Western Islamic tradition, with all its internal divergences and confluences,
represented a unique subsection of an even broader pan-Islamic tradition whose adherents generally
self-identify as Sunni. Chapter Two concludes Section One with a transdisciplinary evocation of the
qualitative and experiential aspects of the Western Islamic tradition. It discusses distinct understandings
of beauty and well-being which emerged within this tradition and underlie diverse approaches to art,
trade, hygiene, eroticism and endless other domains including the technologies of self-discipline aimed
at spiritual enlightenment proposed by Sufis.
Section Two, entitled “Disruption: Modern/Colonial Projects and Muslim Resistance in the
Atlantic World (1415 to 1865),” traces the emergence of the modern/colonial world-system. Chapter
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Three opens this section by examining the gestation period preceding the symbolic birth of this system
in 1492. It discusses the rise of Catholic Portugal and Spain as imperial powers fighting Muslims. AntiMuslim hatred was a pivotal force in the transition from medieval to early modern Europe. In 1415, the
Portuguese captured the Moroccan city republic of Sabta, thereby launching the African crusade
supported by all Catholic Europe. Iberian expansionism had already begun a century earlier in the
Canary Islands, where the Spanish would eventually defeat other Western European rivals in conquering
and exterminating the Indigenous populations. The Portuguese conquered coastal towns in Northwest
Africa and gradually opened new trade routes to Asia by sailing down the West African coast.
Meanwhile, the Spanish Catholics focused on eliminating Islam and Judaism from their lands. They
utilized the Inquisition to persecute Catholics they suspected of secretly adhering to Islam or Judaism,
and they fought to conquer Granada, led by the last Muslim dynasty in Iberia. Only after the conquest of
Granada in 1492 did they allow Columbus to sail in their name across the Atlantic. However, as
discussed in Chapter Four, Muslims refused defeat throughout these events.
Chapter Four analyses the first phase of the modern/colonial system. Between 1492 and 1650,
Muslims fought back militarily on both shores of the Gibraltar Strait, even after Spain expelled all
Muslims and Jews as well as their descendants converted to Catholicism. Andalusian exiles in North
Africa attacked Spanish and Portuguese ships and raided their shores to capture and enslave Catholic
civilians. Some of these captives converted to Islam and even joined Muslim naval forces, thereby
earning the reputation of renegades and pirates in their homelands. Nevertheless, the Atlantic world
dominated by Western Europe slowly challenged the Mediterranean world, in terms of political and
economic might. The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, most of which was still ruled by Muslims,
was progressively forced into a peripheral position in relation to Atlantic European powers. Conquests in
America gave Western European powers a comparative advantage against the Ottomans, and other
Muslim dynasties. African Muslims were captured, enslaved, and to be sent to America. Many of them
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perished in the European genocides against Muslims, Jews, non-Muslim Africans, Indigenous Americans,
European women accused of sorcery, and European Roma. Muslim identity was racialized as race
became the organizing identity in the modern/colonial system, around which were constructed other
identities such as gender, class, and religion. Rather than people with the wrong religion, Muslims were
constructed as essentially inferior to white European Christians. Yet, Muslims were able to avoid the
complete annihilation of their traditional ways of being, knowing, and behaving. Compared to other
peripheralized peoples, such as the Guanches or many Indigenous American nations, certain factors
helped Muslims survive. Muslims had evolved alongside Christians for centuries. In the early
modern/colonial era, they disposed of similar military technology and were mostly immune to the same
diseases.
From the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, which I consider the second phase
of the modern/colonial world-system, the Muslim Atlantic faced excessively difficult conditions. Chapter
Five traces how Northwest European powers such as England, France, and the Netherlands, replaced
Portugal and Spain at the core of the world-system, relegating Southern Europe to the semi-periphery.
But Muslims in the region never surrendered. In the Maghrib, the naval war described by Europeans as
Barbary piracy continued until the early nineteenth century. West African Muslims reorganized their
societies in response to the devastating transatlantic slave trade, through a series of Islamic revolutions
whose fighters occasionally ended up in the Americas. Educated and trained in the traditional Islamic
sciences of their homelands, many African-born Muslims organized revolts, revolutions, and other
efforts to resists assimilation into Euro-American Christian society. In the Muslim Atlantic, the underside
of European modernity was much more obvious than it was for most Muslims further east, who did not
face a massive colonial effort by Europeans until the nineteenth century. Although many of their coreligionists marveled at European achievements in a variety of fields, Muslims in the Atlantic were
directly confronted with the idolatrous ego of the white man and knew that genocide and industrialized
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slavery were major factors in the seemingly unstoppable rise of Europe on a global scale. While Muslim
elites in Asia devised plans to catch up with the West, often through policies of controlled
Westernization, the Muslim Atlantic was fighting to survive genocide, especially in the Americas. North
American Traditionalist Islamic discourse inscribes itself in a distinct heritage of critical suspicion
towards Eurocentric modernity, born from centuries of anti-genocidal resistance.
In fact, this long-drawn struggle to survive became increasingly exhausting for Atlantic Muslims
during what I describe as the third phase of the modern/colonial world-system. Section Three,
“Traditionalism: Atlantic Muslim Approaches to Tradition in the Global Colonial Age (Since 1865),”
begins with an examination of a new and triumphant global wave of European colonialism and
imperialism, in Chapter Six. While Africa, Asia, and the Pacific world attempted to resist an onslaught of
Western colonial might, European settlers in the Americas politically seceded from their ancient
homelands and pursued their colonial projects independently. During the same period, the abolition of
the transatlantic slave trade had the unintended effect of breaking the ties between Africans on each
side of the Atlantic. This resulted in a religious, cultural and epistemic holocaust during which Africans
and their descendants in the Americas had enormous difficulty perpetuating traditions which had
previously been revivified by the constant arrival of new enslaved Africans. As African diasporic culture
became black culture, a Black Muslim identity emerged in North America. Eurasian Muslims who
migrated to North America during this period, fleeing the economic and political difficulties of their
homelands, generally avoided Black Muslims. Their priority was to satisfy the demands of the dominant
white culture and obtain citizenship. Some working-class whites of Western European origin, living
alongside immigrant Muslims, converted to Islam. And certain sectors of the middle-and-upper-class
elites began to view Islam as a captivating exotic religion. Others saw Sufism as a universal spirituality of
Indo-European origin, which had developed against rather than within what they perceived as the
essentially legalistic framework of traditional Islam. Such Orientalist depictions of Sufism were often
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internalized by Muslim colonial subjects in Eurasia, where both Muslim religious revivalists and
Westernized modernists tended to agree that Sufis were largely responsible for destroying Islamic
civilization from within and predisposing it to being colonized. Despite centuries of engagement in anticolonial struggles and the spread of Islam in places such as North Africa, Sufis became increasingly
marginalized in their homelands. Some weakened Sufi institutions were even co-opted by the colonial
and eventually postcolonial state.
However, just as modernity seemed most triumphant, certain sectors of society across the
Atlantic world became somewhat nostalgic for tradition and discontented with modernity. Muslims and
non-Muslims began to explicitly conceptualize tradition in opposition to modernity. One key figure in
the development of Traditionalism as a distinct intellectual current in the West is Guénon, the French
Muslim and Sufi whose oeuvre is discussed in Chapter Seven. Inspired by diverse intellectual and
spiritual currents, he mounted a uniquely devastating critique of modernity and a reaffirmation of nonWestern traditions. These currents included European Perennialism and anti-modernism as well as
North African traditional Islam and anti-colonialism. By drawing simultaneously upon several epistemic
traditions Guénon proposed formulations which inevitably seem unconventional and even unacceptable
to certain representatives of these traditions, including many Islamic scholars and Sufis. Yet, his interepistemic discourse has considerable decolonial potential and has inspired many critics of the current
world-system. Moreover, after embracing Islam he strictly followed the practices taught to him by
Muslims. Guénon was committed to the spiritual path founded by the Moroccan Sufi Shâdhilî, a major
figure in the medieval Western Islamic tradition. Despite Guénon’s aversion to politics, his work
condemns European colonialism and imperialism. While Guénon’s influence is not restricted to Muslims,
many of his enthusiasts are attached to African Sufi orders, such as those of the Shadhilî way, and
adhere to Mâlikî jurisprudence and Ash‘arî theology. Traditionalist Islamic discourse in North America
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and elsewhere is often subtly—at times even unwittingly—influenced by Guénon’s formulations of
tradition and critiques of modernity, although many Traditionalists reject his Perennialism.
Chapter Eight discussed the Traditionalist Islamic discourse deeply influenced by Northwest
African Islamic currents and inspired by Guénonian formulations. This discourse was introduced to North
America in the fourth and most recent phase of the modern/colonial world-system, begun in the mid1960s. At first, it appealed mostly to middle-and-upper-class whites, but over time it has come to
influence a much more diverse community, including scholars who reject Perennialism or are more
prone to sociopolitical activism than Guénon and his early successors. Moreover, this discourse is both
perpetuated and adapted by a distinct but loosely defined community of Muslims connected to
transnational Traditionalist networks. In the second half of the twentieth century, this emergent
community tended to be discreet, allowing other currents to dominate public discourse about Islam and
major Muslim institutions in North America. During the Cold War, Muslims and other peripheralized
peoples were utilized by the United States and the Soviet Union in a series of horrific proxy wars.
Throughout this period, there were many Muslims among the migrants who fled the continuing
vicissitudes of life in nation-states still peripheralized in the world-system despite nominal political
independence. Migrants sought safety in the comparatively calm and prosperous core of the worldsystem, in places such as the United States and Canada. Politically, currents loosely identifiable as
fundamentalist or progressive tended to dominate Muslim societies in this polarized context, the latter
being further divided into socialist and capitalist tendencies. Despite their ostensible opposition, these
currents both tend to regard traditional Islam as antiquated superstition. After 9/11, proponents of
Traditionalist Islam have become increasingly vocal and socially active in defending their understanding
of orthodoxy against the challenges of Wahhâbî influenced Salafism, but also of Progressive Islam.
Refusing Islamophobic depictions which conflate Islam with militant Salafism, as well as calls to basically
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Westernize Islam under the guise of progress, several advocates of traditional Islam have risen to
prominent positions in North American Muslim institutions.
The longue durée analysis of the first three sections provides the framework within which to
understand the theoretical contribution of the intertextual analysis presented in Section Four,
“Decolonization: Traditionalist Islam and Countering Coloniality.” This last section argues that Muslims
must engage in two types of decolonial conversation: an internal one and an inter-epistemic one which
engages other communities. And it argues that Traditionalist Islamic discourse can contribute positively
to both types of conversation. Chapter Nine discusses how people need to connect with their own
community and its traditions if they are to interact positively and constructively with other
communities. Intra-communal conversations are necessary for fragilized communities in the periphery
of the world-system to heal. Muslims of extremely diverse origins are engaged in such delicate
discussions in North American societies where it is generally easier to debate controversial issues than in
most Muslim-majority societies. I observe intertextual connections among various discussions about
modernity, coloniality, tradition, and Islam. While I do critically engage these texts, I consciously
prioritize the positions of diverse established scholars participating in Traditionalist Islamic discourse—
although not necessarily identified by it. So far, it is clear that many Muslim scholars consider Western
influence on every aspect of Muslim life to be a modern/colonial disruption with genocidal implications.
And they think traditional Islamic ways of being, knowing, and behaving require urgent decolonization.
In Chapter Nine, I also propose some new terminological and conceptual tools to facilitate the
internal Muslim conversation on decolonization. For instance, I describe tradition as an inspired
dynamic flow from the past into the present and future. This flow is composed of multiple internal
flows and counterflows. Today, going with the flow can fundamentally challenge modern/colonial ways
of interacting among humans as well as towards non-human life forms. I name this process Traditionalist
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Islamic decolonization.31 African Islam has been the main historical source of this flow in North America.
And since Muslim Atlantic currents overlap significantly with black Atlantic ones, the broader African
and African diasporic intellectual heritage should play a crucial decolonial role for North American
Muslims. It provides an alternate perspective from which to develop forms of critical engagement with
society which transcend the Eurocentric divide between Left and Right. But traditional flows from
Eurasia also circulate in North American Islam. Furthermore, North Americans are actively contributing
to an emergent global Traditionalist Islamic discourse.
Chapter Ten concludes Section Four with a discussion about how Traditionalist Islam can
contribute to inter-epistemic decolonial conversations. Such conversations are at an embryonic stage,
even less advanced than the emerging intra-Islamic decolonial conversations discussed in Chapter Nine.
Consequently, my approach is even more prudent and exploratory. I discuss the conditions for a
successful conversation and make intertextual connections between diverse discourses which have
evolved separately but present promising points of convergence. The Islamic tradition offers a rich
corpus of texts concerned with the etiquettes of engagement which facilitate productive communication
by providing guidelines about who should speak, how, about what, and in which circumstances.
Contemporary Islamic scholars in North America draw from this historical corpus in arguing that those
who are knowledgeable of their tradition and demonstrate a certain level of spiritual self-discipline,
compassion, wisdom, and interpersonal skills are best suited to represent Muslims. In turn, I argue that
such Muslims, proficient in traditional Islamic etiquette can best contribute to and benefit from global
decolonial conversations. It is also important to seriously reflect about priorities when it comes to
choosing which topics should be discussed and with whom. For instance, discussions between Muslims
and secular humanists steeped in Western theoretical frameworks may be useful, but endless
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The term decolonialization might be better suited to express the decolonial process which continues beyond the
political independence of a people within the global nation-state system, but it is rather awkward. Decolonization
is more idiomatic and can very well express a process which is not limited to acquiring nation-state status.

33

core/periphery dialogues can be counterproductive when much-needed conversations among the
epistemic peripheries are generally neglected. Since evidence suggests that most scholars committed to
Western approaches to reality are unwilling to abandon their epistemic privilege and address experts
from other intellectual traditions as equals, I argue that decolonial peripheralized scholars should
prioritize conversations on the peripheries.
So much groundwork needs to be done for decolonial conversations to mature and have a
significant impact on society. Both secularism and dialogue need to be decolonized. Rather than a
neutral position from which to study and manage various subordinate viewpoints, ranging from religion
to magic, secularism needs to be understood as one of many approaches to reality. Islam is another.
Moreover, any given individual might draw upon secular, Islamic or any number of approaches to reality
at different times. Inter-epistemic dialogues begin internally. For these dialogues to become decolonial,
their colonial premises must be revealed and transformed. Only then can people discuss decolonization
in a productive, sincere, respectful, empathetic, and open manner. Muslims should be talking more to
people such as Buddhist monks and Anishnawbe elders. They should be developing ways to discuss
shared decolonial aspirations without being overwhelmed by the world’s enormously diverse
approaches to reality. Difference should be acknowledged but not exaggerated. Enough similarities exist
between most people to work sincerely on shared goals. Pluriversality as a concept can be extremely
useful when forming decolonial coalitions, alliances, and perhaps friendships through inter-epistemic
conversations. One such conversation to which this dissertation seeks to make a significant contribution
is the emergent dialogue between Traditionalist Islam and decolonial world-systems analysis. While this
dialogue traverses the entire dissertation, its theoretical implications are more explicitly and thoroughlty
discussed in the final pages of Chapter Ten. After the conclusion, there are also two appendixes. The
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first provides the complete Charter of Transdisciplinarity (Morin, Nicolescu and de Freitas 1994) 32, a
foundational theoretical source for this dissertation, and the second presents biographical notes for
scholars from the contemporary period whose names are mentioned in the body of the text—not those
only mentioned in citations and footnotes. The biography of historical figures is included in the body of
the dissertation and in footnotes.

Theoretical Framework
Although I draw considerably on my training in the history of religion, this dissertation has
theoretical aims. By engaging simultaneously with decolonial world-systems analysis and Traditionalist
Islam, and by building on Cornell’s concept of “critical traditionalism,” it proposes a new theoretical
framework which can be called “Traditionalist Islamic decolonial world-systems analysis,” or more
concisely “Traditionalist Islamic decolonization.” Actually, this approach might also be called “decolonial
Islamic traditionalism,” since it is a specific application of Traditionalist Islamic thought. However, the
purpose here is not only to engage in an internal dialogue with Muslims, but to make a broader
contribution to decolonial thought. In any case, ideally a conversation between Traditionalist Islam and
decolonial world-systems analysis should simultaneously decolonize traditional Islam, traditionalize
decolonial Muslim thought, and participate in the partial Islamification33 of decolonial thought. What
does it mean to decolonize traditional Islam and traditionalize decolonial Muslim thought? If we take
seriously the Traditionalist contention that traditional Islam faces an existential crisis in the
modern/colonial period, it follows that Muslims need to draw upon the resources of their tradition to
re-establish dynamic flows between past, present and future and respond to the spiritual, epistemic and
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In 1994, the Charter of Transdisciplinarity was adopted at the First World Congress on Transdisciplinarity, held in
Convento da Arrábida, Portugal. The editorial committee was composed of Romanian theoretical physicist Basarab
Nicolescu, Portuguese artist Lima de Freitas, and French philosopher and sociologist Edgar Morin. Nicolescu has
become the prominent figure in the development of transdisciplinary theory.
33
Islamification is used here in its very basic and general sense of “making Islamic.” This in no way implies an
endorsement of any specific sociopolitical project which may utilize terms such as Islamification or Islamization.
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cultural dimensions of coloniality, not just the political and economic ones. As for the partial
Islamification of decolonial thought, I am referring to the inclusion of Islamic perspectives in the interepistemic decolonial conversation, and not a total Islamification, which would mean taking over the
conversation.
Three types of textual sources provide the corpus for this dissertation: (1) primary decolonial
and Traditionalist Islamic sources from North America; (2) secondary sources related to these topics;
and (3) indirectly related primary and secondary sources (e.g. from outside North America, from other
time periods, or of broader theoretical scope). Actually, most of the primary sources are just as scholarly
as the secondary ones. They are simply being utilized in a specific way here. The secondary sources
serve to examine Traditionalist Islam and decolonial theory from an outside academic perspective,
although the insider/outsider dichotomy is problematic, and many works do not fall neatly into either
category. Secondary sources also serve to discuss broad themes, such as Sufism, race, class, and gender,
as well as sociohistorical contexts, such as Islam in the United States and Canada.
The texts surveyed for decolonial theory revolve around Grosfoguel. He represents a useful
starting point for four reasons. First, he offers a clear and concise summary of decolonial theory
(Grosfoguel 2011). Second, some of his writings can serve as models to examine the position of North
American Muslims in the global world-system from a decolonial perspective. His work on Puerto Ricans
living in Western metropolises (Grosfoguel 2003) is an obvious example, but his theoretical work on
migration, ethnicity, and race is also pertinent (Grosfoguel 2004, Cordero-Guzmán, Smith and
Grosfoguel 2001, Cervantes-Rodríguez, Grosfoguel and Mielants 2008, Grosfoguel, Oso and Christou
2015). These are also good examples of writings which serve both as primary and secondary sources,
with no clear boundary in between. But this is not unusual for politically engaged scholarship in
academic disciplines like ethnic studies. Third, Grosfoguel (2013) has applied decolonial theory to the
study of Islam and Muslims. He has discussed the historical development of Islamophobia in the
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modern/colonial world-system, in relation to other types of racism as well as sexism, with a focus on the
early-modern period. Moreover, he has analysed specific instances of epistemic Islamophobia in the
modern social sciences and Western society at large (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006, R. Grosfoguel
2010). Grosfoguel’s influence on critical Muslim thought leads me to the fourth reason he is a central
source: his citations and bibliography have guided me to discover other influential thinkers related to
North American decolonial theory. Many of these thinkers are not considered decolonial theorists but
have either strongly influenced decolonial theory or proposed valuable analyses of colonial power
dynamics.
Since Grosfoguel represents my starting point, it is necessary to first consider the pioneering
work of his mentor Wallerstein (1974, 2004), whose methodology is based on three principles:
1. A focus on world-systems rather than states as units of analysis
2. A longue durée approach to history
3. A unidisciplinary approach
Whereas the first two components involve taking a big-picture view of history and human geography,
the unidisciplinary approach radically attacks the modern disciplines developed in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries to answer the needs of Western imperialism and colonialism. Suspicious
of specialization, Wallerstein’s approach is somewhat eclectic. However, he only suggests utilizing the
appropriate methodological tools to answer a given research problem. This may require drawing from a
few or many disciplines depending on the problem. For instance, to understand the rise of the early
modern Atlantic world-system, one might consider theological, philosophical, political, historical, and
economic data as interdependent aspects of the same research.
Grosfoguel (2011) modifies Wallerstein’s framework in two significant ways. First, he privileges
peripheral viewpoints on the modern/colonial world-system and encourages pluriversal conversations
on the periphery. Second, he substitutes the unidisciplinary approach with a transdisciplinary one which
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seeks to move beyond simply juxtaposing findings from various disciplines. Instead, these findings are
confronted with the intent of discovering elements that traverse or transcend each one. Moreover,
literature, art, mysticism, and other non-academic fields are considered sources of knowledge. The
theoretical foundations of this approach are clearly defined in the Charter of Transdisiplinarity (see
Appendix One) and developed by scholars from diverse nationalities and fields (Nicolescu 2008).
Applying a transdisciplinary approach has had considerable methodological implications for this
dissertation. It has encouraged me to consider multiple sources of knowledge on their own epistemic
terms and avoid reducing aesthetic or metaphysical expressions to rational interpretive frameworks.
And it has affected my writing style. Although I present evidence-based rational arguments throughout
the text, using a generally formal tone, I also consider doses of self-reflexivity, storytelling, lyricism,
colloquial language, and wit conducive to a fuller more multidimensional comprehension of the subject
matter. Knowledge is not reducible to logical argumentation.
Primary sources on Traditionalist Islam in North America can broadly be divided into Perennialist
and non-Perennialist authors, with the caveat that there is a lot of overlap between the two.
Perennialism can summarily be defined as a spiritual and intellectual current which asserts a
transcendental unity of all the world’s major spiritual traditions. However, its Traditionalist proponents,
such as Nasr, reject syncretism, arguing that it is necessary to follow one orthodox path to fully
apprehend this transcendent reality in an experiential, supra-rational, even mystical way. Although the
specific discourse community examined here emerged in Western Europe, its exponents observe
Perennialist dimensions in all the world’s great civilizations, which can explain many similarities across
time and space. This Perennialist discourse has influenced North American scholars such as Yusuf, who
are not associated with Perennialism, but offer similar critiques of modernity (Mathiesen 2013).
Furthermore, Traditionalist Islamic scholarship is produced within transnational scholarly and religious
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networks. North American sources need to be understood in relation to other primary sources,
particularly from Western Europe and Northwestern Africa.
There is some secondary literature about Traditionalist Islam. Mark Sedgwick (2004, 2005) has
done extensive research on Perennialist Traditionalism, presenting it as a secretive but significant
Western intellectual current.34 His historical discussion of the Muslim strand within Traditionalism is
especially relevant to this dissertation. Patrick Laude (2010) has written about Traditionalist Islam from a
Perennialist perspective which situates his work as both a primary and secondary source. Kasper
Mathiesen (2013)35 offers a fascinating discussion of Traditional Islam—which he distinguishes from
Traditionalist islam—in the Anglo-American context.36 In the United States, Traditionalist Islam is
receiving some academic attention, especially in its non-Perennialist, Sunni, and pro-Sufi form (Korb
2013, Yuskaev 2013, Haddad 2011, 62, GhaneaBassiri 2010, 301-302).
For broader contextualization, many secondary sources have been consulted, such as texts on
Sufism (Sharify-Funk, Dickson and Xavier 2018, Jallâb 2017, al-Ashhab 2015), U.S. American Islam
(Hammer and Safi 2013, GhaneaBassiri 2010), Canadian Islam (Zine 2012, Helly 2004), and Northwest
African Islam (Kane 2016, Cornell 1998, Ḥarakât 2017). Another relevant secondary source for this
project is a monograph written by Ali Hassan Zaidi (2011), which explores an intellectual dialogue
between Muslim and Western thought in relation to modernity and the human sciences. His discussion
of Nasr is especially pertinent here. Moreover, both his theoretical discussion of inter-epistemic
dialogue and the way he approaches his case studies serve as a model for my own attempt to engage in
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He observes that René Guénon’s ideas have influenced intellectuals from many walks of life, including fascists
(e.g. Julius Evola, 1898-1974), surrealists (e.g. André Breton, 1896-1966), British royals (e.g. Prince Charles) and
academics (e.g. Mircea Eliade, 1907-1986).
35
Mathiesen (2013, 196) acknowledges how extensive discussions with Sedgwick have contributed to his
understanding of Traditional Islam.
36
Mathiesen, categorizes “Traditional Islam” as a “denomination” which is clearly distinct from “Perennialism.”
However, it seems he is overstating his case. To my knowledge, none of the proponents of “Traditional Islam” in
the West identify as members of a “new denomination.”
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a dialogical and inter-epistemic critique of modernity. However, I focus on decolonial conversations on
the peripheries of the modern/colonial world-system, rather than dialogue between Islam and the West.

Method and Fieldwork
Building on Grosfoguel and transdisciplinary theorists, this dissertation presents a
transdisciplinary, cross-textual analysis of oral and written Traditionalist Islamic texts, including
treatises, articles, prayers, speeches, blogs and social media. In Sections One to Three, the deep
historical genealogies of these texts are explored using a decolonial world-systems framework. Section
Four analyses these texts from a variety of perspectives, including sociology, history, and ethnic studies.
Moreover, it situates the main North American corpus in relation to other relevant texts from Western
Europe and Northwest Africa.
To validate my findings, and fine-tune my conclusions, I contacted twelve scholars whose work
is related to North American Traditionalist Islam, in order to request a formal interview. These
interviews were intended as supplementary oral texts. They represented opportunities to discuss
tradition, Islam, modernity, and coloniality with established experts. I followed the general guidelines
for active interviewing, a sociological approach geared towards establishing an atmosphere of trust for a
conversation about a specific topic, but without following a strict format of set questions (Holstein and
Gubrium 1995). My aim was to allow the conversation to evolve freely around the chosen theme. The
duration of each interview was to be determined based on participant availability and preference.
Participants were also asked to decide with me on the best time, place, and manner to proceed with the
interview (e.g. in person or by Skype).
When contacting scholars to request an interview, I informed them that I would enter the
dialogue with a set of conversation starters and quotes simply intended as helpful openings for a fruitful
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dialogue. They were not set in stone, and I enthusiastically welcomed input from participants in guiding
the interview.
Although many of the scholars I contacted responded favourably to my request, only one
followed through until the interview. It should be noted that the interview process needed to be
approved by the Wilfrid Laurier Research Ethics Board. This led me to develop a rather complex
protocole to communicate with scholars as potential participants. The Ethics Board rightfully insists that
research projects involving human subjects follow procedures which ensure a high level of transparency,
identify potential risks and benefits for the participants, and allow them to give informed consent. In my
case, this meant sending participants a formal interview request, an outline of the interview, and a
consent letter to be signed before the actual interview could take place. These documents were
intended to be detailed and thorough, but I suspect they may have been perceived as lengthy and
bureaucratic by the scholars I contacted. The contrast between their initial enthusiasm and ensuing
silence leads me to think that they were discouraged by the process. Indeed, it is best for a junior
researcher to get to the point when soliciting the assistance of established scholars who are generally
extremely busy. U.S. American scholar Abdullah bin Hamid Ali graciously completed the steps leading up
to our interview (Ali 2018), which has served as a valuable source for this dissertation, along with his
writings (Ali 2014, 2016, 2019).
Other interviews would have been helpful, but in the end, they were not necessary to achieve
my research objectives. Most of the scholars I contacted have already written or spoken extensively on
the themes I wished to discuss. Furthermore, many scholars did honour me by discussing my research
during informal conversations. Their critical input and suggestions ultimately served the purposes
intended by the formal interviews, except that they cannot be formally cited. In any case, the principal
contribution of this dissertation is not to uncover new textual sources. Rather, it is to connect and
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confront previously separate bodies of knowledge and to explore them from a big-picture perspective
with the hope of discovering new ways of understanding tradition, Islam, modernity, and coloniality.
Many of the best conversations I had occurred while I was conducting research in North Africa
and Spain. I spent two weeks in Cairo and one in Sudan in the spring of 2018. Then, I spent four weeks in
Morocco, as well as a week in Spain, in the summer of 2018. In addition to Casablanca and Rabat, I
visited several cities along the two coasts of the Gibraltar Strait, including Tangier, Ceuta, Tétouan,
Chefchaouen, Algeciras, Gibraltar, Málaga, and Granada. Twice in 2019 I returned to Morocco, for a
week in the winter and three months in the summer.
During these travels, I spent long hours in bookstores and libraries in search of documents not
easily accessible in Canada, but I also sought deeper experiential knowledge of my subject matter. I
revisited these lands with which I was already intimately familiar, with the conscious intention of
connecting my perceptions of people, places, and objects to my research. Some of the photographs I
took are presented in this dissertation. But perhaps most importantly, I sat with living representatives of
North African intellectual and spiritual lineages. In Moroccan cafés, professors enthusiastically asked
about my research, suggested readings, spoke about their research, and shared myriads of personal
anecdotes which contributed nuance and living details to a project mostly concerned with grand ideas
about long historical trends and world-systems. In Cairo and Khartoum, I sat on the floor of dusty
bookshops, and spent long hours in mosques, mausoleums, cafés, and living rooms, with disciples of Sufi
Orders affiliated with the Shâdhilî path. Hearing a Sufi poem sung in a ceremony attended by hundreds
of worshippers, or discussing metaphysics with a man sitting on a straw mat in the courtyard of a
shaykh’s house, are completely different experiences from reading texts written centuries ago by people
who are now dead. Experiential knowledge penetrates deeper into the mind, the heart, and even the
body. Reading a book is different from discussing the expulsion of Muslims from Spain with a Moroccan
immigrant selling souvenirs to tourists in Granada. It is different from walking for hours in the intense
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summer heat looking for vestiges of Andalusian Islam. Going over reading notes about Andalusian
Muslims and Jews crossing the Strait of Gibraltar in the fifteenth and sixteenth century to seek refuge in
Morocco, is different from listening to a Guinean Muslim in Ceuta describe how much he wants to cross
over to Europe, as he looks at the Rock of Gibraltar across the water. However, the power of reading
should not be underestimated. My experience of these locations was enhanced by the countless hours I
have spent at my desk reading and taking notes. Erudition is not a bad thing. But in order to stay alive,
dynamic, and flexible, it should be consciously complemented by experience. Plural approaches to
reality facilitate complex, supple, and nuanced knowledge.

Definitions and Meanings
Rather than defining key terms, this dissertation favors exploring the diverse concepts with
which they are associated. When adopting a transdisciplinary approach which conceives of reality as
comprised of many interrelated levels or fields, words appear as intersections for multiple fields of
meaning. This is quite different from the modern/colonial project of categorizing and defining every
aspect of the world for the benefit of Western and Westernized global elites. From a decolonial and
transdisciplinary perspective, an obsession with rigid categorization and definition is best avoided. For
instance, it would be ludicrous to ask a scholar to conduct research using only one of the many
meanings and uses of the verb to be. Even dictionaries, whose sole purpose is to provide definitions, try
to cover the many meanings of a word according to usage and context. Yet, academics are often
expected to specify how they will use key terms in a publication and to stick to one meaning.
But flexibly exploring terminology does not mean anything goes. Instead of proposing a rigid
definition of such terms as religion, Islam, tradition, and modernity, this dissertation attempts to use
them in the most appropriate way according to context. This may vary from sentence to sentence,
paragraph to paragraph, and chapter to chapter. Specific usages or fields of meaning are discussed
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whenever it seems necessary to follow certain arguments and answer certain research problems.
Sometimes religion is the approach to reality favoured by a specific community. Religions in this sense of
the term tend to be internally diverse, and those who self-identify or are externally identified with a
religion often disagree about its ideas, beliefs, attitudes, practices, and modes of expression. And there
is always disagreement about who are truly members of a religion or not. At other times, religion is to
be understood as a subsystem of the modern world-system, along with other subsystems such as
politics, the economy, arts, and government (Beyer 2006). Popular and even playful uses of the term
should not be discarded either (Chidester 2005), such as when someone declares tennis to be their
religion or claims to read the paper religiously every morning.
The religion focused on in this dissertation is of course Islam. Yet the Arabic word islâm is also
polysemic. It can simply mean a state of submission or surrender in relation to the notion of peace
(salâm). In that case, it refers to an individual state of being, an attitude of personal submission to Allah
(God). In other cases, it refers to the various acts one must perform or avoid performing according to
the Prophet Muḥammad and the book Muslims believe was revealed to him by Allah, the Qur’an
(Qur’ân). This usually entails accepting certain beliefs and understanding certain doctrines. A third way
to understand Islam is as the community (Arabic: umma) of those who follow the Prophet Muḥammad.
A fourth way is to situate Islam as a world religion among other world religions or even the civilization in
which this religion is dominant. This latter meaning is perhaps better conveyed in academic writing by
the term Islamicate. All of these meanings are interrelated. Several beliefs, doctrines and actions are
believed by a given community—which has grown enough over centuries to become a world religion
dominating an entire civilization—to cultivate a state of surrender to God and inner peace in individuals
(Muslims) and promote appropriate relations among these individuals and with those of other
communities (non-Muslims). Naturally, these meanings are contested or understood in a variety of ways
by Muslims and non-Muslims. Any individual Muslim might use the word Islam in a variety of ways
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including those mentioned above. And by opposing them, a Muslim might acknowledge the existence of
Islamophobic connotations—for example, presenting Islam as a terrorist ideology or a heresy of
Christianity. Therefore, the word Islam refers to multiple fields of meaning which are recognizable
although contested and fluid.
Tradition and modernity are also polysemic terms whose multiple fields of meaning are
discussed at length in this dissertation. The intention here is to deepen our understanding of the
concepts invoked by the terms. However, exploring multiple levels of meaning should not be a pretext
for obfuscation. Ideally, it should be possible to clarify meanings without oversimplifying them, as
happens when tradition and modernity are depicted as binary opposites. This dichotomy is suspect if we
simply consider the Latin etymology of these words which have been preserved in European languages
like English and French. On a very basic level, tradition means the transmission of a belief, behaviour or
practice within a community, over generations, whereas modernity is simply the synonym of
contemporaneity. In a sense, tradition is a flow from the past to the present. Ostensibly, it cannot be
opposed to modernity, since it includes the present—the modern—in its sphere of meaning. Yet,
current usage makes it impossible to reduce terms like tradition and modernity to their most basic
etymological meanings. Other connotations must be considered.
Around the fourteenth century in Western Europe, these terms began to be increasingly used in
opposition to one another (Black 1982, Gillespie 1998). Over time modernity has come to be widely
understood as a rupture with tradition. Tradition has come to be seen as the preservation or
conservation of the past, a backward movement or a stagnation rather than an onward flow as its
etymology suggests. It has become somewhat synonymous with custom and even superstition, and
modernity with progress and improvement. Placed in opposition, tradition and modernity come to
define one another negatively. Each is everything the other is not. Rather than describing the quality of
contemporary ideas, behaviours and objects, modernity is now associated with the historical period
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which began perhaps as far back as the fourteenth century in Florence and spread throughout Western
Europe in phases labelled with hopeful names such as the Renaissance (c. 1300- c. 1650) and the
Enlightenment (c. 1650- c. 1800). According to this narrative, these historical developments in Western
Europe gave birth to the scientific, technological, and industrial revolutions; political systems promoting
wealth, freedom, and social equality; and the conditions for individual emancipation from traditional
forms of ignorance and oppression. However, such internalist Eurocentric and modernist understanding
of tradition and modernity are heavily contested in Europe and around the world.
Although this dissertation critiques modernist conceptions of tradition and modernity, it does
not argue that they are linguistically wrong. Other meanings associated with these terms are simply
more appropriate in this context. Depending on our position, we differently perceive the multiple
realities—or perhaps aspects of reality—to which such terms refer. And perspective affects our
terminology. This does not necessarily imply that our position is rigidly set by material circumstances
such as race, gender, geography, and age. Although it is imperative to recognize the limitations imposed
upon us by these circumstances, imagination and empathy should not be neglected. While one can
never fully experience reality as others do, it is certainly possible to imagine other perspectives. In many
cases the first step in this process is simply to listen to others.
This dissertation examines how North American Muslim scholars associated with Traditionalism
perceive tradition and modernity and how they have come to such perceptions. Moreover, it enters a
conversation with these scholars, as well as decolonial thinkers who try to connect diverse peripheral
positions within the modern/colonial world-system. It proposes an intellectual journey exploring
peripheral, non-Eurocentric, and decolonial understandings of tradition and modernity. It should be
clear that, from the position adopted in this dissertation, the rejection of tradition in dominant
modern/colonial discourses seems immediately suspect, as does the celebration of modernity.
Traditionalist rejections of modernity and celebrations of tradition are a form of resistance in response
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to such modern/colonial discourses. But other fields of meaning need to be explored. One important
strategy used here to uncover such other meanings is to challenge the tradition/modernity binary by
introducing other terms such as coloniality in between. This makes it possible to understand
Traditionalism as a discourse about tradition, which responds to the disruption of modernity/coloniality.
The first section of this dissertation begins this exploration of meanings by examining the emergence of
a specific tradition in the Western Islamic world.
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Section I—Tradition: Muslim Ways of Being, Knowing, and Behaving in the Premodern Western
Islamic World (682 to 1415)
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Chapter 1- Traditional Islam in the Western Islamicate
علِي ٌم
َ َو ِ ﱠ ِ ٱ ۡل َم ۡش ِر ُق َوٱ ۡل َم ۡغ ِربُ ۚ فَأ َ ۡي َن َما ت ُ َولﱡواْ َفثَ ﱠم َوجۡ هُ ٱ ﱠ ِۚ إِ ﱠن ٱ ﱠ َ َوٲ ِس ٌع
To God belong the East and the West; whithersoever you turn, there is the Face of God. Lo! God is
Embracing, Knowing. (Qur’an 2:115)
One of the ideas developed throughout this dissertation is that contemporary Traditionalist
critiques of modernity by North American Muslim scholars inscribe themselves in a long history of
Muslim resistance to modernity/coloniality in the Atlantic world. For centuries, the expanding
modern/colonial system dominated by Western Europeans and their descendants has threatened to
extinguish Muslim bodies as well as Muslim ways of being, knowing, and behaving developed over many
generations. These ways are not only a heritage to protect but a source of knowledge, inspiration, and
motivation in the Muslim struggle to survive. Sections Two and Three of this dissertation discuss the
struggle of Muslims living far west of Mecca to protect their heritage utilizing its own resources. But
before, the historical development of diverse ways of being, knowing, and behaving, into a specifically
Western Islamic tradition is examined discussed in this chapter, and the experiential aspects of this
tradition are explored in Chapter Two.
Western Islam developed between the seventh and fifteenth centuries 37 into a unique tradition
comprised of many sub-traditions, ethnicities, languages, cultures, and ways of understanding reality.
Different levels of tradition, from the local to the pan-Islamic, can be visualized as overlapping
concentric circles. A recognizable overarching circle, called Islam, also includes Shia (Shî‘a) traditions.
Islam has itself developed in constant dynamic interaction with non-Islamic traditions, such as
Christianity, Judaism, and Hellenic philosophy. In short, when the modern/colonial period began,
traditions had long been established and developed in every region of the Islamicate world, which were
distinct and recognizable although always contested and in movement. Western traditional Islam
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This tradition has continued to develop to this day, but the focus in this chapter is on the formative period
leading up to 1415.
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emerged in close connection to a broader Sunni consensus, which Marshall Hodgson (1974b) (19221968) labels “Sunni internationalism” (255-292).
Among the Muslims living in the Maghrib, Iberia, and West Africa, a normative tradition 38 was
well established by the fifteenth century (M’Baye 2011, El Hareir 2011a, 2011b). This tradition was
centered around four elements, the first of which was sharifism (from the Arabic sharîf: noble), the
veneration of the Prophet Muḥammad’s family and lineage (Sebti 1999). The other three elements were
Mâlikî jurisprudence, Ash’arî creed, and Junaydî Sufism, all of which are discussed below. Although each
of these religious currents existed elsewhere, the further west one went from Mecca, this specific
combination became increasingly dominant. Around this normative consensus, a whole variety of
traditions and customs flourished, including ways of speaking, moving, working, eating, loving, singing,
washing, dressing and all the other aspects which comprise the rich tapestry of daily life. Naturally, there
were people who rejected aspects of this consensus. However, the normative tradition was dominant
enough that all other positions evolved in relation to it, even if this relation was one of dissent or
opposition.

The Islamic West: Al-Maghrib, al-Andalus, and Bilâd al-Sûdân
Arab general ‘Uqba ibn Nâfi‘ (c. 622- c. 683) is remembered as the first Muslim to reach the
shores of the Atlantic in 682, where he is said to have exclaimed ‘’Lord! If the sea had not stopped
me…!’’ (M’Baye 2011, 309). Following the seventh-century Muslim conquests of the northern African
coast, from Egypt to the Atlantic, Muslims expanded northwards from the Maghrib into Europe in the
early eighth century. They also travelled southwards across the Sahara. Since this dissertation situates
North American Traditionalist Islam within an Atlantic framework, the focus in this section is on the
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The term normative is used here both in the sense of a socially dominant norm and a prescribed ideal. Indeed, in
order to prescribe behaviours or beliefs, religious experts need to have some sort of dominance or authority within
a given social context.
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development of premodern Islam in the lands of the Eastern Atlantic, in Northwest Africa and
Southwest Europe.
Muslim armies undertook a phenomenal expansion after the Prophet Muḥammad passed away
in 632 (Hodgson 1974a, 187-230, Taha 2011). This expansion was facilitated by the weakness of the
Persian Sâsânid Empire which covered much of Central Asia, and the Eastern Roman Byzantine Empire,
which dominated the lands around the Mediterranean. Ethnically and religiously diverse local
populations were largely exhausted by over-taxation, wars, power struggles and the generally
oppressive practices of these warring empires and their vassals, often perceived as foreign occupiers.
While Muslim armies clearly faced resistance (Hoyland 2015, 170-206), it is crucial to understand that
many among the local populations were either indifferent to their arrival, or even favourable to Islam’s
vision of social justice, spirituality, and ethics. Consequently, regimes defending themselves against the
Muslims often had great difficulty gathering popular support. Moreover, conditions for non-Muslims
under Muslim rule could improve considerably. For instance, since Byzantium was infamously harsh in
suppressing Christian currents it deemed unorthodox, Christians frequently found it easier to practice
their faith under Muslim rulers. And while many Muslims clearly wished to spread their faith, ‘’[t]he
campaigns did not seek to spread the Islamic religion by the sword, as some non-Muslim historians have
insinuated, but rather to spread the political authority of Islam and give the people the choice between
paying the jizya39 and living within the new Islamic state” (Taha 2011, 149). Hodgson (1974a), a devout
Christian himself, contends that “[t]here was no attempt at converting the peoples of the imperial
territories” (199). He explains the early Imperial Muslim mindset in the following terms: “The superiority
of Islam as religion, and therefore in providing for social order, would justify Muslim rule: would justify
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The jizya is a tax which was imposed on non-Muslims in exchange for protection by Muslim rulers. Ideally, this
tax was only for financially capable adult men. And while it must not have delighted non-Muslims to pay this tax, it
seems to have been generally preferable to previous taxation systems (Aquil 2011, 197-202, Taha 2011, 149).
Moreover, other taxes were imposed only on Muslims, such as the mandatory yearly zakat (zakâ).
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the simple, fair-dealing Muslims in replacing the privileged and oppressive representatives of the older,
corrupted, allegiances’’ (ibid.).
After having completed the conquest of Egypt in circa 642, Muslim troops pushed westwards
into the lands they called the Maghrib (the West), inhabited predominantly by Amazigh peoples, more
commonly known by the pejorative appellation Berber (Laroui 1970, 76-85). These lands roughly
correspond to present-day Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. It should be noted that the notion that
these lands comprised a geographical unit inhabited by one particular people is an Arab invention. In
fact, many peoples, with diverse beliefs, origins and allegiances inhabited the region when the Arabs
arrived. The categories developed by the Arabs were later racialized by modern European colonizers,
especially the French (Rouighi 2019). The Berbers were constructed as one white people, who had been
invaded by the allegedly dark Semitic Arabs and forced to convert to Islam—a narrative which
legitimated a strategy of consolidating colonial rule by dividing indigenous populations (French: les
indigènes). Moreover, borders in the premodern and even early modern periods were much more fluid
than they are today, after the rise of the modern nation-state (Anderson 2006 [1983]), but approximate
equivalences can be made. Precolonial Muslim historians divided the Maghrib into three regions,
situated immediately west of Egypt and Southwest Asia which represent Central Islamdom. The Near
Maghrib (al-Maghrib al-Adnâ) corresponds to most of present-day central and eastern Libya, and
perhaps western Egypt. The Central Maghrib (al-Maghrib al-Awsaṭ) extended from present-day Western
Libya to central Algeria. The Far Maghrib (al-Maghrib al-Aqṣâ) basically corresponds to present-day
Morocco, parts of Western Algeria, and much of Spain and Portugal (El Hareir 2011a, 375).
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Map 1—Early Islamicate World (El Fasi 2000 [1988], 50)

While the first military expedition to reach the Atlantic coast of present-day Morocco occurred
in circa 682, the definitive conquest of the sedentary and mostly Christian Amazigh populations in the
Maghrib was not completed until the early eighth century. One Amazigh leader whose fierce struggle
against the Muslims has become legendary is Queen Kahina (n.d. 40-c. 703) from the mountains of
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Those accustomed to the extensive bureaucracy of the modern Western(ized) nation-state may be surprised by
how often scholars indicate their ignorance of the birth and death dates for historical figures by the abbreviation
n.d. (no date), or even a question mark. However, one need not go back far in time to discover societies in which
the date of birth is neither considered important nor indeed recorded. For example, many middle-aged and elderly
Moroccans today do not know exactly when they were born. Although this is less common now, authorities in this
part of the world were often presented with children born years before and asked to register their births, leaving
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present-day Algeria (Hannoum 1997, Hendrickx 2013). In 710, the conquering Arab general Mûsâ ibn
Nuṣayr (c. 640-c. 716) left the Amazigh Ṭâriq ibn Ziyâd (670-720) to govern the northern parts of
present-day Morocco from Tangier. There is evidence that “[t]he mountain villagers, high-plateau
pastoralists, and desert nomads, fiercely devoted to their independence, either avoided the Arab
conquerors or fought them” (von Sivers 2000, 24). However, Hodgson (1974a) argues that the Arab
Muslims ‘’stimulated and gave guidance to a separate movement, that of the Berbers, which had its own
momentum’’ (206). The Islamization of rural Amazigh populations in the Maghrib progressed slowly over
centuries. Those who did become Muslim often espoused Khârijî or Shia currents which dissented from
the predominant trend seeking compromise between religious idealism and political realism (El Hareir
2011a, 385-409, M’Baye 2011, 312-319, Laroui 1970, 86-96). This consensual current developed into
“Sunni internationalism.” In contrast, Khârijî currents represented a fiercely egalitarian rejection of
nepotism and corruption among the Muslim ruling class. Shia currents maintained that the leader of the
entire Muslim nation (umma) must be a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad through his daughter
Fâṭima and her husband ‘Alî, the Prophet’s paternal cousin and, according to Sunni history, his fourth
successor as Caliph of the early Muslim community. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that
contemporary sectarian divisions do not always correspond exactly to the comparatively fluid religious
affiliations in the early centuries of Islam (Hodgson 1955, 2).
In 788, the first independent Muslim dynasty in the Far Maghrib was founded by Idrîs I (745791). Facing persecution from the ʿAbbâsid Caliphate which ruled most of Islamdom from Baghdad
(Baghdâd), this descendant of the Prophet fled to Tangier (Tanja). From there, he was invited to the site
of the ancient Roman city of Volubilis (Walîlî), near present-day Meknes (Maknâs), where he was
recognized as political and spiritual leader by the Awrâba Amazigh tribe. It is significant that the alliance

no choice but to make up a birth date based on an estimation. Around the world, for most of history, such records
have only been kept for higher classes if at all. Consequently, it is common to know when individuals died but not
when they were born, since many people only become famous as adults.
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was consolidated through the marriage of Idrîs to Kanza (n.d.), the daughter of a powerful Awrâba chief,
symbolically marking the beginning of the Morocco’s mixed heritage in which Arabic and Amazigh
lineages constantly intersect. Idrîs I reigned over much of Northern Morocco and the Atlantic plains. His
son, Idrîs II (791-828, r. 803-828) founded the city of Fez (Fâs) as his capital in circa 808. To this day, Fez
has retained its status as the spiritual capital of Morocco and much of Northwest Africa (Skali 2014
[2006], Burckhardt 1992 [1960]). The Idrîsids (al-Idrîsiyyûn) were in power from circa 788 to circa 985,
but never ruled over all the Far Maghrib. Competition among the descendants of Idrîs II, who divided
the kingdom into loosely affiliated polities, made the dynasty vulnerable to external threats. Rival
regimes included the ʿAbbâsids (al-ʿAbbâsiyyûn, 750-1258), the Fâṭimids (al-Fâṭimiyyûn, 909-1121) from
the Ismaili (Ismâʿîlî) branch of Shia Islam, and the Andalusian Umayyads (al-Umawiyya, 711-1031), who
survived the ʿAbbâsid overthrow of the Umayyad Caliphate in Damascus (Dimashq) in 750. Nevertheless,
the Idrîsids established an indigenized Islamic government in the Far Maghrib, based on an ArabAmazigh alliance and sharifism. (Rivet 2012, 81-88, Skali 2014 [2006], 25-29, Laroui 1970, 105-108) 41
Yet the Western Islamic world was not restricted to Africa. In 711, Ṭâriq ibn Ziyâd led an army of
Arabs and recently Islamized Amazighs into the Iberian Peninsula, which was under foreign Visigoth rule
at the time and amid a civil war. With the support of many Iberian Jews and Christians hostile to the
ruling Germanic Visigoths, Ibn Ziyâd was able to defeat King Roderick (688-711, r. 710-711) and cross the
Pyrenees into Lyon within a year. This marked the beginning of 781 years of Muslim rule in Southwest
Europe, which would end in 1492 (El Hareir 2011b). Several peoples inhabited the lands Ibn Ziyâd
conquered, including Hispano-Romans, Celts, Basques, Suebi, and Visigoths. Catholicism co-existed with
other faiths, such as Arianism and Judaism. Diverse languages and dialects were spoken, some of which
would eventually evolve into modern Spanish and Portuguese. Many of these peoples allied themselves
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It has been argued that much of the official history about the Idrîsid dynasty is unfounded and many of its claims
more attributable to legend than fact (Benchekroun 2011). Since entering such a debate would lead beyond the
scope of this research, this overview is based on the typical accounts from multiple sources.
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with the Muslims, or even converted to Islam. It should be noted that conversion is a complex
phenomenon which cannot generally be reduced to one factor (e.g. convincing theology or social
opportunism). However, it is clear that political despotism, economic strife, and civil war in Iberia had
exhausted local populations, some of whom placed their hopes in the triumphant Muslims. Joining this
community was presumably desirable to many for both worldly and otherworldly reasons. Naturally,
others did not convert and resisted Muslim hegemony for centuries. Yet, over generations, converts and
their descendants naturally saw Islam as an indigenous religion practiced by local peoples, just as
Christianity had been indigenized centuries before. The Islamicate civilization which flourished in the
Iberian Peninsula was called al-Andalus (English: Andalusia).
It is difficult to overemphasize the magnificent achievements of Andalusian civilization. María
Rosa Menocal (1953-2012) (2002) borrows the expression of the medieval Saxon nun Hroswitha (born c.
935—died c. 1000), describing al-Andalus as ‘’the ornament of the world.” Menocal vividly depicts a
place where Muslims, Christians, and Jews, living in harmony, produced incredible achievements in
urban development, architecture, literature, philosophy, science, medicine, technology, art, and
mysticism. Such splendours, discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Two, inspire lyrical descriptions
provoking a range of emotions, from nostalgia to awe. Indeed, an aesthetic or even spiritual sensitivity
seems most capable of capturing the brilliance of a lost civilization. It is no coincidence, therefore, if one
of the best descriptions of al-Andalus available to Western readers is written by Swiss Muslim
Traditionalist Titus Burckhardt (1972 [1970]) (1908-1984), whose interests included metaphysics,
cosmology, arts, crafts, and architecture.
However, it is important to balance poetic accounts of atemporal grandeur with an appreciation
for the messier details of history (García-Arenal 2004, Wacks 2003). Between 711 and 1492, the Iberian
Peninsula experienced enormous political instability. Communities comprising people of diverse
ethnicities, classes, and religious affiliations were often torn by conflict, including internal divisions
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among Muslims. The borders between competing polities were constantly redrawn by war. Muslim and
Christian rulers often became allies against polities led by their coreligionists. A close look at history
reveals that accounts of perpetual inter-religious harmony are as oversimplified as those of perpetual
jihad and crusading. In fact, the amazing achievements of Andalusian civilization were probably as much
the product of creative conflict as they were of cosmopolitan pluralism (Menocal 2002, 11). The devils,
the angels, and everyone in between are in the details.
Oversimplified celebrations of Andalusian civilization can easily hide ideological biases. For
instance, insisting on the Islamic aspect of al-Andalus can lead to neglecting the major contributions of
Christians and Jews. Likewise, a Eurocentric bias underlies narratives which celebrate European Islam in
the premodern period as uniquely advanced and cosmopolitan, thereby concealing many other parts of
the Islamicate world with similar histories—places like Cairo and Baghdad immediately come to mind. A
Eurocentric bias can also hide the intimate connection between al-Andalus and the rest of the Maghrib.
Cornell (1998) explains:
North Africa was never the backwater that many orientalists and social scientists have
assumed. While Muslim Spain […] with its sophisticated intellectual life and “civilized” ways,
is often highlighted in surveys of Islamic civilization, the premodern Maghrib is still
dismissed as either an appendix of Islamic Iberia or a mere subregion of a peripheral and
marginalized Islamic Africa. But the historian who looks at North African primary sources
without prejudice finds that such an extreme center-periphery approach distorts reality.
Rather than making a peripheralized North Africa dependent on Muslim Spain, it is better to
view the entire Islamic West—al-Andalus, the Maghrib, Muslim Sicily, and parts of West
Africa—as a single, relatively unified cultural entity. In this wider region, ideas were freely
exchanged and innovations were adopted as readily as anywhere in the Muslim world.
Most importantly, religious and intellectual movements from Morocco and other parts of
the Maghrib often created ebb tides of intellectual and cultural influence that flowed
toward the East. Instead of being merely imitative, many doctrines and institutions that
were created in western “subcenters” such as Fez or Marrakesh had profound effects on
the rest of the Islamic world. (xxiv)42
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I have also observed this bias among Westernized elites in Morocco, who seem to consider their country more
advanced than other Islamicate societies, due to the influence of Europe through Andalusian refugees, and later
Portuguese, Spanish and French colonialism. This internal colonial bias deserves further investigation.
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If North Africa is often dismissed as peripheral to Islamic civilization, West Africa is marginalized
even more. One historian whose work is of special importance in locating West African Islam within
broader regional and interregional networks is Sylviane Anna Diouf (2013 [1998]). She is a New Yorker,
raised in France and born of a Senegalese father and French mother. Her research represents a useful
starting point to situate West African Muslims in a decolonial world-systems analysis. Pushing back
against modern/colonial stereotypes which often ignore Sub-Saharan Islam and treat it as peripheral to
the broader Islamicate, she writes:
Just as they were part of a local milieu, the West African Muslims belonged to a much larger
sphere—an Islamic world with pockets of followers from Spain to China. The West African
Muslim world had direct economic, religious, and cultural ties to the Maghreb, Egypt, and
the Middle East and was evolving in what today would be called a global market of ideas
and goods. Kingdoms and empires such as Kanem and Mali had established diplomatic
relations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. Pilgrims on their way to Mecca spent
time in Egypt. The sultan of Kanem, Mai Dunama Dibbalemi (c. 1221–1259), built a school in
Cairo for his subjects who were studying there. Mansa Musa of Mali—who, on a pilgrimage
to Mecca in 1324, spent so much gold that he single-handedly drove the gold market down
—brought back to his country lawyers and descendants of the prophet Muhammad, as well
as a Spanish-born Muslim architect, and sent numerous students to North Africa. There was
a constant exchange of religious commentators, scholars, lawyers, and theologians
between sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, and the Middle East. (22)
Diouf’s contention that there is no major rupture in Islamic thought north and south of the Sahara
is supported by a several other scholars, such as Mauritanian historian Alioune Traoré (1983), and
Ousmane Oumar Kane (2016), who works in the United States, but also studied in France, and was born
and raised in Senegal. Like Diouf, Kane (2016) is a cosmopolitan child of the Atlantic world, versed in
many knowledge traditions, and he is critical of the way African Islam continues to be portrayed in the
Western academy:
Western universities nowadays typically divide academic study of Africa so that North Africa
(Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt) falls within the realm of Middle Eastern
studies, whereas the area south of the Sahara, considered Africa proper, is studied within
the field of African studies. Such a division and its underlying assumptions overlook the fact
that the Arabic language, as the language of Islamic learning and liturgy, was the glue
holding together large populations of the Maghreb, the Sahara, and sub-Sharan Africa. […]
Arabic as a linguistic vehicle of knowledge transmission was as important in the history of
Muslim peoples as Latin was in Europe. (7)
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This does not mean, however, that there are no regional specificities. Although premodern
Muslim cultivated extensive networks across three continents, there was conflict and division between
regions and within them. For instance, anti-black prejudice has been prevalent in North Africa and West
Asia from the first generation of Muslims in the seventh century. This type of colourism, which was
based on completely different assumptions from modern racism, plagued Islamicate societies. Ali (2016)
writes:
When reading words intended to deride “blacks” or to degrade their humanity one must
pay careful attention to the exact words of each writer about blackness. Race is a very
elusive concept which often takes centuries to crystallize through negotiation and
imposition. The fact that notions of race differ so much between now and then makes it
vitally important for us to review certain facts about race. We must be very careful not to
conflate modern conceptions of race and color and project them on pre-modern and
medieval civilizations, even though there is some degree of overlap. Race (and “black”
especially) is the result of constructs imposed on the populous which require a certain
amount of dissecting. (25)
He remarks that “blacks themselves, as was the norm of the premodern world, likewise entertained
disdain toward non-blacks, including against Arabs and other blacks as well,” adding that such
widespread antipathy based on skin colour “is a precondition for racism; just as race is a precondition
for racism” (51-52). Naturally, racial taxonomies in the modern/colonial world-systems affect Muslims as
well and today there is undoubtedly anti-black racism in Islamicate cultures.
Yet, in the premodern period anti-black prejudice did not prevent Islam from being embraced and
enriched by dark-skinned peoples (A. Ali 2016, Mubarak and Walid 2016). West African Islam is an
indigenous religion as it was willfully adopted and adapted by West Africans centuries ago, just as
Christianity was adopted and adapted outside Palestine. One of the underlying modern/colonial
assumptions contested in the above passage by Kane is that Islam is a foreign entity in Africa—it is not
authentically African. This view is also held by some non-Muslim Africans. Yet, it contradicts the selfunderstanding of African Muslims. Just as in Europe, once fully indigenized, any African religion should
be understood as indigenous. Kane (2016) explains:
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I expect Afrocentrists to construe my argument as an apology of Pan-Arabism or the
negation of endogenous forms of knowledge of “Africa proper.” To them, I will say that
Islam and the Arabic language are no more foreign in Africa than they are in Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine, and Iraq. Islam was introduced to the African continent before its spread in
Arabia, let alone to the neighbouring countries of the Peninsula. The Prophet Muhammad
sent dozens of his companions to Ethiopia before the beginning of the Muslim Calendar.
Africans in the broad sense of the word have made major contributions to the development
of Arabic, and it is worth recalling that the majority of Arabs now live on the African
continent and that Arabic is by far the most widely spoken African language. Most countries
of the Sahel—Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria—have large populations of native Arabic
speakers. (207-208)
In this passage, Kane refers to a crucial event in the development of Islam as an African religion: Muslim
refugees, persecuted in Mecca, fleeing to Abyssinia—present-day northern Ethiopia—in circa 615 or
earlier (Hodgson 1974a, 188). While Muslims were still a small oppressed minority in Arabia, they were
given asylum in Africa. They came peacefully to Bilâd al-Sûdân (the lands of the blacks), initially as
refugees in East Africa, and later as merchants in West Africa.
Whereas Arab Muslims led the military conquest of the Maghrib and to an extent al-Andalus,
indigenous Amazigh nomads carried Islam southwards across Western Saharan trade routes in the
eighth century. The ensuing Islamization of West Africa was overwhelmingly slow and peaceful until the
religious wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Early adoption of Islam by many local traders
and rulers facilitated the formation of West African scholars and clerics who spread the religion in the
region. Diouf (2013 [1998])reminds us that “[t]hese carriers of the faith were natives and therefore
identified culturally and socially as well as ethnically with the potential converts […] Africans themselves
considered Islam an African religion“ (21). As a significant regional minority, Muslims came to live in
cities throughout West Africa, sometimes as a local majority. They co-existed with non-Muslims in a
general atmosphere of mutual accommodation, despite obvious exceptions. Muslim rulers governed
non-Muslims in some regions while non-Muslim rulers often sought the advice or spiritual assistance of
Muslim subjects, for instance in providing them with protective amulets with inscriptions from the
Qur’an. (M’Baye 2011, Kane 2016, 41-60, Levtzion 2000)
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In part because they were initially associated with economic, political and cultural elites,
Muslims in precolonial West Africa were known for their high level of literacy. For instance, three
thousand teachers were reported to be living in the Nigerian city of Kano at the end of the fifteenth
century (Diouf 2013 [1998], 24). One can imagine how many students they must have taught. Despite
centuries of prejudice and racism among both non-Muslim Western scholars and non-black Muslims,
depicting the Bilâd al-Sûdân as intellectually marginal and underdeveloped, recent scholarship has
established that West Africa has a long history of extensive and advanced Islamic scholarship (Kane
2016, Ware III 2014). By the early modern period, this intellectual heritage was firmly inscribed in the
Western Islamic normative tradition.

Map 2—Prominent Centres in Eleventh-Century West Africa (El Fasi 2000 [1988], 124)
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Sharifism West of Mecca43
Since the earliest days of Islam, most Muslims have venerated the family of the Prophet Muḥammad.
His descendants are referred to as sharifs (noble: sharîf singular, shurafâ’ plural) or sâda (sayyid
singular). Other Muslims are suspicious of this behaviour claiming it contradicts the monotheistic
creed of Islam, worshipping one God with no partners. This was the position of the fiercely egalitarian
Khârijîs in the early period of Islam, as it is the position of many modernist, reformist, or revivalist
Sunnis, who frequently associate sharifism with Shiism44 (S. V. Nasr 2006, 59-61). Yet, the main historical
difference between Sunni and Shia Islam has not been about venerating the Prophet’s family, but about
whether they alone are entitled to assume political leadership of the community. Many Sunnis who
accept non-sharifian political leaders may also accept or prefer sharifian rule. The contemporary Sunni
Sharifian monarchies in Morocco and Jordan are a case in point. Moreover, in the minds of many Shias
and Sunnis, veneration (iḥtirâm or tabjîl) is distinct from worship (‘ibâda), which is strictly reserved for
God in Islam. Whereas it has become increasingly common among modern Muslims to reject the
veneration of sacred people, places and things as idolatry, this uncompromising position was marginal in
premodern times. Moreover, veneration of the Prophet’s family remains widespread throughout the
Islamic world, among both Sunnis and Shias.45 It still inspires a wide array of artistic and cultural
expressions of love, which contribute to the distinctiveness of traditional Islam in diverse contexts.
The Western Islamicate is one such context in which traditional Islam is deeply influenced by
sharifism. In the early Islamic period, many sharifs escaped persecution in Southwest Asia by migrating
westward into Africa (El Sandouby 2008, 37). Like many other Muslims, they were appalled by the
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In this discussion of sharifism I borrow from and build upon my previous research (Sparkes 2013, 18-22).
Whereas Shia and Shiism designate a clearly identifiable community, and are spelt using an initial capital letter,
sharif and sharifism refer to a tendency or trend, and are only used as proper nouns in certain circumstances (e.g.
the Sharifian Monarchy of Morocco).
45
For instance, joyful popular manifestations of Sunni sharifism can be observed in Egypt, especially in Sufi
contexts (Hoffman-Ladd 1992).
44

62

increasing corruption, greed, and worldliness they witnessed in the centres of power of their rapidly
expanding and institutionalized empire. Frontier life could seem comparatively simpler and more
appealing to religious idealists. Muslims often left for the imperial periphery to express dissent or simply
to flee persecution.
Certainly, sharifs faced incredible pressures in the imperial heartlands. After the third Caliph,
‘Uthmân Ibn ‘Affân (born c. 574) was murdered by mutineers in 656, most of the community placed its
hopes in the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law ʿAlî ibn Abî Ṭâlib (c. 600-661). However, others contested
this transition of power and favoured Muʿâwiya ibn Abî Sufyân (c. 602-680) a man from the clan of the
Caliph ‘Uthmân, the Umayyads (al-Umawiyya or Banû Umayya). It is worth noting that the Umayyads
had been the political leaders of Mecca when the early Muslims faced persecution. 46 The Caliph ʿAlî also
faced opposition from others who were initially loyal to him but came to see him as too compromising
with their enemies. They became known as the Khârijîs (those who left or seceded) and ended up
assassinating ʿAlî in 661. Once again, many Muslims hoped to see a member of the Prophet’s family in
power, namely Ḥasan ibn ‘Alî (624-670), grandson of the Prophet and son of ‘Alî. But in the face of
enormous political turmoil, Ḥasan ceded power to Muʿâwiya (r. 661-680),47 who moved the capital of
the new empire from Medina (al-Madîna) to Damascus the same year, thus founding the Umayyad
dynasty (661-750). Moving the political capital to Syria, away from Islam’s spiritual heartland in Arabia,
did not help ease the disillusionment of those who felt Muslim elites were becoming too worldly and
corrupt. In 680, Muʿâwiya was succeeded by his widely unpopular son Yazîd I (c. 645-683, r. 680-683),
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When the early Islamic community emerged, Mecca was ruled by a tribe named Quraysh, itself comprised of
many clans, including the prominent Umayyads and Hâshimites (Hâshimiyya or Banû Hâshim). The Prophet and his
family belonged to the Hâshimite clan. In theory, accepting Islam entailed transcending tribal identities by
adhering to the Muslim community (umma); however, tribalism has continued to influence Arabic politics from the
early Islamic period until today.
47
This secession is a controversial topic among Muslims. Whereas many Sunnis believe Ḥasan negotiated a
peaceful settlement and recognized Muʿâwiya ibn Abî Sufyân as Caliph, Shias generally believe the secession was
forced, and therefore illegitimate (Chittick 1981 [1980], 137).
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whose first year in power is infamously remembered for the slaughter perpetrated by his army against
the Prophet Muḥammad’s grandson Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alî (626-680), along with most of his family and closest
friends.
Although sharifism was understandably perceived as a major political threat by the Umayyads,
the wholesale slaughter of the Prophet’s family committed by Yazîd’s forces shocked the early
community. It represented the culmination of traumatic strife tearing apart early Muslim society
precisely as it enjoyed prodigious victories against older corrupt empires in much of Asia, Africa, and
Europe. Varying reactions to these conflicts set in motion religious currents which would develop into
distinct and often rival sectarian interpretations of Islam. Most famously, the split between the
internally diverse Shia and Sunni currents developed several approaches to sharifism. As for the sharifs
themselves, their responses to the political dangers of the early Islamic period also varied. 48 For instance
the famous Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣâdiq (702-765) who was born and died in Medina, is more broadly
remembered for his piety and scholarship than his politics. Although he is most often associated with
Shia Islam, he is also a major figure in the development of Sunni jurisprudence and Sufism (Geoffroy
2009, 42, Chittick 1981 [1980], 138). Other sharifs were actively involved in politics, such Muḥammad alNafs al-Zakiyyah (c. 718-762), who died leading an unsuccessful insurrection in Medina. His brother who
subsequently fled to Morocco was none other than King Idrîs I.
In many ways, Idrîs I laid the foundations for a distinct sharifian tradition in the Far Maghrib. He
was a descendant of the Prophet’s grandson Ḥasan, as have been most of the subsequent sharifs in the
region to this day, including the present King of Morocco. Although there have been politically
marginalized sharifs in the Far Maghrib, the historical imprint of the Idrîsid dynasty has resulted in the
general association of sharifism with worldly power more than dissent. This is not the case for instance
with dominant Shia currents in Asia which in most periods and places have evolved in the political
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Predictably, even these responses are interpreted in diverse ways by Muslims of various religious currents.
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periphery. When observing sharifism in the Far Maghrib one would be hard pressed to observe anything
like the deep sorrow dramatically expressed in Twelver Shia commemorations of the martyrdom of
Ḥusayn, in places like Iran and Iraq. Moreover, despite the saintly status of Idrîs and many of his
descendants, sharifian veneration in the Far Maghrib tends to be far less exuberant than in Egypt. There,
one can regularly witness ecstatic expressions of love, through songs and mystical poetry, at the
mausoleums of eminent sharifs such as the Prophet’s grandchildren Ḥusayn and Zaynab (Hoffman-Ladd
1992).49 Such scenes occur in the Far Maghrib, but the mood is usually more restrained. Several factors
explain this general emphasis on spiritual temperance, including Amazigh customs, the early presence of
stern Khârijîs in the region, and a tradition of often rigid jurisprudence (Cornell 1998, 5-31, Mackeen
1971). A sense of tough discipline, which developed when the Maghrib was the military frontier of the
early Islamic empire, seems to have been perpetuated by the constant fighting caused by the incapacity
of central governments to rule over rural populations. Indeed, the Far Maghrib has historically been
plagued by insurrections, civil wars, and revolts (Laroui 1970, Rivet 2012).
In the often-chaotic political context of the Far Maghrib, Idrîs I exemplifies the sharif as a
spiritually blessed ruler arbitrating conflicting factions. He is both saint and monarch. His power is both
spiritual and temporal. But not all his descendants are automatically considered saints, nor are all saints
sharifs. Inheritance (wirâthah) is a key concept to understand the relation between nobility and
sainthood in Western Islam. Sharifs perpetuate the Prophet’s bloodline. They are physical inheritors of
his auspicious blessings. Saints are spiritual inheritors of the Prophet. One could add that scholars are
inheritors of his formal teachings, warriors of his courage, and continue indefinitely with different types
of prophetic inheritance. Indeed, inheritance is a crucial notion to understand tradition in Western
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These mausoleums are also contested sites. Often, the same person is said to be buried in two different places,
such as Cairo and Damascus (El Sandouby 2008). While this may cause certain people to dismiss the legitimacy of
any other mausoleum but the one they believe holds the tomb of the sharif they venerate, others believe the
spiritual presence, and possibly physical relics of the deceased, to be in more than one place. They might indeed
visit mausoleums for the same person in many locations.
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Islam, as a transmission, a flow from the prophetic past into the present and future. Sharifs and saints
are central in this traditional process.
It is important to recognize that the English term saint has different connotations, linked to the
Christian tradition, than the terms usually used by Muslims to designate an exceptionally pious and
blessed individual. In Arabic, such a person is usually called walî (friend, feminine waliyya, plural awliyâ’)
which is short for walî Allâh (friend of God), an expression found in the plural form in the Qur’an (10:62).
Cornell (1998) explains:
Allah is the source of all power and authority. Since the walî Allâh is Allâh’s “friend,” he
must be close to Allah. Therefore, he is seen by others as Allah’s protégé, just as the friend
of a king is seen as a protégé of that king. Protégés of the powerful benefit from their links
to their patrons by acting as intermediaries for those who are below them. As an
intermediary, the protégé is also a patron, for others rely on him to intercede for them
before the ultimate source of authority. Thus, the walî Allâh is both an intermediary and a
patron for his clients. (xix-xx)
In Christianity, similar understandings of sainthood can be found, but the emphasis tends to be
more on selfless love than proximity and power. The question is whether the terms saint and walî
refer to the same reality. This dilemma underlies all attempts at translation:
If translation means that fidelity to the original can only be found in exact replication, then
distortion and infidelity are the lot of every translation […] But the mere fact of difference
does not mean that one cannot translate. Such a conclusion would be absurd, since human
beings translate all the time. Every good translator is aware that since translation involves
interpretation, no translation can be exact. (xx)
In the end, the conscientious translator must use analogical terms but regularly draw attention to
the limitations of translation. A Muslim can be described using the English word saint “so long as
we do not claim that it conveys the full meaning of the Arabic concepts” (xx).
Furthermore, language barriers are not the only challenge scholars in the Western or
Westernized academy face when interpreting phenomena such as sharifism and sainthood in the
Western Islamic tradition. Eurocentric paradigms often underlie such endeavours. Once again,
Cornell (1998) provides a critical analysis on this topic:
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The empiricist paradigm of modern social science has proven inadequate in addressing
either the doctrinal or the rhetorical dimension of Muslim sainthood. Because the claims
expressed in Sufi treatises and hagiographies are excluded from the realm of presumably
“objective” fact, most anthropologists and social historians ignore these writings and
approach the Muslim saint form one of three methodological perspectives: Weberian
scholars such as Ernst Gellner work from the hypothesis that the meaning of sainthood is to
be found in the structure of social relations; Durkheimians such as Clifford Geertz start from
the assumption that the symbolism of the sacred reflects the hidden logic of the cultural
system in which the sacred is perceived; Marxists such as Pierre Bourdieu seek to explain
the ideology of sainthood in terms of class structure and the competition for material
resources. Although all of these approaches are relevant, each precludes the possibility of
finding heuristic value in either the hermeneutics of scripture or the metaphysics of the
sacred. (155-156)
This passage alludes to Eurocentrism in arguing that it is reductionist to neglect indigenous
hermeneutics and metaphysics and apply only social scientific analytical grids developed in the Western
academy, when examining Muslim sainthood.50
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Metaphysics are dealt with more frequently in the humanities (e.g. literature or philosophy) than the social
sciences (e.g. sociology or anthropology). Yet, even the humanities tend to be extremely Eurocentric, in the sense
that they usually posit Western Europeans and their descendants as the default humans. In the worlds most
powerful academic institutions (i.e. Western or Westernized universities), if you want to study drama, philosophy,
poetry, or other fields of human expression and thought in a universal manner, you will generally find yourself
studying Western works. To study non-Western cultural creations, you will be better served in a social science
context, such as an anthropology department. Japanese philosopher Osamu Nishitani (2006) observes that “[t]here
exist two families of terms that signify ‘human being’ within European languages. The first is ‘human’ or ‘humanity’
in English and ‘humain’ or ‘humanité’ in French. The second is ‘anthropos’ as it is employed in ‘anthropologie.’ The
former stems from the Latin word signifying human being (homo, humanus), and the later also signifies human
being in Greek” (259). An analysis of the most common modern usage of these terms reveals a disturbing binary.
Whereas anthropos generally signifies non-Europeans, and occasionally premodern Europeans, humanitas
generally refers to humans as an explicitly universal category, implicitly modeled on modern Westerners. “In this
manner, ‘humanitas’ gains significance as an intellectual activity in pursuit of the universal essence of that which is
human. It is the answer to a single question: ‘what is a human being?’ And the pursuit itself of that answer takes
place as the creation of that which is essentially human. If human beings are knowing beings, ‘humanitas’ is the
pursuit and realization of ‘humanitas’ by ‘humanitas’” (265). The relation between humanitas and anthropos is
colonial. “Put simply, people are ‘humanitas’ so long as they relate to knowledge subjectively, while those who
remain the object of that knowledge are ‘anthropos.’ ‘Humanitas’ produces knowledge and enriches itself by that
knowledge. ‘Anthropos,’ therefore, designates the position of the object that is absorbed into the domain of
knowledge produced by ‘humanitas’” (266). Today, it is possible for non-Europeans to enter the field of humanitas,
but it comes with a price according to Nishitani: “Of course, we can all receive this knowledge in principle, nonWesterners included. However, in what fashion? For example, those who are fortunate in former colonies study
Western languages at their former colonizer, thus forming themselves as subjects of knowledge. That means
escaping the station of ‘anthropos’ and becoming a subject who possesses and produces knowledge, i.e.
‘humanitas.’ We might call this process ‘humanization.’ Those ‘anthropos’ who become ‘humanitas’ through this
process, however, no longer behave as ‘anthropos.’ Those who were ‘humanized’ in this fashion under colonial
rule were often the most loyal servants of the colonial regime; a common point made by Frantz Fanon and Aimé
Césaire” (269).

67

One notion conveyed neither by the English term saint nor Eurocentric social science is
the understanding of prophetic inheritance in the Western Islamic tradition. When a person is
both a sharif and a saint, the prophetic inheritance is especially powerful. A famous descendant of
Idrîs I, who embodied these two types of inheritance, is ‘Abd al-Salâm Ibn Mashîsh (c. 1140- c.
1227, sometimes referred to as Ibn Bashîsh) (Zouanat 2005, 1989, al-Wahâbî 2018). He is
considered the first prominent figure in the Far Maghrib to symbolize the confluence of sharifism
and Sufism (Zouanat 2005, 55). In a litany which represents his only known written testament, Ibn
Mashîsh addresses the distinction of physical and spiritual prophetic inheritance when he refers
to the Prophet Muḥammad in the following terms: “Oh Allah, join me to his lineage [nasabihi] and
confirm me as counted with him [ḥasabihi]” (Tariqa Burhaniya 2005, 36, my translation).51 To be
counted with the Prophet here refers to a spiritual relation which can be distinct from a physical
relation through blood lineage.
From Egypt to Morocco, sharifism is to be understood as one, particularly auspicious, form of
prophetic inheritance, which is distinct from Shia sharifism. It is true that many historians categorize the
Idrîsids as a Zaydî Shia dynasty. Moreover, the Isma‘îlî Fâṭimid dynasty had a major impact on sharifism
in both Egypt and the Maghrib. But nuances need to be made. Rival Islamic currents took centuries to
develop into the sectarian divisions we know today (M. G. Hodgson 1955). They may have given birth to
today’s divisions, but they were not identical. For instance, Mâlik Ibn Anâs (c. 711-795) is now known as
the founder of the Mâlikî school of jurisprudence, one of the four traditional Sunni schools. Yet, he
studied with Ja‘far al-Ṣâdiq, best known today as a major Shia Imam. Mâlik supported the insurrection
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In the original Arabic, this text is also a model of eloquence, displaying beauty and magnificence in both meaning
and content. Internal rhymes, such as between the words nasabihi and ḥasabihi, contribute to this eloquence.
Moreover, the latter of the two terms is etymologically related to another important Sufi concept, muḥâsaba,
which refers to the strict self-examination (taking account of oneself) one must constantly undertake to progress
spiritually (Al-Ghazâlî 2015 [c. 1097]). Such linguistic allusions are significant in the Arabic literary tradition,
especially among Sufis.
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of Nafs al-Zakiyyah against the presumably Sunni ‘Abbâsid dynasty and encouraged Idrîs to flee Medina.
Are we to conclude that Idrîs was a Sunni Mâlikî or Mâlik a Zaydi Shia? It seems more reasonable to posit
that there was an early school of Medina which did not easily fit sectarian divisions as they later came to
be understood (Skali 2014 [2006], 24).52 The Medinan tradition was like a trunk from which many later
traditions branched out. It included sharifism, which also branched out into many later manifestations.
Medina is the model Islamic city. One may object that Mecca (Makka) is the model Islamic city,
but a subtle distinction must be made concerning the symbolism of these cities (Nomachi and Nasr
1997). Mecca is the city of Allah, which houses the Ka’ba, a square building in the centre of Islam’s
holiest sanctuary. The Ka’ba is known as the house of Allah, but not of course in the sense that Allah is
localized there, which would contradict basic Islamic doctrine. Muslims from everywhere in the world
face the direction of the Ka’ba when accomplishing the salat (ṣalâ), a specific type of prayer ritual
involving bodily movement such as prostrations.53 Mecca with its holy sanctuary symbolizes the
incomparable divine. It is a unique direction which unifies all Muslims. It is the inimitable centre of the
world.54 On the other hand, Medina houses the tomb of the Prophet Muḥammad. While the Prophet is
considered unique and inimitable, he is a human, and as such he is an ideal model for humans to imitate
to the best of their capacity.55 In Medina, the Prophet established the first Islamic polity, a city-state
which has served as a model for Islamic cities ever since. In the Far Maghrib, Fez is traditionally
understood as a reflection of the Medinan model. The mausoleum of its founder is the spiritual centre
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In the early modern period, when Catholic/Protestant sectarian conflicts were wreaking havoc among Christians
in Western Europe, Sunni/Shia sectarianism intensified in Central Islamdom lands, as sectarian ideologies were
utilized by the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923), dominated by Sunnis, and the Ṣafavid Empire (1501–1736), to justify
their bitter rivalry.
53
The English word prayer can be translated into several Arabic words, which refer to different acts of worship. For
instance, du‘a’ is a type of supplication which is much less formal and ritualized than salat.
54
For a comparative discussion about the central pillar of the world (Latin: axis mundi) in religious traditions, see
Mircea Eliade (1958 [original French 1949], 367-387, 1965 [original German 1957], 38-47). However, decades
before, the French Muslim Traditionalist René Guénon wrote extensively on this subject, notably in Le Roi du
monde (1927). The influence of Guénonian Traditionalism on Eliade is elucidated by Sedgwick (2004, 109-118, 189192).
55
In the Qur’an (68:4), the Prophet is described as having magnificent character traits.
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of the city. It houses the tomb of Idrîs II, a physical and spiritual descendant of the Prophet, a reflection
of the best human model. In Fez, multitudes of sharifs and saints are buried near the resting place of
Idrîs II, symbolically reflecting the function of Medina as the resting place of the Prophet, his
companions, and family. In the Far Maghrib, Fez symbolically inherits its sacred status from the Medinan
model. Sharifs serve a similar function as human inheritors of the prophetic model. (Skali 2014 [2006],
31-48)

Three Dimensions of Traditional Islam: Islâm, Îmân, and Iḥsân
Western Islam is a subsystem of the pan-Islamic Sunni tradition. This broader tradition needs to
be examined before specifying the unique characteristics of Western Islam. One of the basic Islamic
doctrines, upon which there is agreement across all schools, sects, currents and traditions, is that the
Prophet Muḥammad is the best model for all humans. Muslims everywhere attempt to imitate his
words and actions, which are collectively known as his sunna (his way). To be a Sunni, literally means to
be a follower of this way, an aspiration shared by normative Shiism as well. There is no disagreement
among Sunnis and Shias that the sunna is the secondary source of Islamic knowledge after the Quran,
Islam’s holy book, which is considered the word of God revealed to the Prophet. Actually, those we refer
to as Sunnis are more properly called ahl al-sunna wa al-jamâʻa (the people of the way and the
community). They represent an estimated 87 to 90 per cent of the world’s Muslims (Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life 2009, 1). The word jamâʻa, which refers to community, is closely related to ijma‘
(usually translated as consensus), a connection which is not simply etymological. Indeed, ahl al-sunnah
wa al-jamâʻa traditionally self-identify as those who seek consensus to preserve unity among the
Muslims. Consensus means compromise and even acceptance of diversity. It implies a rejection of
sectarianism in favour of internal pluralism based on agreement upon basic doctrines and practices and
tolerance of divergence on issues deemed of secondary importance:
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Although Sunni Islam comprises a variety of theological and legal schools, attitudes, and
outlooks conditioned by historical setting, locale, and culture, Sunnis around the world
share some common points: acceptance of the legitimacy of the first four successors of
Muhammad (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali), and the belief that other Islamic sects have
introduced innovations (bidah), departing from majority belief. (Esposito 2003)
Naturally, those accused of sectarianism by Sunnis would reject these assumptions. Moreover, there is
considerable debate among those who identify as Sunni about who has departed from majority belief,
and accusations of heresy are commonly made by Sunnis against others who identify as Shia.
Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, it is possible to discuss some of the basic beliefs and practices
of ahl al-sunna wa al-jamâʻa.
A foundational text to which Sunnis have widely referred when describing their religion is the
famous Hadith of Gabriel (Ḥadîth Jibrîl), related by the Prophet’s companion, and later third Caliph of
Islam, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭâb (c. 586-644). Here is the first part of this hadith, which is most pertinent to
the present discussion:
One day while we were sitting with the Messenger of Allah (may the blessings and peace of
Allah be upon him) there appeared before us a man whose clothes were exceedingly white
and whose hair was exceedingly black; no signs of journeying were to be seen on him and
none of us knew him. He walked up and sat down by the Prophet (may the blessings and
peace of Allah be upon him). Resting his knees against his and placing the palms of his
hands on his thighs, he said: O Muḥammad, tell me about Islam. The Messenger of Allah
(may the blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) said: Islam is to testify that there is no
god but Allah and Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allah, to perform the prayers, to pay the
zakât, to fast in Ramaḍân, and to make the pilgrimage to the House if you are able to do so.
He said: You have spoken rightly, and we were amazed at him asking him and saying that he
had spoken rightly. He said: Then tell me about îmân. He said: It is to believe in Allah, His
angels, His books, His messengers, and the Last Day, and to believe in divine destiny, both
the good and the evil thereof. He said: You have spoken rightly. He said: Then tell me about
iḥsân. He said: It is to worship Allah as though you are seeing Him and while you see Him
not56 truly He sees you. (Nawawî 1977 [c. 13th century], 28-33)
Later in this hadith, the Prophet informs his companions that the mysterious guest was the angel
Gabriel, who had come to teach them their religion.

56

Literally ‘’if you see Him not.”
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The questions and answers quoted here suggest that the religion comprises three main
elements, or dimensions: islâm, îmân, and iḥsân (Murata and Chittick 1994, xxvii). Each of these terms
and their derivatives are used frequently throughout the Qur’an. Although it can designate the entire
religion (e.g. Qur’an 5:3), islâm also refers to the religion’s first dimension in the Hadith of Gabriel,
arguably because the Prophet’s answer corresponds to the bare minimum required of all Muslims.
These mandatory acts are known as the five pillars of Islam: the profession of faith (shahâda), the five
daily salat, the fast during the month of Ramaḍân, the yearly zakât charity, and the pilgrimage to the
House of Allah, the Ka‘ba, during the period of Ḥajj. Îmân usually translates as ‘faith’ or ‘belief’(e.g.
Qur’an 2:108). It is the second dimension of Islam about which Gabriel enquires, described by the
Prophet as a list of six basic beliefs. Tradition designates these as the six articles of faith to be held by all
Muslims. Iḥsân is a polysemic term which can be translated as ‘beautiful excellence’ (e.g. Qur’an 55:60).
In the Hadith of Gabriel it is described as a state of being in which the worshipper is perpetually
conscious of the divine. Those who attain this elevated state are traditionally recognized as saints.
The descriptions of the three dimensions of Islam given by the Prophet synthesize the basic
tenets of three traditional sciences: fiqh, ‘aqîda, and taṣawwuf. Jurisprudence (fiqh) deals with the
dimension of islâm. It is the science of what Muslims must do, should do, could do, should not do, and
must not do. Fiqh is much broader than the field of law as it is understood in the modern West. It
encompasses collective responsibilities in areas such as governance, economics, and society.
Additionally, it includes individual duties to God and to creation, including oneself. Individuals are
situated in relation with other living beings, a category which includes all things, since the whole
universe is animate and worships God in the Islamic tradition. This worldview is examined by the science
of ‘aqîda (doctrine or creed), which deals with the dimension of îmân. It is also known as ‘ilm al-kalâm
(the science of discourse) which is the Islamic equivalent of scholastic theology. As such, it develops the
basic framework presented in the six articles of faith and attempts to establish which beliefs and ideas
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are correct or erroneous. Sufism, which is related to the third dimension, iḥsân, is notoriously difficult to
define.57
Sufism is an English term used to translate the Arabic term taṣawwuf, which refers to a field in
which an expert is called Sufi (ṣûfî). U.S. American specialist in Islamic studies Carl Ernst (2003) warns
that the English term has colonial connotations absent in the initial meaning of the Arabic taṣawwuf. He
explains that the “term and category ‘Sufism’ was first coined for European languages by British
Orientalists,” and that “the term ‘Sufi-ism’ was invented at the end of the eighteenth century, as an
appropriation of those portions of ‘Oriental’ culture that Europeans found attractive” (110). Moreover,
“the essential feature of the definitions of Sufism that appeared at this time was the insistence that
Sufism had no intrinsic relation with the faith of Islam” (110.). However, Ernst concedes that “Sufism has
now become a standard term, whether we like it or not” (112). Without rejecting the term, it is
important to be aware of its multiple connotations.
In the broader pan-Islamic Sunni tradition being discussed here, taṣawwuf is related to the
notion of Iḥsân, which describes the perpetual and conscious relationship of a person to the Infinite,
understood as beyond any form of definition or limitation. Moreover, iḥsân refers to an inner
experience. Yet discursive reasoning is incapable of adequately describing—let alone defining—
experiential knowledge. To use a typical Sufi metaphor, Sufism is a taste (dhawq).58 Words, incapable of
describing the simple taste of coffee or honey, are even less capable of describing the taste of
metaphysical realities. There is also an ethical dimension to iḥsân since it is understood that an intense
experiential relationship with the Divine should manifest itself on the social level as ethical conduct. For
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In the Shia tradition, the term ‘irfân (gnosis) is often used rather than taṣawwuf. This terminological difference is
one of many examples of the distinct Sunni and Shia approaches to the science of iḥsân (Geoffroy 2009, 41-47).
58
By the time the terminology of Sufism was being codified in the tenth and elevent centuries, it was already
established that Sufis use tasting (dhawq) and drinking (sharb) “to describe the fruits of God’s self-manifestation,
the results of God’s self-unveiling and God’s unexpected visitations, which they experience” (al-Qushayri 2007
[1045], 95).
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this reason, Sufism is often connected to codes of moral excellence called futuwwa (chivalry) and more
broadly to the development of noble character (adab).
For our present purpose, Sufism can be described as the Islamic science devoted to individual
spiritual enlightenment through direct experiential knowledge of the divine. This science offers
indications, and in some cases a fully developed methodology, on how to attain a state of spiritual
excellence. Another facet of this science delves into the metaphysical truths experienced in that state.
Because of the limitations of discursive language, Sufis often share their knowledge through poetry,
song, and other modes of expression which provoke aesthetic experiences. These sensory experiences
serve analogically and symbolically as allusions to extrasensory experiences. Ideally, they can serve as
gateways to metaphysical knowledge. At the same time, they can be understood at many levels,
according to one’s predisposition and level of spiritual development. One powerful experience can make
an illiterate person more knowledgeable of Sufism than scholars who have devoted their entire lives to
theory. For this reason, Sufism is more holistic than jurisprudence or doctrine. As the science of the
limitless, it cannot be limited to science, and it overflows into art and culture in a unique way. Moreover,
it defies class, gender, ethnicity, age and other social confines. Sufis can be found in all sectors of
society, as experiential experts of metaphysical knowledge.
Like all specialists, experts in the fields of fiqh, ‘aqîda, and taṣawwuf represent a tiny minority of
the population, but they have an enormous social impact. They are occupied with the core elements of
the normative Sunni tradition.59 Fiqh prescribes limits on what a baker, a ruler, a parent, a merchant,
and all other types of people can do. But cuisine, governing, parenting, trade and a wide variety of other
aspects of life represent distinct traditions. Similarly, ‘aqîda establishes a basic framework of beliefs
about God and the universe to be espoused by astronomers, biologists, physicians, engineers,
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The focus on Sunni sources is guided by the subject of this research, and in no way implies that this threefold
division of traditional Islamic science is exclusively Sunni.
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calligraphers, cooks, gardeners, and all others exploring specific aspects of reality. Taṣawwuf guides
people towards a state of spiritual excellence but does not determine how such an experience will
inspire them to achieve beautiful excellence in their daily occupations, or how they will express their
inner states. Multiple ways of being, knowing, and behaving flourish in relation to the three dimensions
of Islam described in the Hadith of Gabriel. Together, they comprise a dynamic and plural tradition.

The Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî Consensus
Western Islam, as a tradition encompassing multiple traditions, presents a distinct normative
approach to the three dimensions of Sunni Islam. In The Helpful Guide (Al-Murshid al-Mu'în, also known
as Al Matn Ibn 'Âshir), the Moroccan saint and scholar 'Abd al-Wâḥid Ibn Aḥmad Ibn 'Alî Ibn 'Âshir (c.
1582-c. 1631) summarizes the dominant understanding of orthodoxy in the Maghrib and much of West
Africa as following “the Doctrine of Imam Ash‘arî, the Jurisprudence of Imam Mâlik, and the Inner Path
of Imam Junayd, The Traveler” (Ali 2014, 8). This translation is by Ali, who is intimately familiar with
traditional North African Islam, as a graduate of the prestigious al-Qarawîyyîn University in Fez,
Morocco, reputed to be the oldest university in the world. 60
In his commentary, Ali (2014) writes that Abû al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarî (c. 873/874 c. 935, /936) “was
given credit for codifying the creed of the mainstream Sunni Muslims, and was declared to be the Imam
of Ahl Al-Sunnah wa Al-Jama’a of his time by the later Sunni authorities” (8). Al-Ashʿarî was an Arab
scholar who founded a school of ‘aqîda, which gradually came to dominate the Sunni tradition. One of
the many scholars who championed his doctrinal teachings was Abû Ḥâmid al-Ghazâlî (c. 1058-1111),
“one of the most prominent and influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, and mystics of Sunni
Islam” (Griffel 2016).
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Al-Qarawîyyîn was founded in 859, whereas al-Azhar in Cairo was founded in c. 970-972. Yet there is some
debate as to when each institution developed from a specialized school into a full-fledged university.
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Ali (2014) explains that Mâlik ibn Anâs (c. 711-795) “was known as the Imam of the Abode of
Migration, and the Scholar of Medina whose coming was foretold by the Prophet Muhammad – may
Allah bless and grant him peace” (8). The Mâlikî school (madhhab) of jurisprudence is named after
Mâlik, whose book al-Muwaṭṭaʾ (the Approved) is the oldest surviving compendium of Islamic law. One
of the distinguishing features of Mâlikî jurisprudence is that it considers the practice (‘amal) of the
Medinan community as a valid source of law from which to interpret the meaning and implications of
the Qur’an and sunna (al-Taʼwīl 2014). It is also open to many legal sources used in other schools, such
as analogical reasoning (qiyâs), juristic discretion (istiḥsân), and even custom (‘urf). Overall, Mâlik
emphasized practice over theory, and disliked needless speculation. When asked about hypothetical
situations, he would famously respond “Ask about what actually exists and leave off what does not
exist” (al-Taʼwīl 2014, 13). Although Shâfi‘î jurisprudence is more common along much of the Eastern
coast of Africa, and both Shâfi‘î and Ḥanafî jurisprudence are followed in Northern Egypt, Mâlikî
jurisprudence dominates Western Islamic law. Its emphasis on sober realism and practice also influences
other aspects of Western Islam.
Sober realism and moderation are also distinguishing features of normative Western Islamic
Sufism. The paucity of major Sufi written works produced in the Western Islamicate before the twelfth
century stands in stark contrast to the abundance of writings by Sufis east of the Mediterranean.
However, this does not indicate an absence of spirituality in the Islamic West, which “was a society
eager to practise Islam rather than formulate it” (Mackeen 1971, 408). Perhaps this is why Ibn ‘Âshir
looked eastward to an Iranian Sufi who lived in Baghdad when formulating his description of orthodox
Sufism. Indeed, Abû al-Qâsim al-Junayd (830-910) was known for his asceticism and temperance. Ali
(2014, 9) calls him the “Shaykh of the Sufis.” By describing Junayd as “the Traveller” Ibn ‘Âshir was
referring to the practice of Sufism as a serious path to be travelled. This path is characterized by
discipline and a concern for orthodoxy. In the words of Junayd, “[w]e learned Sufism not through words
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but through hunger, the renunciation of this world, and through depriving ourselves from the things
which we are accustomed to and in which we take delight” (al-Qushayri 2007 [1045], 43). Furthermore,
“[t]his teaching of ours is bound by the foundations of the [Sacred] Book and the custom [of the
Prophet]” (ibid., 44).
Junayd as a model of temperate Sufism is often set in contrast to another Persian Sufi living in
Baghdad, al-Ḥusayn ibn Manṣûr al-Ḥallâj (c. 858-922). This one-time student of Junayd was put to death
after having publicly exclaimed “Anâ al-Ḥaqq” (“I am the Truth”), an ostensibly blasphemous statement,
since Al-Ḥaqq is one of the names of God in the Islamic tradition. Yet, the Truth is not only a proper
name for God. It is also a quality with which created things and beings can be associated. A charitable
opinion would be that the Sufi was simply identifying with the quality, not the divine name. Ḥallâj’s
defenders also argue that he was in such a powerfully ecstatic state that he had lost his sense of self and
become fully overcome with the presence of God. He could not be referring to himself if he had truly
forgotten himself. Thus, Ḥallâj is associated with the Sufi current of ‘drunkenness’ or ‘intoxication’ (sakr)
in contrast to the sobriety (ṣahw) of Junayd.61 Moreover, Ḥallâj’s vocal opposition to abuses committed
by political and economic elites in Baghdad must have been a factor in his persecution, whereas Junayd
maintained a cautious distance from those in power without openly confronting them. “Where al-Hallaj
became the preeminent Sufi martyr, al-Junayd became the exemplar for those who sought the enduring
institutional development of Sufism, by carving out a viable theological niche and conscientiously
relating to Islamic and political authority” (Dickson and Sharify-Funk 2017, 189). Indeed, in traditional
Muslim societies there are various types of saints, ranging from disciplined scholars to wandering
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In Sufi terminology, drunkenness and sobriety are to be understood metaphorically as describing spiritual states.
These two opposing or complementary states have broadly come to be symbolized in the Sufi tradition by Ḥallâj
and Junayd. Such symbolism has its wisdom and didactic purpose within the tradition, but from a historian’s
perspective appears facile. For instance, historical accounts of Ḥallâj’s trial reveal a complicated web of religious,
legal, and political factors. Ḥallâj may not even have been executed for saying “I am the Truth” (Ernst 1997, 71).
Despite its Eurocentric Orientalist tone, the classic biography of Ḥallâj by French Orientalist Louis Massignon (1922)
remains a thorough and nuanced scholarly work.
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hermits, spontaneously ravished by the divine presence.62 Sufism is internally diverse, and includes
ecstatic, socially non-conformist, or even antinomian trends whose practitioners generally exist outside
the organizational structures of the Sufi Orders, although they do interact in often complementary and
mutually respectful ways (Dickson and Sharify-Funk 2017, 112-121). In many regards, ecstatic Sufis
resemble Shakespearean wise fools who keep figures of institutional authority in check. They certainly
tend to play this role with regards to the Sufis and scholars of the Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî tradition which
dominates the Western Islamicate.
Yet, the Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî consensus only emerged after centuries of disputes between
competing schools of thought, especially Khârijîs, Isma‘îlîs, Ḥanafîs, and Mâlikîs (M’Baye 2011, 311319).63 Apart from the Ismâ‘îlîs, who had a sophisticated tradition of theological and mystical thought,
early Islamic scholars in the region tended towards rigorous legalism and were often suspicious of
theology, mysticism, and metaphysics. Although the Ummayads in al-Andalus officially adopted Mâlikî
fiqh in the mid-ninth century, this school did not achieve predominance across the Far Maghrib until the
eleventh century when the Murâbiṭûn dynasty (c. 1054-1147, also known in English as the Almoravids)
built an empire which at its peak covered most of the Far Maghrib and al-Andalus (Laroui 1970, 147-160,
Rivet 2012, 104-120). With its capital in Marrakesh, this empire reached as far south as the Senegal
River, included present-day Algeria in the east, and unified all the Muslim lands of Iberia apart from the
kingdom of Valencia. Under the pressure of the Almoravids, the Ghana Empire (c. 7 th centrury-1240)
slowly fragmented into smaller polities until it became mostly assimilated into the Mali Empire (c. 1230c. 1550). Almoravid religious influence increased, especially through marriage with regional nobility. All
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For a discussion of the various categories of saints in the Moroccan context, see Cornell (1998). Skali (2014
[2006]) also proposes an in-depth study of this topic limited to the city of Fez.
63
It should be noted that throughout Islamdom, these disputes often took place in the margins of power, among
scholars suspicious of the corrupting influence of governing elites. Court-appointed religious scholars were few in
comparison to the majority of Sunni and Shia ulama who tried to be independent.
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West Africa was deeply influenced by the Almoravids, not only through conquest, but through
intellectual exchanges and intermarriage.
However, many of the Mâlikî scholars supported by governing elites favoured a strict legalistic
focus on orthopraxis and were hostile to intellectual and metaphysical currents more common in the
central and eastern Islamicate. Despite this legalism, and partly in reaction to it, from the eleventh to
the thirteenth centuries, which roughly corresponds to the rule of the Almoravid and Almohad
dynasties, many Western Islamic scholars became interested in theology, metaphysics, and mysticism.
They were increasingly connected to Sunni internationalist networks which promoted hadith-based,
Ash‘arî theology, and were generally open to Sufism. Championed by Sufis like Ghazâlî, this emerging
Pan-Islamic tradition also rejected sectarian exclusivism between Sunni schools of jurisprudence. The
intellectual distance between the Eastern (al-Mashriq) and Western (al-Maghrib) Islamicate was
gradually decreasing thanks to networks of theologians, legists, and Sufis, many of whom combined all
three types of expertise. (Cornell 1998, 3-94)
It is only as the Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî consensus slowly developed from the eleventh century
onward that the science and practices linked to Islam’s spiritual dimension of iḥsân became explicitly
associated with the term taṣawwuf across the Western Islamicate. At that time, the Sufi lodge (zâwiya
or ribâṭ) emerged as a powerful institution in the Far Maghrib and to an extent in al-Andalus (Cornell
1998, 34-40), although institutionalized Sufism only gradually spread into West Africa between the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries (Vikør 2000, 444). Usually connected to a mosque and madrasa
(school), the zâwiya served as a centre of basic learning for all types of Islamic sciences and played a
pivotal role in the ongoing spread of normative Islam in rural and urban areas. Western Islamic Sufism,
especially in the Far Maghrib, developed mostly as an ascetic discipline influenced by Eastern currents of
Illuminative mysticism (nûriyya) which emphasized divinely inspired wisdom and gnostic contemplation
as an epistemic source (Cornell 1998, 54-62). It was also greatly concerned with codes of chivalry
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(futuwwa), which Cornell describes as ‘’humility and a total devotion to the service of others’’ (Cornell
1998, 26). These codes of conduct, which entail civic engagement combined with a scrupulous respect
for Islamic law, facilitated the emergence of a normative understanding of Sufism as simultaneously
otherworldly and engaged in society. Sufis trained themselves through asceticism and periods of
isolation but often tried to remain involved in society as compassionate contributors and tough critics of
injustice. In the Far Maghrib, such worldly engagement frequently led to tensions between Sufis and the
political, economic, and religious elites they tended to criticize.
Normative Junaydî Sufism in the Western Islamicate presents itself as serious and socially
conservative. Ecstatic practices of samâ’ (spiritual music) and dhikr (repetition and remembrance of
God’s names) are to be conducted in strictly controlled conditions under surveillance of a spiritual guide
(shaykh). Less controlled popular ecstatic practices, which coexist alongside this normative trend, have
been portrayed as superstitious and unreasonable by the major figures of Junaydî Sufism, such as Abû
Madyan Shu‘ayb (c. 1115-1198). Known as the Junayd of the West (Abû Madyan 1996), Abû Madyan
was described as “the spokesman of our order and the one who revived it in the West” (Ibn al-ʻArabī
2008 [13th cent., 1971 first English version], 69) by another famous Andalusian-born Sufi, the
metaphysician Muḥyî al-Dîn ibn al-ʿArabî (1165-1240). Many branches of the Qâdiriyya Sufi order,
named after the great Sufi of Baghdad ‘Abd al-Qâdir al-Jîlanî (1077-1166), trace their spiritual lineage to
Abû Madyan. In West Africa, the Qâdiriyya was the dominant Sufi order from the sixteenth or
seventeenth century, until the arrival of the Tijâniyya Order, which spread in the late eighteenth
century.64
Other important Junaydî Sufis of the Maghrib include Ibn Mashîsh (c. 1140-c. 1227) and his
successor Shâdhilî (c. 1196/1197 -1258) after whom one of the most widespread Sufi Orders in the
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Indeed, the Qâdiriyya was one of the earliest formally institutionalized Sufi orders, although the Rifâ‘iyya seems
to have been the first (Trimingham 1998 [1971], 11).
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world, the Shâdhiliyya, is named (Geoffroy 2005, Ibn al-Ṣạ bbagh 1993 [c.14th cent.], Ibn ʻAṭāʼ Allāh 2005
[c. 13th cent.], Maḥmûd 1968). This order is famous for encouraging disciples to focus on dhikr and
practice a moderate asceticism without abandoning their families and occupations. Many scholars have
followed this path, including legists such as Abû al-Faḍl ‘Iyyâḍ (c. 1083-c. 1149) a renowned qâḍî (judge)
in Sabta and Granada (Jallāb 2017, vol. 1, 58-150). Furthermore, both Ibn Mashîsh and Shâdhilî were
descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad through the founder of the first Moroccan Muslim dynasty,
Idrîs I. Through their heritage, education, and influence, they embodied the emerging Western Islamic
convergence of sharifism, Mâlikî fiqh, Ash‘arî ‘aqîda and Junaydî taṣawwuf.

Conclusion
When the modern/colonial era began in the fifteenth century, a distinct Islamic tradition had
long emerged in the Western Islamicate comprising nearly all of Iberia and Northwest Africa. The
Western Islamic tradition had been developing gradually and hesitantly since the arrival of Muslims in
the seventh and eighth century. At first, there were too many conflicting traditions and schools of
thought to allow for the predominance of one normative tradition across the region. However,
conditions changed in the eleventh century with the rise of the Murâbiṭûn Empire, which spread across
most of the Far Maghrib and al-Andalus. Although the Murâbiṭûns only conquered part of West Africa,
they had a considerable cultural and religious impact south of the Sahara.
The normative Western Islamic tradition arose from the convergence of four currents: (1)
veneration of the Prophet Muḥammad’s descendants (sharifism); (2) Mâlikî jurisprudence (fiqh); (3)
Ash‘arî theological doctrine (‘aqîda); and (4) Junaydî Sufism (taṣawwuf), characterized by temperance,
discipline and a concern for orthodoxy. Once unified, these currents represented a reference point
around which multiple sciences, occupations, practices, and ways of being were organized. Together,
these multiple lifeways and worldviews formed a distinct tradition, with internal divergences and
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confluences. Moreover, Western Islam was itself a subsection of a pan-Islamic Sunni tradition known as
ahl al-sunna wa al-jamâʻa (the people of the way and the community), which was also being
consolidated at the time. This broader tradition represented an attempt by a wide range of Islamic
scholars to preserve unity among Muslims by rejecting sectarianism and promoting internal pluralism, a
process which entails agreeing upon basic precepts and accepting differences of opinion on secondary
matters.
Understanding the structure of Western traditional Islam examined in this chapter, as it
emerged from the seventh to the fifteenth centuries, provides the historical context which can help to
understand the deeply disruptive impact of the early modern/colonial world-system on Muslims in the
Atlantic world. Yet structuralist analyses can only superficially address how these Muslims experienced
this tradition and its disruption. The following chapter attempts to evoke some of the qualitative aspects
of tradition as it has been experienced by people in the Western Islamicate.
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Chapter 2- Beauty and Well-Being: Tasting Tradition in the Maghrib and al-Andalus

َ ۡ ت َو
ص ۡي
ِ َﺧلَﻖَ السﱠمٰ ٰو
ُ َسن
ِ ص َو َر ُك ۡۚم َواِلَ ۡي ِه ۡال َم
َ ص ﱠو َر ُكمۡ فَا َ ۡح
َ اﻻ ۡر
َ ـﻖ َو
ِ ّ ض ِب ۡال َح
He created the heavens and the earth with the truth, and He shaped you and made your
shapes excellent; and to Him is the journey’s end. (Qur’an 64:3)
On one of the following evenings we were invited home by a Moroccan friend, to a house
which, like all Moorish65 houses, opened only onto an inner courtyard, entirely white,
where roses grew in profusion and an orange tree sparkled festively with blossoms and
fruits. The room on the ground floor, where the guests sat in threes and fours on low
divans, opened onto this courtyard. Amongst all the men present, there was also a small
dark-skinned Arab boy, whose thin face was as if transfigured by an inward fire as well as by
a child-like smile. The master of the house told us he was the best singer of spiritual songs
in the whole country. After the meal he invited him to sing to us. The boy shut his eyes and
began, softly at first, and then gradually more loudly, to render a qaṣīda, a symbolical lovesong. And some of the guests who had gathered near him and had drawn back the hoods of
their jellabas sang the refrain, which contained the shahada (the attestation of Divine
Unity) in a harsh, ancient Andalusian style. The Arabic verses of the poem grew faster and
faster, in a quick, intense tempo, while the answering refrain surged forth in widely
extending waves. All of a sudden the volume of the chorus, which until then had only
'answered' the singer, flowed on without interruption and branched into several parallel
rhythms, above which the voice of the leading singer continued at a higher pitch, like a
heavenly exultation above a song of war.
It was miraculous how the many strands of the melody never came together in those
accords which allow the flow of feeling to rest as if on a broad couch and which promise to
human longing an all too easy, all too human consolation; the melody never turned into a
worldly 'space', its different strands never came together as if reconciled; they continued
endlessly, circling undiminishingly around a silent center, which became ever more clearly
audible, as a timeless presence, an other-worldly 'space', without yesterday or tomorrow, a
crystalline 'now', in which all impatience is extinguished.
This was Fez, unalterable, indestructible Fez. (Burckhardt 1992 [1960], 9)
Having examined the development of a distinct tradition in the premodern/precolonial Maghrib
and al-Andalus, the discussion now turns from the broad scope of history to the subtleties of human
experience. In short, this chapter attempts to evoke the taste of tradition. A difficult task. But an
important one in order to understand the disruptive impact of the modern/colonial world-system
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Moorish is a slightly antiquated and sometimes derogatory term, usually designating the culture of the Western
Islamicate. Moors is a related term designating Muslims in the same region.
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analysed in Sections Two and Three, and why Muslims have struggled to perpetuate and draw
inspiration from this tradition. It is important to ask what is inspiring about the traditional notions of
beauty and well-being which came to have a major impact on Muslims everywhere West of Mecca,
including eventually in North America.66 How are metaphysical principles expressed through the worldly
pursuits of people with these distinct aesthetic sensibilities? In this context, what does it mean to live a
good life and be well?
In the Maghrib and al-Andalus, distinct sensibilities about beauty and well-being manifest
themselves through architecture, arts, crafts, and literature, but also in areas such as hygiene,
cosmetics, fashion, home decoration, and cuisine. Infusing these diverse phenomena is a deeper sense
about what it means to live a good life—a sense related to the traditional Islamic dimension of iḥsân,
whose specialists are known as Sufis. Consequently, much of the following discussion concerns the
central role of Sufism in the development of Western Islamic traditions of beauty and well-being.
Moreover, Sufism deserves special attention as the traditional Islamic science most surrounded by
controversy and confusion in the modern/colonial period, especially since the eighteenth century
(Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], Sharify-Funk, Dickson and Xavier 2018). It is true that there has been
disagreement about jurisprudence and dogmatic theology, the other two fundamental traditional
Islamic sciences discussed in Chapter One. Yet, their legitimacy within the tradition has not been
contested as it has been for Sufism. As discussed in Chapter Six, modern/colonial debates about
tradition and modernity frequently reflect divergent understandings about premodern/precolonial
Sufism. References to the formative period of institutional Sufism in the Maghrib and al-Andalus, from
the eleventh to the fifteenth century, are especially relevant to understand the nature of these debates.
Sufi lineages and networks with distinct theories and practices emerged in this place and time. But some
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more recent references are also appropriate, since tradition has been challenged but not destroyed by
modernity/coloniality. In any case, the focus for now is more on experience than history.

Understanding Experience
Moving beyond mere description to gain an empathetic understanding of human experience can
be challenging in certain academic disciplines. For instance, the limitations of history and sociology
become evident when dealing with experience, because they approach topics as exterior objects of
study—they are objective.67 Annemarie Schimmel (1994) (1922-2003) explains:
All these approaches are valid and offer the researcher ways to understand a religion, in
this case Islam, somewhat better. However, more than other branches of scholarship the
study of religion is beset with difficulties, the most important one being the necessity of
formulating one's stance on the object of one's research while at the same time suspending
judgment, since one is dealing with something which, after all, constitutes the most sacred
area in the lives of millions of people. Can one really deal with religion—in general or in its
specific forms—as if one were dealing with any other object of study as is nowadays
claimed by many historians of religion? Personally, I wonder if a completely objective study
of religion is possible when one respects the sphere of the Numinous and the feeling of the
otherworldly in one's approach, and realizes that one is dealing with actions, thought
systems and human reactions and responses to something that lies outside purely
‘scientific’ research. (xi-xii)
Other approaches to knowledge are needed to understand experience. Schimmel, who is also an
accomplished historian of Islam, suggests that a phenomenological approach is best suited “to enter into
the heart of religion by studying first the phenomena and then deeper and deeper layers of human
responses to the Divine” (xii). She further notes that
the highest spiritual experience can be triggered off by a sensual object: a flower, a
fragrance, a cloud or a person. Islamic thinkers have always pondered the relation between
the outward manifestations and the Essence, based on the Koranic words: ‘We put Our
signs into the horizons and into themselves’ (Sûra 41:53). For the Muslim, everything could
serve as an âya, a sign from God, and the Koran repeats this truth over and over again,
warning those who do not believe in God's signs or who belie them. The creatures are signs;
the change between day and night is a sign, as is the loving encounter of husband and wife;
and miracles are signs (Sûra 30:19–25): they all prove that there is a living God who is the
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Objectivity understood in this sense need not imply neutrality or absence of bias, in the positivist sense. It simply
refers to an approach in which the scholar’s locus of enunciation remains exterior to the topic.
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originator of everything. These signs are not only in the ‘horizons’, that is, in the created
universe, but also in the human souls, that is, in the human capacity to understand and
admire; in love and human inquisitiveness; in whatever one may feel, think, and
experience. The world is, as it were, an immense book in which those who have eyes to see
and ears to hear can recognize God's signs and thus be guided by their contemplation to
the Creator Himself. Sensual and spiritual levels meet through and in the signs, and by
understanding and interpreting them one may be able to understand the Divine wisdom
and power; one will also understand that, as the Koran proclaims repeatedly, God teaches
by means of comparisons, parables and likenesses to draw the human heart beyond the
external, peripheral faces of creation.
For one has to keep in mind that spiritual aspects of life can be revealed only by means of
sensual ones—the wind becomes visible only though the movement of the grass, as the
nineteenth-century Indo-Muslim poet Ghâlib sings; the dust which we may see from far in
the desert hides the rider who stirs it up; and the foam flakes on the surface of the ocean
point to the unfathomable abyss. (xii-xiii)
By presenting a phenomenology of Islam, Schimmel was swimming against the current in late
twentieth-century religious studies. Since that time, the tendency in the field has been to reject
phenomenology of religion as essentialist and unscientific, for presupposing that religion is a stable and
fundamental category of human existence, with mystical experience as its essence or core. Antiessentialist approaches consider religion an unstable social construct. Schimmel was pushing back,
knowing full well that the
scholarly study of Islam has in recent years attracted more and more people, spurred on by
the political developments in the Muslim world and in other areas increasingly populated
by Muslims. Needless to say, many of these political and sociological studies have little
interest in the ‘spiritual’ values of Islam, instead ranging from questions of religious
authority to the position of children in medieval Muslim society; from Muslim responses to
Western education to the changing role of the Sufis; from the mechanics of conversion to
the formation and functioning of the biosphere in the Koran; and concerning the question
of human rights and their implementation in the modern world. (vii)
Whether or not one accepts or rejects the essentialist premises of phenomenology, it should be
recognized that Schimmel is legitimately concerned that objective approaches cannot do justice to
religious experience.
More recently, Ann Taves (2009, xiv) has attempted to resurrect the notion of experience in
religious studies from a naturalistic position, arguing that “experience can be studied both as a biological
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phenomenon from the science side of the divide and as a subjective phenomenon from the humanistic
side.” However, even the binary representation of subjective and objective knowledge seems
problematic when approached from the transdisciplinary standpoint favoured in this dissertation. Article
5 of the Charter of Transdisciplinarity affirms that “[t]he transdisciplinary vision is resolutely open
insofar as it goes beyond the field of the exact sciences and demands their dialogue and their
reconciliation with the humanities and the social sciences, as well as with art, literature, poetry and
spiritual experience” (see Appendix One). Taves makes a similar argument fifteen years later. However,
her interdisciplinary approach is less radical than the vision set forth in article 6 of the Charter: “In
comparison with interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity is multireferential and
multidimensional. While taking account of the various approaches to time and history,
transdisciplinarity does not exclude a transhistorical horizon” (see Appendix One).
Transdisciplinarity, with its characteristic suppleness and openness to multiple ways of knowing
and experiencing reality, is best suited to discover culturally distinct sensibilities about beauty and wellbeing. Such sensibilities are implicitly understood by members of a community and transmitted
intergenerationally. This does not entail a static consensus. Individuals and subgroups within a
community may differ. Moreover, the borders between communities are always fuzzy. Certain people
may be attracted to external trends and currents which can be to an extent imported, internalized and
transformed, creating new internal currents. Yet, by stepping back one can perceive dominant trends
and sensibilities around which this plurality flourishes. Attempting to define these currents is mostly
futile, since discursive reason is ill-adapted to the realm of taste. To share non-rational and experiential
knowledge, it is wiser to utilize the resources of art, literature, and non-verbal forms of communication
which trigger empathy and a degree of imitation. For instance, one who has never been in love could
learn much about love by observing two lovers. How they sound, move, and interact could trigger
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vicarious experiential knowledge in the observer, which can simply not be obtained through rational
analysis.
From a transdisciplinary perspective, it seems appropriate to follow Schimmel’s advice, and begin
with an aesthetic appreciation of phenomena such as places, events, objects, sayings, and writings.
These phenomena can serve as entrances into deeper and deeper realms of experiential knowledge
about beauty and well-being in the Western Islamic tradition. Accordingly, the following discussion
starts with aspects of material culture, such as urban development, architecture, and crafts, before
moving towards human occupations, and concluding with metaphysics. The subtle force connecting and
encompassing all these dimensions can be called tradition.

Magnificent Andalusian Cities
Cities can serve as an excellent showcase for Islamicate traditions, as attested by the urban
civilization of al-Andalus, whose material legacy continues to attract tourists more than five centuries
after the end of Muslim rule.68 This legacy includes architecture, gardens, arts, crafts, and technology.
An important aspect of this material culture is that while it developed highly efficient solutions to
functional problems, such as irrigation or conservation of perishable goods, it also expressed
conceptions of beauty and harmony connected to sacred sciences like numerology and sacred
geometry. The ideal Islamic city was a holistic matrix connecting the microcosm of individuals to the
macrocosm of the universe (Burckhardt 2009 [1976], 199-225, Michon 2008, 4-10, 30-45, 59-87).69 All
these levels were symbolically related as diverse creative expressions of the One Absolute Metaphysical
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The Islamic material legacy is especially well-preserved in the eight provinces of Southern Spain which comprise
the region of Andalucia. “In 2016, the region of Andalucia received 10.6 million international tourists. 12% up on
2015, which was 10% up on 2014, which was 8% up on 2013, which was 3% up on 2012” (Chaplow 2019). The
Alhambra palace in Granada, home to the last Muslim dynasty in Spain until 1492, recorded over 2.4 million
visitors in 2014 (Jones 2015).
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For a more general discussion of cities as symbols of the cosmos, see Eliade (1965 [original German 1957], 47-49)
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Reality of God. Consciously connecting to this underlying unity was achieved through sciences
concerned with individuals (such as psychology), society (such as architecture), and the universe (such as
astronomy/astrology). These sciences were generally considered of little value if they did not improve
individual, social, and environmental conditions in both useful and beautiful ways. There was no rupture
between science, technology, and art. The loss of this holistic worldview is one of the symptoms of
Eurocentric modernity decried by Traditionalists such as Burckhardt (2009 [1976]) :
If art is no longer considered a science—that is, a part of knowledge—it is because Beauty,
the object of contemplation at various levels, is no longer recognized as an aspect of the
Real. The normal order of things has, indeed, been so far overturned that ugliness is readily
identified with reality, beauty being no more than the object of an aestheticism whose
outlines are utterly subjective and shifting. (224)
Naturally, not everyone in a traditional context is concerned with or even aware of these
multiple dimensions, but even the daily actions of unconscious individuals participate in perpetuating
this collective worldview. Nasr (1987a) describes the interconnectedness of the city with the individual,
cosmic, and metaphysical levels of reality:
God designated the whole of virgin nature, that inexhaustible masterpiece of His creative
act, as the place of worship for Muslims and distinguished His final messenger by allowing
Islam, the primordial religion, to return to primordial nature as its temple. The sacred
architecture of Islam par excellence is the mosque which is itself but the 'recreation' and
'recapitulation' of the harmony, order, and peace of nature which God chose as the
Muslims' enduring house of worship. In praying in a traditional mosque the Muslim in a
sense returns to the bosom of nature, not externally but through the inner nexus which
relates the mosque to the principles and rhythms of nature and integrates its space into
that sacred space of primordial creation which dilated and still dilates, to the extent that
virgin nature has survived the onslaughts of Promethean man, in the Divine Presence that
at once calms and unifies the soul. Through the Divine Command which placed nature as
the Muslim's temple of worship, the sacred architecture of Islam becomes an extension of
nature as created by God within the environment constructed by man. It becomes
encompassed by and participates in the unity, inter-relatedness, harmony, and serenity of
nature even within the environment of the city and town. It becomes in fact a centre from
which these qualities emanate to the whole of the urban environment. The spaces and
forms of the traditional Muslim town and city are in a sense extensions of the mosque,
organically related to it and participating in its sanctifying and unifying character in the
same way that the whole city or town participates in the blessedness that emanates from
the chanting of the Quran and the call to prayers (al-adhan) issuing from the precinct of the
mosque. In making the mosque an extension of primordial nature, Islam emphasizes the
primordial nature of man himself. This nature it seeks to revive and reaffirm by awakening
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man from the dream of forgetfulness, arousing within him the consciousness of the reality
of the One or the Absolute, a consciousness which constitutes the very substance of
primordial man and the raison d'être of human existence. (37-38)
From the traditional Islamic perspective, urban development serves both other-worldly and worldly
functions. Yet, in the face of Divine Unity, such binaries appear as complementary rather than opposed
or separated. In the Islamically inspired city, there is no conceptual rupture between the spiritual and
the material, the sacred and the profane, or the beautiful and the functional.
The first generations of Muslims built many cities connected by a complex network of routes
over land and sea. These urban centres exhibited the rapidly increasing knowledge, know-how, and
artistry of a new civilization which stretched from the borders of China to the Atlantic Ocean. Ancient
cities were revived, and new ones founded. In this process, a vast reservoir of pre-existing cultures,
comprising a dizzying diversity of worldviews and lifeways, came into close contact. Products from
enormously different places were displayed together in busy markets, and people from different lands
sat together, sharing knowledge and techniques. Often, they fell in love with foreigners and settled far
from their birthplaces. Children sang poems in languages their ancestors had never heard, as new
combinations of knowledge, know-how, and culture were born.
Building an unprecedentedly huge, cosmopolitan, and urbanized empire was an extraordinary
accomplishment for the ruling minority of mostly Arab Muslims. Jean-Louis Michon (2008) (1924-2013)
notes the “astonishing contrast within the geographical and human context where the Islamic message
first established itself: the Arabian Peninsula, inhabited mainly by nomadic Bedouins or semisedentaries, and the classical visage of the Muslim world as it was to emerge” (4). According to him,
within three decades of their foundation in 637, the cities of Kufa (Kûfa) and Basra (Baṣra), in presentday Iraq, became home to over 100,000 and 200,000 people respectively. A short distance north of
these cities, the ‘Abbasid Capital of Baghdad boasted some 2,000,000 inhabitants only forty years after
its foundation in 762 (5). More conservative estimates suggest that by the tenth century the population
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of Baghdad was closer to a million, but either way it was the biggest city in the world in that era, when
“the flourishing cities of medieval Europe had populations of scarcely more than 30,000 or 40,000”
(Sinaceur 1977, 4). Urbanization also occurred in the Western Islamicate. For instance, between 300,000
and 400,000 lived in Córdoba (Qurṭuba), the Capital of the Umayyad Caliphate in al-Andalus (ibid.).
Menocal (2002) describes tenth-century Córdoba as “an astonishing place, and descriptions by
both contemporaries and later historians suffer from the burden of cataloguing its wonders” (32). These
include “nine hundred baths and tens of thousands of shops,” as well as “hundreds or perhaps
thousands of mosques” (32). Aqueducts provided the city with running water and the paved streets
were properly-lit. Moreover, Menocal writes admiratively about the “rich web of attitudes about
culture, and the intellectual opulence” symbolized by the hundreds of thousands of books collected in
over seventy libraries across the city, “at a time when the largest library in Christian Europe probably
held no more than four hundred manuscripts” (33).
Comparisons with Christian Europe, so often made by scholars of Islam, are perhaps unfair. They
often fit into a facile reductionist narrative according to which medieval Europe was living in a dark
period of decline during Islam’s golden age, only for roles to switch during the Western European
Renaissance as Islam began its own decline, from which it has yet to recover. This narrative is both antitraditional in its reductionist view of premodern Europe and colonial in its reductionist view of
Islamicate societies in recent centuries. Christians in the past and Muslims today should not be
stereotyped, nor their complex experiences of reality reduced to their geopolitical and technological
weaknesses. Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, some generalizations are pertinent when
analysing the longue durée movements of world-systems: Menocal (2002) remarks:
Cordoba’s libraries were a significant benchmark of overall social (not just scholarly) wellbeing, since they represented a near-perfect crossroads of the material and the intellectual.
The sort of libraries built in Cordoba—unseen and unimagined for hundreds of years amid
the intellectual spolia of the Roman Empire—ultimately depended on a vigorous trading
economy throughout the Mediterranean. (34)
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While it is true that knowledge and culture, as manifest in libraries, depends on a strong economy, a
complex analysis should also recognize that the enthusiasm required for “vigorous trading” also
depends on knowledge, creativity, and even inspiration. Economic development presupposes some
motivation related to notions of a good and even beautiful life. Indeed, more than commodities were
transported along the routes connecting Córdoba to distant places around the Mediterranean, as well as
further into Europe, Africa, and Asia. Ideas, sensibilities, beliefs, and other non-material riches also
flowed through these networks.70
Andalusians understood that international trade is not the only requirement of a strong economy.
Drawing on multiple types of knowledge, as a scholar, artist, educator, and poet, Jan Carew (1992)
(1920-2012) praises what he describes as the “Moorish Enlightenment”:
The Moors had been able to create a harmony in the rhythms of life in the city and in the
countryside. They dotted the map of al-Andalus with their cities and towns, but they could
only do this because the surrounding countryside was kept fertile and productive – with
advanced drainage and irrigation systems, reservoirs, aqueducts, sophisticated storage
facilities and efficient marketing, transportation and trading networks. The Moors also
brought the countryside into their cities with fantastic gardens, parks, lush inner
courtyards, and a constant supply of pure water. The gardens in Moorish cities, both public
and private, were known as ‘paradises’, a fitting term to describe these exquisite botanical
marvels.
Different Moorish cities came to be known for their particular forte – Córdova for its
libraries and collections, Seville for its music and musical instruments and Toledo as a
centre of industry and learning – but all shared a common feature of highly sophisticated
urban management and unbroken seminal connections with the land. Moorish cities were
noted for their public hospitals, public baths, lighted thoroughfares, hot and cold running
water, magnificent religious monuments, the grandeur of their mosques, gardens with
exotic plants and even more exotic birds, and beautifully designed fountains. (11)
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One figure who has come to symbolize the culture of refinement connecting the Eastern and Western
Mediterranean is Abû al- Ḥasan ‘Alî ibn Nâfi‘, better known as Ziryâb (c. 789-c. 857). He settled in the royal court of
Córdoba in the ninth century, after being expulsed from the ‘Abbasid court in Baghdad. Ziryâb has become a
legendary figure, remembered as the founding father of the classical Andalusian musical tradition still alive in
contemporary Morocco (Guettât 1995, Davila 2009). Moreover, he is reputed to have revolutionized Andalusian
culture by introducing “innovations in other areas of courtly culture, among them a new hairstyle (bangs on the
forehead instead of hair parted in the middle), a deodorant that would not stain clothes, leather tablecloths and
gold and silver service, and new foods, such as asparagus” (Davila, 2009, 124).
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Although facilitated by an initial period of economic and political strength, the cultural
refinement and intellectual advancement of Andalusian civilization was also observable in difficult times.
One such period occurred when the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba dissolved in the eleventh century,
and al-Andalus became severely fragmented into several competing polities known as Taifa (ṭâ’ifa,
plural ṭawâ’if: factions). Only the Almoravid conquerors from Northwest Africa were able to reunify
Islamic rule in al-Andalus in 1091. Yet, despite this period of political turmoil and its disruptive economic
effects, rivalry among petty kings led them to vie with one another for the presence of scholars and
artists in their courts. Such conditions favoured the blooming of a sophisticated culture which valued
eloquence, art, and science. In Taifa courts, upper and lower-class women and men, free and enslaved,
exchanged ideas and pursued artistic refinement. Often the speciality of women, stories were told in
colloquial Arabic interspersed with classical Arabic. Contemporary oral literary traditions in which formal
and popular tones overlap can be traced to these this period. This oral heritage contributed to the rise
of courtly love literature and music in Christian Europe but was transferred more directly to Northern
Morocco by Andalusian exiles in subsequent centuries. In cities such as Tétouan (Tiṭuân), women still
gather in living rooms to share these stories, although modern media threatens this literary mode
(Lebbady 2009, 22).
Another period of geopolitical weakness for Andalusian Muslims, discussed in Chapter Three,
was in 1248, when the Catholic armies of Castile conquered Seville (Ishbîliya). “But these victorious
armies could not repress their astonishment upon beholding the grandeur of the conquered city. The
Christians had never possessed anything similar in art, economic splendor, civil organization, technology,
and scientific and literary productivity” (Castro 1985 [1971], 226). In wartime, the opulence of an enemy
can be a decisively motivating factor for conquerors seeking spoils. The Catholic armies fought on until
in 1252 only Granada (Gharnâṭa) remained under Muslim rule in Iberia.
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Under the Naṣrid dynasty established in 1238, Granada flourished into the final showcase of
Islamic urbanization, architecture, and decoration in a Western European land. To this day, these
attractions make the city a major international tourist destination. It is a spectacular site in the foothills
of the Sierra Nevada mountains, whose snowy peaks offer a majestic backdrop of colours which shift
and change according to the light at different moments of the day. According to a Spanish proverb,
“quien no ha visto Granada, no ha visto nada” (one who has not seen Granada has not seen anything).
The city’s main attraction is the citadel of Alhambra, whose name derives from the Arabic qala’at alḥamra’ (the red citadel), “with its shimmering red, castellated, rammed-clay ramparts above the city
lying in a semi-circle at its feet” (Barrucand and Bednorz 2007 [1992], 183). It is located on a hilltop west
of the main city and across from another hill upon which is established the old Andalusian
neighbourhood of Albaicin. In 1984, both Alhambra and Albaicin were recognized as UNESCO World
Heritage sites. The palatine city was once much bigger and comprised all the services typical of a
medieval Islamicate city, including government offices, markets, and neighbourhoods serving a range of
social classes. But today only the most spectacular buildings and gardens have been preserved
(ibid.187).
Scottish Orientalist William Montgomery Watt (1909-2006) portrays the Alhambra as the last
stand of a dying civilization:
We can see in the Alhambra how the general outlook of the kingdom affected its art. It was
a society on the defensive, conscious of being a bastion of Islam against a hostile world, and
intent on preserving what it had inherited. In art this meant that it remained firmly within
the earlier artistic tradition of al-Andalus and introduced no novelty; that it rose to new
heights of achievement was through the perfection of its craftsmanship. (Watt and Cachia
1965, 163)71
Focusing on the main palatial section, he describes this aesthetic finery:
The passion to cover whole surfaces with intricate finely-wrought decoration was given
rein, with exquisite results. Full use was also made of the water, which was available in
abundant supply from higher up the mountains, to palace fountains, formal pools and
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Watt’s co-author, Pierre Cachia, wrote the sections on literature in this book.
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vegetation in the courtyards—a great source of pleasure in the warm climate. The chief
impression, however, is that of perfect ornamentation and perfect grace resting lightly on,
even descending on, the slender columns.
This was an art that, in its exuberance, built for present enjoyment, and had no thought of
creating enduring monuments. It used fragile materials superimposed on a basic structure
that was of the slightest. It is mainly through a series of happy chances and the continuing
care of successive generations that the Alhambra has been preserved for us. (ibid., 163164)

Figure 1—Contemporary View of Alhambra from the Garden of the Mosque of Granada

Hindsight is 20/20 as says the idiom. Watt may be projecting an Orientalist teleology of Islamic
decline onto Spanish history. After all, the Naṣrid dynasty in Granada lasted 254 years. As I write these
lines in 2018, Israel has only been a political entity for 70 years and the British have ruled the tiny
territory of Gibraltar off the southern coast of Spain for 205 years. Visible across the water from
Gibraltar on a sunny day, the North African city of Ceuta (Sabta) has been governed by Spain for 438
years, after 165 years of Portuguese rule. These places could be portrayed as embattled enclaves with
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uncertain futures, but generations have lived there and continue to invest considerable time and effort
to plant seeds, build houses, give birth to children, and decorate their streets as if taking for granted
that successive generations will continue their work. Why would the people of Granada before 1492
have been any different?
The theory of decadence and inevitable decline is common among Western Orientalists as well
as many Muslims in places such as Morocco when explaining the end of Muslim rule in Iberia. Al-Andalus
is often portrayed as a civilization too enamoured with worldly pleasures to defend itself and survive. In
contrast, the Maghrib is commonly understood to be religiously sterner. For instance, in the sixteenth
century, there was some concern in Northern Morocco that Andalusian refugees were introducing
“European customs that undermined traditional Islamic values” (Cornell 1998, 268). These customs
included usury, the sale of alcohol, and tattooing. Locals surely had some legitimate apprehensions,
especially as Iberian powers were conquering many cities along the Moroccan coast, and there were
even reports of some Moroccans converting to Christianity. At the same time, refugees are an easy
scapegoat for social anxieties in times of strife.
Although it may be true that certain sections of Andalusian society were prone to revelling in
wine, music, dancing, erotic poetry, and other worldly pleasures, such stereotypes remain problematic.
Examples of stern religiosity and worldly hedonism have existed across the Western Islamicate at
various times. And both tendencies often exist simultaneously in the same locations. Hodgsdon (1974a)
reminds us that efforts by pious Muslims “to build a good society often produced actual results strikingly
different from what anybody had anticipated […] such as many devoted Muslims could not look on with
favour” (71). Moreover, generalizations minimize the deep religious, historical, and cultural connections
between Islamicate societies on both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar (Daoud 2017). Indeed, Northern
Morocco had much more in common with al-Andalus than the Sahara, and perhaps still does. Simplistic
comparisons do injustice to the significant contributions of North Africans in the advancement of
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worldly arts and sciences, as well as to the spiritually ascetic currents in al-Andalus. While differences in
style and sensibility can undoubtedly be observed, the two regions should be understood as sharing the
same Western Islamic heritage. Before 1492, people often moved back and forth and lived parts of their
lives between the two regions. For instance, shortly after Fez was founded on a more ancient settlement
in the ninth century, refugees fleeing unrest in Córdoba established what is called the Andalusian district
to this day. There were many similarities between cities in al-Andalus and those in the Maghrib, even
before Jewish and Muslim exiles from Catholic Spain flooded the Maghrib in the early modern period,
thereby transferring much of their culture to North Africa.
While avoiding oversimplifications, it is surely possible to interpret phenomena typically
observable in premodern Andalusian cities as indicative of certain underlying social norms related to
beauty and well-being. For instance, although it would be ridiculous to suggest that all people in all
Andalusian cities, living under diverse regimes during eight centuries of Muslim rule, partook in the
extravagant pleasures of courtly life, certain traditions of well-being were widespread. The existence of
many public and private baths attests to certain hygienic standards grounded in Islamic scriptures which
very explicitly prescribe constant cleanliness as well as ritual purity. These prescriptions include details
about ablutions, cleaning one’s teeth, trimming hair, bathing, and other habits such as using perfumes
and burning incense. Medieval and early modern views about hygiene among Western European
Christians were undeniably different.72 One dominant view held by Catholic priests during the Spanish
Inquisition, and the eventual genocide of Iberian Muslims and Jews, was that regular ablutions and
bathing were sinful. In fact, public baths were banned in Spain by royal decree in 1568 (Carew 1992, 12).
Similarly, before this era of persecution, the widespread availability of books in both private and public
libraries, as well as bookstores, indicates high literacy rates not confined to elites. And markets filled
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Despite the overarching decline of hygienic norms in Western Europe after the fall of Imperial Rome, there were
obviously diverse beliefs and practices at different times and places in medieval Europe.
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with refined goods can only survive when there is a considerable number of consumers. Many of these
objects were destroyed when the Muslims and Jews were driven out of Iberia in the early modern
period, but the Andalusian legacy has far from disappeared. Part of this legacy is still observable in North
Africa.

Fez: City of Islam
The opening lines of this chapter, which lyrically describe an evening of spiritual chanting in a
Fez living room, come from a book by Burckhardt (1992 [1960]) entitled Fez: City of Islam. Translated
from the original German into English, this work is far from meeting the academic requirements of
contemporary religious studies in Western and Westernized universities. Its tone is personal, poetic,
somewhat antiquated, and often ahistorical if not anti-historical. Yet, it is the only major work written
about Fez, in a European language, which deliberately attempts to explore the “transhistorical horizon”
mentioned in article 6 of the Charter of Transdisciplinarity (see Appendix One). Very well. In any case, a
rigorous religious history of the city is not necessary for a transdisciplinary exploration of beauty and
well being in the Western Islamic tradition. An empathetic, sympathetic and consciously aesthetic text is
much more valuable in this circumstance. The Traditionalist publishing house World Wisdom describes
Burckhardt as
one of the most remarkable of the exponents of universal truth, in the realm of
metaphysics as well as in the realm of cosmology and of traditional art. In a world of
existentialism, psychoanalysis, and sociology, he was a major voice of the philosophia
perennis, that ‘wisdom uncreate’ that is expressed in Platonism, Vedanta, Sufism, Taoism,
and other authentic esoteric or sapiential teachings. In literary and philosophic terms, he
was an eminent member of the “traditionalist” or "perennialist" school of 20th century
thinkers and writers. (Stoddart 2008)
But Burckhardt is not just a writer. He is a recognized authority on art, religion, Sufism, and indeed
the city of Fez. In the foreword to Burckhardt’s book on Fez, his friend and colleague Michon explains
how the author’s “role as a UNESCO expert and adviser to the Moroccan government during the years
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1972 to 1977 was central in organizing a world campaign for the preservation of the venerable Medina
of Fez, recognized as the ‘intellectual capital’ of the Kingdom of Morocco” (Burckhardt 1992 [1960],
164). Burckhardt’s mandate included the preservation of traditional arts and crafts.73 Elsewhere,
Michon (1984) describes how “Burckhardt’s relationship with Morocco was a beautiful and longstanding
love story, which began in the 1930’s and which was faithfully continued and renewed by frequent visits
later.” Indeed, Burckhardt (1992 [1960]) believed that “to understand a culture, it is necessary to love it”
(11). But being a lover is not a sufficient qualification for high-level positions with the United Nations.
One needs considerable knowledge and technical expertise. And it is precisely this combination of love
and expertise which makes Burckardt’s writing a privileged entry point to explore experiences of beauty
and well-being in the Western Islamic city of Fez.
Since its foundation as the capital of an Islamic polity twelve centuries ago, Fez has perennially reemerged as the emblematic spiritual, cultural, and intellectual capital of the Far Maghrib. This
perception may be largely symbolic, and many other cities could serve as examples of traditional Islamic
urbanization in the region, but symbolism and perception are relevant when approaching the deep
sensibilities of a people. In 1933, Burckhardt certainly perceived Fez to be an appropriate place to seek
instruction in the traditional Islamic sciences from living masters. Yet, colonial authorities grew
suspicious of this young Swiss wearing traditional Moroccan garb and blending in among the students of
the Qarawiyyîn University in the Old Medina. French policy in Morocco was to encourage the
preservation of traditional native culture but discourage the mixing of European and indigenous
identities. While it is always advisable to avoid a selective reification of one’s cultural preferences as
tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), colonial discourses about tradition are particularly problematic.
In Morocco, such discourses legitimized the building of new cities for European settlers outside the city
walls of old centres such as Fez. Burckhardt, who also became known as Ibrâhîm ‘Izz al-Dîn, was
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breaking the rules of segregation. He was ordered to leave in 1934, only to return twenty-five years
later, after Morocco gained its independence in 1956.
When he returned, Burckhardt (1992 [1960]), feared that the forces of modernity might have
destroyed the traditional character of the city in which he “had experienced another world and another
age, a world of the Middle Ages such as perhaps now no longer existed, an austere and yet enticing
world, outwardly poor but inwardly rich” (4). He asked:
For how could there be any reconciliation between the inherited traditional life which,
despite all its frugalities, carried within it the treasure of an eternal meaning, and the
modern European world which, as it so palpably demonstrates, is a force entirely
orientated towards this world, towards possessions and enjoyments, and in every way
contemptuous of the sacred? (4)
Burckhardt’s idealized account of traditional Islamic culture as a sacred counterpoint to the secular West
resembles Orientalist discourses which legitimize colonial and neocolonial power structures (Said 2003
[1978]). His suspicion of Moroccan modernists with a French education, trying to catch up with the West
in the postcolonial period, may serve to reinforce unjust inequalities in the world-system, even if
unintentionally. Still, it must be noted that, contrarily to typical Orientalists, he submitted to the
authority of Muslim masters who shared similar concerns about modernity. In any case, upon his return,
Burckhardt (1992 [1960]) was relieved to find his beloved city “unalterable” and “indestructible”(3):
A GEODE of amethyst, brimful of thousands of tightly packed crystals and surrounded by a
silver-green rim: this was Fez, the Old City of Fez, in the twilight. As we came downhill
towards it, the hollow in which it lies grew visibly larger; the countless crystals, uniform in
themselves, but irregularly grown into one another, now came more clearly into view; one
side of them was light, while the other side, the one facing the prevailing wind, had become
darkened and weather-beaten. Between them and the silver green girdle of olive trees, the
wall of the Old City with its towers could be seen. Towards the city gate now facing us—Bab
al-Gissa—the small donkey caravans made their way as of old, and from out of the gate into
the evening wind and towards the expanse of green, came men and children in Moroccan
dress; for it was spring, and the hills round about were covered with yellow and blue
flowers.
In the heart of the city, in the lowest point of the hollow, one could make out the tentshaped roof of green glazed tiles that covers the dome of the tomb of the holy Idrîs, the
founder of Fez; nearby was a minaret. Not far away were the equally green roofs of the old
Quranic college of al-Qarawiyyîn. The nearer we came to the city, the more minarets rose
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to Heaven, clear-cut, square, flat-topped towers, similar to the Romanesque city towers of
Italy. There must have been hundreds of them. These reveal the position of the larger
mosques; even more smaller mosques are hidden from sight in the confusion of the high,
grey-white and, at this moment, reddish cubes of houses. A city full of sanctuaries: the
European travelers who first visited it at the beginning of the century spoke either of a
'citadel of fanaticism', or marveled at it as a place of perpetual prayer. (3)
At first, Burckhardt’s account does not include anyone donning European fashions or utilizing
modern technology. Are they absent from the scene? Is his description intentionally deceptive? A
sympathetic reading would be that he paid no attention to the modern blemishes on the face of his
beloved traditional city. Yet, perhaps grudgingly, he does eventually notice how “a few miserable huts
which had crept into deserted lime-pits, showed that the army of the poor had now burst outside the
protection of the old walls” (4). The modern “wretched of the earth” (Fanon 2002 [1961]) 74 have forced
themselves into his idyllic scene, but Burckhardt’s (1992 [1960]) lyricism persists:
In front of the city gate there was still the neglected cemetery with its irregular crop of
graves between mule tracks and flowering thistles, where children were playing on white
slabs and, here and there, men sat silently waiting for sunset and the call to prayer.
Just then the last pink glow on the towers disappeared. The sun had completely set and
now only the green-gold of the sky shed a mild, non-shadow-forming light, in which
everything seemed to float as if weightless and somehow glowing in itself. At that moment
the long-drawn-out call to the sunset prayer rang out from the minarets. Lights appeared in
the towers. But the city was silent; only a few cries, like suddenly broken-off laments,
reached our ears. The wind which had suddenly arisen and which, high above us in the
town, blew from mountain to valley, interrupted the sound. But the people who were
waiting had heard the call. One could see both individuals and groups spread out their
prayer mats and turn towards the south-east, the direction of Mecca. Others hurried
through the city gate to reach a mosque, and it was with the latter that we ourselves
entered the city. (5)
Inside the city walls, a dense universe of sometimes overwhelming sights and sounds is unveiled:
We were immediately enveloped in the half-light of the narrow streets which descended
steeply from the various gates into the hollow where the great sanctuaries lie surrounded
by the bazaars or commercial streets (aswâq; sing. sûq). In the streets all that can be seen
of the houses are the high walls, darkened with age, and almost entirely without windows.
The only open doors are those of the fanâdiq (sing. funduq) or caravanserais, where
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peasants and Bedouins visiting the town leave their steeds and beasts of burden, in open
spaces surrounding a courtyard, and where, on the upper storey, they can hire a room to
pass the night or store their wares. Otherwise the street is like a deep, half-dark ravine
which turns unexpectedly, sometimes here, sometimes there, often covered in by bridges
from one building to another and only wide enough to allow two mules to squeeze past
each other. Everywhere the cry Bâlek! Bâlek! ('Take care! Take care!') rings out. Thus do the
mule drivers and the porters with heavy loads on their heads make their way through the
crowd. Only further down do the shops begin, where the traveler on arrival may find his
necessities; there too are the saddlers, the basket-makers and the cook-shop-owners, the
latter preparing hearty meals on little charcoal fires. We proceeded past them into the
street of the spice-dealers (Sûq al-‘Aṭṭârîn), which runs through the entire town center, and
in which one shop lies hard against the next, a row of simple plain boxes, with shuttered
doors in front, just as in Europe in the Middle Ages, and with no more space than will allow
the merchant to sit down amongst his piled-up wares. (5-7)
For all its detail, this description could apply to nearly any of the great cities built or revived by Muslims
in the premodern period.
Burckhardt’s portrayal of Fez can be completed and contrasted with the generic description of
medieval Islamic cities, provided by Moroccan philosopher Mohammed Allal Sinaceur (1977) (19412000):
The prosperity of these trading centres and the wealth and prestige of the great merchant
adventurers were reflected in their buildings in palaces, mosques and colleges known as
madrasahs. […]
The layout of the city reflected its economic and social role. At its heart lay the suq, the
market district, and at the heart of the suq stood the principal mosque, symbol of a
discipline which transcended the petty constraints of day-to-day affairs. This marriage of
the sacred and the secular, of piety and profit which can still be seen today in the suqs of
such cities as Fez and Tunis recalls the remark attributed to the Caliph Omar, that "in all
things, the bazaar and the mosque are in harmony".
Not far from the suqs were the funduqs, warehouses and lodgings for the merchants, and
the qaysarriyya, where precious goods were kept under lock and key. The same
neighbourhood contained the place of the money-changers and sometimes a mint.
This was the core of the city. Around it lay a veritable labyrinth of little streets and lanes,
each lined with the open-fronted workshops of groups of craftsmen busily weaving, carving,
dyeing, beating out copper and generally engaged in the thousand-and-one activities of
their trades. To an outsider, fascinated by the mystery of blind, trellis-shaded alleys, streets
that kept the secrets of houses hidden behind high, windowless walls, and thoroughfares
noisy with the hubbub of the market, this workaday world, in which merchant and broker
rubbed shoulders with journeyman and porter, must have seemed like chaos. (9)
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While Sinaceur’s account resembles Burckhardt’s, it differs in its description of the Islamic city as a
bountiful urban environment in which there is a balance of worldly and otherworldly concerns. For
Sinaceur, the sacred in Islam can allow for prosperity and power. Looking back on the
premodern/precolonial period of his tradition, when Muslims ruled much of the world, Sinaceur does
not romanticize poverty and austerity, whereas Burckhardt’s wording suggests a contradiction between
inner and outer wealth.
But Burckhardt (1992 [1960]) is trying to access a taste of the timeless from the door of the
present. He writes of smells and sounds:
Nothing stirs the memory more than smells; nothing so effectively brings back the past.
Here indeed was Fez: the scent of cedar wood and fresh olives, the dry, dusty smell of
heaped-up corn, the pungent smell of freshly tanned leather, and finally, in the Sûq al‘Aṭṭârîn, the medley of all the perfumes of the Orient—for here are on sale all the spices
that once were brought by merchants from India to Europe as the most precious of
merchandise. And every now and again one would suddenly become aware of the sweet
smell of sandalwood incense, wafted from the inside of one of the mosques.
Equally unmistakable are the sounds; I could find my way blindfold by the clatter of hooves
on the steep pavings; by the monotonous cry of the beggars who squat in the dead corners
of the streets; and by the silvery sound of the little bells, with which the water-carriers
announce their presence when, wending their way through the sûqs, they offer water to
the thirsty. (7)
Despite his appreciation of frugality, Burckhardt’s amorous words are lush and sensuous. They betray
some nostalgia for days gone by, when Muslims dared to pursue the delights of this world and the next.
Suddenly, Burckhardt’s (1992 [1960]) enthusiasm is tempered by sober reflections about what
he is experiencing:
But now I paid attention only to the faces, which here and there loomed up in the glimmer
of the newly lit lamps; I thought perhaps to recognize an old friend or acquaintance. But I
saw only the features of familiar racial types: sometimes grave and worthy figures,
sometimes the sly and slightly scornful townsman, but no known face. There were also
youths, dressed more or less in the European manner, with the mark of a new age on their
foreheads, and sometimes staring defiantly and inquisitively at the foreigner. (7)
But the aesthete resurfaces, overtaking the critic of modernity in Burckhardt:
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To the right of the spice market, just beside the Sepulchral Mosque of Idrîs II, the holy
founder of Fez, there is a cluster of narrow passages lined with booths. Here all kinds of
clothing are on sale: coloured leather shoes, ladies’ dresses in silk brocade embroidered in
gold and silver. Near the mosque there are also decorated liturgical candles, frankincense
and perfumed oils; for perfumes belong to the sunna, the sacred Tradition, according to the
saying of the Prophet: “Three things from your world have been made worthy of my love:
women, perfumes, and the solace of my eyes in prayer.” (7)
Beauty and well-being emerge once again as holistic experiences available to the entire Muslim being,
including the physical senses.
Around the Sepulchral Mosque of the holy Idrîs there is a narrow alley, made inaccessible
to horses and mules by means of beams. This constitutes the limits of the ḥurm, the
sacratum, within which formerly no one might be pursued. Only a short time before the
French withdrawal was this rule broken for the first time—in the revolt against the Frenchimposed Sultan Ben ‘Arafa. (8)
Although by no means a revolutionary, Burckhardt is no colonialist. His critique of European modernity
and admiration of non-European traditions entail a degree of anti-colonialism, which surface even in his
poetic moments.
Yet, deep in Old City, he seems to seek refuge from the fiery debates of modernity. He tastes
beauty and experiences well-being in the narrow lanes and ancient monuments such as the mausoleum
of Idrîs II:
We walked along the arabesque-decorated outer walls of the sanctuary, past the little
window, covered with an iron grille, which opens on to the tomb, and reached another
brightly lit street which brought us into the vicinity of the great mosque and college of alQarawiyyîn. In the streets surrounding it the advocates and notaries have their little offices
and the booksellers and bookbinders have their shops-just like their Christian colleagues of
old in the shade of the great cathedrals. As we passed by, we stole a glance through several
of the many doors of the mosque and gazed into the illuminated forest of pillars, from
which the rhythmical chanting of Quranic suras could be heard.
Then through the district of the copper-smiths, where the hammers were already at rest
and only here and there a busy craftsman still polished and examined a vessel in the light of
his hanging lamp; soon we reached the bridges in the hollow of the town and ascended
from there to the gate on the other side, the Bâb al-Futûḥ. As we looked back we saw the
Old City lying beneath us like a shimmering seam of quartz. I now knew that the face of Fez,
the old once-familiar and yet foreign Fez, was unaltered. (8-9)
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The account of Burckhardt’s return to Fez ends with the passage which opens this chapter, which
describes an evening during which a boy sings religious songs. In fact, that passage describes a typical
Sufi ceremony of samâ‘ (listening) involving singing, mystical poetry, prayers, and sometimes playing
instruments. Once again, Burckhardt’s vivid lines could very well describe similar moments, hundreds of
years ago, in Córdoba or elsewhere in the premodern Islamicate.
Burckhardt’s recollection of his return to Fez begins outside the city and ends deep within its
walls, during a Sufi ceremony inside a beautiful home. He guides the reader on a journey from busy
external phenomena to an inner state of timeless beauty and well-being. Situating this experience in a
domestic setting is most appropriate. It is impossible to understand the Western Islamic tradition
without acknowledging the central importance of its most intimate institution: the home. When I first
visited Fez in 1990, a stranger invited my friends and I to share a meal with him. As he was rushing
home, he found us slightly panicked, at an intersection, wondering why the street had suddenly become
empty. He explained that at this time of year everybody rushes home to eat at sunset. It was the Islamic
month of Ramadan, in which fasting is prescribed for those Muslims who are physically capable of it,
from dawn until sunset. He got off his motorcycle and walked with us into increasingly narrow and dusty
lanes, which seemed to me an indication of severe poverty. Soon, I found myself thinking this gentleman
might be very poor and feeding us could be too great a burden for him, despite his generosity. I was very
ignorant. Behind a non-descript wooden door at the end of a dark lane, he opened my eyes to a new
universe. His house was a multi-leveled splendour, boasting magnificent carpets, tiles, stucco,
metalwork, pottery, and every other type of traditional Moroccan decorative craft. In the courtyard,
there was a fountain surrounded by a colourful garden. Our meal was an extraordinary experience
during which I instantly became aware that Moroccan cooking is a fine art whose practitioners draw
upon a vast heritage of knowledge and skill.
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Burckardt (1992 [1960] devotes an entire chapter to the house (91-105). The opening lines of
this chapter confirm my own experiences beginning in 1990:
The true unveiled face of Fez remains hidden to whoever knows Fez only from the street
and has seen only the shopping alleyways and the grey outer walls of the houses. The inside
of the house is the strongly defended domain of the women. The expression ‘harem’ (from
the Arabic ḥaram), which has entered the English language, means nothing other than
‘sanctuary’. (91)
Indeed, traditions of beauty and well-being in Morocco can only be fully experienced if the intimacy of
the home is given as much importance as traditionally male-dominated domains such as commerce and
monumental architecture. Away from markets, castles, and courthouses, the home for Burckardt “is not
merely a world of its own, it is a universe transformed into a crystal” (105). An appreciation of physical
interiors should also be accompanied by a recognition of those occupations which occur inside the
home, and the expertise of women in domestic contexts. Women’s contributions to making life
endurable in conditions of poverty should also be acknowledged alongside discussions of palatial
interiors. Moreover, an exploration which combines inner and outer dimensions of beauty and wellbeing in the Western Islamic tradition would be incomplete without a discussion of Sufism. 75

Doing What is Good and Beautiful: Occupations and Activities
The famous Tunisian scholar ʻAbd al-Raḥmân Ibn Khaldûn (2005 [1967, original Arabic version
1377]), who lived from 1332 to 1406, devotes an entire chapter of his Muqaddima76 to surveying and
analysing the ways people make a living (297-332). 77 His discussion of crafts is a window into the urban
life of the fourteenth-century Western Islamicate:
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Although the focus here is not gender, it is necessary to acknowledge the central role of women in the Islamic
tradition, and in particular in Sufism (Schimmel 1997 [1995 original German edition]).
76
Al-Muqaddimah, which translates as ‘The Introduction,’ was originally intended as the opening of a more
extensive historical study, but rapidly gained recognition as an independent work.
77
Ibn Khaldûn was a jurist and historian whose important contributions to theorizing social organization position
him as a forbear of social sciences such as sociology, economics and political sciences. He was born in Tunis and
died in Cairo, having lived for extended periods in several places throughout North Africa and al-Andalus. His
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When civilization flourishes and the luxuries are in demand, it includes the refinement and
development of the crafts. Consequently, these are perfected with every finesse, and a
number of other crafts, in addition to them, is added, as luxury-customs and conditions
demand. Among them are those of the cobbler, the tanner, the silk weaver, the goldsmith,
and others. When the civilization is fully developed, these different kinds are perfected and
refined to the limit. In the cities, they become ways of making a living for those who
practice them. In fact, they become the most lucrative activities, because urban luxury
demands them. Other such crafts are those of the perfumer, the coppersmith, the bath
attendant, the cook, the biscuit baker, the teacher of singing, dancing, and rhythmical drum
beating. There are also the book producers who ply the craft of copying, binding, and
correcting books. This (last mentioned) craft is demanded by the urban luxury of occupation
with intellectual matters. Crafts become excessive when civilization develops excessively.
Thus, we learn that there are Egyptians who teach dumb creatures like birds and domestic
donkeys, who produce marvelous spectacles which give the illusion that objects are
transformed, and who teach how to dance and walk on ropes stretched in the air, how to
lift heavy animals and stones, and other things. These crafts do not exist among us in the
Maghrib, because the civilization of (Maghribî) cities does not compare with the civilization
of Egypt and Cairo. (315)
Ibn Khaldûn explains that “crafts are customs and colours of civilization” which take generations
to refine (315). They can be more developed in older civilizations than in more populous and prosperous
contemporary ones which have more recently developed sedentary culture. In this regard, al-Andalus
compares favourably to other regions:
There we find the crafts and their institutions still in existence. They are well established
and firmly rooted, as far as the things required by the customs of the Spanish cities are
concerned. (They include), for instance, building, cooking, the various kinds of singing and
entertainment, such as instrumental music, string instruments and dancing, the use of
carpets in palaces, the construction of well-planned, well-constructed houses, the
production of metal and pottery vessels, all kinds of utensils, the giving of banquets and
weddings, and all the other crafts required by luxury and luxury customs. One finds that
they practice and understand these things better than any other nation even though
civilization in Spain has receded and most of it does not equal that which exists in the other
countries of the (Mediterranean) shore. This is only because, as we have mentioned before,
sedentary culture had become deeply rooted in Spain through the stability given it by the
Umayyad dynasty, the preceding Gothic dynasty, and the reyes de taïfas, successors to the
Umayyads, and so on. (316)

examination of civilization as encompassing various sciences and occupations is useful. The way he includes Sufism
as a normal aspect of Islamic civilization and science is especially relevant here, as it shows how Sufism was
accepted as integral to Islamicate civilization at the time. As a historical source, an apology of Sufism by a
renowned Sufi might be seen by some as less objective and credible.
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Clearly, varied and refined crafts manifest worldly notions of beauty and well-being
favoured by wealth and power, but they also express spiritual sensibilities. For instance, by the
fourteenth century craftsmen throughout the Islamicate world, were typically organized into
guilds whose membership “was subject to initiatory rites” (Sinaceur 1977, 9). Such associations,
which still survive in diminished form in cities such as Fez, and whose early development was
related to urbanization in the first decades of the Islamic era, were inspired by spiritual concerns
(Dickson and Sharify-Funk 2017, 130-136). They are intricately related to institutional Sufism. An
apprentice developing practical skills is often also a disciple embedded in networks facilitating
worldly and spiritual “transmission of skill and authority” (ibid.). Although his explanation is overly
general, and does not reflect the diversity of institutional arrangements across the Islamicate at
different times, the late Syrian scholar Yusuf Ibish (1977) (1926-2003) illustrates how professional
and spiritual networks are historically interconnected:
The grand master of the guilds enjoyed great authority in the Islamic city, for he was the
head not of only all the guilds but also the Sufi orders. In some cases he was also the doyen
of the Ashraf, the descendants of the Prophet. In this triple capacity he ruled over the guilds
and through them the bazaars, which meant that everything that was produced and
distributed in the city as well as all its services were under his control.
As grand master of the Sufi orders, he co-ordinated the affairs of the "Lodges" and
supervised their trust funds. High-ranking civil servants and army officers who were not
organized in guilds generally belonged to a Sufi order and so they too fell under the
authority of the grand master.
His authority in the city was such that he only nominally acknowledged the suzerainty of
the political rulers. In various ways his spiritual authority counterbalanced the temporal
power of kings and sultans. It should not be forgotten that many rulers in Islamic history
were also members of the Sufi orders and submitted to their inner hierarchy even if they
were political rulers. This of course does not mean that the grand master was a "political"
figure in the modern, Western sense of the term; it simply means that he was, in the
absence of a caliph, the symbol of stability in Islamic society.
Under the influence of Sufism, Islamic guilds emphasized the moral and spiritual basis of
manual skills. Craftsmanship had to reflect the artisan's "inner state", regardless of
economic incentives or other rewards. (15)
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Sufism opens a transcendent universal dimension to particular occupations. For instance,
Burckhardt (1992 [1960]), composes some nostalgic lines about his encounter with a comb-maker in the
city of Fez, who worries about the future of his craft. Cheap imported plastic combs threaten the
viability of his slow and meticulous manual transformation of ox horns. The comb-maker tells
Burckhardt that “[t]his craft can be traced back from apprentice to master until one reaches our Lord
Seth, the son of Adam. It was he who first taught it to men, and what a Prophet brings—for Seth was a
Prophet—must clearly have a special purpose, both outwardly and inwardly” (78-79). Losing a
traditional craft means losing an inherited prophetic trust. Burckhardt warns that “the dire straits in
which Moroccan craftsmanship finds itself is not merely an outward predicament, but above all a
spiritual threat” (307).
Guilds have ensured that specialized artisans can transmit and refine unique traditions of beauty
and well-being over generations, but cultural norms in Islamicate societies also discourage the type of
overspecialization which could result in suffocating narrowmindedness. Knowledge and skill in a broad
array of fields are encouraged by a cultural tendency succinctly expressed by the polysemic term adab.
Sachiko Murata and William Chittick (1994), explain that the original meaning of this Arabic word is “to
invite, to gather together for a banquet,” and refers to the pre-Islamic Arabic “social duty to invite
travelers into the home and take care of them” (306). With the advent of Islam, the religious importance
of this duty was emphasized, and came to encompass increasingly complex levels of religious and
cultural meaning:
Early in Islamic history, the word had come to signify proper discipline of the soul and
correct modes of activity. Primarily, this meant proper training and education in all the
domains of Islamic learning and practice that were necessary for a person to achieve the
ideals of the religion. Hence, adab was identified with the Prophet’s Sunna in the broad
sense, as including both his character and his activity. (306)
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In short, adab reflects traditional Islamic notions of beauty as manifest in human character. Even
non-Muslims and non-practicing Muslims living in an Islamicate society are influenced by the cultural
ramifications of this concept:
In Islamic languages, to say that a person has adab means that he or she is cultured, wellmannered, sophisticated, and, in general, has good breeding. Not uncommonly, a person
with adab knows thousands of verses of the best poetry by heart and is able to recite them
on the most appropriate occasions. It is almost impossible to imagine that a person should
be described as having adab in classical times and not have beautiful handwriting.78 In
several Islamic languages, one of the worst things you can say about a person is that the
person is without adab. One might as well say that the person is a monkey or a pig.
The term adab was applied to the proper mode of conduct for every group of people in
society and to all the appropriate activities considered individually. Many books detail the
adab of judges, Sufi novices, princes, courtiers, physicians, and even housewives […] Adab
always brings along with it a sense of beauty, refinement, and subtlety. (306-307) 79
In cities such as Fez, Western Islamic traditions of character refinement with premodern roots
can still be observed. As was the case in many places across the Islamicate world, especially after the
ninth century, urban norms in the Maghrib and al-Andalus entailed that people of varying social status
should display some mastery of varied arts and sciences. In addition to developing specialized expertise,
individuals were generally expected to participate in the broader culture and help refine its regional
specificities. This included knowledge of music and poetry in which “epicurean love of life, eroticism and
praise of the Muslim city were among the favourite themes” (Moussali 1977, 23).80 Participating in
human activities beyond one’s official occupation led some to excel as amateurs. For instance, many
people whose day jobs are now often forgotten made contributions to the field of Sufism.
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When I lived in Morocco, I was surprised at how much importance was given to proper handwriting in the
primary school attended by my children, compared to its relatively low importance in Canadian schools.
79
In Sufism, adab becomes a technical term defining acceptable conduct for Sufis or Sufi novices (Al-Sulamî 2010
[original Arabic c. 11th century]).
80
North of the Mediterranean, the notion that individuals “should try to embrace all knowledge and develop their
own capacities as fully as possible” only became widespread in the fifteenth century, with the ideal of the
Renaissance man (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2017). Assuredly, the rebirth of culture and science in
places like Italy, centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, was influenced by the increasing awareness
Christians had of the sophisticated arts and sciences developed by Muslims on the other shores of the
Mediterranean.
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The Science of Excellence and Beauty: Sufism
There is a tension between the prescriptions of normative Islam and the sensuous worldliness
characterized by so many traditions of beauty and well-being which emerged in societies ruled by
Muslims. While Muslims have never been prohibited from acquiring wealth and enjoying physical
pleasures, the extent of such pursuits is traditionally limited by the Divine Law (sharî’a), concerning
which jurisprudence (fiqh) represents the human effort of interpretation. Yet, many of the activities
pursued by Muslims in search of a good life have exceeded these limits. Islamicate civilization has often
been decidedly “un-Islamic” (Hodgson 1974a, 57). Moreover, non-Muslims have contributed greatly to
Islamicate societies as experts in a wide variety of fields. For instance, Menocal (2002) reminds us that it
was in al-Andalus that “the profoundly Arabized Jews rediscovered and reinvented Hebrew; there that
the Christians embraced nearly every aspect of Arabic style—from the intellectual style of philosophy to
the architerctural styles of mosques” (11). Would anyone deny the status of Maimonides (1135-1204),
the Jewish philosopher, jurist, and physician born in Córdoba, and known in the Islamicate world by the
Arabic name Abû ‘Imran Mûsâ ibn Maymûn ibn ‘Ubayd Allâh? But the Islamic element of Islamicate
civilization should not be underestimated. Notions of beauty and goodness developed in the traditional
Islamic sciences necessarily affect all those living in Islamicate societies, including the irreligious and
adherents to other religions. The science of Sufism has been particularly influential in this regard.
The pursuit of spiritual excellence and beauty (iḥsân) has not always been designated by the term
taṣawwuf, from which the English term Sufism is derived. Lumbard (2004c) explains:
The central manifestation of the practice of iḥsân took form in what is traditionally known
as Sufism (Islamic mysticism), where the emphasis is on making one’s heart and soul
beautiful so that beauty will arise naturally from within. But the iḥsânî tradition has taken
on many forms, under many names, throughout Islamic history. Wherever there has been a
vibrant Islamic civilization, be it Sunnî or Shî‘î, the iḥsânî intellectual tradition has been
present in one form or another. (41)
Murata (1992) writes of an Islamic “sapiential tradition” comprised of both Sufism and philosophy,
which is distinct from the legalistic approach of jurisprudence supported by dogmatic theology about
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creed (2-4). Whereas the “sapiential” current is concerned with the why of things, the legalistic and
dogmatic current is concerned with what must be done and how. Yet, while the science and practice of
iḥsân may be called an “iḥsânî” or “sapiential” tradition, the most widely used term remains Sufism
(taṣawwuf), and in the Western Islamicate no synonym remains in common usage. Nevertheless, by
describing Sufism using other terms, authors like Lumbard and Murata draw our attention to what is
being described rather than the word commonly used to describe it.
Ibn Khaldûn (2005 [1967, original Arabic version 1377]) summarizes the traditional
understanding of Sufism as an Islamic science among many others, including Qur'an interpretation,
Qu’ran recitation, hadith sciences, jurisprudence, theology, dream interpretation, mathematics,
astronomy, logic, physics, medicine, agriculture, grammar, literature, and even magic (358-367). 81 Hallaq
(2018) offers a similar description:
The scholars, thinkers, and intellectuals from East to West of Islamdom, were those whom
we call ulama, jurists, judges, professors, Sufi Shaykhs, Quran specialists, hadith experts,
adab writers, linguists, historians, biographers, traveler-scholars, kalam-theologians,
philosophers, astronomers, Tasawwuf philosophers, chemists, vision scientists, logicians,
mathematicians, scholars of instruments (“technology specialists”), and a host of subsidiary
others. (73-74)
Scholars regularly studied many fields and “Islamic learning was generally constituted by crossfertilization through what may be called dialectical traditions” (74). Expertise in this context did not
entail overspecialization:
The subjects and fields of Islamic learning, in their divisions and subdivisions, were
countless and nearly inexhaustible. Yet, they stood in a particular relationship to one
another, one that could be said to have had a cohesive structure in which cross-fertilization
was routine. Leading components in the structure were the Shari‘a and Sufism, two
discursively dialectical traditions and paradigmatic domains that permeated the
educational, legal, social, and spiritual practices of Islam, and influenced much in the
economic and mercantile spheres. (76)
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Ibn Khaldûn’s presentation of Sufism appears in the chapter of his Muqaddimah devoted to science, which
follows the one about various ways of making a living, itself preceded by a chapter on countries, cities, and other
forms of sedentary civilization. This coincides with the progression of the present discussion from material
phenomena to ideas.
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In this context, Sufism appears as a science with practical applications, and connected to complex
intellectual, social, and cultural networks. At first, taṣawwuf referred to the sciences and practices
developed by an informal and transregional network of Muslims, but this network soon developed
formal institutions and a specific terminology. An expert in the field of taṣawwuf is known as a Sufi
(ṣûfî). Although all practitioners of Sufism are frequently referred to as Sufis, internally this is a technical
term which applies only to those who have attained a state of spiritual excellence and enlightenment. A
Sufi is a saint. A practitioner of Sufism who has yet to attain enlightenment is called a mutaṣawwif.
Ibn Khaldûn (2005 [1967, original Arabic version 1377] explains that terms like taṣawwuf and
ṣûfî can only be traced to the second Islamic century, which corresponds to the eighth century CE (358).
In the tenth and eleventh centuries, biographers and codifiers of Sufism in the Central and Eastern
Islamicate, such as Abû Bakr al-Kalâbâdhî (1935 [c. late tenth cent.] 5-11) (n.d.-c. 990), Abû al-Qâsim alQushayrî (2007 [1045], 288-289) (986-1072), and ‘Alî al-Hujwīrī (1911 [c. 1073], 30) (c. 1009-c. 1073),
discussed the mysterious etymology of these terms. Their works examine many possible origins, such as
ṣafâ (purity) and ṣûf (wool), in reference to the wool garments worn by early Muslim ascetics. Hujwîrî
suggests that this etymological mystery reflects the mysterious nature of Sufism. Whereas these three
classical authors are content to explore these possibilities without offering a definitive choice, Ibn
Khaldûn favours the connection to wool (ṣûf).
Moreover, Ibn Khaldûn (2005 [1967, original Arabic version 1377], 359-360) explains that,
although early Muslims had deep implicit knowledge of all the traditional Islamic sciences, it took
generations to develop systematically distinct disciplines. Such specialization required new technical
terms to make previously implicit notions explicit. This process occurred for all the sciences, including
jurisprudence (fiqh) and Qur'an interpretation (tafsîr). Furthermore, there were practical consequences
to specialization, as new techniques and methods were developed to pursue each of these fields of
knowledge. Yet Sufism was often singled out for developing innovations which did not exist during the
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Prophet’s lifetime. Ibn Khaldûn situated his argumentation in a long lineage of apologetic literature
affirming the orthodoxy of Sufism in the face of challenges from scholars from other disciplines, such as
jurisprudence (Jong and Radtke 1999). At the same time, Sufis also challenged specialists from other
disciplines for what they perceived to be their superficiality or excessive legalism. The debates were not
one-sided (Geoffroy 2004).
Ibn Khaldûn (2005 [1967, original Arabic version 1377]) explains that Sufism as a distinct Islamic
science was developed by people “who aspired to divine worship” in an era of characterized by an
increase of “worldly aspirations” (258). Indeed, as the early generations of Muslims enjoyed
phenomenal successes in establishing a vast, powerful, and wealthy empire, Sufis rejected such
worldliness and became associated with asceticism. “Then, they developed a particular kind of
perception which comes about through ecstatic experience” (258). They developed technologies of selfdisicpline by which novices exert themselves through worship, and progress through increasingly
elevated degrees of experiential religious knowledge:
Knowledge originates from evidence, grief and joy from the perception of what is painful or
pleasurable, energy from rest, and inertia from being tired. In the same way, the exertion
and worship of the Sufi novice must lead to a ‘state’ that is the result of his exertion. That
state may be a kind of divine worship. Then, it will be firmly rooted in the Sufi novice and
become a ‘station’ for him. Or, it may not be divine worship, but merely an attribute
affecting the soul, such as joy or gladness, energy or inertia, or something else. (359)
Here, Ibn Khaldûn is explaining the crucial distinction made by Sufis between a passing state (ḥâl) and a
definitive spiritual station (maqâm). From the perspective of Ibn Khaldûn, trying to establish the Sufism
as reasonable, scientific, and orthodox, a definitive station is most valuable on the path to
enlightenment:
The Sufi novice continues to progress from station to station, until he reaches the
(recognition of the) oneness of God and the gnosis (ma'rifah)82 which is the desired goal of
happiness.
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For an examination of ma‘rifa in comparison to other types of knowledge see for example Shah-Kazemi (2002) or
Chittick (2006, 126, 1989, 147-149)
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Thus, the novice must progress by such stages. The basis of all of them is obedience and
sincerity. Faith precedes and accompanies all of them. Their result and fruit are states and
attributes. […] If the result shows some shortcoming or defect, one can be sure that it
comes from some shortcoming that existed in the previous stage. The same applies to the
ideas of the soul and the inspirations of the heart.
The novice, therefore, must scrutinize himself in all his actions and study their concealed
import, because the results, of necessity, originate from actions, and shortcomings in the
results, thus, originate from defects in the actions. The Sufi novice finds out about that
through his mystical experience, and he scrutinizes himself as to its reasons. (359)
According to this argument, only after a novice has successfully progressed through these inner
stations, can she or he properly be called Ṣûfiyya (feminine) or Ṣûfî (masculine).83 Generally, a successful
apprenticeship “is followed by the removal of the veil of sensual perception” (360). This is the state of
kashf, which “can be translated as ‘unveiling’, but has further connotations of searching, bringing to
light, disclosing, discovering, exploring, and revealing what is hidden” (Dickson and Sharify-Funk 2017,
4). Such unveiling of special knowledge by God for the worshipper represents an epistemic category
claimed by Sufis and contested by their detractors, including many Muslims. Fraudulent claims of
divinely inspired knowledge, unverifiable by the average person, can favour abusive power dynamics by
conferring undeserved authority to individuals and even institutions. Even in circumstances free of
abuse, it may simply be difficult for one who has not experienced such an unveiling to believe it exists.
Yet, Ibn Khaldûn (2005 [1967, original Arabic version 1377]) describes it as one of many types of
knowledge:
The Sufi beholds divine worlds which a person subject to the senses cannot perceive at all.
The spirit belongs to those worlds. The reason for the removal of (the veil) is the following.
When the spirit turns from external sense perception to inner (perception), the senses
weaken, and the spirit grows strong. It gains predominance and a new growth. The spiritual
exercise helps to bring that about. It is like food to make the spirit grow. The spirit
continues to grow and to increase. It had been knowledge. Now, it becomes vision. The veil
of sensual perception is removed, and the soul realizes its essential existence. This is
identical with perception. (The spirit) now is ready for the holy gifts, for the sciences of the
divine presence, and for the outpourings of the Deity. Its essence realizes its own true
character and draws close to the highest sphere, the sphere of the angels. The removal of
83

The Islamic tradition does not limit the possibility of spiritual realization to men only, despite the use of genderneutral masculine pronouns in languages such as Arabic.
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(the veil) often happens to people who exert themselves (in mystical exercise). They
perceive the realities of existence as no one else does. (360-361)
Spiritual unveiling is usually understood to be accompanied by the ability to predict the future and to
perform miracles, but Ibn Khaldûn warns that “the great Sufis” are very cautious about such gifts: “They
give no information about the reality of anything they have not been ordered to discuss. They consider it
a tribulation, when things of that sort happen to them, and try to escape them whenever they afflict
them” (361). After all, non-Muslims and even sorcerers are also known to have psychic powers. In the
Junaydî Sufi tradition, such extraordinary abilities are considered unsound if unaccompanied by strict
adherence to the Islamic behavioural norms prescribed at the level islâm, and orthodox beliefs at the
level of îmân. Iḥsân cannot go against the other religious dimensions upon which it is built.
Similarly to Murata and Chittick (1994), Burckhardt (1992 [1960]) describes the diversity of
traditional sciences with special reference to the tripartite islâm, imân and iḥsân categorization
discussed in Chapter One:
The instruction that is provided in the Koranic universities relates to the first two principles
just mentioned, namely to the contents of the faith, which are enshrined in the dogmas,
and to the law which, on the one hand, determines divine worship (the rites) and, on the
other hand, determines the social order. The exact knowledge of the third principle,
spiritual virtue, exceeds the bounds of scholastic instruction, which has been called ‘the
science of the outward’. It is the prerogative of the contemplative sage or mystic, the Sufi,
who alone has access to ‘the science of the inward’. In the Islamic world mysticism is
regarded as a science, which is handed down from master to disciple just like jurisprudence,
with this difference, that from the disciple a special qualification, or more exactly, an
inward vocation, is required. In addition, theoretical learning must go hand in hand with
spiritual practice, which alone is capable of disclosing the content of the propositions and
the symbols that are taught. (113)
In the Western Islamic tradition, Sufism gives inner meaning and inspiration to other
pursuits:
The spiritual high-points of Maghribi culture are to be found in the realm of Islamic
mysticism, which in Arabic is known as taṣawwuf. Possessing as it does the dual aspects of
wisdom and the love of God, it finds expression not only in metaphysical doctrines, but also
in poetry and the visual arts, and, as its essence is communicated most directly in symbols
and parables, it can speak without hindrance not only to learned believers, but also to the
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simple man of the people: the craftsman and the Bedouin; in fact, it may often be more
readily accessible to the unlearned than to the learned. (129)

Being Excellent and Beautiful: Iḥsân
إِ ﱠن ٱ ﱠ َ َم َع ٱلﱠذِي َن ٱت ﱠقَواْ ﱠو ٱلﱠذِي َن هُم ﱡم حۡ ِس نُو َن
“Truly God is with those who fear, and those who are virtuous.” (Qur’an 16:128)
In this verse, the word muḥsinûn is translated as “those who are virtuous,” yet it could also be
rendered as “those who do what is excellent and beautiful.”84 The singular of muḥsinûn is muḥsin, which
designates a person characterized by iḥsân. Furthermore, “those who fear” refers to the fear of God, but
this translation restricts the initial Arabic meaning, which connotates reverent awe and consciousness of
God, rather than mere fear in the mundane sense. Since Muslims believe the Qur’an to be the word of
God, this verse represents divine corroboration of the saying attributed to the Prophet, describing iḥsân
as “to worship Allah as though you are seeing Him and while [if] you see Him not truly He sees you.”
Many other scriptural passages express similar meanings, adding nuance to the fundamental notion that
iḥsân is an action—worship—performed in a specific state: reverent consciousness of God (Murata and
Chittick 1994, 267-294). When this state is perpetual, it infuses every act of worship with excellence and
beauty. Such is the permanent state (maqâm) attributed to Sufis, understood in the sense of saintly
friends of God (awliyâ’ Allâh).
But how do Sufis propose one can reach such an elevated state? Perpetual conscience of the
divine is no easy task for a person still vulnerable to the ego (nafs) and its passion (hawá), as well as the
distractions and attractions of this world (dunya), and the whisperings of Satan (Shayṭân). To surmount
such formidable obstacles, two basic models of spiritual realization were identified as Sufism developed
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The translation of the Qur’an by the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought has been selected in this
dissertation for the reasons explained in the section on notes on language usage. However, any translation is
limited, and additional comments can provide valuable nuance.
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into an increasingly detailed science, especially between the tenth and sixteenth centuries (SalamahQudsi 2018). 85 One model entails following a path (sulûk), and the other occurs when an individual
comes under the overwhelming power of divine attraction (jadhb). Sulûk involves the active pursuit of
iḥsân while jadhb is a passive state in which an individual is dominated by a divinely inspired state (ibid.
255-256). In recognition of God’s omnipotence, the success of both models is understood to depend on
divine assistance. Moreover, each model encompasses a great diversity of subcategories detailed in the
literature.
Faouzi Skali (2014 [2006], 141-227) writes of the different typologies classifying jadhb and how
they relate to various saints in Fez. Citing such metaphysicians as Ibn al-ʿArabî, he explains that the
spiritual state of a majdhûb (one characterized by jadhb) can be greater than her or his personal
strength, equal to it, or under its control (143). Some Sufis become permanently and integrally absorbed
in jadhb. Consequently, they are unconscious of this world and its norms, and due to their unusual
actions and demeanour, they tend to be perceived as crazy saints. Such intense states may also
overcome the majdhûb intermittently. Other types of majdhûb have more control over their states.
They can conceal their jadhb and act rationally. Moreover, there exists a category of Sufis who
deliberately act unconventionally to provoke the blame (malâma) of others. They are the malâmatiyya
(the people of blame, singular malâmatî), whose vocation involves hiding their spiritual rank from
others. The crucial distinction between a malâmatî and a majdhûb is that the former’s actions are
deliberate, whereas the latter’s are unintentional—the former acts and the latter is acted upon (144).
A Sufi who espouses the model of sulûk is called sâlik. As discussed in Chapter One, this is
precisely the designation given to Junayd in Ibn ‘Âshir’s endorsement of “the Doctrine of Imam Ash‘arî,
the Jurisprudence of Imam Mâlik, and the Inner Path of Imam Junayd, The Traveler” (Ali 2014, 8). Junayd
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By engaging texts written in distant lands, Sufis during this period participated in a veritable transregional and
intergenerational intellectual exchange, which allowed for certain concepts to emerge as fundamental
components of Sufi thought. Similar processes also occurred in other sciences.
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al-Sâlik comes to symbolize the path of sober exertion and devotion which systematically prepares the
mutaṣawwif novice to receive the divine blessing of iḥsân, in other words to become a Sufi. This basic
method was elaborated by numerous Sufi orders, known as ‘ways’ or ‘paths’ (ṭuruq, singular ṭarîqa),
born as the progressive institutionalization of Sufism accompanied its theoretical specialization. In the
framework of institutional Sufism, a certain degree of jadhb is expected. However, ecstatic states should
remain manageable thanks to the guidance of a mentor (shaykh, feminine shaykha) following a
methodology transmitted through a chain (silsila) of saints, themselves guided by previous saints. These
lineages invariably trace their origins back to the Prophet Muḥammad. Through initiation into an order,
an aspirant to iḥsân enters such a lineage and accepts the guidance of a mentor, namely the grandshaykh (and occasionally shaykha), or in some cases an authorized representative. No equivalent step
exists for the majdhûb. Although an uncontrollable state of jadhb may occasionally overwhelm an
initiate, this is the result of an unpredictable divine intervention which occurs outside the logic of
initiation.
The Algerian Sufi poet, metaphysician and polymath ʿAbd al-Qâdir al-Jazâʾirî (1995 [original
Arabic c. 1856-1883] (1808-1883), whose heroic but unsuccessful military resistance against French
colonial forces is discussed in depth in Chapter Six, explains the differences between jadhb and sulûk:
I am one of those whom Allâh, through His mercy, has gratified by making himself known to
them and by making known to them the essential reality of the universe through ecstatic
rapture rather than by means of an initiatic voyage (‘alâ ṭariqati l-jadhba, lâ ‘alâ ṭariq alsuluk). For the “voyager” (al-sâlik) the sensible world is unveiled first, then the world of
imagination. Then he rises in spirit as far as the heaven of the lower world, then to the
second heaven, then to the third, and so on until he reaches the divine throne. During the
whole course of this journey he nonetheless continues to be among those beings who are
spiritually veiled until such time as Allâh makes Himself known to him and tears away the
final veil. Afterwards, he returns by the same route and sees things differently than he did
when he saw them on his first journey. It is only then that he knows them with a true
knowledge.
This way, even though it is the highest and most perfect, is indeed long for the voyager and
exposes him to grave dangers. All of the successive unveilings are in fact so many trials. Will
the voyager allow himself to be stopped by them or not? Some are stopped at the first
unveiling, or at the second, and so on until the last of these tests. If he is one of those
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whom divine providence has predestined for success, if he preserves in his quest, stays firm
in his resolution, avoids everything which does not lead to the goal, he achieves victory and
deliverance. If not, he is rejected from the degree at which he has stopped and sent back to
the one he departed from, losing at the same time this world and the other.
[…] As for the way of ecstatic rapture, it is the shortest and the surest. (31-32)
ʿAbd al-Qâdir acknowledges the superiority of sulûk, as established in the normative Junaydî Sufi
tradition, but also recognizes the benefits of his own situation as a majdhûb who has bypassed all the
difficulties, efforts, and indeed spiritual dangers of the initiatic path. Yet, ʿAbd al-Qâdir is no crazy saint.
His involvement in the worldly affairs of his day as a political and military leader, a strategist, and a
diplomat, attest to his ability to manage his inner states. Moreover, as the member of a sharifian family
in charge of a Qâdirî Sufi lodge and Qur’anic school, ʿAbd al-Qâdir was educated to express his views in
accordance with the conventions of Islamic scholarship. Eventually, he sought to perfect his spiritual
state by becoming a novice of sulûk, regardless of his fame as a Sufi.
Despite being the son of a Qâdirî shaykh and having established himself as the spiritual disciple of
Ibn al-ʿArabî, ʿAbd al-Qâdir took an oath of allegiance to the Moroccan Shâdhilî Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn
Mas’ûd al-Fâsî (c. 1797-1872) at the age of sixty (Makhlouf 2005, É. Geoffroy 2010). This astonished and
indeed embarrassed many of his peers. One of his cousins wrote to ʿAbd al-Qâdir
Word has reached us that you had met, in your travels, with an accomplished shaykh
(shaykh ‘ârif), from whom you have taken [the oath of allegiance]. I could hardly believe
it!... Your station is that of a Gnostic (‘ârif), not that of a disciple (murîd)! One like you gives
(yufîd), he does not take (la yastafîd)! (Makhlouf 2005, 271).
Although his shaykh was nowhere nearly as renowned as him, ʿAbd al-Qâdir knew that in his tradition,
no matter how high one’s spiritual level attained through jadhb, only the spiritual poverty and humility
of apprenticeship can help a Sufi attain the highest stations. ʿAbd al-Qâdir writes in detail about how he
gave his oath of allegiance in Mecca after having longed “for a dawn that would break this endless
night” (ibid., 274). In the holy city, ʿAbd al-Qâdir threw himself at the shaykh’s feet, declaring him to be
the “reviver of his dead remains” who “bestowed upon him a new life” (ibid. 275).
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By following a virtually unknown shaykh, ʿAbd al-Qâdir replicated the actions of the founder of
the Sufi order to which he became attached. In the thirteenth century, the initiation and spiritual
progression of Shâdhilî, recorded in several hagiographies, represent an important moment in the
development of institutional Sufism In the Western Islamic tradition (Ibn al-Ṣạ bbagh 1993 [c. 1320], Ibn
ʻAṭāʼ Allāh 2005 [c. 13th cent.], Maḥmûd 1968). After completing his training in the basic Islamic
sciences, such as the memorization of scripture and the knowledge of jurisprudence, Shâdhilî wished to
receive initiation into the Sufi path by the most elevated of all saints, the head of the spiritual hierarchy
of his age, technically referred to in Sufism as the divinely appointed quṭb (pole or axis) of the created
universe. He travelled eastward, spent some time in Tunis, and performed several pilgrimages to Mecca
and Medina. Eventually, he went to Iraq, where one of the local saints told Shâdhilî he would find the
quṭb in his homeland of Ghumâra. This region is situated in the mountainous region of Northern
Morocco, near the Mediterranean coast. Shâdhilî related the account of his meeting with the quṭb Ibn
Mashîsh to his disciples:
When I drew near him, while he was living in Ghumara in a lodge on the top of a
mountain,86 I bathed at a spring by the base of that mountain, forsook all dependence
on my own knowledge and works, and went up toward him as one in need. Just then he
was coming down toward me, wearing a patched cloak, and on his head a cap of palm
leaves. "Welcome to ‘Ali ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbar,” he said to me, and repeated
my lineage down to the Apostle of God. Then he said to me, “O, ‘Ali, you have come up
to us destitute of your knowledge and works, so you will receive from us the riches of
this world and the next.”
He (al-Shadhili) continued,
Awe of him seized me. So I remained with him for some days until God awakened my
perception, and I saw that he possessed many supernatural powers (kharq al-‘adat)87.
For example, one day as I sat before him while a young son of his played with him on his
lap, it came into my mind to question him concerning the greatest name of God. The
child came to me, threw his arms about my neck, and shook me, saying, “O Abu alHasan, you desired to question the master concerning the greatest name of God. It is
86

This mountain, at the bottom of which is the spring in which Shâdhilî is reported to have bathed, is still a
pilgrimage site today. As the burial place of a famous quṭb, it is appropriately known as the Mount of the World
(Jabal al-‘Alam). See supra note 54 and accompanying text concerning the symbols of the centre of the world.
87
kharq al-‘adât literally means ‘breach of customs. In Sufism, this term refers to supernatural occurrences
attributed to saints, i.e. events which breach the customary functioning of the cosmos.
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not a matter of importance that you should ask about the greatest name of God. The
important thing is that you should be the greatest name of God, that is to say, that the
secret (sirr) of God should be lodged in your heart.” When he had finished speaking, the
sheikh (Ibn Mashish) smiled and said to me, “Such a one has answered you for me.” (Ibn
al-Ṣạ bbagh 1993 [c. 1320], 15-16)
Shâdhilî represents the special case of an already spiritually advanced novice of sharifian origin,
fully trained in the fundamental external religious sciences. When he met his fellow sharif and
compatriot Ibn Mashîsh, he was ready to progress very rapidly through many initiatic stages. He only
needed to show complete humility and come to Ibn Mashîsh without any pretention of knowledge or
merit. After his ritual bath at the foot of the mountain, Shâdhilî ascended to present himself as an empty
vessel ready to be filled by the knowledge and blessings of his shaykh. The superiority of spiritual
knowledge over erudition is illustrated by the many miraculous events Shâdhilî witnessed during his
spiritual apprenticeship, such as Ibn Mashîsh reciting his full lineage upon their first encounter, or the
young child teaching Shâdhilî about one of Sufism’s most mysterious and complicated topics, the
greatest name of God, after having read his mind. Surely, Ibn Mashîsh, his young son, and Shâdhilî all
experienced some powerful states of spiritual jadhb, but the initiatic context ensured a certain sobriety
to their interaction (Sparkes 2013, 33-35).
After only days, the apprenticeship was complete. Ibn Mashîsh ordered Shâdhilî to journey
eastward once again, predicting that he would one day inherit the function of quṭb. Shâdhilî first
traveled to Tunisia, then called Ifrîqiya, where he initially followed the example of his shaykh by
devoting most of his time to ascetic worship in wild isolated places, such as a cave on Mount Zaghawân.
He had very few companions. But one day he heard a voice calling him by one of his names, ‘Alî:
I was told, ‘’O ‘Ali, go down to the people in order that they may receive some good from
you.” I replied, “O my Lord, deliver me from other men. I have no capacity to mingle with
them.” Then I was told, “Descend, for We have caused security to accompany you and We
have withdrawn blame from you.” I said, “O Lord, if Thou commit me to men, I must eat by
their pittances.” Then I was told, “Spend, O ‘Ali for I am the Provider, if you wish from your
pocket (jayb) or if you wish, from the unseen (ghayb). (Ibn al-Ṣạ bbagh 1993 [c. 1320], 21)
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Subsequently, Shâdhilî attracted many followers in Tunis, and later in the Egyptian city of Alexandria,
where he settled permanently at the head of a community of disciples. Following his mandate to “go
down to the people,” Shâdhilî differed from his hermit shaykh in mingling with scholars, princes,
merchants, and peasants alike. Moreover, in accordance with his vocation, he was known to wear
elegant clothes.
Shaykh Abû al-Ḥasan was visited once by a dervish who was wearing a hair shirt. When the
shaykh had finished speaking, the man came up to him, took hold of his garment and said,
“Master, it’s impossible to worship God in clothes like the ones you’re wearing.”
The shaykh then took hold of the man’s clothing and, finding them to be coarse, said, “Nor
is it possible to worship God in clothes like the one’s you’re wearing! My clothes tell people
‘I have no need of you. Don’t give me anything.’ Whereas your clothes tell people, ‘I need
you. Give to me!” (Ibn ʻAṭāʼ Allāh 2005 [c. 13th cent.], 263)
Taking pride in asceticism is a trap for those seeking to defeat their ego. However, the shaykh was not
condemning the wearing of coarse garments and other manifestations of an ascetic lifestyle; he was
against taking pride in any type of attire: “The person who wishes to wear such attire is free to do so;
and those who choose not to wear it are free not to do so, so long as they are doers of good.” (ibid. 264)
The early Shâdhilî community established the basic foundations of a Sufi lineage which would
become prominent in North Africa, spread throughout Islamdom, and eventually beyond to such places
such as Western Europe and North America (Geoffroy 2005). Although this community was organized
somewhat informally, it can be called a Sufi institution. The Egyptian Islamic scholar ‘Abd al-Ḥalîm
Maḥmûd (1968) (1910-1978) writes of the Shâdhilî School (al-Madrasa al-Shâdhiliyya), which can refer
to a current much broader than a particular order. Indeed, many orders were born from the initial
communities in Tunis and Alexandria. As a rule, these Shâdhilî orders encourage disciples to progress
along the spiritual path without abandoning their occupations or families. Shâdhilî’s successor at the
head of the Alexandrian community, Shaykh Abû al-‘Abbâs al-Mursî (c. 1219 - c. 1287) said “If a
merchant becomes our disciple, we do not tell him: Leave your craft and come. Nor do we tell a student:
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Abandon your pursuit of knowledge and come. Rather we confirm everyone in that which God has
established him.” (Ibn ʻAṭāʼ Allāh 2005 [c. 13th cent.], 141)
Sufism can be an official occupation for some. Although they may have other professional
activities, some people are known as specialists in the science and method of iḥsân. Isolated hermits
with an intense spiritual life are believed to have a beneficial influence (baraka) on the lands they
inhabit, and Sufis with the vocation of guiding novices provide society with expertise on the
fundamentals of living well and acting virtuously. In addition, the institutions they lead often provide
other social services such as schools, collective farming units, or simply refuges for travelers, widows,
and others in need of a place to stay. However, many novices and accomplished Sufis do not embrace
Sufism as an official occupation. They may even conceal their spiritual rank. But according to their
tradition, the experiential knowledge of subtle realities, attained by adhering to a Sufi path or through
jadhb, inspires their actions in other activities and occupations. Calligraphy, pottery, medicine,
governance, and even comb-making become conduits for the expression of divinely inspired excellence
and beauty.

Conclusion
In the premodern/precolonial Maghrib and al-Andalus, distinct understandings of beauty and
well-being emerged which were crucial in the formation of the Western Islamic tradition. This heritage,
which encompasses an enormous diversity of manifestations, from the enjoyment of worldly luxuries to
the ecstasy of hermits, has represented an ongoing source of inspiration and a cause worth defending
for many Muslims. It is true that the relative political and economic weakness of Islamicate societies in
the modern/colonial period has led many Muslims to question their heritage. Tradition clearly failed to
prevent the gradual colonization of nearly all Muslim lands by Europeans, between the fifteenth and
twentieth centuries, and the ongoing Western hegemony experienced even by those whose lands never
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fell under direct colonial administration or have since gained political independence. Failure is a brutal
teacher. And difficulties in the present can shed a stark light on the past.
Assuredly, many premodern Muslims were conscious of the disfunctions within their societies.
The perpetual gap between religious ideals and social realities inspired many to retreat from society and
devote themselves to a life of asceticism and worship. Historically, Sufism was born from a deeply
critical view of societies under Muslim rule. In the pursuit of beauty and excellence inspired by Islam,
Muslims had developed societies plagued by inequities and the often ruthless pursuit of power and
worldly pleasures. One person’s experience of beauty and well-being often came at the expense of
another’s rights, and the disregard of religious obligations and prohibitions. Sufis headed to caves,
mountaintops, deserts, and forests to flee such corruption and concentrate on worship. Yet, not all Sufis
abandoned society. Many tried to contribute religious expertise to redeem and improve their
communities by sublimating worldly activities and establishing institutions in which individuals could
seek to attain sainthood. Aware of the risks of trying to improve society, Shâdhilî exclaimed, “O my Lord,
deliver me from other men. I have no capacity to mingle with them.” (Ibn al-Ṣạ bbagh 1993 [c. 1320], 21).
History proved that his apprehensions were founded. By the eighteenth century, when Western
European powers still only occupied small parts of Islamdom, there was a “widespread sense of decline
and concern over the debasement of Sufism among the masses, sunk in superstition and entranced by
the extravagant claims of wonderworking charlatans” (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 1). Even the institutions
established to promote beauty and well-being can be used for ugly ends. Neither the professional guilds
nor the Sufi orders are immune to such abuse.
Many Muslims have felt betrayed by their traditional institutions. But doesn’t the very
bitterness of this betrayal attest to the beauty and hope these institutions so often provide? Arguably,
the potential for great disappointment is proportionate to the value of an institution, be it a family, a
guild, a government, or a religious organization. The immense benefits these institutions provide when
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they function properly makes their disfunctions even more painful. As discussed in the subsequent
chapters of this dissertation, Muslims have reacted to the challenges faced by their societies in a variety
of ways. Some have called for the partial or complete upheaval of their tradition. Many of their critiques
stem from an idealistic view, either of modern progress, or of the early Islamic period, before the
religion had developed into a complex civilization with diverse and often conflicting traditions. Yet, not
everyone is a utopian, and many Muslims accept that their traditional institutions are both precious and
imperfect. They continue to struggle to perpetuate traditional Islam by constantly revivifying its
institutions and decrying abuses and disfunctions. In this effort, they are trying to follow the divine
order:
ََوأ َ ۡح ِسنُ ٓواْ ِإ ﱠن ٱ ﱠ َ يُحِ بﱡ ۡٱل ُمحۡ ِسنِين
“ […] be virtuous [aḥsinû]; God loves the virtuous [al-muḥsinîn]” (Qur’an 2:195)
Their quest is also encouraged by a well-known hadith:
Allah the Almighty has said: Whosoever shows enmity to a friend of Mine, I shall be at
war with him. My servant does not draw near to Me with anything more loved by Me
than the religious duties I have imposed upon him, and My servant continues to draw
near to Me with supererogatory works so that I shall love him. When I love him I am his
hearing with which he hears, his seeing with which he sees, his hand with which he
strikes, and his foot with which he walks. Were he to ask (something) of Me, I would
surely give it to him; and were he to ask Me for refuge, I would surely grant him it.
(Nawawī 1977 [c. 13th century], 118)
Such scriptural sources serve as inspiration for countless Muslims today, as they did in the
fifteenth century, when the Western Islamic tradition, with its internal tensions and diversity, faced an
existential and physical threat. The Catholic Crusaders of Western Europe were setting in motion the
genocidal processes which would play a crucial role in the emergence of the modern/colonial worldsystem, in ways they could not possibly foresee. Quite naturally, this provoked resistance from the
Muslims, Jews, and even some Christians inhabiting the Western Islamicate. They resisted to survive
individually and collectively. Their plural tradition represented a cause worth fighting for. It also
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represented a heritage from which to draw when resisting—a source of knowledge, comfort, and
inspiration. Subsequently, Muslims who crossed or were forced to cross the Atlantic to America carried
within them their traditional lifeways and worldviews as well as their will to resist.
In North America, Islamic history is dominated by efforts to resist modern/colonial genocide.
Contemporary Traditionalist critiques of modernity by North American Muslim scholars are part of this
history of transatlantic resistance. Section Four of this dissertation argues that traditional Islam still
needs to be decolonized, and that Traditionalist Islamic perspectives need to be included in the global
inter-epistemic decolonial project. But this argument presupposes a historical understanding of the anticolonial genealogy of North American Traditionalist Islam. That story begins in 1415.
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Section II—Disruption: Modern/Colonial Projects and Muslim Resistance in the Atlantic World (1415 to
1865)
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Chapter 3- Crusades and Inquisitions: The Gestation of Modernity/Coloniality in Iberia and Northwest
Africa88
ص
َ ََو َكمۡ أ َ ۡهلَ ۡ نَا قَ ۡبلَ ُهم ِ ّمن قَ ۡر ٍن هُمۡ أ
ٍ ش ﱡد مِ ۡن ُہمۡ َب ۡطشًا فَ َنقﱠبُواْ فِﻰ ۡٱل ِبلَ ٰـ ِد ه َۡل مِ ۡن ﱠمحِ ۡي
And how many a generation We destroyed before them, who were mightier than these in
prowess, and [who] then searched throughout the land [wondering]: is there any escape?
(Quran 50:36)
In August 1415, a fleet of galleys, barges, and tall ships lent by the states of northern
Europe arrived before the walls of Sabta, which was governed independently from Fez by a
family of wealthy merchants. Taken completely by surprise, the defenders had no time to
summon help. Within a week, the city’s ramparts were breached by an overwhelming
assault. The last stand of Sabta’s inhabitants was as hopeless as it was valiant. The
Portuguese chronicler Gomes Eannes de Azurara, writing in 1448, reports that many
Christian soldiers were killed by civilians, who ambushed them in their homes as they
attempted to loot their possessions. Progress through the city’s streets was slow and costly
as the defenders retreated step by step. The citizens of Sabta continued fighting until their
weapons broke, whereupon they retreated to the rooftops, hurling pieces of masonry at
their attackers. Finally, lacking any weapons at all with which to fight, the Muslim defenders
threw themselves unarmed against the Portuguese, fighting with fists, teeth, and
fingernails. The final battle near the castle (qaṣba) in the city’s centre was especially bloody,
as the last remaining contingent of indigenous troops fired indiscriminately upon Christian
invaders and Muslims alike, who swarmed below the walls in a frenzied melée of hand-tohand combat. (Cornell 1998, 164)
The events of 1415, described in this passage, represent a major labour pain in the symbolic birth of
modernity/coloniality, which according to decolonial world-systems analysts occurred in 1492 (Dussel
1995 [1992], 12), with the defeat of the last Muslim-led polity in Iberia and the crossing of the Atlantic
by Christopher Columbus (1451-1506). Although colonial forces from Europe came to dominate the
emerging world-system, Muslims fiercely resisted from the onset, to ensure their physical survival but
also the perpetuation of their traditional ways of being, knowing, and behaving, described in Section
One.
This chapter charts the gestation of the modern/colonial Atlantic world-system, from 1415 until
1492. It situates the Catholic crusades of the fifteenth century, in al-Andalus and Northwest Africa, as a
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bridge between the medieval crusades and the modern/colonial age of European conquest and
exploration. Anti-Muslim zeal is an important element to understand the continuity between these
periods. Another crusade which was closely connected to the anti-Muslim crusades, was the genocidal
conquest and colonization of the Canary Islands and its indigenous Guanches, begun in the fourteenth
century. Spanish Catholic conquistadors were the driving force behind this conflict. In the early
formation of modern/colonial identities, the Guanches were constructed as savage enemies, and the
Muslims as civilized adversaries. Sub-Saharan Africans, many of whom were Muslim, were also being
constructed as savages.
Ironically, the common understanding of the term savagery applies very well to the genocidal
and colonial expansion of Western Europe depicted in this and following chapters. However, it is crucial
to keep in mind that such observations should not be a pretext to simply reverse the dominant
noble/savage binary. It may seem like a platitude to state that Europeans are often very nice people, or
that some Muslims are not, but one can never be too cautious or clear when discussing controversial
issues. Consequently, let it be explicitly stated that this dissertation does not argue that Western
Europeans are savages and Muslims noble hapless victims. It is true that decolonial world-systems
analysis depicts the modern/colonial world-system as devastatingly destructive overall. Yet, a structural
critique is too broad to ascribe personal guilt to every individual privileged by a system or innocence to
all others. Certainly, it is possible to provide evidence that the actions of certain individuals are moral or
not, but the overall concern here is systemic, not personal. Moreover, even on a systemic level, it would
be unserious to negatively portray every product of modern European civilization. But in the face of
ongoing global coloniality, it remains necessary to challenge Eurocentric binaries by drawing attention to
the negative aspects of the modern/colonial core as seen from peripheral locations, such as the Western
Islamicate. Understanding the historical genealogy of this system is also important.
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As Portugal led the African crusade in Morocco and sailed down the West African coast in search
of trade routes which circumvented Islamdom, Spanish crusaders were bent on eliminating or at least
severely limiting the Muslim and Jewish presence on the Iberian Peninsula. They put together a twofold
strategy to (1) conquer Granada, the last Muslim-ruled kingdom in Iberia, and (2) purify the Catholic
faith by establishing the Spanish Inquisition. During the Inquisition, the notion of race was first applied
to humans, namely Muslims and Jews, and bureaucratic practices were developed which became a
template for the banal rationalization of state violence associated with modernity. Once Islam and
Judaism had been subjugated at home, the Spanish conquistadors rapidly turned their gaze overseas.
Months after the conquest of Granada, Columbus travelled westwards across the Atlantic and reached
America. At the end of this journey, decolonial world-systems analysts situate the symbolic birth of
modernity/coloniality. As a continuation of Spanish crusading and conquests in the Canary Islands and
Granada, the modern/colonial Atlantic world-system emerged not simply from an internal European
process but also from a European reaction to internal and external ‘Others’, particularly Muslims.
Evidence for this argument is provided throughout Section Two.
Yet, for many Muslims, some haunting questions linger, such as why they suffered so many
defeats at the hands of European crusaders in the fifteenth century, or how little resistance West
African Muslims seem to have initially presented to Portuguese slavers. Any serious answer to such
difficult questions should be both tentative and complex. While it seems clear in hindsight that the
fifteenth century began a period during which Western Europeans slowly emerged as the dominant
world-power, this emergence was neither smooth nor uncontested. It is true, for example, that Muslims
in al-Andalus and al-Maghrib faced a string of defeats in the fifteenth century but, as discussed in
Chapter Four, they fought back and won some major victories in the sixteenth century. Moreover,
Muslim defeats were the product of multiple factors, some of which were internal to their societies. But
there were also many external factors over which Western Muslims had little or no influence.
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Perhaps it is easier to explain the ease with which the Portuguese were able to establish a slave
trade in West Africa. They came first with small contingents, not massive armies. West Africans
responded to them with caution and resisted any type of aggression, but they came to see the
Portuguese as partners offering new markets for the existing commerce of various commodities,
including slaves. At the time, neither the Africans nor the Portuguese could have known the cataclysmic
repercussions of the transatlantic slave trade which developed from these early transactions. Indeed,
none of the people inhabiting Northwest Africa and Southwest Europe in the fifteenth century could
have known that their interactions were setting the foundations of a new world-system which would
eventually become fully globalized. Yet this is precisely what was set in motion by the rise of the
Portuguese and Spanish Empires, largely driven by anti-Muslim zeal.

Al-Andalus, Africa, and the Western Crusades
A statue of Dom Henrique (1394-1460), better known in English as Prince Henry the Navigator,
stands in the middle of a roundabout which connects the Port, the Marina, the residential districts, and
the historical city centre of Ceuta (Sabta). This strategically situated monument serves as a reminder of
the city’s crucial role in the early Portuguese imperialism which opened the way for the Spanish
conquests of 1492 (Beazley 1968 [1895], 1910). Under the leadership of Prince Henry, the Portuguese
explored the Northwest coast of Africa, invading and settling many cities and ports. These voyages
aimed at diverting the trade of Sub-Saharan gold, ivory, and slaves from the inland caravan routes
dominated by Muslims to sea routes controlled by Portugal. More ambitiously, the aim was to find a
maritime route to India and other parts of Asia, which would circumvent the land routes of Islamdom.
Through these actions, Portugal initiated the modern Atlantic slave trade and the Western European age
of maritime exploration, conquest, and colonization (Diffie and Winius 1977, Boxer 1969). Writing in the
heyday of his own nation’s empire, British historian Charles Raymond Beazley (1910) (1868–1955)
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affirms that “[a]mong the men who prepare the Catholic civilization of the later Middle Ages for that
oversea expansion which marks the opening of the modern world, the figure of Prince Henry of Portugal
is of commanding importance” (11). He further eulogizes the prince, stating:
It is he who gives continuity, permanence, and final success to the feeble and decadent
movement of oceanic discovery; it is he who starts again, with so different a result, that
search for the Indo-African waterway which the Genoese of 1291 had begun. With him
commences the effective participation of the centralized, monarchical, Christian states (the
larger unities which now supersede the city republics and feudal principalities of earlier
time) in that colonial, commercial, and crusading expansion whose burden had hitherto
rested partly on volunteer adventurers, partly on the great mercantile communities. The
Portuguese Infant makes his nation the pioneer of Europe in its final conquest, by maritime
paths, of the outer world. (12)
Conquering the Moroccan city of Sabta in 1415 launched Henry’s public career (Beazley 1968 [1895],
147-159, Diffie and Winius 1977, 44-56). This was a major tactical victory, cutting off a major supply
route for the Muslim rulers of Granada. Sabta had for centuries been an important trade hub for goods
coming from Asia and Africa to Southwestern Europe. But defeating Sabta was also a strategic victory in
the long-term struggle between Western European Christendom and its Muslim rivals (Julien 2011
[1978]). Although the invasion of this small North African city-state is not widely remembered today, it
was a major turning point in world history. According to Cornell (1998):
One cannot overemphasize the impact of the conquest and subsequent depopulation of
Sabta on the inhabitants of the Far Maghrib. Even the fall of Granada in 1492 failed to
provoke the same level of outrage and despair as the loss of this mercantile and intellectual
center on the formerly secure southern shore of the Dâr al-Islâm 89” (164).
Whereas Muslims had been accustomed to fighting Christians in the Iberian Peninsula for centuries,
Henry took the fight to the North African mainland. Suddenly, the Muslims of the Atlantic world found
themselves in a defensive anti-colonial jihad, rather than a contested conquest and expansion into
Western Europe. Their struggle has been overwhelmingly defensive ever since.
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Dâr al-Islâm (the House of Islam) is the classical Arabic term used to designate Islamdom, i.e. lands ruled by
Muslims.
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Figure 2— Prince Henry the Navigator in Sabta (Ceuta)
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Better known in the West by its Spanish name Ceuta, Sabta has long been a place where worlds
meet and sometimes collide. The name Sabta derives from the Latin Septem Fratres (Seven Brothers),
or simply Septem, referring to seven of the mountains surrounding the city. It is the site of Mount
Hacho, called the Pillar of Abyle by the Ancient Greeks, since it was believed by many to be one of the
two legendary pillars of Hercules along with the rock of Gibraltar on the northern shore of the Strait of
Gibraltar. This waterway connects the Atlantic to the Mediterranean and separates Africa from Europe
by only 19 kilometres at its narrowest point. It has therefore been a strategic economic and military
location for centuries (Daoud 2017). In 218 BCE, Hannibal (247-183 BCE), a famous general of the North
African Carthaginian Empire, attacked the Roman heartland by crossing the Spanish Pyrenees with a
huge army which included at least 37 elephants. The most probable location for crossing these
elephants into Europe from Africa is naturally the Strait of Gibraltar between the two pillars (Culican and
Hunt 2018). And when Ṭâriq ibn Ziyâd crossed this Strait in 711 CE to invade the Iberian Peninsula, he
landed on the rock which would henceforth carry his name. Indeed, Gibraltar is an Anglicized form of
the Arabic Jabal Ṭâriq (Mount Ṭâriq).
Conquering Sabta in 1415 opened the way for the final reversal of the historical period opened by
Ibn Ziyâd. It was the beginning of the end of eight centuries of Muslim rule in Southwest Europe. When
we look at the big picture of history, sweeping over centuries and millennia in a few paragraphs, it is
easy to lose the sense of how people experienced the passing of time. Perhaps it is useful to point out
that as I write these lines in 2019, Columbus arrived in the Americas only 527 years ago—254 years less
than the era of al-Andalus. Europeans like Prince Henry certainly sensed that this was a long time,
indeed much too long! He was born in a period Eurocentric history remembers as the early Renaissance
(French for Rebirth). But what had died and what was being reborn? In the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, there was a growing sense among European elites that the previous millennium had been a
period of cultural darkness, starvation, even death. These Dark Ages or Middle Ages, as they began to be
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categorized during the Renaissance, were also a period of political and economic weakness. For our
purpose here, it is crucial to remember that this very weakness had facilitated the early Muslim
conquests around the Mediterranean. It is equally crucial to understand that it was the strength of
Islamdom which made Western Christendom seem comparatively weak and isolated at the remote
western edge of the Eurasian-African trading routes. Christian Europe had been surrounded by Muslims
for centuries.
As discussed in Chapter One, in less than a century after the life of the Prophet Muḥammad,
Muslim armies conquered the eastern, southern and western shores of the Mediterranean, previously
ruled by Christians, as well as the entirety of the Persian Sâsânid Empire. Latin Christendom was
politically reduced to the lands north of the Mediterranean, although Christians continued to live in
lands ruled by Muslims. This initial shock for Christians was followed by centuries of conflict with Muslim
powers. The Crusades, which began in 1095, attempted to reverse Muslim expansion around the
Mediterranean. They were successful for a time, even establishing the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1099,
which covered much of the Eastern Mediterranean. Christian rule of Jerusalem (al-Quds) launched what
the Encyclopedia Britannica describes as “a reign of terror against Muslims and Jews” which contrasted
vividly with the generally pluralist and cosmopolitan policies of Muslim rulers, although there were
periods of Muslim intolerance as well (Dumper, et al. 2018). Moreover, the Crusaders were infamously
intolerant towards Eastern Christian communities.
Muslims eventually regained control of the Eastern Mediterranean. They reconquered
Jerusalem in 1187. In response, the Christian kingdom moved its capital to Acre (‘Akkâ), reduced to a
tiny polity along the coast until its final defeat in 1291. The Ottoman Empire (1299-1923) was beginning
to assert its dominance in the region. When the Ottomans subjugated Constantinople in 1453, changing
its name to Istanbul and opening the way for the subsequent conquest of Greece and much of
Southeastern Europe, Western Christendom was shocked once again. Constantinople had once been the
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capital of the Roman Empire, and Greece was generally seen as the birthplace of pre-Christian Western
civilization. However, these defeats did have some positive consequences for Western Europe. For
instance, many eastern scholars fled the Ottomans to Italy with books and manuscripts. The West
rediscovered classical Greek texts which had been preserved in Islamicate societies and began to catch
up on centuries of scientific developments from which they had been isolated. Political losses and
scientific discoveries provided the context in which Western Europeans would seek to be reborn into a
new age in which they were powerful and advanced. Modernity was being conceived in the minds of
Western Europeans who increasingly wanted to break out of their so-called Dark Ages and enter a more
hopeful period.
Christian Crusading in the Eastern Mediterranean was over, but not in the Western
Mediterranean. A few scattered Christian polities had survived the Muslim conquests in the northern
fringes of the Iberian Peninsula in the eighth century. These small polities reorganized themselves and
battled their Muslim rivals for centuries. Various struggles, which resulted eight centuries later in the
expulsion of Muslims and Jews from the Peninsula, are now presented by Eurocentric history as the
Reconquista, the reconquest of Spain and Portugal by its original Catholic inhabitants. But this analysis is
anachronistic and incomplete. Spain and Portugal did not exist in the eighth century. For Muslims, the
Reconquista was simply a Conquista (Spanish for conquest). Yet, Christian kingdoms did forge an identity
over time in opposition to Islam and with the desire to reclaim the lands previously under Visigothic
Christian rule. Thus, the Reconquista was a political and religious project which slowly evolved among
some—not all—of the peoples in the Peninsula along with new linguistic and cultural identities. Neither
was this project unanimously adopted by all Christians always, as is evidenced by the several ChristianMuslim alliances which resulted in Christian rulers fighting fellow Christians and Muslims fighting
Muslims.
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Conquista or Reconquista, efforts to forcibly Catholicize all of Iberia were officially declared a
Crusade by Pope Innocent III, in 1212, at the bequest of King Alphonso VII of Castile. Allied with the
Christian Kingdoms of Aragon, Navarre, and Portugal, the Castilians fought the Muslim Almohad Dynasty
(al-Muwaḥḥidūn, which means “believers in the unity of God”) whose reign (c. 1121-1269) covered
immense territory at its peak, including both al-Andalus and most of North Africa, nearly as far east as
Egypt. The Christian kingdoms won a decisive victory at Las Navas de Tolosa, on July 16, 1212.
Andalusian Muslims then faced forty years of defeats against their newly unified enemies. In 1252, all
that was left of al-Andalus was the southern emirate of Granada, ruled by the Naṣrid dynasty (12381492). Rivalries among Christians continued as did alliances and friendships across confessional lines,
but identities hardened as the crusading fervour gained momentum.
The Order of the Temple, also known as the Knights Templar, renowned for their crusading in
the Eastern Mediterranean, was dissolved by Pope Clement V in 1312, but its Portuguese knights and
estates were integrated into the new Order of Christ. Prince Henry the Navigator would eventually
become the order’s Grand Master. As Beazley recollects somewhat gleefully, Henry’s biography
illustrates the direct connection between anti-Muslim crusading and the beginnings of modern
European expansion through conquest and exploration. Concerning Henry’s invasion of Sabta, Beazley
(1910) adds that “among all the enterprises of European states in the later Middle Ages no single one
had a more marked crusading character” (13).
Decades before 1492, an African crusade was launched in Sabta as a continuation of the Catholic
crusade to expel Muslims from Iberia. Both crusades were supported by the Pope and allies throughout
Northwest Europe. While it would be an oversimplification to say that all those participating in the
conquests were motivated by religious purposes, Catholic theology was utilized to provide ideological
legitimation. After his success in Sabta, Prince Henry was supported by papal bulls, in 1418, 1436, 1442,
1452, 1454, 1456, 1459, and even posthumously in 1481. These edicts built upon one another in
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exhorting Christians to assist the Portuguese crusade in every possible way, to exterminate or enslave
the infidels, and to conquer their lands. Those participating in the crusades were assured absolution of
their sins. At the same time, Portuguese sovereignty over conquered African territories received papal
sanction.
Sabta continued to play a major role as a crusading stronghold while other Moroccan cities and
ports fell to the Portuguese: Qaṣr al-Ṣaghîr in 1458, Anfâ (present-day Casablanca) in 1469, Aṣîla and
Ṭanja (Tangier) in 1471, followed by all the country’s major ports except Slâ (Salé) in the next five
decades. During the same period, Portugal also colonized Madeira (c. 1418) and the Azores islands (c.
1432). Moreover, the Portuguese sailed progressively down the African coast, establishing trade posts.
Bartolomeu Dias (c. 1450-1500) rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1488, and Vasco da Gama (c. 14601524) reached India in 1498. Pedro Álvares Cabral (1467/68-1520) landed in Brazil in 1500—a major
discovery from a Eurocentric perspective, although people already lived there of course. Through these
crusading conquests, Portugal established the first modern/colonial European empire, which lasted six
centuries, from the battle of Sabta in 1415 to the return of Macau to China in 1999. In 1580, Sabta came
under Spanish jurisdiction. Significantly, the first modern European colony on the African mainland—
where it all began for the Muslims of the modern/colonial Atlantic world—remains a Spanish territory
today. It is still widely perceived by North Africans as a colony. In the Strait of Gibraltar, it is still too early
to speak of postcolonialism.

Conquest, Crusading, and Colonization in the Canary Islands
While the conquest of Sabta was a violent labour pain in the decades leading to the birth of
modernity, there was also great suffering in an archipelago just off the coast of Morocco. Now known as
the Canary Islands, this archipelago is technically part of Africa. However, its inhabitants lived in isolation
from the mainland until the fourteenth century. Indigenous islanders comprised several peoples now
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referred to collectively as the Guanches. Their existence had been known to outsiders at least since the
reign of King Juba II (c. 50 BCE-24 CE) in Roman Mauretania, but whereas the inhabitants of the North
African mainland and Southern Europe had been in close contact for millennia, their knowledge of these
islands was very limited. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, Moroccan pirates raided
the Canaries. But sustained contact did not take place until the mid-fourteenth century, when European
sailors from such places as Genoa, Castile, Portugal, Mallorca, and Catalonia, began to intensively raid
and plunder the archipelago.
The brutalization, enslavement, conquest, colonization, and eventual genocide of Indigenous Canary
Islanders is a crucial episode in the formation of the modern/colonial world system (Mercer 1980, 155258).90 During an early military expedition on the islands, in 1341, when the Portuguese came to what is
now called Gran Canaria, they marveled at the nearly naked islanders who spoke softly and were eager
to communicate with them. In response, the Portuguese enslaved the four islanders who swam out to
meet them on their boats. This was “the first recorded example of the trust and treachery henceforth to
become commonplace in the Canaries.” Moreover, “since the islanders were to be the first people
conquered and colonized by Europeans, here were the small beginnings of a cycle not yet gone full
cycle. The captives, young, were described as handsome, robust, courageous, and very intelligent” (ibid.,
56). They were also described as trusting, generous and merry, even civilized, although they did not use
money, spices, or various other technologies such as metal weapons. Indigenous islanders physically
resembled the inhabitants of the Western Mediterranean and were genetically related to the indigenous
Amazigh people of the Maghrib. Yet, they seemed to come from another universe. As the Portuguese
sailors wondered at the difference of the islanders, they portrayed them in a way which preludes the
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For a historical discussion situating Portuguese expeditions in the Canary Islands in the broader context of
maritime expansionism, see Boxer (1969). For a discussion focusing on the importance of the Canary Islands in the
formation of Spanish imperialism and colonialism, see Merediz (1998) In pages 58-29, Merediz offers a scholarly
commentary on the work of Spanish historian Alonso de Espinosa (1543-n.d.), who deplored the devastation
caused by Spanish colonialism in the Islands as well as in the Americas. See also de Espinosa (1907 [1594]).
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noble savage tropes later applied to Indigenous peoples across the Atlantic (Merediz 1998, 11-57, Hall
2010 [1992], 309-314). When the Indigenous islanders eventually fought back, the Europeans described
them as brutal savages. A good/bad savage dichotomy was being developed which would be applied in
the Caribbean to Arawaks and Caribs, and to countless other peoples around the world. In the formation
of modern/colonial identity constructions, the Guanches represent the first ‘savage’ enemies to be
colonized, just as the Muslims represent the first ‘civilized’ enemies to be conquered. The dark-skinned
populations encountered by the Portuguese as they sailed down the African coast were also portrayed
as exotic savages. However, decolonial theorist Maldonado-Torres (2014) remarks:
We should also consider here the fact that while Latin Christianity had already known the
existence of black-skinned subjects, the encounter with African blacks in their own habitat
that began with the Portuguese explorations posed the need for new forms of
anthropological reflection. The same occurred with the inhabitants of the Canary Islands
who, after being confronted with Portuguese explorers, were gradually conquered by the
Spanish during the second half of the fifteenth century. However, the encounters with
African blacks and the indigenous peoples of the Canary Islands in the fifteenth century, of
whom early Christianity had already been aware, did not significantly alter the terms with
which Christians classified and understood the communities and peoples that were inside
or surrounding their territories. In both cases, the subjects were described according to a
classificatory system based on the Christian politics of true versus false religion. (649)
Maldonando-Torres is arguing that modern racism only appeared after Columbus encountered
Indigenous Americans. Rather than describing them as having a false (pagan, heathen, heretical, etc.)
religion, Columbus portrayed Indigenous Americans as having no religion at all. The crucial difference
between premodern forms of protoracism and modern racism is elaborated below in my discussion of
the sixteenth century, but it is worth developing Maldonado-Torres’s point a bit more here to situate
how Christians were categorizing the ‘Others’ they encountered as they sailed down the Atlantic coast
of Africa. He writes:
While the natives of the Canary Islands were conceived as populations who practiced a false
religion, Columbus described natives in the ‘New World’ as beings without religion
altogether. One was lacking truth, while the other was lacking what was deemed to be a
universal feature of humankind, therefore putting their very humanity in question. (650)
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Although the nuance between protoracism and modern racism is important, my main contention
here is that the unfathomable violence Europeans unleashed on the Guanches set a precedent for the
treatment of indigenous peoples in the modern/colonial world-system. In short, it became a template
for genocide. More generally, this destructive pattern opened the way for the modern/colonial age of
massive extinctions—of humans, animals, and indeed entire ecosystems (LaDuke 1999, Whyte 2017).
This broader destruction is known as ecocide (Churchill 2002 [1992], Short 2016). Furthermore, while it
is true that writings about the Canary Islanders by Europeans in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
portray them as pagans or idolaters with the wrong religion, rather than no religion, these depictions
clearly put their humanity in question by constantly describing them as beasts or beastly (Merediz 1998,
33-55). Dehumanization leading to genocide is indeed characteristic of the modern/colonial power
dynamics, but it was well under way in the centuries leading up to 1492.
Raids and missionary work in the Canary Islands were sanctioned by the Catholic Church in a
series of grants starting in 1344, but full-scale invasion, conquest, and colonization only began in 1402,
led by French adventurer Gadifer de la Salle (c. 1340-1415). By that time, the population of Indigenous
Islanders had already been seriously depleted by raids and slave runs carried out by various Europeans,
especially from the Iberian Peninsula. Jean de Bethencourt (c. 1360- c.1425) betrayed his leader de la
Salle and established himself as Lord of the islands, under the sovereignty of Castile. With this title in
hand, he left the islands forever in 1405, leaving his nephew Maciot de Bethencourt (c. 1390-c. 1454) to
govern in his name. In 1414, the despotic Maciot sold the islands to a representative of the Castilian
Crown, as well as to Prince Henry of Portugal, and finally to the Spanish Count of Niebla. This started a
60-year conflict between Portugal and Castile for ownership of the Canaries. It was only resolved in
1479, by the Treaty of Alcáçovas-Toledo, which ceded the African coast to Portugal and both the
Canaries and Granada to Castile. The terms of the treaty were sanctioned by a Papal bull in 1481,
essentially dividing the Atlantic in a way which encouraged Portugal’s efforts to seek a route to India by
142

sailing along the African coasts, and authorized Castile to expand westward from the Canaries after
defeating Granada.
As the year 1492 approached, legal precedents were being established in which colonial powers
divided foreign lands into spheres of influence or control. Foundations for what would become
modern/colonial international law were being laid as Iberian crusaders, conquistadores, and
adventurers exterminated Canary Islanders and enslaved Northwest Africans. The conquerors were
introducing new modes of capitalist production based on forced labour, such as the methods of
sugarcane cultivation in the Canaries Madeira and Azores, which became a template in colonial America.
In 1496, four years after the conquest of Granada, the subjugation of the Canary Islands was complete.
Many conquistadores participated in both wars. Some even sailed to the Americas at the turn of the
century. By 1504, more than 90% of the Indigenous Canary Islanders had been killed or enslaved and
sold abroad (Maltby 2009, 19-20). Any clearly identifiable Indigenous community would disappear over
the next century. The genocide was complete.

The Spanish Inquisition and the Conquest of Granada
While fighting Muslims in Africa and conquering new territories abroad were exciting prospects
for Western Europeans, expelling Islam from Europe was surely the priority for Queen Isabella I of
Castile (1451-1504) and King Ferdinand II of Aragon (1452-1516). Their marriage in 1469 led to the
unification of the Spanish Crown, and their subsequent policies laid the imperial and colonial
foundations for the modern nation-state. Isabella and Ferdinand wished to eliminate religious diversity
within their dominions and to defeat the Naṣrid emirate of Granada, better known in Arabic as
Gharnâṭa.
To homogenize religious beliefs and practice, the infamous Spanish Inquisition was launched. As
the Conquista/Reconquista gained momentum in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Jews and
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Muslims living in Catholic Iberian kingdoms faced enormous pressure to convert to Christianity to avoid
persecution. Nevertheless, Catholic authorities continued to suspect these converts and their
descendants of secretly practicing their old religion. In 1478, Ferdinand and Isabella were authorized by
Pope Sixtus IV (1414-1484, r. 1471-1484) to name inquisitors to investigate these cases. Thus, the
monarchs whose forces would conquer Granada, the Canary Islands, and the Indigenous people of the
Caribbean region were also the instigators of the Spanish Inquisition, which only ended in 1834.
Mignolo (2006) argues that during the Inquisition, the notion of race91 was first applied to
humans, in connection to purity of blood:
“Race” was a concept that referred to a lineage, particularly applied to horses. Horses had, in
Arabic history, a distinction they did not have among Christians. Thus, the fact that in Spanish
dictionaries horses became the primary example of lineage—and still today, “pure blood” is an
expression applied to horses with distinction that invaded the vocabulary in English and Spanish
[pura sangre inglesa, pura sangre española)—is telling about the fact that animals were classiﬁed
by “race” and people by “ethnicity” (Greek nous, Latin natio). “Ethnicity” refers to a lineage of
people for whom blood is not the only factor (and I wonder when blood became a crucial factor to
redeﬁne ethnicity), but rather memories and common histories, languages, rituals, everyday
practices, food, songs and music were elements connecting a community of people through history.
However, when Spanish Christians deﬁned “race” on the example of horses and added the slippage
toward the human (“Race in [human] lineages is understood pejoratively, as having some Moorish
or Jewish race…”), they planted the seed for the historical foundation of racism. Racism, in other
words, is not a question of blood or skin color but of a discursive classiﬁcation entrenched in the
foundation of modern/colonial (and capitalist) empires. “Race” in the famous Spanish dictionary by
Sebastian de Covarrubias, is synonymous with “blood” and implied “religion;” that is, the wrong
religion. In the New World the situation was different. (18-19)
Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the medieval period tended to view those who did not share
their faith as people with the wrong religion or the wrong God. Modern racism constructs hierarchies
along the line of the human, subhuman, and non-human. Protoracism, as developed during the early
decades of the Spanish Inquisition, was a bridge between these two forms of othering:
Historically, the expulsion of Arabs and Jews from Christian Spain in the name of “purity of
blood” was a protoracist process (not yet fully racist, although the consequences were not that
different). “Purity of blood” was not used as a racial term but as a technology of power to trace
91

Although the etymology of the word race is unclear, the Arabic word ra’s (head) may have converged with words
such as the Italian razza, more clearly connected to notions of family lineage. Different etymologies may reveal
different premodern understandings of human belonging.
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the religious ancestry of the population. However, “purity of blood” did not become a fully
racist perspective until much later and only after the application of the notion of the “purity of
blood” to indigenous peoples in the Americas. (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006, 3)
Initially, “impure” Moorish (Muslim) or Jewish blood was understood as an indicator that a person might
be secretly against the Christian political project of the Reconquista. Pretending to be Christian was seen
as a form of religious and political treason. But impure blood did not yet explicitly signify that one was
subhuman or non-human.
Initially sanctioned by Pope Gregory IX (c. 1145-1241, r. 1227-1241) in 1227, Inquisitions were
tribunals led by special judges called inquisitors. The establishment of this institution in the thirteenth
century needs to be understood in the broader context of Christendom’s defeat against the external
Muslim ‘Others’ in the Eastern Mediterranean. As they were being progressively expulsed from the
Eastern Mediterranean in the century after their 1187 defeat in Jerusalem, the governing elites of
Christendom turned their violence inward in a systematic campaign to eliminate heretics, who
represented internal ‘Others.’ For instance, the Inquisition against the Knights Templar in 1307 led the
way for the dissolution of this order in 1312. Thus, the Templars can be seen as scapegoats for the loss
of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at the very moment in which the Ottoman Empire was emerging as a major
power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Inquisitions were bureaucratic affairs which followed legalistic procedures. Official notaries
recorded what was said. The Spanish Inquisition built on its predecessors in establishing institutional
practices which would serve as a template for the bureaucratic rationalization associated with
modernity. For this reason, Canadian public intellectual John Rolston Saul (1993, 41-47) considers that
modern rationalism, as a tyrannical and ultimately irrational form of reason, was first developed by the
banal bureaucracy organizing the unspeakable violence of the Inquisition. Cultural Anthropologist Irene
Silverblatt (2004) also contends that this institution played a central role in establishing race thinking
and bureaucracy as constitutive aspects of modernity, in connection with colonialism. These ideological
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developments legitimized—indeed rationalized—torture and other forms of violence, connected not
only to religion but to reasons of state, later labelled national interest. In the Inquisition, Saul and
Silverblatt uncover a much more sinister genealogy to the modern processes of rationalization and
bureaucratization than the comparatively Eurocentric and euphemistic dominant models proposed by
thinkers like Max Weber. These sinister genealogies are called modernity’s “underside” by Dussel
(1996), or its “dark side” by Mignolo (2011). They are best perceived from the perspective of the
modern West’s constitutive ‘Others’, such as Muslims, Jews, blacks, and Indigenous Americans. The
banal rationalization and bureaucratization of violence witnessed in the Inquisition lays the foundations
for state-sponsored violence in the name of freedom, civilization, purity of race, the proletariat,
democracy, or any other number of modern ideological constructs. Ferdinand and Isabella are the
predecessors of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821, r. 1799-1814/15), Leopold II (1835-1909, r. 18651909), Adolph Hitler (1889-1945, r. 1933-1945), and Pol Pot (1925-1998, r. 1975-1979), but also of those
contemporary leaders of Western democracies whose bureaucratic and technocratic apparatuses codify
violent practices.
Before undertaking ambitious conquests overseas, Isabella and Ferdinand wanted to eliminate
the presence of Islam in Iberia, not just through the Inquisition, but also by militarily defeating Granada.
When in 1486 the Genoese merchant and sea captain Christopher Columbus asked the monarchs to
finance an expedition across the Atlantic, they kept him waiting for six years. On January 2, 1492, when
they succeeded in defeating the Emirate of Granada, the last Muslim-ruled polity in Southwest Europe,
Columbus was there. He had been asked by Isabella to wait for the victory, with her entourage, in the
camp of Santa Fe (Spanish for Holy Faith), set up just outside Granada. Columbus also witnessed Sultan
Abû ʿAbd Allâh Muḥammad XII (c. 1460- c. 1527, r. 1482–1483, 1487–1492) known in colonial Spanish
history as Boabdil, hand over the Alhambra Citadel to the Catholic monarchs on January 6, 1492, which
coincided with the Catholic holiday of Epiphany. Isabella, whose great-uncle was none other than Prince
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Henry the Navigator, was now ready to talk with Columbus. She and Ferdinand signed the Capitulations
of Santa Fe, on April 17, 1492, thereby finalizing their deal with the sailor. By August, Columbus was
ready to set sail. Starting his voyage with a stopover in the Canary Islands, Columbus reached the
Bahamas on October 12, 1492. The crusading, conquering, and colonizing of the Eastern Atlantic world
had arrived in North America. (Delaney 2011, 43-90)
Intensely motivated to defeat and surpass Muslims politically and economically, the Spanish
Catholics had followed the Portuguese in seeking maritime trade routes, new lands to conquer, and new
people to Christianize. These entangled motivations are well expressed in the following excerpt from the
prologue to Columbus’ (1893 [1493]) travel journal, addressed to Ferdinand and Isabella:
In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.
BECAUSE, O most Christian, and very high, very excellent, and puissant Princes, King and Queen
of the Spains and of the islands of the Sea, our Lords, in this present year of 1492, after your
Highnesses had given an end to the war with the Moors who reigned in Europe, and had
finished it in the very great city of Granada, where in this present year, on the second day of
the month of January, by force of arms, I saw the royal banners of your Highnesses placed on
the towers of Alfambra [Alhambra], which is the fortress of that city, and I saw the Moorish
King come forth from the gates of the city and kiss the royal hands of your Highnesses, and of
the Prince my Lord, and presently in that same month, acting on the information that I had
given to your Highnesses touching the lands of India, and respecting a Prince who is called Gran
Can, which means in our language King of Kings, how he and his ancestors had sent to Rome
many times to ask for learned men of our holy faith to teach him, and how the Holy Father had
never complied, insomuch that many people believing in idolatries were lost by receiving
doctrine of perdition : YOUR Highnesses, as Catholic Christians and Princes who love the holy
Christian faith, and the propagation of it, and who are enemies to the sect of Mahoma and to
all idolatries and heresies, resolved to send me, Cristobal Colon, to the said parts of India to see
the said princes, and the cities and lands, and their disposition, with a view that they might be
converted to our holy faith; and ordered that I should not go by land to the eastward, as had
been customary, but that I should go by way of the west, whither up to this day, we do not
know for certain that any one has gone.
Thus, after having turned out all the Jews from all your kingdoms and lordships, in the same
month of January your Highnesses gave orders to me that with a sufficient fleet I should go to
the said parts of India, and for this they made great concessions to me, and ennobled me, so
that henceforward I should be called Don, and should be Chief Admiral of the Ocean Sea,
perpetual Viceroy and Governor of all the islands and continents that I should discover and
gain, and that I might hereafter discover and gain in the Ocean Sea, and that my eldest son
should succeed, and so on from generation to generation for ever.
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I left the city of Granada on the 12th day of May, in the same year of 1492, being Saturday, and
came to the town of Palos, which is a seaport; where I equipped three vessels well suited for
such service; and departed from that port, well supplied with provisions and with many sailors,
on the 3d day of August of the same year, being Friday, half an hour before sunrise, taking the
route to the islands of Canaria, belonging to your Highnesses, which are in the said Ocean Sea,
that I might thence take my departure for navigating until I should arrive at the Indies, and give
the letters of your Highnesses to those princes, so as to comply with my orders. (15-17)
This excerpt illustrates how Columbus’ journey in 1492 was quite literally an extension of the conquests
of Granada and the Canary Islands, driven by profoundly anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish hatred.
Key formations of modernity developed through the Spanish Inquisition and conquest of
Granada under Ferdinand and Isabella. These monarchs lived well before the seventeenth century,
depicted as the Age of Reason in Eurocentric history, and well before the nineteenth century in which
Weber believed modern bureaucracy had developed into the ultimately rational organizational form.
And the royal couple died well before the Treaty of Westphalia, which is widely considered to have given
birth to the modern nation-state system in 1648. Eurocentric narratives typically describe this system as
an internal European creation which established the ideal of states with clearly defined borders, and
only one clearly defined religion, language, and culture—one nation.92 Yet, at the end of the fifteenth
century, this royal couple was consolidating territory and building the model of a state which
rationalizes and banalizes violence through bureaucratic procedures legitimating the elimination of
human diversity within its territory. Without denying the impact of internal European developments, the
early formation of modernity was very much produced by European reactions to internal and external
‘Others’, including Muslims (Hall 2010 [1992]).

Why the Muslims Were Defeated
A fundamental question haunting many Muslims in the modern period is how they lost to
Europe in the long run. This dissertation is very much concerned with some of the diverse responses
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For a discussion of modern nation-state formation, a classic in the field remains Anderson (2006 [1983]).
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Muslims have given to this question. In al-Andalus and the Maghrib this has been a burning question for
over six hundred years. Muslims on the shores of the Strait of Gibraltar were first confronted with this
defining question of Muslim modernity when Sabta was invaded by the Portuguese in 1415. And the
question would erupt again in 1492. East of the Mediterranean, this would not be a central question
until many centuries later, when European colonialism and imperialism would focus more aggressively
on Asia.
Over the centuries, many Muslims have been very harsh on themselves when answering this
question. Countless explanations have blamed internal weakness, division, and corruption for Muslim
defeats against Christian Europe. Muslims have criticized their societies as harshly and often even more
harshly than European colonial and Orientalist scholars of Islam. For example, Moroccan historian and
public intellectual Abdallah Laroui (1970) contends that North African weakness invited European
invasion. While he recognizes the value of past accomplishments in the Southern Mediterranean, he
portrays the Crusades of the fourteenth century and subsequent European conquests as a response to
the decadence of societies in the Maghrib. He further proposes that, to become fully decolonized, the
Maghrib and Arab societies in general need to catch up with Europe and modernity by adopting
progressive ideologies developed in the West (Laroui 1974). While deeply informative, his analysis
typifies the limitations of focusing on the bilateral relation between one colonial region and its
metropole—in this case the Maghrib and France—without sufficiently addressing the impact of
interregional and even global dynamics. Anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi (1997) offers another
example of internalist critique by arguing that Moroccan authoritarianism is rooted in cultural schemata
centred on the relationship between Sufi master and disciple. Like Laroui, he extends his findings about
Morocco to the broader Arab context in an attempt to ‘’account for the prevalence of authoritarian
political systems in our societies, from the Atlantic to the Gulf’’ (1). Certainly, it is important to recognize
the agency of Muslims in their successes as well as failures. Internalist explanations are useful to this
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end, but if they are not balanced by externalist ones, they can reinforce a Eurocentric narrative which
perpetually emphasizes European strength (Christian or secular) and Muslim weakness. Externalist
explanations consider broader contexts, including such elements as climate and events which nobody
could have foreseen at the time they occurred, including Europeans of course. A balance of internalist
and externalist approaches can lead to analyses which are at once rigorous, fair, and even
compassionate.
Furthermore, once any community has been integrated into the modern/colonial world-system,
the internal/external dichotomy becomes blurred, since even powerful nation-states operate within this
framework. Rather than internal/external dynamics, world-systems analysis can help determine how
specific locations are unique or not in relation to other locations. Core/periphery dynamics can be
analysed with more nuance by including categories such as the semi-periphery or the extreme
periphery, and distinguishing between geographical, social, epistemic, and other types of location within
the system. In the case of Moroccan authoritarianism, this would entail considering local and regional
particularities, as well as connections with other peripheral locations within the global world-system.
For example, connections can be found between North African and Latin American
authoritarianism. Interestingly, the Arabic word qâʾid (leader, commander) tends to be overlooked as
the best etymological root of the Spanish term caudillo, which generally refers to Latin-American
authoritarian leaders who rule through personal whim rather than the rule of law. Although the English
word qaid, like the French caïd, usually refers to Muslim chiefs or leaders in North Africa, the
Encyclopedia Britannica suggests that the Latin capitellum (small head) evolved into the Spanish caudillo
(De Riz 2018). Not only is the Arabic closer morphologically, but it has a nearly identical meaning. One
cannot help but suspect a Eurocentric blind spot is at play here, considering the enormous influence of
Arabic language and culture in Spain (Salloum 1987, n.d.). By ignoring the linguistic connection between
Latin American caudillos and North African qaids, broader connections between two southern regions of
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the Atlantic world, with similar geopolitical and economic challenges, are concealed. Internalist analyses
only reinforce this concealment. Broader regional or world-systems analyses are much better suited to
connect the authoritarianism described by Hammoudi with the problem of caudillos decried in Eduardo
Galeano’s (1997 [1971]) (1940-2015) classic Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of
a Continent. In fact, if one is truly interested in understanding the internal specificities of Moroccan
authoritarianism, similarities with other peripheral locations need to be addressed. Differences can only
be clear in contrast to similarities. Without such references, how can we verify if authoritarianism,
selfishness, greed, nepotism, corruption, and tribalism in Morocco can be blamed, for instance, on a few
powerful families, rather than allegedly “abstract bogeymen, such as underdevelopment,
neocolonialism, capitalism, or even bureaucratic organizations” [my translation from French]
(Benhaddou 1997, 13)? While there clearly exist national or regional particularities, it seems
uncontestable that elites in many parts of the Global South often behave in extremely similar ways.
These similarities are even more remarkable considering the extremely heterogenous cultures in which
they can be observed. Without reference to the modern/colonial world-system, such similarities are
hard to explain, unless of course one wishes to resort to essentialist tropes about the West being the
only civilization capable of producing rational legal systems enforcing equitable social conditions.
Clearly, this whole dissertation is arguing against such tropes. And the present digression about
internalist and externalist analyses has provided some broad theoretical insights about the
modern/colonial world-system, as well as how relations between Muslims and Christians in the fifteenth
century laid many of the foundations for this system.
It would be wrong to say that in the fifteenth century Muslims in Northwest Africa and
Southwest Europe were weak and that Christians were strong. Naturally, the Christian victories were
favoured by internal strengths and Muslim weaknesses. But as hard as it may be to accept for those
seeking to understand the world, there are always elements of luck involved, or at least entangled
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circumstances of such complexity that neither we nor those we are studying could ever fully grasp. The
significance of many factors only become clear in hindsight, when looking at the longue durée of history,
or when looking at world-systems. Nobody knew in the fifteenth century that they were building the
foundations of a Western-centric world-system which would one day become global. As they sailed
towards Sabta, the Portuguese could not have been certain they would win, nor did the Moroccans
suspect what was about to hit them. It is easy to lay blame after the fact. At the same time, human
agency exists, and some actions can safely be called noble or ignoble, wise or foolish, even by the
standards of the time in which they occurred.
I try to be both humble and critical in approaching this complexity. However, I am not
attempting to be objective or offer a complete view. My mind is too limited for this as are the resources
of language. In fact, I am admittedly emphasizing the externalist elements because I think they have
been underacknowledged in explaining these Muslim defeats, and that this is the most conducive way to
decolonize our perception of these events. To reach an equitable outcome, it is not wise to treat two
sides of an asymmetric power dynamic equally. In this case, it seems best to compensate for the
dominant Eurocentric bias by being harsher on the colonial victors and more lenient on the defeated.
Decolonial analysis entails deflating overinflated discourses and inflating deflated ones—which makes
sense both because it seems fair and because it can provide us with a more complete and nuanced
understanding.
In the fifteenth century, the Far Maghrib and al-Andalus were both isolated from the rest of
Islamdom and internally divided. They were attempting to deal with the repercussions of a series of
geopolitical catastrophes which had been affecting Central and Western Islamdom for two relentless
centuries. The Naṣrid dynasty established itself in Granada in 1238 in the midst of forty years of
crusading which would annihilate all other Muslim dynasties in al-Andalus between 1212 and 1252. In
Morocco, an Arabized Zenata tribe of Amazigh origin, the Banû Marîn, better known in English as the
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Marînids, captured Fez in 1248, making it their capital. They conquered Marrakesh in 1269, putting an
end to the Almohad dynasty which had never recuperated from its crushing defeats in al-Andalus. Yet
descendants of the Almohads did continue to wield limited power and influence in dispersed regional
settings, thereby challenging the new rulers. Fighting among themselves, these ruling elites were
generally unsuccessful in resisting the increasingly motivated crusaders. For instance, Castilian raiders
burned down the Moroccan Atlantic city of Salé (Slâ) in 1260, taking away more than 3000 women and
children among their booty (Cornell 1998, 125).
Muslims in Western Islamdom could not count on much military help from their coreligionists
further east, who were in the middle of one of their worst historical crises. Exhausted by ongoing
conflicts with the Crusaders coming from the west, Central Islamdom was devastated by the
exceptionally ferocious Mongol conquests coming from the northeast. In the thirteenth century, Mongol
armies wreaked havoc from Syria to India, as well as beyond Islamdom, into Russia and China. Their
conquest and destruction of Baghdad, on February 10, 1258, was especially traumatic for Muslims.
Baghdad was the seat of the Caliphate. A nominal but symbolically important unifying figure for Sunni
Muslims, Caliph al-Mustaʿṣim (1212-1258, r. 1242–58) was executed after the defeat. He died along with
an estimated 800,000 of the great city’s inhabitants (Woods, et al. 2018).
The Marînids tried to rule pragmatically while declaring an Andalusian jihad against the
Crusaders, but they were plagued with internecine conflicts in North Africa and hardly motivated by the
ideological fervour displayed by many of the Crusaders (Laroui 1970, 209-226). However, their efforts
did help the Naṣrid dynasty of Granada, with whom they were at times bitter rivals and at others allies.
And the Crusaders were considerably slowed down in their southward advance. Full centralized control
of the region was never established by the Marînids, who instead ruled through an oligarchy of tribal
warrior-chiefs and clients among the religious and commercial elites (Cornell 1998, 123). Restless
overtaxed populations watched the economy deteriorate as their elites struggled for power.
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Periodically, there were even severe food shortages. In 1337, the Marînid Sultan Abû al-Ḥasan ʿAlî,
captured Tlemcen (Tilimsân) in present-day Algeria, the capital of the ʿAbd al-Wâdid Dynasty (1236–
1550). Nevertheless, the Marînids were never able to expand into Tunisia, ruled by the Ḥafṣid Dynasty
(Banû Ḥafṣ, 1229-1574). These internal and external struggles impoverished the Marînid dynasty which
was in chaos by the mid-fifteenth century. Several small kingdoms and city-states fragmented the Far
Maghrib, such as the Kingdom of Fez, which became independent in 1374. Then, a secondary branch of
the Marīnids, the Waṭṭâsids (Banû Waṭṭâs, 1465-1549) assumed control over much of Morocco in 1465,
after having wielded considerable power as king-making viziers since 1358. But they were unable to
unite the people of their divided realm.
These were the conditions faced by Muslims in Morocco as the Portuguese conquered all their
major harbours between 1415 and 1513, leaving Granada alone to defend itself against a Crusade
supported by all Western Christendom. However, during these same centuries, cultural, intellectual, and
spiritual relations flourished between the Maghrib and the broader Islamic Sunni world, particularly
Egypt. As discussed in Chapter One, a pan-Islamic understanding of Sunni orthodoxy was being
consolidated throughout Islamdom, strengthening a classical understanding of tradition which would
serve as a precious resource to motivate Muslim resistance in the modern/colonial world-system.
It should also be noted that, at first, the impact of European expansionism was less traumatic
overall on Muslim societies in West Africa than in the Western Mediterranean. The Western Sahara and
Sahel regions of Africa were connected to the broader Islamicate civilization through solid interregional
trade networks facilitating cultural, religious, and scholarly exchanges. Although colonial discourses
portray Black Islam as separate from Arab Islam, just as they separate Arab from Berber (Amazigh)
religion in the Maghrib, Muslims across Africa were not isolated from developments elsewhere in the
Islamicate. In the Western Bilâd al-Sûdân, Muslims were especially connected to the Maghrib. They
were aware of the Crusading wars in the Western Mediterranean as well as Portuguese expansion along
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the Atlantic coast. Yet, the Mediterranean was relatively far away and, after all, these conflicts in alAndalus were nothing new. Moreover, the Portuguese presence along the West African coast did not
initially cause a major disruption.
After some skirmishes, the Portuguese skillfully integrated themselves into existing West African
trade networks for goods such as gold dust and slaves. Upon arrival in Senegambia in 1444, the
Portuguese began to kidnap and enslave free Africans. Diouf (2013 [1998]) explains:
They met fierce hostility, however, and left many dead sailors behind. Because they had
encountered organized, structured, and militarized societies that could not simply be
pillaged, the Europeans had to negotiate with the authorities. By 1448 they had established
commercial relations with the kingdoms along the coast of West Africa for the supply of
local goods and captives on the one hand and the distribution of European merchandise on
the other.
The development of the European-African slave trade was not unique or unusual;
Europeans had been dealing in slaves for centuries. Medieval Europe traded in European
slaves on a large scale. Slavs, Irish, Welsh, Greeks, Scandinavians, Russians, and Turks
furnished the bulk of the enslaved population across Europe up to the middle of the
fifteenth century. They worked as domestics, in mines, on farms, on the sugar plantations
of the Portuguese, and in the harbors. Just as in Africa, most European slaves were
obtained through raids and wars. As was also true in Africa, slavery in Europe was justified
on the grounds that the slaves were different: they followed a religion other than that of
their captors or belonged to a different ethnic group. The Christian Venetians, for example,
could not trade in Christian slaves but sold and bought “pagan” Slavs. The Catholic Church
forbade the Jews to own Christians but was not concerned with slaves who were not
Christians.
The patterns of slavery in medieval Europe and in Africa were similar initially; what became
unique was that by the sixteenth century Europeans reserved slavery for the Africans, and
the enslavement of whites totally disappeared from the countries they controlled. Slavery
and color were linked for the first time, and adherence to Christianity on the part of the
Africans did not make any difference. Their evangelization was a priority as a religious duty
but served primarily as a justification for the slave trade. (34)
In other words, West African elites did not know what was about to hit them when they began
trading slaves and other ‘goods’ with the Portuguese. They could not have known that this would be the
beginning of a process which would lead to a transatlantic holocaust and the establishment of a worldsystem which would wreak havoc on their societies. In the fifteenth century, the brutal practice of
enslaving enemy captives and selling them to merchants, be they African or European, was business as
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usual. Yet, these inconspicuous beginnings allowed the Portuguese to push southwards along the
African coast and divert commerce from the Saharan land routes. Similarly, the Portuguese could not
have been aware that this was but the first act in the establishment of the early modern Atlantic worldsystem which would massively displace wealth to the Atlantic regions of Europe, from Africa, Asia,
America, and even the Mediterranean.

Conclusion
The rise of Christian Portugal and Spain in the fifteenth century, in opposition to the Muslims of
Western Islamdom, led to the symbolic birth of modernity in 1492. In 1415, the capture of Sabta by the
Portuguese marked the beginning of this process from a Muslim perspective. But it did not happen
spontaneously in a historical vacuum. For instance, colonial conquests had begun a century earlier in the
Canary Islands. Various Western European interests competed in the Canary Islands, but the Spanish
would be the ultimate conquerors. While the Portuguese established a presence in Africa and explored
new trade routes to Asia by sailing down the West African coast, Spanish imperialism was born from the
efforts to eliminate Islam and Judaism from Spain. Catholics suspected of secretly adhering to Islam or
Judaism were subjected to the Inquisition as the last Muslim dynasty in Iberia faced defeat, ending eight
centuries of Andalusian civilization. When the Spanish sailed across the Atlantic in 1492, they could not
have been aware that they were giving birth to a new era. Modernity, as it is now understood, is
inextricably connected to the emergence of a Western European colonial project in the Atlantic world.
This emergence is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4- The Age of Genocide: Birth of the Colonial/Modern Atlantic World-System
َ ۡ عا ٌد فَاسۡ ت َۡك َب ُر ۡواْ فِي
ۖ ً ش ﱡد مِ ۡن ُهمۡ قُ ﱠوة
َ َ ش ﱡد مِ ﱠنا قُ ﱠوة ً ۖ أَ َولَمۡ َي َر ۡواْ أ َ ﱠن ﱣ َ ٱلﱠ ِذي َﺧلَقَ ُهمۡ ه َُو أ
َ َ ﻖ َوقَالُواْ َم ۡن أ
ِ اﻻ ۡر
َ فَأ َ ﱠما
ِ ّ ض ِبغ َۡي ِر ۡال َح
ََوكَانُ ۡوا ِب ٰايٰ ِتنَا َي ۡج َحد ُۡون
As for ‘Âd, they acted arrogantly in the earth without right, and they said, ‘Who is more
powerful than us in might?’ Did they not see that God, He Who created them, was more
powerful than them in might? And they used to deny Our signs. (Qur’an 41:15)
This chapter joins the decolonial conversation on the early modern/colonial period, which lasted
approximately a century and a half, beginning in 1492 and ending around 1650. It introduces decolonial
world-systems analysis and contributes Muslim perspectives from both shores of the Atlantic. These
were the first Muslims to have been integrated as a peripheral people in the modern/colonial worldsystem. Muslims sailed back and forth across the Atlantic during this period, usually by force. However,
not all enslaved Muslims were Sub-Saharan Africans. Furthermore, there were free Muslim sailors,
corsairs, and merchants from Western Islamdom, including Sub-Saharan Africa and even Europe
(GhaneaBassiri 2010, 9-14). Ships transported spiritual, intellectual, cultural, and social traditions from
Western Islamdom to North America. These traditions were transformed by this journey and the North
American experience, and these transformations affected Muslims on both sides of the Atlantic. The
realities of Muslims overlapped and interacted with non-Muslim Africans, Jews, Indigenous Americans,
and all the other countercultures which formed constitutive elements of the modern/colonial worldsystem in relation to one another and to the dominant Euro-Christian culture.
Intercultural and interreligious relations in the early modern period were conducted in an
intensely violent context. Western Europeans imposed themselves on other Atlantic peoples through a
series of genocides against Jews, Muslims, Sub-Saharan Africans, Indigenous Americans, and within
Europe against Romani and women accused of witchcraft. This genocidal process was crucial in
developing a fundamental characteristic of modernity/coloniality: the Eurocentric racialization of
identities. Yet, Western Europeans did not become globally dominant overnight. In the Atlantic world,
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non-Europeans fiercely resisted, and Muslims were at the centre of this struggle. Among their ranks,
Muslim resisters counted many women who drew upon a distinguished tradition of female scholars,
saints, and even warriors in the Western Islamicate. It should also be noted that Muslims further east
did not fathom the historical importance of the intense struggles raging in the Atlantic world. For most
of the early modern period, the dominant power in the Mediterranean was the Ottoman Empire, ruled
by Muslims. And even Western Europe only gradually realized that the centre of power was slowly
shifting from the Mediterranean world to the Atlantic world. It took generations to fully realize the
repercussions of 1492.

1492: The Birth of Modernity
At the busy intersection connecting the old and new sections of downtown Granada, Spain, one
can find Plaza Isabel la Católica (Spanish for ‘Isabella the Catholic’), named after Queen Isabella. Much
like her great-uncle, the Grand Master of the Order of Christ, Prince Henry the Navigator, sherepresents
an especially militaristic current within Catholicism. And this city square attests to the ongoing
significance of that violent legacy, despite the existence of peaceful Catholic counter-discourses.93 In
the middle of the plaza, there is an imposing monument which features a sculpture of Christopher
Columbus kneeling before Queen Isabella and presenting his plan to sail westward across the Atlantic. It
was commissioned in 1892, to celebrate the fourth centennial of Columbus’s journey.
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Even in response to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, some Catholics argued for peaceful
dialogue with Muslims. The Castilian prelate and theologian Juan de Segovia (c. 1393 to 1458) exemplified this
current in the fifteenth century (Wolf 2014). More recently, one might look to certain aspects of Liberation
Theology, a movement which emerged within the Catholic Church in the second half of the twentieth century,
especially in Latin America, but spread to other denominations of Christianity, and even other religions (Dabashi
2010, Rambachan 2015). It emphasizes what it considers to be a fundamental aspect of Christianity, namely
service to the poor, marginalized, and disenfranchised members of society (Rowland 2007 [1999]). Seminal texts in
Liberation Theology draw upon Marxism and other anti-systemic intellectual currents in arguing that such service
must go beyond individual charity and include political action against oppressive systems and wealthy elites
(Gutiérrez 1971, Cone 1970).
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Figure 3— Christopher Columbus and Queen Isabella in Granada
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Directly beneath the sculpture, on the side of the pedestal facing the main street, two dates are written
out in Roman numerals:94 January 2 and October 12, 1492. As discussed in Chapter Three, these dates
correspond respectively to the conquest of Granada by Catholic forces, and the day Columbus first set
foot on American soil. The names of historical characters associated with both events are written all
around the pedestal. On the sides, bronze reliefs depict the Granada War and a grandiose reception in
honour of Columbus. These two interconnected events represent the foundational moment of Spain’s
imperial past, but also have much broader significance in world history.
The events depicted in this monument re-emerged in the forefront of public discourse
surrounding the fifth centennial of Columbus’s journey. Around the year 1992, many critical thinkers in
the Atlantic world produced works discussing the implications of this anniversary (Gallo 1992).
Incredulous, many basically wondered ‘Are we actually going to celebrate this anniversary?’ Answering
such a question meant reassessing the significance of 1492 in the development of the modern world.
Moreover, with the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991, leftist critical theory was in a state of disarray
and in need of rejuvenation. Motivated to challenge dominant Eurocentric accounts of what had
occurred over the past five centuries, ground-breaking works were produced about the role of European
expansionism, conquest, and genocide in modern history. An edited volume called Formations of
Modernity was first published in 1992 (Hall and Gieven 2010 [1992]). Stuart Hall’s (2010 [1992]) (19322014) chapter in this volume, entitled “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” presents a robust
critique of Eurocentrism from a global perspective. That same year, David E. Stannard (1992) published
American Holocaust, contending that the genocide of Indigenous Americans is historically unrivaled.
Crucially, he emphasizes the ongoing and contemporary nature of this holocaust, arguing that it is not
enough to ask if it can happen again when the more pressing question is "can it be stopped" (xiii)? A
year later, Paul Gilroy (1993) published The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. He
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Roman numerals are often considered more prestigious than the more common Arabic ones.

160

argues that the modern Atlantic world comprises not only a dominant European culture, but also
diverse, overlapping, and changing countercultures, including a black Atlantic one. Somewhat
surprisingly, Gilroy’s book does not examine the presence of a Muslim Atlantic which overlaps with the
black Atlantic.95 After all, for centuries, most of the Muslims travelling across the Atlantic to the
Americas were enslaved West Africans. Likewise, it should be noted that the overlapping black and
Muslim Atlantic are linked to a global African Muslim diaspora discussed by Edward E. Curtis IV (2014).
The early 1990s also represented a turning point in the development of Latin American
decolonial thought. Quijano (1991) introduced the concept of coloniality and Dussel (1992) delivered a
series of lectures whose publication would pioneer the field of decolonial world-systems analysis.
Translated into English under the title The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse Of “the Other” and the
Myth of Modernity (Dussel 1995 [1992]), this work lays the historical foundation for scholarship by
decolonial thinkers like Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres, Tlostanova, Grosfoguel, and indeed the author of
this dissertation. From the opening lines in the preface to Invention of the Americas, Dussel lays out his
ambitious vision of modern world history:
I focus on the immense majority of humanity, the seventy-five per cent of the world
situated in the southern hemisphere, the excolonial world. These exploited, excluded, and
poor peoples, whom Fanon termed the "wretched of the earth," consume less than fifteen
per cent of the planet's income. Their history of oppression began five hundred years ago.
This history of world domination originates with modernity, which thinkers such as Charles
Taylor, Stephen Toulmin, or Jürgen Habermas consider as exclusively a European
occurrence, having nothing to do with the so-called Third World. The expositions of these
thinkers explain modernity by referring only to classical European and North American
authors and events. My undertaking here differs from theirs, since I argue that while
modernity is undoubtedly a European occurrence, it also originates in a dialectical relation
with non-Europe. Modernity appears when Europe organizes the initial world-system and
places itself at the center of world history over against a periphery equally constitutive of
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Apparently, I am not alone in having drawn upon Gilroy to conceptualize a Muslim Atlantic. Recently, a research
institute has been launched with the support of the British Council, King’s College London, and George Mason
University to explore this theme (The Muslim Atlantic 2019). The institute has already produced a first report
(DeHanas and Mandaville 2019). However, this institute focuses on the United States and United Kingdom,
whereas I focus on the northern hemisphere, although the Atlantic world, and its overlapping cultural networks
encompasses all the lands surrounding this ocean.
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modernity. The forgetting of the periphery, which took place from the end of the fifteenth,
Hispanic-Lusitanian century to the beginning of the seventeenth century, has led great
thinkers of the center to commit the Eurocentric fallacy in understanding modernity.
Because of a partial, regional, and provincial grasp of modernity, the postmodern critique
and Habermas's defense of modernity are equally unilateral and partially false. The
traditional Eurocentric thesis, flourishing in the United States, modernity's culmination, is
that modernity expanded to the barbarian cultures of the South undoubtedly in need of
modernization. Max Weber first posed the question of world history Eurocentrically:
Which chain of circumstances has resulted in the fact that on Western soil and only
there cultural phenomena have been produced which, as we represent it, show signs
of evolutionary advance and universal validity? 96
Europe possessed, according to this paradigm, exceptional internal characteristics which
permitted it to surpass all other cultures in rationality. This thesis, which adopts a
Eurocentric (as opposed to world) paradigm, reigns not only in Europe and the United
States, but also among intellectuals in the peripheral world. The pseudo-scientific
periodization of history into Antiquity, the Middle (preparatory) Ages, and finally the
Modern (European) Age is an ideological construct which deforms world history. One must
break with this reductionist horizon to open to a world and planetary perspective—and
there is an ethical obligation toward other cultures to do so. (9-10)
In this passage, which densely summarizes the decolonial approach to modern/colonial history,
Dussel also positions himself in the centre of philosophical debates dominated by men from the Global
North. He pursues this philosophical project in a series of essays engaging prominent thinkers, collected
in a book entitled The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of
Liberation (Dussel 1996). Many of his interlocutors respond to Dussel. Yet, his translator and editor,
Eduardo Mendieta, deplores Dussel’s general lack of international recognition as a major philosopher:
In Marxist, theological, or Latin American studies circles Enrique Dussel would not need any
introduction. Unfortunately, this is not the case in philosophical circles, although Dussel
himself was trained primarily as a philosopher. (xiii)
It appears that Dussel is marginalized by the very Eurocentric paradigm he describes:
Dussel is a Latin American philosopher writing in what is today a “barbaric” language,
Spanish. This, however, translates into two strikes against him; that is, he is neither from
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As discussed in Section Three, Traditionalist Islamic critiques of modernity tend to concur with the Weberian
notion that modern Western civilization is unique, but for very different reasons. And they come to very different
conclusions. Thinkers such as Nasr see modern Western civilization as an “irredeemable and irremediable”
abomination “in the history of civilizations” (Zaidi 2011, 150). Their rejection of modernity is more total than that
of decolonial world-systems analysts, although these positions are arguably complementary (see Section Four).
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one of the cultural “centers” authorized to produce and disseminate the latest
philosophical fashions, nor are his works known or translated (except for a few exceptions).
(xiii)
Naturally, the authorization to which Mendieta refers here is not explicit regulations. Rather, it is the
manifestation of core/periphery power dynamics which are so pervasive that they are perpetuated
often quite unconsciously. They can even be internalized by individuals whose self-perception
authorizes them only to either represent their peripheral identity (variations of the native informant) or
disappear in the false universalism of the core (epistemic assimilation). If per chance, they heroically
surpass these internalized biases, they must then convince others to take them seriously. For instance,
Argentinian scholars such as Dussel are expected to study U.S. American and Western European
thinkers. If they choose to do so exclusively, they are adopting a Eurocentric position of thinking about
the world from the core. They may choose to also study other Latin Americans; in which case they are
entering a core/periphery dialogue. But they are not expected to become international experts on, say,
Moroccan, Vietnamese, or Aboriginal Australian thought.
From peripheral locations, people are not supposed to think about other peripheries, let alone
the whole world, unless it is for their own peripheral audience. For instance, a scholar from a place such
as Morocco might very well write about Latin America but would have great difficulty gaining
international recognition. As a Moroccan-born scholar doing fieldwork in Chiapas, Beggar (2015 [original
French 2007] was confronted to this resistance when the Cho’l Mayans he was studying kept asking
“What is the point of all this? And who is this man? He claims he is from Morocco; where is that
country? And, if he is not Mexican, the anthropologist is always European or American” (17-18). Today,
in Canada, Beggar does not teach Latin American Studies, his initial area of expertise. Instead he has
been called upon to teach Arabic, Mediterranean Studies and Religious Studies. In Latin America, he was
breaking the unwritten rules by occupying the role of observer reserved for scholars socially associated
with the core, who can realistically hope to be internationally recognized as experts about the core (e.g.
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Elizabethan literature), a peripheral location (e.g. area studies), or even the world (e.g. abstract
philosophy or globalization).
Dussel (1995 [1992]) fights back by refusing provincialism and thinking about philosophy and
world history from a peripheral location. Not only does he think about the world, but he has the
audacity to do so while positioning himself with “the seventy-five per cent of the world situated in the
southern hemisphere” who represent “the wretched of the earth” (9). However, everybody in the
Global South cannot be sweepingly characterized as “wretched.” I can guarantee that I know many
people in places such as Morocco or Egypt, who are far from wealthy or powerful, but would be
offended to be described in Dussel’s (1996) terms:
The oppressed, tortured, destroyed, in her suffering corporeality, simply cries out,
clamoring for justice:
I am hungry! Don't kill me! Have compassion for me! —cries out the miserable.
The radical origin is not the affirmation of one's self (the soi-même), for that one must be
able to first reflect, assume oneself as possessing value, that is, discover oneself as a
person. We are before all of that. We are before the slave who was born slave and who
therefore does not know he is a person. He simply cries out. The cry, as noise, as clamor, as
exclamation, proto-word still not articulated, which is interpreted in its sense and meaning
by those "who have ears to hear," indicates simply that someone suffers, and that from out
of their suffering they emit a wail, a howl, a supplication. This is the originary
"interpellation." It is evident that someone ought to have "a responsible response to the
other's call"—this is still the question of "ethical conscience," and for that it must affirm
itself. But, it seems to me, the soi-même of the responsible-hearer affirms itself as valuable
in the measure to which it has previously been affected by the supplication of the other;
priority which is anterior to all possible reflection, responsibility for the "taking-charge-ofthe-other" is a priori to all reflective consciousness. We respond, responsibly before the
miserable, when she has already "touched" us. (80)
In Morocco, Beggar (2015 [original French 2007]) remembers being severely reprimanded by his father
one day when he and other children from his town in the mountains swarmed to catch candies being
thrown at them by a rich European woman. Beggar’s father was not wealthy, but he did not accept his
boy being positioned as wretched or miserable. He told the boy, “you are not a monkey. Allow nobody
to deprive you of your dignity” (46). Interestingly, Beggar recollects this childhood scene while watching
youths in Uruguay shouting at tourists that they are not beggars. Not everybody in the South is
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oppressed to the point of having their sense of personhood destroyed and being unable to articulate
their suffering in any other manner than a primordial cry. Moreover, countless rich and powerful men in
the Global North have experienced depression so deep as to be only expressed by such a cry or even
suicide.97 Many in the Global South, including African Sufis, would recognize these as expressions of
spiritual misery which can make anyone feel “wretched.”
As an articulate thinker from the South, Dussel is surely conscious of these nuances, but he is
concerned with the big picture. And his concern is deliberate. It serves a purpose. For instance, thinking
globally allows Dussel (1995 [1992]) to examine the symbolic significance of the year 1492 in world
history:
The birthdate of modernity is 1492, even though its gestation, like that of the fetus,
required a period of intrauterine growth. Whereas modernity gestated in the free, creative
medieval European cities, it came to birth in Europe's confrontation with the Other. By
controlling, conquering, and violating the Other, Europe defined itself as discoverer,
conquistador, and colonizer of an alterity likewise constitutive of modernity. Europe never
discovered (des-cubierto) this Other as Other but covered over (encubierto) the Other as
part of the Same: i.e., Europe. Modernity dawned in 1492 and with it the myth of a special
kind of sacrificial violence which eventually eclipsed whatever was non-European. (12)

Genocide and the Racialization of Identities
The way humans “other” one another was transformed in the early modern period, when
characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, and skin colour came to be reorganized as modern racial
identities. Drawing on Quijano’s notion of coloniality of power, Grosfoguel (2011) explains that “the idea
of race and racism becomes the organizing principle that structures all of the multiple hierarchies of the
world-system” (11). These multiple hierarchies—including class, gender, sexuality, spirituality, and
epistemology—are all traversed by the axis of race. “The idea of race organizes the world’s population
into a hierarchical order of superior and inferior people that becomes an organizing principle of the
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How else can one explain the enormous impact in the core of the world-system of artistic expressions of brutal
desperation, such as U.S. American poet Allen Ginsberg’s (1956) Howl and Other Poems?
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international division of labor and of the global patriarchal system” (11). Whereas dominant
modern/colonial ideologies have tended to present these entangled hierarchies as human essences
which firmly categorize human beings, decolonial analysis draws on critical race theory to reject such
essentialism and counter that these hierarchies are unstable sociohistorical constructions. Yet, as social
beings we necessarily inhabit these constructions. Our bodies are socially situated within them whether
we like it or not.
An interesting approach to this question is offered by religious studies scholar Sean McCloud
(2007). He builds on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930-2002) notion of habitus and proposes the term “socially
habituated subjectivities” to describe “conventions of being and acting” inscribed by multiple variables,
like class, race, place, gender, and age (168). To conceptualize this dynamic complexity, McCloud
proposes a tripartite conception of class, which can also be applied to other socially habituated
subjectivities. First, these subjectivities are externally ascribed statuses. Second, they are subcultural
identities through which individuals actively associate with certain groups. Third, they are affected by
material conditions which make options more or less available to individuals.
To understand Muslim perspectives on modernity/coloniality, it is useful to remember that each
individual Muslim inhabits a unique set of entangled subjectivities in relation with others. How
individuals and groups are categorized within this social web affects all others. Each Muslim within this
web is uniquely positioned and identified in relation to people of different religions, classes, genders,
and skin colours. Naturally people share similar experiences, but two individuals can never occupy
precisely the same position in the entangled web of identity. For instance, in 1550 a rich Muslim slaver
in the East Atlantic would have a very different experience of the system than an enslaved Muslim in
America. The actions of Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others in the East Atlantic influenced the
discursive categories which travelled westwards with Columbus and his crew and affected how they
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related to Indigenous Americans. In return, power dynamics in the Americas had an impact on Africa
and Europe.
The processes which formed the Atlantic world-system were horrendously violent. 1492 marked
the symbolic beginning of what I would call the age of extinctions, in which we are all still living today.
These extinctions include the ongoing and accelerating ecocide threatening all aspects of life on earth,
and very possibly leading to an apocalyptic end. Recent research in the so-called exact sciences
corroborates aspects of eschatological narratives by religious thinkers, as well as scholarship in the
humanities and the social sciences which connect modern environmental crises to the the globalization
of European colonial and imperial power started in 1492 (Lewis and Maslin 2018). Transdisciplinary and
decolonial analyses can help make sense of these diverse bodies of knowledge. For example, Grosfoguel
(2013) provides a useful analysis of how the modern/colonial world-system emerged from what he calls
the four genocides/epistemicides of the long sixteenth century:98
o

The extinction of Islam and Judaism in Spain (1492-1614)

o

The holocaust of Indigenous Americans (1492-ongoing)

o

The early modern witch trials (c. 1450-c. 1750)

o

The transatlantic slave trade (1502-1865 at least)

Grosfoguel’s list should also include the Romani of Europe, also known rather pejoratively as Gypsies,
whose ongoing genocide is also traceable to the sixteenth century (Brearley 2001). 99 As one of the
communities constructed as Europe’s internal others, they belong to the peripheralized peoples who
developed countercultures which were just as constitutive of the modern/colonial world-system as
dominant European cultures.
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In world-systems analysis, the long sixteenth century represents the period spanning from the end of the
fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth century.
99
Integrating the Romani and perhaps the Guanches into Grosfoguel’s (2013) analysis of early modern genocide
model represents an opportunity for further research.
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Men from Western Europe, later constructed as white, were the main perpetrators in all these
genocides, but some nuance must be added here. Isabella is an example of a woman who actively
participated in the extinction of those she perceived as undesirable others. Some Muslims and Jews
served Christian European colonial powers. Africans often captured and enslaved other Africans.
Indigenous American nations allied themselves with Europeans against other Indigenous nations. And
women accused other women of sorcery. Moreover, many European men were horrified by these
genocides and tried to prevent the killing of innocents whenever they could. Yet, unique historical
conditions propelled patriarchal Western European societies, in which leadership positions were
overwhelmingly held by men, to the head of a world order characterized by previously unrivaled power
asymmetries.
One may reasonably ask if other societies under the same conditions would have acted the
same way. Largescale massacres and even genocides perpetrated on a smaller scale by other groups of
people, throughout history, serve as interesting analogies which remind us that European men are not
the only ones capable of horrific conduct. But this should be understood from the start in a decolonial
world-systems analysis which seeks to challenge and dismantle racial constructions of power, not
reverse them. Perhaps making comparisons with other contexts would assuage deep, even unconscious
desires some might have to preserve a degree of Western innocence by spreading the guilt. However, as
explained in the introduction to Chapter Three, this research is not primarily concerned with innocence
or guilt. While there are surely individuals guilty of immoral actions during genocides, passing judgment
on millions of people is completely beyond the scope of this research. Here, the focus is on broad
intellectual, political, economic, cultural, social and even spiritual trends, which intersect in such
complex ways that they can never be reproduced. The reality is that no other group has ever wielded as
much power on a global scale as European men. Uniquely destructive consequences have emerged from
this equally unique historical circumstance. Speculation about alternate or virtual histories would lead
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this research away from its stated objectives, one of which is to examine how Muslims were affected—
sometimes directly and sometimes not—by the four early modern genocides described in the following
pages.

The Extinction of Judaism and Islam in Spain and the Holocaust of Indigenous Americans
On January 2, 1492, Sultan Abû ʿAbd Allâh Muḥammad XII surrendered the Kingdom of Granada
to Ferdinand and Isabella. In return, the Catholic monarchs promised to protect the right of Muslims to
practice their religion freely, own property, and generally live unharmed. However, these promises were
quickly broken. In 1493, six thousand Muslim leaders emigrated to Morocco under pressure from the
crown, leaving their property to be taken over by Catholic nobles. The crown also ordered all Spanish
Jews to convert to Christianity or be deported just three months after the conquest of Granada. Named
the Alhambra Decree, this edict was only overturned in 1968, at the Second Vatican Council. Over
160,000 Jews were expelled and scattered mostly across the Islamicate lands around the Mediterranean
(Ryan 2017). Those who converted were known as Marranos or Conversos. Edicts of expulsion followed
from Portugal in 1497, and Navarre in 1498, thereby making Judaism illegal in all of Iberia. In 1499, a
regime of forced conversion began to be implemented against Muslims, who naturally revolted in large
numbers. In return, the monarchs ordered the expulsion of all unconverted Muslims under Castilian
rule, in 1502. This order was extended to all of Spain in 1526, thereby officially prohibiting Islam across
the land.
Spanish authorities suspected that the forced conversion of Muslims to Christianity were mostly
insincere. They considered the ongoing secret practice of Islam by these converts, known as Moriscos, a
form of religious and political treason. Predictably, ongoing persecution did not encourage Moriscos to
embrace their new religion. Morisco communities were targeted by special taxes, the Inquisition, and in
1566 even their languages and customs were made illegal. After more than a century characterized by
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never-ending cycles of harassment, resistance, revolt, and persecution, the Spanish crown ordered the
deportation of all Moriscos on September 22, 1609. By 1614 an estimated 300,000 had been relocated
in Islamicate countries, mostly across the Maghrib (Maltby 2009, 16-17, Jónsson 2007, The Editors of
Encyclopaedia Britannica 2013, El Hareir 2016).
Grosfoguel (2013) describes these events as both a “physical genocide” and a “cultural
epistemicide,” and he defines the repopulation of vast Jewish and Muslim properties in the south of the
Iberian Penninsula by Christians from the north as settler colonialism (78). As Andalusian Jews and
Muslims were all progressively expulsed, killed, or converted, their cultural, spiritual and intellectual
traditions were targeted by a systematic campaign of destruction. Soon, Indigenous peoples in the
Americas would be subjected to the same treatment. Grosfoguel explains:
In addition to the genocide of people, the conquest of Al-Andalus was accompanied by
epistemicide. For example, the burning of libraries was a fundamental method used in the
conquest of Al-Andalus. The library of Cordoba, that had around 500,000 books at a time
when the largest library of Christian Europe did not have more than 1000 books, was
burned in the 13th century. Many other libraries had the same destiny during the conquest
of Al-Andalus until the final burning of more than 250,000 books of the Granada library by
Cardenal Cisneros in the early 16th century. These methods were extrapolated to the
Americas. Thus, the same happened with the indigenous “códices” which was the written
practice used by Amerindians to archive knowledge. Thousands of “códices” were also
burned destroying indigenous knowledges in the Americas. Genocide and epistemicide
went together in the process of conquest in both the Americas and Al-Andalus. (79-80)
Mandated with the task of spreading Spanish rule overseas, Columbus carried more than a bunch
of sailors across the Atlantic—he transported the seeds of genocide. It is fascinating to see how
European patterns of othering were transposed in the Americas. For instance, the rivalry with Islam was
always in the background, such as when sailor Rodrigo de Triana (1469-1535) is reported to have left for
Africa and become Muslim after his voyage with Columbus (1893 [1493], 35). He was disturbed by the
treachery of Columbus, who claimed the reward the Spanish crown had promised to the first person to
see land across past the Canaries. De Triana had in fact been the first onboard to see the land. Yes, if this
report is correct, the first European to see the Americas in this voyage became Muslim following the
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treachery of his leader. The first peoples of the Caribbean would soon become the victims of worse
treachery. They would share the fate of the Canary Islanders to whom Columbus compared them in his
first journal entry after their meeting (38).
As soon as he set foot on the shore, Columbus formally declared before his companions that he
was taking possession of this land for the King and Queen of Spain. After a brief encounter with the
native Arawak islanders who had assembled around his crew, he returned to the ship to record his
thoughts:
It appeared to me to be a race of people very poor in everything. They go as naked as when
their mothers bore them, and so do the women, although I did not see more than one
young girl. All I saw were youths, none more than thirty years of age. They are very well
made, with very handsome bodies, and very good countenances. Their hair is short and
coarse, almost like the hairs of a horse's tail. They wear the hairs brought down to the
eyebrows, except a few locks behind, which they wear long and never cut. They paint
themselves black, and they are the colour of the Canarians, neither black nor white. Some
paint themselves white, others red, and others of what colour they find. Some paint their
faces, others the whole body, some only round the eyes, others only on the nose. They
neither carry nor know anything of arms, for I showed them swords, and they took them by
the blade and cut themselves through ignorance. They have no iron, their darts being
wands without iron, some of them having a fish's tooth at the end, and others being
pointed in various ways. They are all of fair stature and size, with good faces, and well
made. I saw some with marks of wounds on their bodies, and I made signs to ask what it
was, and they gave me to understand that people from other adjacent islands came with
the intention of seizing them, and that they defended themselves. I believed, and still
believe, that they come here from the mainland to take them prisoners. They should be
good servants and intelligent, for I observed that they quickly took in what was said to
them, and I believe that they would easily be made Christians, as it appeared to me that
they had no religion. I, our Lord being pleased, will take hence, at the time of my departure,
six natives for your Highnesses, that they may learn to speak. (37-38)
It is amazing how confidently Columbus produced a detailed analysis of a people he had just ever so
briefly encountered. The comparison with the Canarians provides an important key here. To use Dussel’s
terminology, Columbus did not discover the Arawaks as others, he covered them with the sameness of
his own worldview, just as the Spanish soldier Francisco de Orellana (c. 1490- c. 1546) would later name
the Amazon River after having encountered strong Indigenous women he associated with the Amazons
of classical Greek mythology.
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It is true that, when encountering anything new, one inevitably refers to known categories.
Unfortunately for the Arawak and all other Indigenous Americans, the worldview with which Columbus
was familiar was one of conquest and genocide. The Spanish colonized the Caribbean and enslaved their
peoples. Within three decades of Spanish colonization and enslavement, native Caribbean people had
been exterminated by a fatal combination of conflict with settlers, overwork, and European diseases to
which they had no immunity. Estimates of how many Indigenous islanders died in this genocide vary
enormously, from 50,000 to 8 million (Maltby 2009, 25-28). No matter the numbers, it was genocide.
And it was the first act of a historically unparalleled holocaust, vividly described by Stannard (1992):
Within no more than a handful of generations following their first encounters with
Europeans, the vast majority of the Western Hemisphere's native peoples had been
exterminated. The pace and magnitude of their obliteration varied from place to place and
from time to time, but for years now historical demographers have been uncovering, in
region upon region, post-Columbian depopulation rates of between 90 and 98 percent with
such regularity that an overall decline of 95 percent has become a working rule of thumb.
What this means is that, on average, for every twenty natives alive at the moment of
European contact—when the lands of the Americas teemed with numerous tens of millions
of people—only one stood in their place when the bloodbath was over. To put this in a
contemporary context, the ratio of native survivorship in the Americas following European
contact was less than half of what the human survivorship ratio would be in the United
States today if every single white person and every single black person died. The
destruction of the Indians of the Americas was, far and away, the most massive act of
genocide in the history of the world. (10)100
Spain’s conquest of the Caribbean and the events of the following decades in the Americas had
a profound effect on European culture and thought. When Columbus arrived back in Spain on March
15, 1493, he wrote a letter announcing his discoveries to Isabella and Ferdinand. As this letter travelled
through Europe in April 1493, it was published in several newspapers (Gallo 1992). On May 4, 1493,
Pope Alexander VI issued a bull sanctioning Spain’s exclusive right to acquire territory or trade anywhere
in the “New World” discovered by Columbus west of the Atlantic and proclaiming the duty of Christians
to conquer any non-Christian nation they discovered. This established the infamous “Doctrine of
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Recent estimates on early modern depopulation rates in the Americas corroborate Stannard’s numbers (Lewis
and Maslin 2018, 158)
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Discovery” used for centuries to justify genocide in the Americas. Columbus was also able to impress
European elites with the handful of Arawaks with whom he returned. Thinking he had returned from
India, Columbus invented the myth of the New World Indian. The Spanish monarchs sent him for a
second voyage in October 1493, now with over 1200 men and 17 ships. On his way, his fleet came across
the Leeward Islands where they encountered the indigenous Caribs, who showered them with arrows.
Visibly, the Caribs would be hostile both to Castilian rule and conversion (Maltby 2009, 25). Then, upon
returning to the small settlement of La Navidad, in present-day Haiti, he found that the 39 men he had
left behind had all been killed by the Arawaks in apparent retaliation for such violent actions as raping
local women. Initially seen by Columbus as noble savages eager to convert to Christianity and serve their
new masters, the islanders were now treated as brutish rebels who could justifiably be enslaved. On
February 2, 1494, Columbus sent 12 ships back to Spain, with a first consignment of enslaved Native
Americans, thus opening the transatlantic slave trade. When he died in 1506, Columbus still thought he
had reached India, and that the North American mainland was China.
While Columbus had denied the Arawaks and Caribs, as well as the lands they inhabited, their
otherness, by covering them with his sameness, Spain soon sent other conquering explorers who would
begin to discover realities previously unknown to Europe. In 1502, Amerigo Vespucci (1454-1512)
realized that America is not Asia. This was indeed a discovery for Europe, but the fact that his name
would be given to this continent amply demonstrates that his fundamental role was to cover American
otherness with European sameness. Vespucci’s realization allowed Europeans to position themselves at
the centre of the world, with Asia to the east and America to the west. On September 8, 1522, this
process of European discovery culminated when Sebastián Elcano (1486-1526) arrived in Seville (once
known as Ishbîliya) after having completed the first circumnavigation of the globe. He was accompanied
by a handful of survivors from the expedition begun on September 20, 1519. Ferdinand Magellan (1480-

173

1521), who had originally led the expedition, had died in the Philippines. Dussel (1995 [1992]) comments
on the significance of this voyage:
As a result, the earth became the scene of world history, and its Fourth Part (America) was
distinguished from the Asiatic fourth peninsula. These discoveries took place within a
European perspective interpreting itself for the first time as the center of human history
and thus elevating its particular horizon into the supposedly universal one of occidental
culture. (35)
World history was born into European minds in 1522. Europeans had discovered that they could play the
role of central figures capable of discovering new worlds (in the sense of oecumene). They had broken
out from the western margin of the world, where they had been surrounded by Muslims, and become
central.
As Magellan’s expedition was underway, the Spaniard Hernán Cortés (1485-1547) was
conquering the Aztec Empire, from 1519-1521. While Eurocentric history emphasizes the role of
European exploring, mapping, and discovering the world, it is crucial to remember that these activities
were fundamentally motivated by a will to conquer. Dussel (1995 [1992]) uncovers the modern
subjectivity expressed in the Cartesian I think therefore I am, which is preceded by the early modern I
conquer therefore I am (43). He argues that the “conquistador was the first modern, active, practical
human being to impose his violent individuality on the Other.” (38) Moreover, Cortés “epitomized
modern subjectivity” since he subjugated the Mexican empire rather than “scattered indigenous tribes
and ethnic groups” with no urban culture, in the Caribbean (38). Eurocentric theories of modernity
normally describe Cortés’s contemporary Martin Luther (1483-1546) as epitomizing an emerging
modern subjectivity. Yet from a decolonial world-systems framework it is impossible to understand the
Reformation without reference to the conquest of Granada and America. And Cortés was a conquistador
par excellence.
In 1504, Cortés sailed to the Caribbean colony of Hispaniola founded by Columbus. That is the
same year the first enslaved Africans arrived there. Aztec civilization, which Cortés encountered in 1519,
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was highly complex, with an intricate bureaucracy comprising diverse classes of specialists. The capital
Tenochtitlán was a major urban centre. Although the Aztecs had not developed such technologies as the
wheel, iron, and gunpowder, they did not fit the stereotype of so-called primitive peoples associated
with the Guanches, the Arawaks, and the Caribs. Cortés seems to have considered the Aztecs a
somewhat civilized enemy comparable to the Muslims back home. In fact, he called the immense
buildings of Tenochtitlán mosques (Spanish: mezquitas), a most remarkable mental association
(Grosfoguel 2013, 79).
The Aztec Emperor Montezuma II (1466-1520, r. 1502-1520) and his spiritual advisors
apparently feared that Cortés might be the divinity Quetzalcohuatl come to end the present cycle of
earthly existence. Realizing this, Cortés decided to assume the role of punishing deity. He met the Aztec
Emperor and humiliated him before his subjects. “Everyone else stared at the earth in front of the
emperor. The ‘I-conqueror’ was the first ever with the freedom to look him in the face” (Dussel 1995
[1992], 43). Despite Montezuma’s surrender, Cortés eventually slaughtered the Aztecs with horrific
brutality. In Mexico, Cortés applied the same ruthless, treacherous tactics which had been used by the
conquisadors in al-Andalus and the Canary Islands. These tactics led to the same result: genocide. To
underline the ongoing logic of coloniality, Dussel makes an interesting comparison between the
sixteenth century and the moment he was writing about these events. In Mexico, 100,000 natives died
against less than a hundred Spaniards. “The proportion resembles that of the 1991 Gulf War; 120 U. S.
marines in contrast to more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers perished, without counting civilian deaths
through fratricidal battles, hunger, and sicknesses. Five hundred years later, modern violence maintains
its proportions” (Dussel 1995 [1992], 162).
Dussel (1995 [1992]) argues that a quintessentially modern moment was recorded in the many
passages he quotes of conquistadors who wrote with sickening serenity about how they slaughtered the
Aztecs and surrounding peoples. A new world was born for conquering European men who assumed the
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role of gods and the world of indigenous Mexicans came to an end. Although modern science might find
Aztec systems of knowledge primitive and irrational, it seems the Aztecs were correct in assuming that
Cortés came to end the world. The conquistadors acted like little gods, accepting offerings of gold, silver,
and even women in return for alliances they rarely kept. They abused the freedom they had to oppress
their new subjects in a variety of ways, including widespread rape. Although rape and abuse of women
have always been prevalent in times of war and conquest, the utterly asymmetric power dynamics in
the Americas were unheard of. After all, the Spanish conquerors, like the Portuguese, French, British,
and Dutch who followed them, had come to see themselves fundamentally superior to other beings,
somewhat like gods (Maldonado-Torres 2007, Craun 2013). Their sense of superiority towards nonEuropean peoples established modern racism, and their newfound erotic freedom to dominate women
established modern sexism (Grosfoguel 2013). Premodern Western-European patriarchy,
ethnocentrism, and religious exclusivism were transformed into modern racism and sexism by the
asymmetric power dynamics of the genocidal long sixteenth century.

The Early Modern Witch Trials
How European men generally perceive themselves is important to understand their privileged
position in the colonial/modern world. Grosfoguel (2013) suggests that between Dussel’s description of
the conquering ego—I conquer therefore I am— and the thinking ego—I think therefore I am—we must
add an intermediary exterminating ego—I exterminate therefore I am (77). European man, who would
soon be constructed as the white man, established himself at the centre of the early modern/colonial
world-system as a conqueror with the power of death over all other beings. One may wonder what is so
particular about white man that he lends himself to genocidal tendencies. Some answers to this
question may be found in the Traditionalist Islamic critiques of modernity discussed in Chapters Seven to
Ten, which are complementary to world-systems analyses of the unique historical circumstances which
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created the white man as conqueror, dominator, and exterminator, whose future promised to fulfill all
his fantasies. This sense of white male superiority may have been incubated for centuries, in
circumstances such as the crusades and the Inquisition, but it was born in America. Then, it was
exported to Europe in the early sixteenth century. At the time, Indigenous American and African
captives were paraded around Europe and exhibited in human zoos, a practice which continued until
1958 (Chrisafis 2011). They were soon joined by captives from Asia and the Pacific Islands.

Figure 4—Sistine Chapel Ceiling by Michelangelo c. 1512 (Public Domain
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=280349)
In the decolonial understanding of secularization and its link to modernity, the crucial
development is the replacement of the theocentric perspective, with God at the centre of the universe,
to an anthropocentric one, with white man at the centre. In 1512, Michelangelo (1475-1564) illustrated
this process perfectly, if perhaps unwittingly, in his depiction of God as a big white man touching the
finger of an equally white Adam. Although Michelangelo was religious, a discursive analysis of his
famous painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in Vatican City can reveal what appears to be a
transmission of powers. While Traditionalist Islamic critiques tend to trace this secularizing process back

177

to late thirteenth and early fourteenth century humanism, decolonial world-systems analysis focuses on
the transformative boost humanism and other premodern European currents received after 1492. Many
thinkers from the North American colonial periphery have criticized what they consider the
modern/colonial idolatry of white man. Dustin Craun (2013), a U.S. American Muslim racialized as white,
explores the genealogy of this critique in the writings of prominent U.S. American intellectuals racialized
as black. For instance, he discusses the notion of a “religion of whiteness” in the work of W.E.B. Du Bois
(1868–1963) and the way Muslim scholar Sherman Abdul Hakim Jackson links the existential terror
produced by the idolized white man to the fear of God. Craun draws upon this lineage to argue that
worshipping the white man is a modern/colonial form of idolatry, or to use an Islamic term, shirk: the
unforgivable sin of associating a created being with Allah.
Of course, sixteenth century Christians could not theologically justify the notion that white men
were gods, but they could question the humanity of non-white people and all women, be they white or
not. This is how sexism and racism became connected as modern/colonial identity formations. White
women could not be conquistadors. They could not go out and exterminate other peoples. That was a
man’s job. Therefore, white women could not go through the process leading from the conquering ego,
through the exterminating ego, to the thinking ego. They could not develop a fully idolatric modern
subjectivity. They were obviously situated above non-white men in the modern/colonial world-system,
but their humanity was still in question. The humanism of the Renaissance was reinforced by coloniality
to become the worship of the human as white man, nothing else. 101
In his list of four early modern genocides/epistemicides, Grosfoguel (2013) includes one which is
not usually mentioned in critiques of colonial conquests:
This is the conquest and genocide of women in European lands who transmitted IndoEuropean knowledge from generation to generation. These women mastered indigenous
knowledge from ancient times. Their knowledge covered different areas such as astronomy,
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in the emergence of modern humanism.
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medicine, biology, ethics, etc. They were empowered by the possession of ancestral
knowledge and their leading role inside the communities organized around commune-like
forms of economic and political organization. (85)
Grosfoguel is venturing beyond his usual field of expertise here. He only relies on one source (Federici
2004) and his numbers are vague.102 At times he speaks of millions of women killed and at others of
thousands. However, his main argument is worthy of serious consideration. It is true that, as is the case
with the Indigenous American holocaust, there is huge disagreement about the number of victims in the
witch hunts of Europe and its American colonies of America. Estimates range from tens of thousands to
ten million deaths. But there seems to be a growing consensus among experts in the field, including
feminists like Anne Llewellyn Barstow, that the higher estimates are not based on solid evidence. They
suggest a range between 60, 000 and 200,000 deaths, which is still quite a discrepancy. Barstow (1995)
remarks that “[w]orking on statistics of witchcraft is like working with quicksand.” Moreover, she
observes that “[a] statistically based figure, though lower, still makes the same point: that this was an
organized mass murder of women that cannot be dismissed by historians” (21). It is also true that many
men were tried, tortured, and executed for witchcraft, and that other types of criminal justice tended to
target men more than women. European judicial procedures of the day were brutal overall, not just
when it came to women accused of witchcraft. However, as Barstow demonstrates, no matter how
much nuance one wishes to add, there was vicious genocidal violence in early modern Europe which
principally targeted women. Furthermore, the social impact of these witch hunts extended to women
who were not found guilty but whose reputations were destroyed, as well as women who were
suspected and possibly brutalized or killed by mobs without being brought to trial. Beyond the
gruesome legally sanctioned executions, often by burning at the stake, countless lives were ruined and
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To investigate this genocide against European women I have also consulted Stuart (2001), Breslaw (2000),
Levack (1995), and Barstow (1995).
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ended in misery or suicide. Even the awareness of witch hunts could terrorize women who would never
be accused.
From a decolonial world-systems perspective, Grosfoguel’s argument that the dehumanization
of white women was linked to that of non-Europeans is convincing. The genocidal witch hunts among
Europeans intensified during the same period as the other three early modern genocides he mentions.
As white men began to see themselves as essentially superior to all others in terms of their level of
humanity, ‘pagans’, ‘heathens’, ‘savages’ and all women became their inferior others. In this mindset,
witchcraft was associated with paganism and pre-Christian ‘savagery’ in Europe, just as powerful
Indigenous women in in South America became associated with the Amazons of Greece’s pagan past.
Women accused of sorcery were constructed as akin to non-European, non-Christian ‘savages’ in the
modern/colonial hierarchy of humanity. European men became increasingly suspicious about the
degree of humanity of the women around them, even if they were Christian and white.

The Transatlantic Slave Trade
Whereas the premodern “Others” of Europe had been people with the wrong religion, or the
wrong God, modern othering came to be constructed on the range of the human. This process was at
work from 1550 to 1551, in Valladolid Spain, when two Catholic clerics came to debate whether
“Indians” were human. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1494–1573) argued that “Indians” were inferior beings
who could justifiably be enslaved, whereas Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) argued for the humanity
of “Indians,” describing them as culturally inferior savages who could be educated through
compassionate Christianization. Instead, Las Casas suggested black Africans, for whose humanity he did
not argue at the time, were much better suited to slave labour (a position he would later regret). The
Valladolid debates were presided over by famous theologians and carefully followed by political elites,
including the powerful monarch Charles V (1500-1558, King of Spain 1516-1556, Holy Roman Emperor
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1519-1556). In any case, the impact of genocide meant that Indigenous Americans were dying and
falling ill on a massive scale by this time. Europeans did not see them as very robust or productive
slaves. Although both sides claimed victory in the debates, the result was that “Indians” came to be
categorized as primitive humans with souls and were incorporated into a system of coerced labour
called the encomienda.
Grosfoguel (2013) observes that “[b]oth Las Casas and Sepulvera represent the inauguration of
the two major racist discourses with long lasting consequences that will be mobilized by Western
imperial powers for the next 450 years: biological racist discourses and cultural racist discourses” (83). In
the first case, non-whites are constructed as non-human, in the second they are subhuman, or on a
lower level of humanity than whites. Dussel (1995 [1992]) is more charitable towards Las Casas:
Las Casas attained the maximal critical consciousness by siding with the oppressed Other
and by examining critically the premises of modern civilizing violence. In his view, a more
developed Christian Europe would have displayed its pretended superiority over Others
differently. It would have taken account of the Other's culture, respected the Other's
alterity, and engaged the Other's free, creative collaboration. (72)
Yet, Las Casas’ degree of critical consciousness is of secondary importance here, compared to
the privilege white men have, in the modern/colonial world-system, to debate amongst themselves
about the humanity of ‘Others.’ Their decisions have massive repercussions on these ‘Others.’ The
question is simple: Are ‘Others’ human, subhuman, or non-human? No matter how noble some of the
responses may be, the question is deeply troubling. As Maldonado-Torres (2007) points out, the
answers have varied, but the suspicion about the humanity of non-European men and women, as well as
European women, has remained constant. In the early sixteenth century, modern racism and sexism
were born in America and returned to Europe from where they were progressively imposed on Muslims,
Jews, Sub-Saharan Africans, and eventually everyone around the world. Race came to reorganize all
previous power dynamics. For Muslims, this meant that the anti-Muslim protoracism of the crusades
and the Inquisition became fully racialized. This is the beginning of the anti-Muslim racism that we now
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call “Islamophobia.”103 The expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain needs be understood with this in mind.
It did not matter anymore if converts to Christianity could prove that they sincerely believed in the
“right” God. Their Muslim or Jewish ancestry no longer simply aroused suspicion about their sincerity; it
was an essential racial marker they could never escape.
The racialization of colour prejudice was also well under way. Once the enslavement of
Indigenous Americans ceased to be considered appropriate in the mid-sixteenth century, Europeans
focused on the enslavement of black Africans. After all, both debaters in Valladolid agreed that black
Africans were not human and could be enslaved at will. The transatlantic slave trade evolved and
intensified as the modern formations of racism developed. This leads us to the very controversial
question of whether this slave trade was different or worse than other historical forms of slavery.
Naturally, many argue that slavery is slavery, period. In his study on white Christians enslaved by
Muslims in the Mediterranean from 1500 to 1800, historian Robert C. Davis (2003) makes this very
point: “Slaves are slaves, after all, and within the structuring relationship of bondage are to be found
many of the same features anywhere in the world where there is or has been slavery” (xxvii). In the
premodern world slavery existed in one form or another nearly everywhere and always. However, there
are differences. Slave soldiers wielding enough power to end up governing a country, such as the
Mamlûk dynasty in Egypt and Syria (1250-1517), can hardly be compared to galley slaves rowing day in
and day out under the whip in the bottom of a boat. One wonders if the same term should be used for
both. Recognizing differences in circumstance does not mean condoning any type of slavery. More
specifically, arguing that the modern/colonial transatlantic slave trade was unique does not entail
minimizing the horrors of other slave trades, just as arguing that the conquest of Indigenous Americans
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The term Islamophobia was popularized in 1997 after being used in a report launched by British Home
Secretary, Jack Straw, following the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (The Runnymede Trust
1997). However, the term is not new. “Between the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century,
various authors detected the presence in Europe of an attitude towards Islam and Muslims that some of them
designated with the term ‘Islamophobia’” (Bravo López 2011, 568).
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was uniquely destructive does not make, say, the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century any less
horrific.104 On an individual level, it is insensitive to compare the suffering of anyone who experiences
extreme violence or oppression. For instance, the victim of one isolated murder is no less a victim than
each victim of a mass murder. At the same time, it would be ridiculous to deduce from this that there
are no differences on a larger systemic scale.
The modern/colonial transatlantic slave trade was unique in its systemic scope. It was crucial in the
development of power dynamics in which new formations of race and class intersected and made
possible the emergence of early modern capitalism:
Slavery, in America, was deliberately established and organized as a commodity in order to
produce goods for the world market and to serve the purposes and needs of capitalism.
Likewise, the serfdom imposed on Indians, including the redeﬁnition of the institutions of
reciprocity, was organized in order to serve the same ends: to produce merchandise for the
global market. Independent commodity production was established and expanded for the
same purposes. This means that all the forms of labor and control of labor were not only
simultaneously performed in America, but they were also articulated around the axis of
capital and the global market. Consequently, all of these forms of labor were part of a new
model of organization and labor control. Together these forms of labor conﬁgured a new
economic system: capitalism.
Capital, as a social relation based on the commodiﬁcation of the labor force, was probably
born in some moment around the eleventh or twelfth century in some place in the
southern regions of the Iberian and/or Italian peninsulas and, for known reasons, in the
Islamic world. Capital is thus much older than America. But before the emergence of
America, it was nowhere structurally articulated with all the other forms of organization
and control of the labor force and labor, nor was it predominant over any of them. Only
with America could capital consolidate and obtain global predominance, becoming
precisely the axis around which all forms of labor were articulated to satisfy the ends of the
world market, conﬁguring a new pattern of global control on labor, its resources, and
products: world capitalism. Therefore, capitalism as a system of relations of production,
that is, as the heterogeneous linking of all forms of control on labor and its products under
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“It may be argued that the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century are both comparable and analogous to
the European conquests of the Americas but this is a plainly erroneous argument. Despite their extraordinarily
destructive effects, the Mongol conquests represented an “event” rather than a structure or process. They
represented a modus operandi of conquest, not a modus vivendi in the world, one that reflects a certain attitude
and view of life, humanity, and nature writ large. Once the Mongols accomplished their initial military goals of
conquest, they resumed the same modes of governance that had inhabited the world before them. Their three
Western Khanates became Muslim and followed, more or less, the same patterns of governance as had existed in
Muslim lands earlier, namely, a rule of law under the Shari‘a” (Hallaq 2018, 329).
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the dominance of capital, was constituted in history only with the emergence of America.
Beginning with that historical moment, capital has always existed, and continues to exist to
this day, as the central axis of capitalism. Never has capitalism been predominant in some
other way, on a global and worldwide scale, and in all probability it would not have been
able to develop otherwise. (Quijano 2000, 550-551)
This new racist system of labour had catastrophic consequences for Africans. It led to a massive
holocaust which had a uniquely devastating impact on African societies, not just segments of these
societies:
Nothing in their cultural and religious background could have prepared the African Muslims
(and non-Muslims) for what they encountered in the New World. Those who had never
been slaves or who had been slaveholders found a system they certainly would not have
condoned at home. Even the former slaves could not have expected what was in store for
them. This new world not only was racially hostile but went contrary to what the Africans
believed in, all they had learned from childhood and seen around them. The system must
have been viewed as unacceptable, revolting, and inhuman, and this perception certainly
shaped the response of the Muslims to their new existence as slaves of the Christians.
(Diouf 2013 [1998], 33)
Muslims from Senegambia, taken to Spain and forcibly converted to Christianity, were the
first enslaved Africans to be transported to America, in 1501. Since the Spanish did not want Islam
to reach America they did not allow the transportation of slaves directly from Africa to America at
first. Quite simply, they were afraid of Muslims and did not want them to cause trouble in their
new colonies. Yet, market pressures triumphed over these fears and Muslims continued to be
enslaved and sent to the Americas:
After the first slave uprising in the New World, led by the Wolof in 1522, a royal decree of
May 11, 1526, specifically forbade the introduction of “Gelofes” (Wolof ), negros (blacks)
from the Levant (or Middle East), those who had been raised with the Moors, and people
from Guinea without a special license from the Casa de Contratación, which regulated the
slave trade and put levies on the slaves. All the groups that the decree prohibited were
either completely or mostly Muslim. Within fifty years, five decrees were passed to forbid
the introduction of African Muslims to the Spanish colonies. This insistent reissuing of the
prohibition shows that Muslims nevertheless continued to arrive and to cause concerns and
problems in the New World. The colonists claimed that the Muslims incited the other
nations to rebellion, and it was feared that they would take Islam to the Indians […] (Diouf
2013 [1998], 36-37)
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As the sixteenth century progressed, the racialization of transatlantic slavery would result in the
development of an enslaved population nearly exclusively comprising people constructed as black. This
would include both Muslim and non-Muslim Africans. However, this process was gradual. For instance,
British privateer Sir Francis Drake (c. 1540-1596) is reported to have captured “local Indian, Moorish and
Turkish slaves” from the Spanish colony of Cartagena he burned and pillaged in 1586 (Brotton 2016, 48).
It should be added that in the lands now called Canada, the enslavement of Indigenous people as well as
people of African descent continued well into the nineteenth century (Neeganagwedgin 2012, Lawrence
2019 [2016]). Yet, the connection between blackness and slavery in the Americas was already solid by
the late sixteenth century.
The exact number of Africans enslaved and shipped to the Americas is unknown. As is the case
with Indigenous population numbers in the Americas, and victims of European witch hunts, estimates
vary enormously and tend to be politicized. However, researchers who have seriously examined the
sources can give us at least a sense of how enormous the trade was. Diouf (2013 [1998]) proposes an
estimate of 12.5 million Africans enslaved and transported to the Americas (68-70). This number does
not include those born into slavery in the Americas. There was a gendered difference as well, since “the
transatlantic slave trade took away about seven West African men for every three women” (62).
Moreover, Diouf estimates that Muslims represented a substantial minority among these victims but
hesitates to give an exact number. They may have been hundreds of thousands. Perhaps a few million.
Solidarity among Muslims seems to have protected them from being enslaved. This was probably a
factor in the Islamization of West Africa in the modern period. Most often, African Muslim men were
captured outside their home territory during wars or travelling to trade or seek knowledge. The typical
enslaved Muslim in the Americas was therefore learned in both religion and the arts of war (55-64).
European settlers must have sensed that, as they were developing a new dominant culture in the
colonial Atlantic world, countercultures were also emerging. The Muslim Atlantic, which overlapped
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considerably with the black Atlantic, was one of these countercultures. The Spaniards especially dreaded
the prospect of Indigenous Americans being Islamized. Solidarity among black, Muslim, and Indigenous
countercultures was a nightmare for colonial elites (Diouf 2013 [1998], 210-216). Perhaps it still is.
Spanish fears of Muslims in the Americas were directly connected to their ongoing conflicts with
Muslims closer to home. They and the Portuguese had a long history of war with Muslims and therefore
had firsthand knowledge of Muslim martial traditions. Indeed, the Muslims of the Atlantic world drew
upon traditional Islam as a source of inspiration and embodied knowledge (Ware III 2014) applicable to
the fight against modern/colonial European domination. As previously discussed in Section One,
traditional Islam also represented a precious heritage worth defending. Grosfoguel reminds us that
modernity/coloniality threatens not only the political and economic structures of non-European
societies, but every aspect of people’s lives. Resistance to modernity/coloniality in the Muslim Atlantic
came from a deep will to avoid physical, emotional, intellectual, cultural, and spiritual annihilation.

Shifting the Locus of Enunciation
To understand how modernity appears as a fundamentally colonial and genocidal project from
the perspective of Atlantic Muslims, a parallel can be drawn from Grosfoguel’s (2011) suggestion that
we look at the world from the perspective of an Indigenous women:
How would the world-system look like if we moved the locus of enunciation from the
European man to an Indigenous women [sic] in the Americas, to, say, Rigoberta Menchú in
Guatemala or Domitila Barrios de Chungara in Bolivia? I do not pretend to speak for or
represent the perspective of these indigenous women. What I attempt to do is to shift the
location from which these paradigms are thinking. The first implication of shifting our
geopolitics of knowledge is that what arrived in the Americas in the late fifteenth century
was not only an economic system of capital and labor for the production of commodities to
be sold for a profit in the world market. This was a crucial part of, but was not the sole
element in, the entangled “package.” What arrived in the Americas was a broader and
wider entangled power structure that an economic reductionist perspective of the worldsystem is unable to account for. From the structural location of an indigenous woman in the
Americas, what arrived was a more complex world-system than what political-economy
paradigms and world-system analysis portrait. A European/capitalist/military/Christian/
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patriarchal/white/heterosexual/male arrived in the Americas and established
simultaneously in time and space several entangled global hierarchies […] (8)
The term “locus of enunciation” merits some further explanation, since it refers to a crucial aspect
of decolonial theory regarding the positionality of knowledge. At this point, it seems warranted to return
to a passage by Grosfoguel (2011), partially quoted and briefly discussed in the preface of this
dissertation:
This is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our
knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the
geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. In Western philosophy
and sciences the subject that speaks is always hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis.
The “ego-politics of knowledge” of Western philosophy has always privilege [sic] the myth
of a non-situated “Ego”. Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that
speaks are always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location
from the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth
about a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as
well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial
power/knowledge from which the subject speaks.
It is important here to distinguish the “epistemic location” from the “social location.” The
fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations does not
automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic
location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consists in making
subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think
epistemically like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are
knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic
knowledge in the power relations involved. I am not claiming an epistemic populism where
knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. What
I am claiming is that all knowledges are epistemically located in the dominant or the
subaltern side of the power relations and that this is related to the geo- and body-politics of
knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of
knowledge is a Western myth. (5-6)
Decolonial thought is different from identity politics or particularism. It recognizes the possibility of
imagining the world from different locations than our own. If the oppressed can internalize the
worldview of their oppressors, often to the point of alienation, it follows that people situated in
privileged locations can empathize with the oppressed, sometimes to the point of trying to speak for
them. That is why it is important when considering other points of view and listening to others not to
inadvertently silence them in the process.
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Without saying ‘this is what Indigenous women thought or think,’ Grosfoguel proposes that we
consider what Europe looked like as a force arriving from without rather than expanding from within.
Imagine European boats coming at you. If we think of Europe expanding, we will necessarily be
concerned about the complex internal developments which led Europeans to modernity. Also, we will
probably focus on the explicit intentions of Europeans in this expansion, in which case we risk ignoring
the totalizing quality of the modern/colonial system which disrupted every aspect of people’s lives.
Europeans may have been motivated by economic or political interests in their conquests, as well as in
many cases by a desire to save the souls of people unexposed to the message of Christ. They surely did
not leave the comfort of their homelands because they felt a pressing need to change the way foreign
people arranged their hair or expressed affection. But these intentions are of little interest to those who
experienced or experience European interference in every aspect of their existence.
Changing the locus of enunciation is extremely difficult in the Western(ized) academy, which
structurally predisposes us to accept universalizing ideas mainly from white men firmly ensconced in
Judeo-Christian-Secular lineages (Grosfoguel, Hernández and Velásquez 2016). This may seem
counterintuitive in an age when the academy is filled with postcolonialism, postmodernism, feminism,
critical race theory, subaltern critique, Indigenous studies, queer studies, and countless other fields in
which scholars seek to disrupt established power dynamics. Yet, all these perspectives tend to be
presented as particular, even parochial. This is the same point made earlier in this chapter in the
discussion on Dussel: women are expected to study women, blacks blacks, Moroccans Moroccans, and
so forth. Additionally, women can criticize men, blacks whites, and Moroccans the French. But a
Moroccan-born scholar in Canada would have difficulty being recognized as an expert on Latin America.
The message from the core of the modern/colonial world-system is that you are welcome to join us in
studying the core or informing us about your section of the periphery. But leave the global issues to us.
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There are of course exceptions, since this is not an explicit rule, but the implicit message is strong
enough to have wide repercussions.
It should be noted that the power dynamics between European elites and diverse minorities in
multicultural Western universities are a microcosm of the power relations between the Western
academy and the Westernized academies on the periphery of the world-system. For instance, sociologist
Syed Farid Alatas (2006) observes that there are many scholars engaged in “non-Eurocentric, counterOrientalist and autonomous social science in Asia”(19).105 However, “[m]ost Filipino or Signapore-based
social scientists read English fluently but do not discuss the works of Indian social scientists, which are
predominantly in English, in their classes” (19). The academic subsystem of the global world-system is
organized in such a way as to make it more embarrassing for Filipino scholars to omit citing one major
French scholar in their field than to omit mentioning any Indian ones. Alatas explains that
in Asia and in other parts of the world usually termed collectively as the Third World, the
South, or developing societies, there is a high degree of dependence of social science
practitioners and institutions on their counterparts in the United States, Great Britain,
France and a few other nations. This takes the form of dependence on ideas, theories and
concepts, the media of ideas, technologies of education, and aid and investment in
education. This state of what we call academic dependency is perpetuated by certain
features by the global division of labour in the social sciences. This is seen in the division
between theoretical and empirical intellectual labour, other country studies and own
country studies, and comparative and single case studies. As long as academics in the South
continue to do predominantly empirical work that is largely confined to single cases in their
own countries or localities and therefore lack a comparative perspective, the prospects for
theoretical or conceptual innovation are bleak. (17)
This analysis could also apply to the humanities and exact sciences, as it could to racialized power
dynamics on a North American campus. The modern/colonial division of labour in the academy means
issues seen as important to people in the core are prioritized and reflected when determining
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Alatas critically engages the work of his father, the Malaysian politician and social scientist, Syed Hussein Alatas
(1928-2007), as well as his uncle, the Muslim philosopher Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas. While this
dissertation does not focus on Asia, the body of literature produced by these three Malaysian Muslims examines
many of the themes discussed in this dissertation, including the creative tension between tradition and
decolonization. This might present an avenue for future research, to broaden the present conversation beyond
North America and the Atlantic world.
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institutional objectives and funding, thereby providing the parameters of what is urgent, interesting, or
irrelevant in terms of research.
It is true that much postcolonial scholarship has strived to “provincialize Europe” (Chakrabarty
2000), that is, to remind Europeans that while they may like to think about universal concepts, they are
doing so from a particular location. But much more needs to be done to recognize that while scholars
from the rest of the world are thinking from specific locations, they can be taken seriously when
examining universal or global concepts. They can be cited as international experts on major issues
confronting all those living in the global world-system, that is, humanity. This has implications for the
study of religions:
Religion is a much-discussed phenomenon in sociology, anthropology, history, psychology,
and philosophy. Yet, theoretical discussions surrounding religion have been unable to
develop conceptualizations of religion that are derived from religions other than
Christianity. The field of the sociology of religion, for example, is founded on a central
vocabulary almost wholly derived from Christianity. An approach that moves away from
parochialism would not merely study non-Christian religions but attempt to develop an
alternative conceptual vocabulary that is derived from various religions. The term
‘alternative’ is used here not to indicate that indigenous or local concepts are to replace
Western ones, but to suggest that there is a need for thinking in universal terms, for taking
seriously non-Western sources of ideas and concepts in the social sciences, and for
considering a more critical assimilation of Western theories and concepts. (Alatas 2006, 16)
Perhaps the difficulty of adopting universal ideas from non-Western theoretical traditions in the
modern/colonial academy can explain the continuing influence of figures such as Karl Marx (1818-1883)
on decolonial world-systems analysis, which also tends to be a bit of a boys’ club, despite the best
intentions of thinkers like Dussel and Grosfoguel. Globally renowned and influential critics of colonialism
have generally adapted theories developed in the European tradition to their contexts. Frantz Omar
Fanon (1925-1961) and Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1928-1967) draw upon Marx while Edward Said (19352003) favours Foucault. This dissertation attempts to shift the locus of enunciation about modernity to
that of Atlantic Muslims. It responds to a problem clearly articulated by Grosfoguel’s student Dustin
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Craun (2013), who asks “who does the Muslim world look for as its own exemplars of decolonization?”
(110)
Just as Grosfoguel is not suggesting there were no oppressive dynamics in pre-Columbian
America, I am not suggesting there was no oppression in premodern Muslim societies, based on
ethnocentric, economic, religious, gendered, colourist, or sexual hierarchies. But the dominant
entanglement of modern/colonial hierarchies which has left a trail of genocide and extinction in its path
since it began over five centuries ago, and now threatens the very existence of all life forms on earth, is
“European/capitalist/military/Christian/patriarchal/white/heterosexual/male” (Grosfoguel 2011).
Grosfoguel tries to isolate the main hierarchies, but the list could include other terms like
anthropocentric. Each hierarchy in this list of concepts connected by slashes is transformed by its
entanglement with the other elements. Other entangled packages, such as those found in the Americas
or Northwest Africa before the long sixteenth century, were surely problematic. Moreover, people
affected by modern/colonial power structures have tried to improve their conditions and reduce
injustice. But attempts for social improvement were and continue to be seriously hampered by the
ongoing genocidal project of modernity/coloniality imposed from outside these societies. Over the last
six centuries, many Atlantic Muslims have understood that improving their communities internally is
crucial yet insufficient. External threats must also be addressed.

Sayyida al-Ḥurra
In continuity with Grosfoguel’s suggestion that we seriously consider how the modern/colonial
world-system looks from the perspective of an Indigenous woman in Guatemala or Bolivia, I propose we
consider the perspective of an Andalusian woman exiled in Morocco. If borders provide the best vantage
points for decolonial thinking (Mignolo 2012 [2000]), Sayyida al-Ḥurra (c. 1491 – c. 1552) was optimally
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positioned to resist the early modern Iberian crusaders.106 Born some time between 1485 and 1495, and
deceased between 1552 and 1561, she embodied early modern Muslim resistance to European
colonialism. Her name, which may have been a title, mean ‘the free lady’. Her mother was a Spanish
Christian convert to Islam, Zuhra Fernandez (n.d.), and her father was ‘Alî Ibn Râshid (n.d.), a notable
from Granada who had fought the Catholic crusaders in al-Andalus before leaving to found the city-state
of Chefchaouen (Shafshâwan) in 1471. He established the city in the Rif Mountains of Northern
Morocco, 66 kilometres inland from the Mediterranean. This was far enough into the mountains to be
protected from Catholic raids and close enough to receive waves of Andalusian refugees with whom to
fight the Portuguese and Spanish invaders along the coast. As a member of the Râshid clan, Sayyida alḤurra was a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad through the Sufi Ibn Mashîsh, and King Idrîs I,
whose biogrpahies are discussed in Chapters One and Two. Resisting the Iberian crusades was personal
for Sayyida al-Ḥurra whose family experienced the devastation of exile from al-Andalus first-hand. She
knew her enemies intimately. In fact, it is said that her mother would reprimand her for fighting her
Christian maternal uncles. At the same time, her ancestry connected her deeply with Northern Morocco
and its traditions. Highly educated, she was fluent in Castilian Spanish, Portuguese, and Arabic, and she
had access to diverse bodies of knowledge, including religious sciences (‘ulûm al-dîn). One of her
teachers was the eminent Sufi ‘Abd Allâh al-Ghazwânî (n.d.-1528-9), who had revived the pilgrimage to
the mausoleum of her ancestor Ibn Mashîsh, at the top of Jabal ‘Alam mountain, not far from
Chefchaouen.
Ghazwânî was a pivotal figure in theorizing the connections between Sufism, anti-colonial
defensive jihad, and sharifism (al-Ashhab 2015, Jallâb 2017, vol. 2, 55-158). His spiritual authority was
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There is some discrepancy in the sources surrounding the biographies of Sayyida al-Ḥurra and her family. Where
there is disagreement, I have followed Lebbady (2012), who critically examines many earlier sources as well as
more recent evidence. Other sources include Idelhadj (2015) Grimau (2000), Mernissi (2006 [1988], 18-19), Verde
(2017), and Triqui and Reggab (2016).
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crucial in the establishing the first major Sharifian dynasty in the Far Maghrib since the Idrîsids (alIdrîsiyyûn, r. 788- c. 985), namely the Saʿdî dynasty (al-Sa‘diyyûn) which ruled Southern Morocco from
1509-1549 and unified Morocco from 1549-1659 (Rivet 2012, 183-218). However, it should be clear that
political involvement was a controversial issue among Sufis. There has always been a strong Sufi
tradition of disengagement from worldly affairs. For instance, the famous Sufi and scholar Aḥmad Zarrûq
(1442-1493) of Fez, affiliated to the Shâdhilî path like Ghazwânî, was strongly opposed to such political
engagement by Sufis, especially when it entailed overthrowing Muslim regimes (Kugle 2006). Political
quietism among Sufis and Muslim scholars in general should be confused neither with passive
submission to political rulers nor with an absence of social consciousness. Rather, it is based on the
textually based opinion that the scholar or saint can only have a beneficial influence on society when
uninvolved in political power games. Similarly, politically engaged Sufis and scholars argue based on
Islamic textual sources that it is sometimes necessary to take political stances. Naturally, worldly
disengagement can be used to justify pandering to political elites, just as engagement can be another
word for ambition, but such abuses are not normative. Moreover, there is a broad range of positions
about when and to which extent a Sufi or scholar ought to intervene in political affairs, and
disagreements are often about specific cases or secondary applications of basic notions on which there
is agreement (Heck 2009, Dickson and Sharify-Funk 2017, 258-262). Differences between Moroccan
saints like Ghazwânî and Zarrûq attest to the intellectual pluralism within the Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî
tradition. In any case, the endorsement of prominent Sufis such as Ghazwânî gave significant spiritual
credibility to the Saʿdî dynasty (Al-Ḥâjjî 2013).
The ancestor of the Saʿdîs is Sharîf Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmân (n.d.-1517), better known by
his title Abû ‘Abd Allâh al-Qâ’im bi-Amr’illah (the Father of ‘Abd Allâh, who has Arisen by the Command
of Allah). Between 1509 and 1511, this clan chief received the allegiance of the Amazigh tribes of the
Moroccoan Sûs region, which extends over much of southern parts of the High Atlas Mountains and the
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northern Sahara. Backed by prominent Sufis, his prestige was based both on his noble lineage and his
reputation as a leader of anti-Portuguese defensive jihad. His son Aḥmad took over Marrakesh in 1525,
making it the new capital of the Sa’dî principality. Aḥmad’s first symbolic act was to move to Marrakesh
the remains of his father as well as the Sufi shaykh Muḥammad Ibn Sulaymân al-Jazûlî (c. 1404-1465),
the founder of the Jazûlî branch of the Shâdhilî path, to which Ghazwânî was affiliated (Rivet 2012, 185,
Jallâb 2017, vol. 1, 225-336). The Waṭṭâsî dynasty which dominated northern Morocco tried
unsuccessfully to reconquer Marrakesh in 1527. As a result, the Waṭṭâsîs formally recognized Sa’dî
sovereignty over southern Morocco. Sa’dî military success continued, as they expelled the Portuguese
from Agadir, Safi and Azzemour in 1541. In 1549, the Sa’dîs overthrew the Waṭṭâsî capital of Fez,
thereby rising in status from a southern principality to a monarchy ruling over a mostly unified Morocco.
The Sa’dîs annexed all the independent northern city-states within decades, and in 1578
defeated the Portuguese in the Battle of the Three Kings, also known as the battle of Ksar el-Kebir (Qaṣr
al-Kabîr) (Nekrouf 2009 [1984]). To redeem their captured soldiers, the Portuguese spent years paying
reparations to Morocco. During the battle, King Sebastian I (Portuguese: Dom Sebastião I) of Portugal
was killed. A fervently religious man, he had presented his campaign against the stronger Moroccan
army as a crusade. His humiliating defeat announced the end of Portuguese colonialism in Morocco. In
1580, when the Spanish Habsburg dynasty annexed Portugal, Ceuta (Sabta) came under Spanish rule.
Only tiny territories along the Atlantic coast remained under Portuguese administration. Portuguese rule
ended in Anfa (present-day Casablanca) in 1755, and in Mazagan (al-Jadîda) in 1769.107 By the end of the
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After the Battle of the Three Kings, a rumour rapidly began to spread among the Portuguese that King Sebastian
had survived and was in hiding. Under Spanish rule, which had begun two years after the great battle, popular
discontent in Portugal raged, and many began to see the return of the hidden Sebastian as the only hope for
independence. Moreover, Sebastian’s pious reputation gave him a religious mystique. Soon, the political
movement seeking to restore him to the throne became a religious cult. Saint Sebastian (Portuguese: São
Sebastião) became a messianic figure who could return at any time to save his followers. After the return of
Portuguese sovereignty in 1640, anti-Spanish fervour dwindled, as did the cult of Sebastianism. However, the cult
was revitalized in the early nineteenth century, across the Atlantic Ocean, among the poor and disenfranchised
classes of Northeastern Brazil, where it spurred a bloody uprising in 1836. The cult has been assimilated into
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sixteenth century, Morocco was once again considered a major player in the geopolitical theatre of the
Mediterranean, a position consolidated by its short-lived conquest of the Malian Songhai Empire in
1591.
As the Sa’dî dynasty was waging war against the Portuguese invaders and slowly unifying
Morocco under its rule, Sayyida al-Ḥurra led her own defensive jihad as ruler of the city-state of Tétouan
(Tiṭuân) in northern Morocco. Raided and destroyed in 1437 by Castilians, Tétouan was rebuilt from
1483 to 1485 by refugees from Granada, led by Abû al-Hasan al-Manẓarî (n.d.-c. 1505, his last name is
often transcribed as Mandri to reflect colloquial Moroccan pronunciation). These Andalusian refugees
built a formidable naval force using the port of Tétouan to trade with partners as far off as Denmark,
and to fight Iberian conquerors. The city is situated just 40 kilometres southeast along the coast from
Sabta, which was then occupied by the Portuguese. Further eastward along the coast, Spain conquered
the city of al-Malîliyya (Spanish: Mellilia) in 1494, which it still occupies today. In 1510, Sayyida al-Ḥurra
of Chefchaouen married Abû al-Hasan’s nephew and successor as Governor of Tétouan, Muḥammad alManẓarî (n.d. - c. 1519). An alliance was thereby forged between these two northern city-states ruled by
Andalusian exiles intent on fighting the Iberian crusaders. Muḥammad al-Manẓarî is reputed to have so
greatly valued Sayyida al-Ḥurra’s judgement that they co-governed the city-state until his death, after
which she officially became Governor of Tétouan (c. 1519-1542).
On the frontline of the North African war against Iberian invaders, Sayyida al-Ḥurra proved to be
a formidable strategist, diplomat, and warrior. When necessary to protect her territory, she was willing
to pursue an independent policy in Tétouan. For instance, she allied herself with the Ottomans in her

diverse Brazilian religious movements, and has occasionally been associated with popular uprisings, such as in
1893, 1930, and as recently as 1962 (Nekrouf 2009 [1984], 169-213). Another fascinating event connecting
Morocco to Brazil occurred after the Portuguese evacuated Mazagan in Morocco, the city’s colonial settlers
migrated to Brazil, where they founded the city of New Mazagan (Portuguese: Nova Mazagão). Such historical
connections between the southern lands of the Atlantic world, deserve further analysis from a decolonial worldsystems perspective, and represent avenues for further research.
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struggle against Portugal and Spain. Europeans saw her as a pirate queen, ruthlessly pillaging Iberian
ships and coasts to capture goods as well as Christians to be ransomed or enslaved. But perception is
everything when it comes to piracy. In the early modern period, most states around the Mediterranean
and in the emerging Atlantic world outsourced much of their naval defense to privateers, such as the
famous Englishman Francis Drake, who was knighted by Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603, r. 1558-1603) in
1581.108 Was he a pirate, a privateer, or a knight? The Encyclopedia Britannica (2018) proposes a clear
definition of a privateer as simply “a pirate with papers […] commissioned by governments to carry out
quasi-military activities” at sea. However, this definition should be completed by noting that in
geopolitical terms their privateers are our pirates, and vice versa, just as on land, our militias or freedom
fighters are their terrorists (Tinniswood 2010, xvi). It depends whom one considers to be us or them.
From a Moroccan perspective, Sayyida al-Ḥurra was at war and privateers were part of her naval force.
Similarly, her Ottoman allies, the brothers Oruç Reis (1474-1518) and Khayr al-Dîn (c. 1480-1546) are
remembered in Europe as infamous pirates, both attributed with the name Barbarossa (ibid., 6-10). In
Italian barba rossa means red beard. It seems this moniker is a deformation of Baba Oruç (baba is Arabic
for dad), given to the older brother by the many Muslim refugees he transported from Spain to North
Africa, from 1504-1510. The younger brother went on to become Admiral of the Ottoman fleet and
Chief Governor of Ottoman North Africa.
For Andalusian refugees, Sayyida al-Ḥurra and her allies were military heroes and legitimate
rulers, not pirates. As warriors and rulers, they were capable of ruthless violence, as can be attested by
the many Christians they raided, plundered, killed, and enslaved. According to Davis (2003),
enslavement of European Christians by North African Muslims was much more massive than the
transatlantic trade before the mid-seventeenth century. He contends that the Muslims were fuelled by
an intense desire to get back at their Christian enemies “for the wrongs of 1492, for the centuries of
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For an in-depth examination of early-modern English piracy, see Appleby (2009).

196

crusading violence that had preceded them, and for the ongoing religious struggle between Christian
and Muslim that has continued to roil the Mediterranean world well into modern times” (xxv). For Davis,
this made them “more aggressive and initially (one might say) more successful in their work than their
Christian counterparts,” (xxv), whose motivations were primarily economic. Europeans were not seeking
revenge from human rivals according to this analysis; they saw black slaves as chattel, like oxen and
horses. While this argument has its merit, it is problematic since it downplays the viciousness of the
European slavers and the motivation to compensate for centuries of domination by Muslims which
underlay the whole transatlantic venture from the outset. In any case, up to “a million and a quarter
white, European Christians enslaved by the Muslims of the Barbary Coast” (i.e. the Maghrib), between
1530 and 1780, is historically significant (23). It shows that, far from passively submitting to the rising
power of Western Europe, Muslims fought back passionately, even ruthlessly. One must be firm in
stating that all systems of slavery at the time were oppressive. The personal guilt of Muslim slavers as
perpetrators of extreme violence is not being questioned here. At the same time, it must be understood
that from a decolonial world-systems perspective, leaders like Sayyida al-Ḥurra represent examples of
Muslim resistance to early modern/colonial genocide.
Sayyida al-Ḥurra did not allow a tactical alliance with Oruç Reis and Khayr al-Dîn to turn her into
a vassal of the Ottomans, against the interests of her allies in Morocco. While her mentor Ghazwânî
backed the emerging Sa’dîs, her family had close ties to the Waṭṭâsîs. Her brother Ibrâhîm (1490-1539)
was vizier to Sultan Aḥmad al-Waṭṭâsî (n.d-1549, r. 1526-1545 and 1547-1549) in Fez, whom she married
in 1541, thereby consolidating ties between Tétouan, Chefchaouen and Fez. Just as the political
implications of Isabella and Ferdinand’s marriage had been disastrous for Muslims and Jews, Christians
such as Phillip II of Spain feared the political consequences of Sayyida al-Ḥurra’s wedding to the Sultan.
This marriage which sent shock waves through Europe was also unique in Moroccan history as the only
time a Sultan left his capital to marry the bride in her own town. But Sayyida al-Ḥurra was no typical
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bride. Not only did she not marry in Fez, but she continued to live in Tétouan as governor until she was
overthrown members of the Manẓarî family loyal to the increasingly powerful Sa’dîs. After losing power,
she is said to have returned to Chefchaouen to live a life of worship and contemplation. She is buried in
Chefchaouen, where her mausoleum within a Sufi lodge (zâwiya) continues to be a place of pilgrimage
to this day.
The historical significance of Sayyida al-Ḥurra is contested. For the well-known Moroccan
sociologist Fatima Mernissi (2006 [1988]) (1940-2015), she represents one of many Muslim women to
have exercised power despite the constraints of tradition (18-19). Mernissi has a negative understanding
of tradition, much like her contemporary Laroui. Yet, other scholars situate Sayyida al-Ḥurra within
strongly feminist traditions which have evolved alongside and in interaction with patriarchal Islamic
currents.109 Hasna Lebbady (2009, 2012), for example, observes feminist traditions in Andalusia and
Northern Morocco. Margaret Rausch (2006) situates these currents in a broader framework of
knowledgeable Muslim women in positions of authority:
Muslim women throughout the world over time have been actively involved in acquiring as
well as transmitting knowledge in a variety of capacities. The daughters of scholars, for
example, often received instruction from their male relatives, and some became teachers,
scholars or poetesses. Examples include ‘A’isha al-Ba‘uniyya (d. 1516), member of a Syrian
scholarly family residing in Cairo who wrote a famous poem in praise of the Prophet and
served as a legal expert, Nana Asma’u bint Usman dan Fodiyo (d. 1864), daughter of a
renowned shaykh of the Qadiri Suﬁ order living in the northern Nigerian town of Kano, who
wrote a vast corpus of poetry, established Islamic educational practices for women and
corresponded with male Suﬁ scholars, and the well-known nineteenth-century
Mauritanian/Moroccan Tijani Suﬁ scholar al-Hajja Khadija bint Ahmad, who is reported to
have corresponded with male scholars on questions concerning women’s roles within the
Tijaniyya, including the initiation of men into the order. Other Muslim women are known to
have provided signiﬁcant and highly inﬂuential instruction to males, who later became
prominent scholars, including Ibn ‘Arabi, as-Sanusi in Libya and al-Jazuli in Morocco. Some
medieval Muslim women served as instructors of men and women in hadith-transmission
within the local central educational institutions. Several of them gained prominence in their
day. (174)
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For a discussion of Islam by contemporary Muslim women theologians, with diverse approaches to the issues of
feminism, womanism, patriarchy, and tradition in Islam, see Aslan, Hermansen and Medeni (2013). For a survey of
Western scholarship written in English on gender and Sufism, see Sharify-Funk (2019).
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Rausch’s contention that there is an important historical tradition of Islamic women scholars is
supported by British Muslim scholar Mohammad Akram Nadwi (2007), who has documented the
biographies of over 9,000 women scholars of hadith from all Islamic periods and regions, a
summary of which is available in English. And hadith scholarship is but one of many traditional
Islamic sciences. Yet within this broader Islamic tradition of empowering women through
knowledge, Rausch (2006) corroborates Lebbady’s findings that there exist unique regional
traditions in place like Morocco:
In Morocco, like elsewhere in Africa, women were recognised as indispensable in the
transmission of Islamic knowledge to other women. Al-Jazuli (d. 1465), founder of the Jazuli
Suﬁ order, emphasised the importance of women’s education, as did his successors and
their disciples, ‘Abdallah al-Ghazwani (d. 1528/9), ‘Abdallah al-Habti and Musa ibn ‘Ali alWazzani (1562/3). Al-Ghazwani is known to have initiated entire villages, men as well as
women, into the Jazuli Suﬁ order to insure the spread of religious knowledge. Al-Habti and
Yusuf at-Tilidi (d. 1543/4) were known to maintain separate women’s zawiyas, which were
presided over by women trained in ﬁqh. Al-Habti’s wife Amina bint Khajju was a fully
trained legal scholar who taught local women Islamic and Suﬁ dogma and practice in her
own zawiya in Shafshawan in northern Morocco. Another example from a different
historical period and context is Zuhra’ bint ‘Abdallah bin Mas’ud al-Kush (d. 1020), who
studied with her father and had her own zawiya in Marrakesh, where she taught other
women and led them in ritual. Unfortunately, few speciﬁc details on the educational
process in these settings were recorded. (175)
Muslim women cannot be reduced to innocent victims of history. They have faced catastrophic
tragedies just as they have enjoyed phenomenal successes and victories. At various times, and often
simultaneously, they have been liberators, oppressors, and oppressed. In the present period, still
dominated by Eurocentric coloniality/modernity, the decolonial liberation of Muslim communities
cannot be completed without drawing upon the complex and dynamic traditions of Muslims, rather than
the colonial gaze of Eurocentric modernism. Women like Sayyida al-Ḥurra have much to teach us in this
process. Their stories are to be found not only in writing, but also in oral traditions perpetuated by
women. Lebbady (2009) argues:
Such tales can help us to enrich our present by taking into consideration our authentic heritage,
which we no longer view through a distorted colonial lens. As Moroccan women we have a rich
history of creative women, who were trying to cope with problems very similar to the ones that
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face us today. […] In fact, the storytelling in which the traditional communities of women were
involved served, among other things, as a form of consciousness-raising that was as good as
any devised by Western feminists more recently. (52-53)
Yet, Sayyida al-Ḥurra is not simply a model for Muslim women. Her story illustrates the struggle
of Muslim women and men on the shores of the Mediterranean delving into their traditions—their ways
of being, knowing, and behaving—to resist the early modern/colonial European project of genocidal
conquest. This resistance was so strong that it would have been impossible to predict that
developments in the Atlantic world would eventually lead to the global subjugation of Muslims.

Atlantic Ascent and Mediterranean Decline
The global political dominance of Western Europeans was not easily predictable for most of the
sixteenth century, during which the African-Eurasian landmass was politically and economically
dominated by Muslims. Not only were the Ottomans the strongest naval force in the Mediterranean, but
they were also continuing to conquer new territory in Southeast Europe for most of the century.
Hodgson (1974c) writes:
Muslims, indeed were little conscious of all the channels whereby the new Occidental
activity was affecting them in the sixteenth century. They took the rivalry less seriously than
did the Occidentals. But at least some of them were aware that whereas before in the
Chinese court no astronomers could rival the Muslim astronomers, now the upstart
Occidentals could do as well and perhaps better; and some were aware that whereas
before, if an artist wished exotic inspiration, it was to things Chinese he should turn, now a
new Occidental style of painting charmed and troubled the tastes of the most perceptive
Muslim patrons. Thereafter, from the end of the sixteenth century on, the Occidentals
gradually grew from prominent rivals into an overwhelming world force which ended by
sapping all the strength of Islamdom. (14)
It may be difficult for many English-speaking readers to envision how powerful the Ottomans were
in comparison with, say, Tudorian England under Queen Elizabeth I. Yet, in The Sultan and the Queen,
English scholar Jerry Brotton (2016) reveals how Elizabeth pursued alliances with the much more
powerful Ottomans against her rivals in Europe:
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This book tells the remarkable story of the Elizabethans who traveled to the Muslim world,
what they learned and how their discoveries, and the stories they told, affected life back
home. It shows how, for some, there was a real enthusiasm for a Protestant-Islamic alliance
to oppose the papacy and the Catholic power of Spain, both determined to wipe out all
forms of heresy, be it reformed Christianity or “Mahometan” Islam. It reveals how far
Elizabethan England had to come in its willingness to perceive Islam as a faith with which it
could do business and also shows how the fear, or allure, of converting to Islam, which
became known at the time as “turning Turk,” was taken seriously by many men and women
who had already experienced one shift in state religion and were thus capable of imagining
another. Catholic Europe reacted with horror at the rapprochement between Queen
Elizabeth and the sultans of Ottoman Turkey and Morocco, and sought to conflate
Protestantism with Islam as two sides of the same heretical coin. In an age when the
Ottoman Empire was regarded as the world’s most powerful and successful military
machine, the possibility of an Anglo-Ottoman alliance was viewed with genuine alarm in
Spain and Italy as a direct threat to Catholic hegemony in Europe. (8-9)
Even in the Maghrib, where Muslims had been directly experiencing the rising strength of Atlantic
Europe since at least 1415, if not 1212, the sixteenth century appeared to be turning the tide in favour
of Muslims. Brotton (2016) describes what the Sa’dî capital of Marrakesh must have seemed like to
Europeans such as Henry Roberts (n.d.), who was appointed as the first English Ambassador to Morocco
in 1585, during the rule of Sultan Aḥmad al-Manṣûr (1549-1603, r. 1578-1603):
Marrakesh's mellah had been established in the late 1550s on the same principles as Fez's,
but it was very different from the Jewish ghettos created in the Christian cities of Venice
(1516) and Rome (1555). In Europe the religious persecution of Jews led to severe
restrictions on their rights of employment, property ownership and freedom of movement.
Under Muslim rule, Jews were granted the status of a protected minority (dhimmi) and
acknowledged to hold important positions in government and finance, as well as the
monopolies over trade in sugar and Christian captives. The vast majority were Sephardic
Jews, thousands of whom had started to arrive in Morocco following the expulsions in 1492
of both Muslims and Jews from the Iberian Penninsula. Their cosmopolitan experience and
ability to broker international political, cultural and commercial deals on behalf of
Morocco's new rulers ensured that al-Mansur was assiduous in building a mellah in
Marrakesh with grand mansions, its own funduq (markets)110 and synagogues, as well as
Christian chapels for other exalted foreigners, like Roberts, who found themselves lodged
there.
To a soldier like Roberts, used to the monoglot world of England and Ireland and its stark
religious divisions between Protestant and Catholic, the multiconfessional and polyglot
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This translation is unusual. Also known as a khan (Turkic etymology) or caravanserai (Persian etymology), a
funduq was in fact an inn where travelling merchants could also store their merchandise and shelter their animals.
Such institutions were vital links in the trade routes connecting Southern Europe, Northern Africa and most of Asia.
In modern standard Arabic, funduq designates any hotel or inn.
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world of Marrakesh must have come as a massive shock. Marrakesh was a multicultural
city, containing Berbers, Arabs, Sephardic Jews, Africans, Moriscos and Christians, many of
them merchants and diplomats, others slaves and captives hoping to be ransomed and
each professing one or another of a variety of religious persuasions. Walking through the
city, Roberts would have heard Arabic, Hebrew, Spanish—the lingua franca of most of the
resident Europeans—Portuguese, Italian, French, and even German. Marrakesh was also
becoming known as the home for a new community that was caught between religions: the
renegadoes. The Spanish renegado (from the Latin renegare, "to deny") was an apostate,
specifically a Christian who had converted to Islam, although the term could also refer to
Jewish and Muslim apostates. (127)
By late sixteenth century, there were English subjects traveling, trading, or living throughout
Islamdom, including many slaves. There were also some Muslims circulating in England, including
captives. It was a time in which there were many conversions—Catholicism to Protestantism, Islam to
Christianity, Judaism to Catholicism, and sometimes reconversion to one’s original faith. Brotton writes
of several English converts to Islam who lived in Islamicate lands, insisting that while some may have
converted to improve their lot as captives, many preferred their new life. Indeed, converts frequently
preferred to stay Muslim, even once given the opportunity to return to Europe. This is true not only of
those who had been emancipated from slavery after their conversion, but also of many who considered
their enslavement in administrative positions better than the conditions of free life back home.
The attraction many Europeans felt for the sophisticated and cosmopolitan Muslim societies
worried Christians enormously. Such worries were justified by the fact that so many European converts
became the most aggressive fighters in the Muslim fleets attacking Christians. In England, where
Elizabeth’s alliances were surrounded by some controversy, plays written by such figures as Wlliam
Shakespeare (1564-1616) and Christopher Marlowe (1564-1693), began to feature more and more
Muslim characters. Exotic goods imported from Islamicate lands became increasingly fashionable and
English products began to incorporate ‘Turkish’ or ‘Moorish’ motifs and techniques. Some Elizabethans
justified their fascination and rapprochement with Muslims with the hope of offering them salvation
through Christianity. But Brotton (2016) insists that “Protestants across North Africa and the
Mediterranean […] were more likely to bow down before the Qur’an and convert to Islam than Muslims
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were to embrace Christianity” and he portrays Christian delusions about converting Muslims as “a
wishful fantasy” (207-208). In a similar vein, historian Tobias P. Graf (2017) explains how European
Christians and Jews who had converted to Islam were very well represented among Ottoman elites,
including in high level administrative and military positions. Undoubtedly, these converts joined in the
fight against Christian Europe. Yet, they also often served as bridges between their native and adopted
communities in an entangled Mediterranean world where, despite their conflicts, Muslims and
Christians continued to trade, develop alliances, and frequently admire one another’s cultures.
The Ottomans and to an extent the Moroccans were confident in their dominance over Christendom
for most of the sixteenth century, but "the Muslims and the entire mare nostrum were on the verge of
becoming poorer due to gold and silver inflation resulting from the riches pouring in from peripheral
Latin America” (Dussel 1995 [1992], 32). They did not see it coming. To be fair, even the Europeans did
not know how much of an impact American riches would have. Muslim elites were aware of European
explorations and conquests starting from the Atlantic, but these exploits were happening very far away
from the central lands of Islamdom.111
It is worth noting that the Moroccan Sultan Manṣûr did propose the idea of a joint colonial venture
in America to Queen Elizabeth I. After all, Morocco was an Atlantic power like Spain and Portugal. Yet,
he made no serious attempt to pursue this dream with or without the English. This may reasonably be
interpreted as evidence that Muslims had become too comfortable in their civilization and that the bold
adventurous spirit which had once characterized them was now manifest in the expansionism of
Western European Christians. Such an interpretation would be consistent with theories of decline
popular among Western Orientalists, but also among Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Khaldûn. Indeed,
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A fascinating avenue for future research would be a decolonial world-systems analysis of Ottoman expansion
into Southeastern Europe, and European expansion into North Africa and West Asia. The Ottomans were an
empire in the early modern period and used many of the same strategies and techniques as the Western European
powers. However, the Ottomans did not participate in the genocidal conquest and colonization of the Americas,
which gave Western Europe the competitive advantage upon which the modern/colonial system was built.

203

several Qur’anic verses warn that Allah can replace any people who has gone astray with another people
(e.g. Qur’an 14:19, 41:15, 47:38). But these other people need not be better or more virtuous, as
indicated in the following verse of Qur’an:
ض ال ﱣ
َظلِمِ ۡينَ َ ۡعضا ِب َما كَانُ ۡوا َي ۡك ِسب ُۡون
َ َۡوك َٰذلِكَ نُ َولّ ِۡﻰ َبع
“So, We let some of the evildoers have power over others because of what they are wont to earn.”
(6:129)112
Various perspectives related to the theory of decline, including Traditionalist Islamic ones, are
examined in Section Three. Perhaps modern Western civilization is a punishment for all the other
peoples of the earth, and Europeans can be compared to locusts or the plague. Surely, it may have
seemed that way for many Indigenous Americans. But for now it seems wise to pursue the decolonial
world-systems analysis focusing on historical conditions rather than moral judgments. From this
perspective it is pertinent to observe that for Western Europeans to break out of their dependence on
trade routes in lands ruled by Muslims, they had little other option than to take to the sea. Morocco, like
the rest of Islamdom, was embroiled in geopolitical struggles and rivalries in the African-Eurasian zone.
America was not a major concern. Moroccans and others in the Islamicate world were arguably as bold
and adventurous as Western Europeans, but their circumstances led them to pursuing very different
policies. Besides, there seems to be an undertone of regret, resentment, and even envy in much Muslim
discourse about the rise of Europe. As both a Muslim and an ethnic European trying to make sense of
the massive extinctions spurred by modern/colonial European expansion, I must admit that the
implications of such discourse are rather unsavoury. Can a believer truly argue that Muslims missed the
boat of modern colonialism, while many Europeans, including practicing Christians, are struggling to
come to terms with the horrors committed by their societies? Knowing in hindsight that genocidal
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In his incomparably accessible manner, the late Egyptian Islamic scholar Shaykh Muḥammad Mutawallî alSha‘rawî (2014) (1911-1998) explained that Allah does not punish a tyrant with a pious person, since piety entails
compassion. Instead, God lets oppressors punish one another.
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conquest in America was the key factor which propelled the phenomenal global expansion of Western
European powers, shouldn’t any Godfearing Muslim breathe a sigh of relief that their predecessors did
not invade America?
By the end of the sixteenth century, American resources gave Western Europe an increasing
comparative advantage against neighbouring regions. At the battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Catholic
forces of the Holy League reversed the westward expansion and naval supremacy of the Ottomans in
the Mediterranean. In 1603, Elizabeth I died, as did her Muslim allies, the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed III
(1566-1603, r. 1595-1603) and the Moroccan Sultan Manṣûr. Her successor to the English throne, King
James I (1566-1625, r. 1603 to 1625) did not pursue alliances with Muslims, although trade with the
Ottoman empire was booming. Instead, he ended England's diplomatic isolation in Europe. Spain and
England signed the Treaty of London in 1604, after 19 years of war. At the same time, the Ottomans
disengaged slowly from Europe throughout the seventeenth century to focus on their conflict with
Persia. This did not alarm James, whose policy of rapprochement with the Christian kingdoms of
continental Europe was accompanied by a new project: colonial expansion into North America.

Conclusion
Between 1492 and 1650, the Mediterranean world slowly became positioned as a periphery of
the modern/colonial Atlantic world dominated by Western Europe (Thiam 2016). This peripheralization
was more acute in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, since the Northern Mediterranean was
part of the Western European core. According to the decolonial world-systems analysis examined in this
chapter, Western Europe benefited from the conquests in America which gave it a comparative
advantage against Islamdom. Muslims in the Atlantic world suffered from the rise of Western Europe,
especially Spain and Portugal, much earlier than did Muslims living further east. On both sides of the
Atlantic, many Muslims were rapidly forced into the periphery of the modern/colonial world-system.
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They were eliminated from al-Andalus, attacked in Northwest Africa, and increasingly enslaved to be
sent to America. Countless Atlantic Muslims perished in the early modern/colonial genocides
perpetuated by Europeans. These genocides also targeted Jews, Sub-Saharan Africans (including many
Muslims), Indigenous Americans, European women accused of sorcery, and European Roma.
Core-periphery power dynamics, established through genocide, conquest, colonization, and
enslavement, also transformed identity construction. In the modern/colonial world-system, race
became the organizing factor for other hierarchies such as gender, class, and religion. In other words,
various aspects of human identity were racialized, including Muslim identity. Under these intensely
harsh conditions, Muslims continued to fight ferociously to survive as their bodies and their traditional
heritage were threatened with extinction. Compared to other peoples, such as the Guanches or the
Indigenous peoples of the Americas, many of whom were exterminated by European weapons and
diseases, Muslims had many factors assisting their survival. They had been in contact with Western
Europeans since the birth of Islam, and many were in fact descendants of converted European
Christians. They had developed comparable military technologies, such as the use of iron and
gunpowder. And they had relatively the same immunity as Christians to diseases commonly found in the
African-Eurasian zone. In the end, Muslim bodies and traditions were severely embattled but not
annihilated in the Atlantic world. In fact, their resilience persisted into the second phase of
coloniality/modernity, after 1650.
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Chapter 5- Expanding Resistance: Atlantic Muslims in the Second Phase of Coloniality/Modernity
ََوقَا ِتلُ ۡوا ف ِۡﻰ َس ِب ۡي ِل ﱣ ِ الﱠذ ِۡينَ يُقَا ِتلُ ۡو َن ُكمۡ َو َﻻ تَعۡ تَد ُۡوا ۚ إِ ﱠن ﱣ َ َﻻ يُحِ بﱡ ٱ ۡل ُمعۡ تَد ِۡين
And fight in the way of God with those who fight against you, but aggress not; God loves
not the aggressors. (Qur’an 2:190)
This chapter examines the period spanning approximately from 1650 to 1865, as the second phase
of coloniality/modernity. Yet, as we have seen, such dates are largely symbolic mileposts along the long
winding roads of history. As is the case with the long gestation period which prepared the symbolic birth
of modernity in 1492, the second phase of modernity emerged slowly in the second half of the
seventeenth century. It was the culmination of processes under way for decades. Geopolitically, the
second phase arose as the powers of the Northern European Atlantic coast—namely England, France,
and the Netherlands—established themselves at the core of the modern/colonial Atlantic world-system
and displaced the Spanish and Portuguese to the semi-periphery. Accompanying this geopolitical
transformation was the rise of secular rationalism as the dominant modern/colonial ideology.
Moreover, these political and epistemic transformations were accompanied by ontological ones,
particularly in the collective ego of white Northwestern European men. Drawing on Dussel, Grosfoguel
(2013) portrays this shift as the move from the conquering ego—I conquer therefore I am— through the
exterminating ego—I exterminate therefore I am— to the Cartesian thinking ego—I think therefore I am
(77).
However, these transformations were not solely internal processes in the core of the
modern/colonial Atlantic world-system—they developed through dynamic interaction with the
periphery. While the core constructed itself in mostly oppositional relation to the periphery, the
periphery influenced the core and was affected by it. Peripheralized Muslims on both sides of the
Atlantic were utterly transformed by the radically new capitalist modes of production fuelled by the
transatlantic slave trade. For enslaved Muslims in the Americas, this was a cataclysm to be resisted and
fought at all costs. Moreover, the modern/colonial slave trade transformed the economies of Western
207

Islamdom so deeply that it provoked major political and cultural upheavals. For instance, a series of
revolutions, legitimated by innovative engagements with traditional Islam, shook West and Central
Africa. Eurocentric history has largely neglected the impact of these revolutions on Europeans from both
sides of the Atlantic, as well as their impact on slave revolts and revolutions in the Americas. To resist
annihilation, Muslims in North America, by then mostly racialized as black, drew upon the dynamic
developments within the Western Islamic tradition to which they were attached. Clinging to their
heritage, they cultivated the dream of a return to Africa, which has remained a major theme in the black
and Muslim Atlantic to this day. Moreover, they assumed leadership positions in revolutions and revolts
across the continent, and resisted assimilation as subordinates in Euro-Christian society. They were
sewing the seeds for generations of North American Muslims to engage their tradition in resisting the
genocidal processes of the modern/colonial system.

Shifts in the Modern/Colonial Core
The geopolitical shift from the first to the second phase of modernity/coloniality was marked by the
decline of Luso-Hispanic imperial power and the rise of England, France, and the Netherlands. Through
various dynastic, economic, and cultural ties, the fate of Portugal and Spain were intricately connected
in the early modern period, but Portugal was the weaker player. It was ruled by the Spanish Habsburg
dynasty from 1580 to 1640. And although the Portuguese Empire began before the Spanish one and
lasted well into the twentieth century, there is little doubt that Spain was the greatest imperial and
colonial power in Europe during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. Therefore, it is important
to have at least a general picture of how Spain lost this status (Maltby 2009, 2-4, 100-145).
In the sixteenth century, Spain built a historically unprecedented empire ruling over huge land
masses with millions of non-European subjects, as well as possessions and vassal states around Europe.
Although the borders of the empire were unstable, at different times it spanned over the entire Iberian
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Peninsula, and much of the present-day Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. In Europe
and overseas, a Castilian elite dominated a multilingual, multicultural, and religiously diverse population.
But expansion costs money. Spain turned to foreign banks to finance its multiple military campaigns and
maintain state institutions across the empire. Ironically, much of the wealth from Spanish possessions
ended up profiting Dutch, German, and Italian banks. Moreover, the enormous amounts of gold and
silver extracted from Spain’s American colonies also led to the devaluation of bullion across most of the
African-Eurasian trading zone. Broke and overstretched, Spain had to fight land wars across Europe, and
naval disputes on multiple fronts. In the Netherlands, where a strong financial and mercantile class was
emerging, in good part thanks to Spanish wealth, there was growing unrest. From 1568 to 1648, the
Netherlands Revolt exhausted the Spanish and gradually expanded into an all-out war across Europe.
William Maltby (2009) summarizes the Spanish debacle:
American wealth passed directly to foreign creditors or was paid to soldiers stationed on
foreign soil where it helped fuel the accumulation of capital that ultimately produced the
Industrial Revolution. In Spain, however, high taxes and a weakening agricultural economy
produced an economic crisis. By 1665, Spain had ceased to be Europe’s greatest military
power. Most of its economy—including the bulk of American trade—was by this time in the
hands of foreigners.” (4)
Dussel (1995 [1992]) offers a very similar analysis but adds that, by eliminating its internal diversity
during the genocide of Muslims and Jews, “Spain forfeited the future possibility of its own bourgeois
revolution” (31). The Spanish had lost a cosmopolitan population comprising experts in a wide range of
fields.
However, Spanish and Portuguese problems represented great opportunities for the French,
English, and Dutch, who turned their gazes towards America. In the early sixteenth century, these three
powers took over much of the trade in Spain’s American colonies. Previously controlled by the
Portuguese, the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans rapidly came to be mostly controlled by the
Dutch, and then the English by the mid-seventeenth century. The northern powers revolutionized the
modern/colonial world-system by introducing corporate capital as the primary engine of colonialism.
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While competing with Portuguese commercial and imperial interests in Asia and the Pacific, the
Netherlands established American colonial settlements in places like Guyana (1616) and New
Amsterdam in present-day Manhattan (1626). The English established their first permanent American
colony in Jamestown, Virginia (1607), thereby beginning their genocidal conquest of the North American
mainland. They also settled Caribbean islands such as St Kitts (1623), Barbados (1627), and Antigua
(1632). Spain lost Jamaica to England in 1655. In the meantime, the French established such permanent
settlements as Quebec (1608), Dominica (1632), Martinique and Guadeloupe (1635), and Montreal
(1642). France expelled Spain from the western section of Hispaniola, now known as Haiti, in 1664, and
began to colonize Louisiana in 1682.
As competition between European powers intensified in the colonial periphery, a new peace
was being sought in the core. In 1648, several wars between European powers ended with settlements
collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia. For a century, wars which often pitted Protestants
against Catholics had devastated Western Europe. The Westphalian arrangements laid the foundation of
the modern nation-state system, although this process had begun in Spain two centuries earlier. One
result of the new European order was the increasing dominance of the state over the church, facilitated
by a growing desire for religious toleration among Europeans exhausted by sectarian Christian wars. In
the mid-seventeenth century, internecine conflicts seemed under control as did the Ottoman threat.
Europe could focus more than ever on colonial expansion. Spain and Portugal did not lose their empires,
but Northwestern Europe replaced them at the core of the world system. Over time, this core would
come to include other Northern countries like Germany, as Southern Europe fell behind during the
Industrial Revolution.
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Secularization
While Northern Europe pushed Southern Europe to the semi-periphery of the increasingly global
modern/colonial world-system, a major epistemic shift was also taking place. Although churches
continued to play an extremely important role in Europe, society was becoming increasingly organized
around the use of secular rationality rather than faith. In other words, truth claims grounded in rational
argumentation rather than theological truths were becoming increasingly influential. Of course, this is a
massive claim which seems to neglect much nuance, such as the persistence of Judeo-Christian tropes in
allegedly secular discourse, and the frequent complementarity between secular and religious discourse,
both in the premodern and modern period. One person can very well be simultaneously motivated by
so-called secular and religious ideas without seeing this as contradictory. Even contemporary Western
political institutions which claim to be independent from religion may remain “ﬁrmly grounded in a
common set of core values with their roots in Latin Christendom” (Hurd 2008, 5).
In Western civilization, secularization has meant different things at different times. In the
medieval period, it usually referred to Catholic clergy abandoning their monastic oaths and returning to
society. Later, people used the term to describe the confiscation of Church properties by political
powers, such as during the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547) in England, or during the French Revolution
(1789-1799) and Russian Revolution (1917). Since the nineteenth century, many theorists have
predicted that in the face of modern science, religious beliefs and practices will eventually vanish or
become mostly irrelevant around the world. They have made “various attempts to explain the general
observation that modernization undermines the power, popularity, and prestige of religious beliefs,
behaviour, and institutions” (Bruce 2011, 24). From this perspective, secularization is an inevitable
consequence of the inescapable march of human progress. However, this scenario needs more nuance
since research shows that secularization occurs in very different ways, even inside Western societies,
because of the diversity of national contexts and cultural particularities (Martin 1978). The very term
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secularization has different meanings, which are frequently confused. On the individual level, it usually
refers to decline in belief or church involvement. On the institutional level, it refers to how churches
adjust to the worldly conditions of modernity, for instance through social activism. And on the societal
level it refers to the general decline of religious influence on society (Dobbelaere 1981). Furthermore,
the secular must not be confused with secularism or secularization. Something secular is simply not
religious, although the concept can have positive connotations beyond this simple binary. Secularism
can be defined as an ideology that seeks to reduce, or in extreme cases eliminate the influence of
religion on society. Secularization commonly refers to the process of religious decline (Casanova 2011).
More recently, it has been observed that religion has never really disappeared, and that the world is in
fact experiencing a religious resurgence characterized as “desecularization” (Berger 1999). Certain
scholars reject fundamental aspects of earlier theories, such as the “Golden Age of Religion” scenario
according to which premodern Europeans were much more religious than their descendants (Casanova
1994, Stark 1999). Others think secularization is a Western exception (Taylor 2007, Casanova 1994), or
even a Western European exception not applicable to the United States (Berger 1999, Stark 1999) or
Canada (Bibby 2004). It has been argued that once religious, political, economic, academic, and other
differentiated institutions accept to operate within their respective fields, religion should be free to
intervene in the public sphere within its area of expertise: ethics and spirituality. This notion of religious
“deprivatization” entails that privatization is a political choice, not an inevitable outcome of modernity
(Casanova 1994). Rather than disappearing, perhaps religion is simply changing through an observable
increase of individualized religion and spiritualties experienced outside traditional institutions (Fuller
2001, Davie 1990). In addition, the increasing depth and precision of quantitative data now imposes
itself more than ever in the conversation. For instance, there seems to be a general trend of polarization
between non-believers and believers in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. While the
undecided middle is shrinking in favour of the non-believers as time goes by, this seems to be having the
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effect of intensifying religious fervour among believers. Decline in religious belief may very well
eventually bottom out, leaving a sizeable minority of committed believers (Wilkins-Laflamme 2014).
Without a doubt, all these nuances are interesting and relevant, but they mostly reflect the internal
concerns of Western civilization.
When peripheral perspectives are considered, light is shed on different aspects of the secular,
secularism, and secularization. For instance, the secular/religious binary can appear as a formation of
Western power imposed on colonial ‘Others’ such as Muslims (Asad 2003, 1993, Mahmood 2015, 2006).
Indeed, this binary is not universal, but a construction of European modernity which serves specific
forms of history making and political projects. It underlies secularization theories which describe how
modernity transforms religion from a totalitarian and repressive ideology into a relatively harmless
privatized institution. In turn, these theories justify imposing liberal political projects in various places,
as opposed to religious ones which threaten modernity, freedom, and reason. Categories like religion
and the secular are unstable, having constantly changed meanings throughout Western history, which
makes them very difficult to apply outside the West. And they are discursively related to other binaries,
such as belief and knowledge, imagination and reason, fiction and history, the sacred and the profane,
the supernatural and the natural (Asad 2003). In the modern period, these concepts have taken on new
connotations and often serve to distinguish ‘superior’ Europeans from ‘inferior’ Others. So-called
universal reason asserts authority when it removes the sacred power from certain objects or concepts
(profanes them) and assigns them to others, such as ‘sacred human rights’, to be enforced and
protected, even by violent means. Such analyses call into question the premises of much secularization
theory by contesting the very concepts upon which it is built. While there appears to be no general
agreement about what constitutes categories like modernity, liberalism, and secularism within a clearly
definable West, there are observable political processes:
Modernity is a project—or rather a series of interlinked projects—that certain people in
power seek to achieve. The project aims at institutionalizing a number of (sometimes
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conflicting, often evolving) principles: constitutionalism, moral autonomy, democracy,
human rights, civil equality, industry, consumerism, freedom of the market—and
secularism. It employs proliferating technologies (of production, warfare, travel,
entertainment, medicine) that generate new experiences of space and time, of cruelty and
health, of consumption and knowledge. The notion that these experiences constitute
"disenchantment"—implying a direct access to reality, a stripping away of myth, magic, and
the sacred—is a salient feature of the modern epoch. It is, arguably, a product of
nineteenth-century romanticism, partly linked to the growing habit of imaginative
literature—being enclosed within and by it—so that images of a "pre-modern" past acquire
in retrospect a quality of enchantment. (Asad 2003, 13-14)
Decolonial world-systems analysis does not deny any of these nuances, but it offers a unique
perspective about the big picture. Thinkers such as Maldonado-Torres and Craun argue that there has
been a long process involving the transfer of authority from God, imagined as a big white man, to white
men idolized as gods. Secularization understood in this sense developed not simply from intra-European
events such as the Reformation and the Peace of Westphalia, but also through the constant inflation of
the male white ego, resulting in what is labelled “egolatry” (Maldonado-Torres 2008a, 114, Craun 2013).
Maldonado-Torres (2008b) further contends that secularism replaced Christianity as the hegemonic
ideology in the second phase of modernity. Significantly, he argues that through this process Christianity
did not in any way become irrelevant. It simply came to play a secondary yet powerful role, influencing
Eurocentric secularism somewhat like Judaism influences Christianity. To be clear, Christianity and
secularism cannot be reduced to ideologies, but their ideological aspect is crucial to understand how the
modern/colonial project has been legitimized. Leaving more or less the same people at the periphery of
the world-system, the secular project of replacing ignorance, superstition, and primitive religion by
science and reason, followed in the tracks of Christianizing heathens—new ideology but same colonial
project. Grosfoguel (2011) puts it bluntly:
During the last 510 years of the “Capitalist/Patriarchal Westerncentric/Christian-centric
Modern/Colonial World-System” we went from the 16th Century “christianize or I shoot
you,” to the 19th Century “civilize or I shoot you,” to 20th Century “develop or I shoot you,”
to the late 20th Century “neoliberalize or I shoot you,” and to the early 21st century
“democratize or I shoot you.” (28)
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The shift in terminology in this passage indicates a gradual secularization of the reasons given to justify
violent domination by the West of the Rest.
In the second phase of modernity, major ontological repercussions also accompanied the
epistemic shift towards secular reason. Following Dussel, decolonial analysts see the Cartesian ‘I think
therefore I am’ as a symbolic turning point in Eurocentric thought. Maldonado-Torres (2007) explains:
If the ego cogito was built upon the foundations of the ego conquiro, the ‘I think, therefore I
am’ presupposes two unacknowledged dimensions. Beneath the ‘I think’ we can read
‘others do not think’, and behind the ‘I am’ it is possible to locate the philosophical
justification for the idea that ‘others are not’ or do not have being. In this way we are led to
uncover the complexity of the Cartesian formulation. From ‘I think, therefore I am’ we are
led to the more complex and both philosophically and historically accurate expression:
‘I think (others do not think, or do not think properly), therefore I am (others are-not, lack
being, should not exist or are dispensable)’.
The Cartesian formulation privileges epistemology, which simultaneously hides both what
could be regarded as the coloniality of knowledge (others do not think) and the coloniality
of Being (others are not).” (252)
Admirers of René Descartes (1596-1650)113 may understandably be shocked by such massive claims. And
the intention here is not to enter a detailed debate about his thought. However, it should be clear that
the decolonial contention is not that Descartes ever intended to argue that subaltern others in the
modern/colonial system could not think and therefore ‘are not.’ Rather, his reflection occurred within a
broader discourse, with many underlying suppositions about who is human and who is capable of
rational thought. Descartes was necessarily influenced by this broader discourse which he in turn
influenced. In this analysis, his explicit intentions are secondary to his discursive impact. Grosfoguel
(2012) acknowledges that Descartes is not explicitly Eurocentric:
It is also important to note that Kant, also in Critique of Pure Reason, makes explicit the
Eurocentrism that remains implicit in Descartes. In Kant’s work, transcendental reason is
not a characteristic of all those beings who, from a decolonizing, anti-racist and anti-sexist
113

Descartes is one of the key figures in the development of modern philosophy, mathematics, and science. Apart
from his conception of mind-body dualism discussed here, Descartes was an early promoter of modern scientific
methods based on observation and experiment, rather than authority. In 1616, he obtained a degree in Law from
the University of Poitiers, but he never worked as a lawyer.
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perspective we would include among human beings. For Kant, transcendental reason
belongs fundamentally to those considered to be “men.” If we take up his anthropological
works, we can see that for Kant transcendental reason is predominantly male, white, and
European (see Kant, Anthropology). African, Indigenous Asian, and Southern European
(Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese) men and all women (including Europeans) do not have
the same access to “reason”. The geography of reason changes with Kant, since he writes
from 18th-century Germany at precisely the moment in which other empires in
Northwestern Europe (including France, Germany, and England) displace Holland and in
competition among themselves constitute the new core of the world-system. (90)
Cartesian philosophy paves the way for explicit expressions of Eurocentrism. By never specifying to
whom the thinking ‘I’ refers, Descartes conceals his position in the false universality of
a subject of enunciation that is detached, emptied of body and content, and of its location
within the cartography of global power from which it produces knowledge. As a result, the
split of the subject from body and space allows Descartes to produce knowledge with
claims to truth, universally valid for everyone on earth. (89-90)
Theological and philosophical discourses for centuries before Descartes presented themselves as
universal, but in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, universal Truth is the All-Powerful Absolute One God
who only reveals Himself to utterly submissive humans. The ego and its rational mind are incapable of
fathoming this Truth which is the unifying force behind all manifestation. Such monotheism produces
very different truth claims than those produced by Cartesian dualism of the mind and body, even though
Descartes argued for the existence of God. Over five centuries before Descartes, Ghazâlî went through a
similar process of epistemic doubt, but with very different results.114 Ghazâlî came to affirm the
weakness of the individual mind before the Absolute Truth of Allah, which can only be known
experientially through supra-rational spiritual experience, in the Sufi sense (Al-Ghazālī 2000 [1116]).
Certainty for the medieval Sufi was only to be found in God, not in the thinking ego (Alwahaib 2017).
Universal truth in the modern sense is radically different.
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Centuries before Ghazâlî, ascetics in India also put to the test their assumptions through a form of epistemic
doubt in the quest for certainty. They produced some of the greatest texts of the traditions we now call Hinduism
and Buddhism.
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Which kind of man could dare to attribute his existence to his own capacity to think rather than
God? A modern man. Descartes was the epitome of the white imperial man living in the core of the
modern/colonial world-system. He was a Frenchman. His affirmation of existence through thinking
appeared in his famous treatise Discours sur la méthode (Discourse on Method), published in 1636, in
the Dutch university town of Leiden. Dussel (1996) reminds us that Descartes had studied at La Flèche
College in France, run by the Jesuits, “a religious order with great roots in America, Africa, and Asia at
that moment. The ‘barbarian’ was the obligatory context of all reflection on subjectivity, reason, the
cogito’’ (133). From a decolonial perspective, the “egolatric” affirmation of this Northern European
philosopher’s thinking self could not exist without the non-thinking racialized and feminine ‘Others’
constructed during a century and a half of modern/colonial conquering and genocide. These others
came to include Southern Europeans.
Ironically, the Spanish and Portuguese founders of the early modern/colonial world-system, who
had tried so hard to rid themselves of any trace of African, Muslim, or Jewish heritage, became
racialized by Northern Europeans as semi-peripheral dark peoples whose blood is tainted with Moorish
blood. This racialization is known as the Black Legend (Maltby 2009, 117-119, 1971). According to an oftrepeated Northern European adage, ‘Africa begins at the Pyrenees.’ Begun as Protestant English
propaganda against Spain in the second half of the sixteenth century, the “Black Legend should be
understood in this scenario as the historical foundation of a mild form of racism among European
Christians and the North-South divide in Europe itself” (Mignolo 2006, 18). Northern Europeans
racialized Iberians as essentially religious, superstitious, corrupt, cruel, and somewhat black. They were
constructed as traditional—in other words not modern. In a study of how Spanish Moors are
represented in early modern English drama, Moroccan scholar Khalid Bekkaoui (1998) observes that the
historical fact of a long presence of dark-skinned Muslims in Europe unsettles the European identity:
Moorish difference irresistibly contaminates European cultural purity and alluringly draws it
into complicit sameness. On the Renaissance stage the Moors are notably black, but their
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Moorish blackness, the incarnation of monstrosity, distinctly dyes and darkens the
whiteness that the Spaniards pride themselves on […] So, Self and Other collude in a
metaphorical embrace, they ambivalently but intrinsically merge deeply in a mirror image
which indicates how profoundly European identity is fractured under the weight of its selfcontradictions. This sharply upsets the binary opposition at the heart of Europe’s
conception of Self and Difference. (184-185)
I would add that the presence of many light-skinned Muslims and dark-skinned Christians may unsettle
the racial binary underlying European identity even more. In any case, by Africanizing Southern Europe,
the British and other Northern Europeans were perhaps trying to elude this unsettling attack on their
identity, at the very moment they were developing a capitalist system which depended on the othering
of non-Europeans to succeed. Even Iberian colonialism was depicted as more vicious, and less
enlightened than that of Northern Europeans, despite the historically indisputable genocide of
Indigenous peoples in lands colonized by Northwestern Europeans. “What the Black Legend does not
mention is that the British were as brutal and greedy as the Spaniards” (Mignolo 2006, 23).
As the second phase of modernity progressed, epistemic and ontological inferiority was eventually
attributed to all Southern Europeans. Dominant ethnic groups in the South became liminal racial groups,
positioned below dominant Northern Europeans, but above Jews and Romani. In the colonial periphery
as well, Northern European settlers came to dominate the European settlers of Iberian colonies. To this
day, even the lightest skinned Latinos are racialized as inferior by English and French North Americans.
The deep historical connections between Iberia and Muslim Africa can still be observed in racist border
and immigration policies in the United States, which disproportionately target Muslims and Latinos.
Both these populations are feared by white North Americans, just as Northerners in the European
continue to fear the allegedly corrupt and backwards influence of Southerners, especially in economic
terms.
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According to my periodization, the second phase of modernity lasted until at least 1865. 115 This is
the period Eurocentric narratives of modernity focus on, with the great revolutions—French, American,
Industrial, scientific, but not so much Haitian or West African. However, the purpose here is to view the
evolution of the modern/colonial world-system from the perspective of Muslims of the Atlantic world
and more specifically North America, not to repeat the internal narrative of modern Western history.

Muslims in North America
The immense majority of Muslims in North America from the fifteenth to the mid-nineteenth
century were enslaved Africans (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 9-58). As the Mediterranean trade of Christian
Europeans enslaved by Muslims slowed down in the mid-seventeenth century, the transatlantic trade of
enslaved Africans surged. Despite the propaganda of the Black Legend, this surge was propelled by
English, Dutch, and French capitalism. Ruthless market logic drove modern/colonial slavery to become a
highly efficient system of genocide for profit, on a historically unrivaled scale.
Before examining the experiences of enslaved Muslims, the presence of free Muslims in North
America should be briefly discussed. On the boats going back and forth across the Atlantic, there were
free Muslims who came to shore in North America, some of whom even stayed. Others were enslaved
when they arrived but were later emancipated. One early figure to have experienced both servitude and
considerable freedom in North America was Musṭafá al-Azammûrî (c. 1500- c. 1539). He was also known
by many other names, such as Esteban de Dorantes, Estebanico, Estevanico de Azemor, Esteban the
Black Moor, and Estevanico the Negro. Captured by the Portuguese and sold in Spain, this native of
Azemmour (Azammûr), Morocco, was shipped to the Americas in around 1527. After arriving in presentday Florida, the entire crew of his ship died of disease, hunger, and conflicts with Indigenous
populations. Only Azammûrî and three Spanish noblemen survived. He eventually arose as the small
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The second modernity lasts until 1945 according to Grosfoguel (2003, 23).
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group’s leader as they made their way across North America’s southern lands during an eight-year
journey in which they faced numerous hardships. They ended up in Mexico City, where the Spanish
Viceroy appointed Azammûrî as commander of a military and religious expedition into present-day
Arizona and New Mexico. Although the exact circumstances of his death remain uncertain, the
Moroccan is reported to have been killed during his stay among the indigenous Zuni nation. Azammûrî
was the first major non-Indigenous explorer of the present-day United States, whose linguistic and
intercultural skills allowed him to successfully communicate with people from Portugal, Spain, and
various Native American nations. This dark-skinned Moroccan-born Muslim, who was forcibly baptized
Catholic, navigated the complex heritages which clashed in the Atlantic world and eventually produced
modern racial identities. (Simour 2013, Goodwin 2008)
While Azammûrî struggled out of servitude, some Muslims in North America were never
enslaved. This is the case of the van Salee brothers, Abraham (c. 1602-1659) and Anthony (c. 16071676), who were among the earliest colonial settlers in New Amsterdam, present-day Manhattan. Their
mother, whose first name was Margarita (n.d.), must have been of North or West African origin, since
documents from the period described the brothers as ‘mulatto.’ Their father was better known. He was
Murâd Raʾîs, born Jan Janszoon van Haarlem (c. 1570- c. 1641), a Dutch convert to Islam who became an
admiral in the Moroccan navy (Tinniswood 2010, 126-142). He was based in the Moroccan port of Salé
(Slâ), from which the name van Salee is derived.116 Anthony van Salee eventually became the first
colonial settler of Brooklyn. Moreover, the van Salee brothers were the ancestors of such prominent
U.S. American families as the Vanderbilts and the Whitneys. Their descendants even include Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis (1929-1994) and Humphrey Bogart (1899-1957). Yes, President Kennedy’s wife was the
descendant of an African woman and a Dutch convert to Islam (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 9-14, de Valdes y
Cocom n.d.).
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For a discussion of the Republic of Salé see Levant and Maziane (2017).
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However, most Muslims came forcibly to the Americas. They were more than just slaves or a
skin colour. Muslims represented a linguistically and culturally diverse minority among the immensely
diverse cultures of enslaved Africans in the Americas. Despite their internal diversity, Muslims were
generally united around the Northwest African Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî tradition. Consequently, this
became the dominant form of Islam in the Americas for nearly four centuries—approximately 80% of
post-Columbian history. Honouring and preserving this tradition helped enslaved Muslims resist the
demeaning racialization imposed upon them as generic ‘blacks.’ Moreover, it allowed them to access
unique knowledge to help them survive, resist, and rebel against their oppressors. At the same time, the
cataclysmic trauma enslaved Muslims faced in the Americas transformed their tradition on both sides of
the Atlantic. Northwest African societies were deeply impacted by the transatlantic slave trade, socially,
politically, economically, and culturally. Furthermore, on a more personal level, some Muslim sailors and
freed slaves returned to Africa, and shared their experiences in America. The horrors of slavery could
only have a deep impact on the psychology and spirituality even of those who did not experience them
firsthand.
Muslims enslaved in North America posed unique problems to white colonial society for many
reasons. They were a liminal group within the colonial social hierarchy. On the one hand, whites needed
to racially construct them as subhuman to justify their enslavement. On the other hand, it was difficult
to maintain the status of Muslims as inferior savages when their literacy rates were considerably higher
than those of white elites. Indeed, their written culture rooted in Abrahamic monotheism resembled the
high culture to which only a small minority of white Christians had access. Widespread Muslim literacy
threatened the very racial hierarchy upon which colonial society was structured. However, many white
slaveholders utilized the specialized skills of enslaved Muslims and placed them in positions of authority
or relative prestige compared to enslaved non-Muslims. In British North America, the liminal status of
Muslims compelled some whites to insert a third racial category in between white European Christians
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and pagan Africans, often based on spurious arguments about alleged physiological differences between
Muslim and non-Muslim Africans. Some whites reasoned that Muslims could be useful intermediaries
to negotiate with North African Barbary States. Others claimed they were preparing converts to return
to Africa for missionary work. Many nineteenth century U.S. American abolitionists even asserted that
slavery was preventing semi-civilized Muslim converts to Christianity from spreading the gospel and
civilization to Africa (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 9-58, Diouf 2013 [1998], 130-136, 159-209).
It was in the interest of enslaved Muslims to emphasize their liminality in the hope of bettering
their conditions or at least making their daily lives less unbearable. Moreover, some Muslims already
held negative views of other Africans. Among the non-Muslims with which they found themselves living,
there were people from enemy communities in Africa—peoples who enslaved Muslims and were
enslaved by Muslims in African wars. It is also clear that a belief in the superiority of Islam led some
Muslims to look down upon non-Muslims, black or white. Indeed, religion, not skin colour, remained the
primary category of othering among monotheists outside the modern/colonial world-system.117
Nevertheless, many Muslims in North America succumbed to the enormous pressure to convert to
Christianity, or at least pretended to do so. Yet, trying to improve their lot within the racial hierarchies
of colonial society was not the only survival strategy employed by Muslims.
One feature which distinguished Muslims from other Africans in the Americas was the general
resistance to borrowing features from a diversity of religions and cultures and synthesizing them. This
process of creolization led to the rapid development of many distinctly African American religions,
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One may reasonably ask whether Muslim othering on the base of religion is not as dehumanizing as European
othering based on race. Countless examples can surely be given of Muslims acting horrendously towards nonMuslims, and it would be distasteful to try to somehow escape this fact through any sort of comparison.
Moreover, modern/colonial racial categories have been internalized by many Muslims, and colour prejudice also
existed in premodern Muslim societies, even though it was not conceptualized the same way as modern racism.
Likewise, religion has become largely racialized in the modern/colonial world. Therefore, one should not force this
dichotomy too much. Yet, from a world-systems perspective it seems clear that the impact of genocides in the
modern/colonial period (in which race is nearly always a major factor) is unprecedented, just as is the elimination
of non-human biodiversity. In short, modern racism is more effective than any type of premodern othering in
eliminating life on a massive scale
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incorporating elements of Indigenous religions, Christianity, Islam, and eventually Hinduism. Diouf (2013
[1998]) explains:
The Muslims’ deliberate maintenance of their cultural and religious distinctiveness, as
opposed to adaptation, demonstrates that they did not stop considering themselves African
and Muslims. They chose to keep their previous frames of reference and values, and in so
doing, they made it evident that neither the white Christian world nor a creolized identity
and culture appealed to them. Clearly, they were convinced that what they had left behind
was not only superior but could be replicated, within certain limits, in the Americas. (142)
To perpetuate their Islamic traditions in the Americas, Muslims wrote Qur’ans, religious texts, and
amulets. Despite the constraints of slavery, they were also able to write letters, revolt plans, and
autobiographies, even in the United States where it was illegal for slaves to write. They wrote in Arabic,
in African languages using Arabic script, and in European languages. Underground Islamic schools were
even established. Enslaved Muslims also fought to respect Islamic dietary restrictions, modest clothing
requirements, and worship obligations such as praying and fasting. Assisting them in these efforts were
escaped and enfranchised slaves, as well as thousands of African sailors transporting goods, including
Islamic books, prayer rugs, rosaries, paper and ink. (99-158)
Despite their stubborn distinctiveness, Muslims often got along very well with non-Muslim
Africans. Although there were conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims, peaceful coexistence was
the historical norm both on both sides of the Atlantic. In Africa, Muslim kings ruled over large nonMuslim populations while Muslim merchants, clerics, and scholars often served non-Muslim kings:
Between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries, when many of the people and ruling
classes of the savanna region had a "pagan" identity, there are only fleeting and elusive
references to the invocation of jihad. In Sahara and savanna alike, Muslim communities had
become accustomed to operating under and alongside non-Muslim authority. Their
scholars made much of the corrupting effect of power, and suggested that less injustice was
probably committed in the existing order of things than in a specifically "Islamic" regime.
(Robinson 2000, 132)
In America, some non-Muslims did complain that Muslims were aloof or disdainful, but there was also
solidarity among all enslaved Africans and their descendants (Diouf 2013 [1998], 212). Enslaved nonMuslims benefited from the skills of Muslims. Particularly popular among non-Muslims was Muslim
223

ritual expertise, just as it was in Africa. This is not surprising since non-monotheistic African belief
systems are generally not exclusivist. They tend to incorporate beliefs and practices from other systems
with great ease. Non-Muslim Africans in the Americas frequently wore Muslim amulets and even
incorporated Muslim beliefs or rituals into their syncretistic religions. To this day, Islamic influences are
common in diasporic African religions in the Americas. For example, Carol Duncan (2008) describes how
the belief system and rituals of Spiritual Baptists in North America incorporate elements of many
religions, including West African Orisha religion, Christianity, Hinduism, and indeed Islam.
Among the skillsets many Muslims brought from Africa to America was military expertise. White
colonists feared the potential for Muslims to instigate rebellion. Predictably, considering their history of
conflicts with Muslims in the metropole, the Spanish were especially afraid of Muslim insubordination in
the colonies, as explained by Diouf (2013 [1998], 211-216). Within the first five decades of their arrival in
the Americas, the Spanish issued five pieces of legislation to prohibit the presence of Muslims, Moriscos,
Jews, and mulattos in the colonies. Yet, “only Muslims were targeted repeatedly and with extraordinary
vigor. The Spanish Crown was worried for two reasons: it feared the expansion of Islam in America, and
it was confronted with deadly rebellions fomented by Muslim slaves and maroons” (212). One measure
taken to prevent the expansion of Islam among other Africans and Native communities, was the early
establishment of the Inquisition in Spain’s American colonies (Silverblatt 2004). However, these
prohibitions were not respected, and enslaved Muslims continued to arrive in the colonies.
Of course, from a colonial perspective, these fears were justified. Muslims did frequently ally
themselves with non-Muslim Africans and Natives in the Caribbean and Latin America. And they did
rebel. In 1522, the first African slave revolt in the Americas was led by ethnic Wolof Muslims from
Senegal, on the island of Hispaniola. Wolofs soon led similar revolts in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Colombia,
and Panama. Colonial officials blamed Muslims for instigating several major joint Native and African
revolts throughout their American territories from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Segregation
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laws were rapidly implemented making it a crime punishable by death for Africans to frequent
Indigenous communities. For instance, a runaway Wolof known as Pedro Gilofo, was condemned to be
boiled alive in 1540 for having been found in a Native village in Costa Rica (Diouf 2013 [1998], 213).
The English and French did not prohibit Muslims from their North American colonies, and they were
not as quick to make the link between Islam and the hundreds of slave revolts they faced. Colour was
the dominating factor of racialization in their colonies. Religion was still a racial marker, but much less
than it had been in the early modern/colonial period dominated by Spanish and Portuguese crusaders.
As we have seen, secularism was the main ideology of the second modernity dominated by Northern
Europeans. Yet, there is no doubt that Muslims fought the system of modern/colonial genocide in
English, French, and Dutch North America, just as in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies:
By running away from the mines and plantations; by organizing and leading revolts; and by
insisting, once free, on going back to Africa, the Muslims firmly established their opposition
to the Christian world of their enslavement. They were indomitable opponents whose
antagonism was rooted in the normal hatred the enslaved feels for the enslaver, in the
ordinary longing for freedom, but also in religious certitude and cultural self-confidence.
(Diouf 2013 [1998], 249)
For Muslims, who considered themselves members of a broad Islamic community spread across
continents, acts of resistance in the Americas were situated in a sacred struggle to defend Islam from its
enemies. Traditional Islam offered them unique inspiration, knowledge, and a sense of purpose in their
struggle.

African Islamic Revolutions
The average North American high school graduate has heard about the French Revolution (1789–
1799) and the American Revolution (1775-1783), but much less about the other revolutions happening
in the Atlantic world during the same period (Lovejoy 2016, 9-35). How many high school or entry-level
university history textbooks situate the revolutions of white people alongside contemporaneous
revolutions by Native Americans, mixed-heritage creoles, and Africans? How many closely examine the
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Andean revolutionary movement (1780- c. 1783) led by Indigenous Peruvian leader Túpac Amaru II (c.
1740-1781), a descendant of the last Inca ruler Túpac Amaru (1545-1572)? Why do educated North
Americans generally know so little about the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) or the anti-colonial
movements from 1808 to 1826 during which all the American colonies of Spain and Portugal, except
Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, became politically independent? World-systems analysis allows us to
observe interconnections among all these revolutions. Of course, the focus here is on the role of North
American Muslims in this hemispheric revolutionary current, but since most of the Muslims enslaved in
North America came from West Africa, it is impossible to understand their experience in strictly
American terms. Events in West Africa had a direct influence in America and vice versa (Lovejoy 2016,
167-205).
By the eighteenth century, West African societies were completely destabilized by the massive
enslavement of their populations. European slavers spent enormous sums to corrupt favourable African
elites and defeat detractors. In a typical policy of dividing to conquer, foreign powers were flooding
West Africa with an estimated 350,000 to 400,000 guns per year in the late eighteenth century (Ware III
2014, 118). The influence of Atlantic slave-based capitalism became so corruptive that, in flagrant
disregard for Islamic legal consensus, many Muslim leaders enslaved and sold their own Muslim
subjects. African Muslims did not passively accept this calamity. Historian of West African Islam, Rudolph
T. Ware III (2014) explains:
Men of letters took up arms. Muslim peasants, their disciples, and even slaves joined their
rebellions. They went to war and conquered states, choosing to forgo long-established
traditions of clerical pacifism, neutrality, and pious distance from power. They chose to
incur the moral risks of exercising worldly authority rather than broker such abomination.
(112)
From 1770 to 1776, Sufi scholar and warrior Ceerno Sulaymaan Baal (n.d.-1776) led an Islamic
revolution in the Senegambian Futa Toro region. He and his successor ‘Abd al-Qâdir Kan (n.d.-1806, r.
1776 to 1806) established an Islamic state (1776-1880). They defeated the Deeñanke nobility and its
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Saltigi princes who had allowed the enslavement of masses of Muslim subjects, with the help of
nomadic Ḥassânî Arab slave traders of the southwestern Sahara. These revolutionaries were consciously
following in the footsteps of earlier revolutionary scholars and Sufis, such as the Amazigh Naṣr al-Dîn
(n.d.-1674), from present-day Southwest Mauritania. Success in the Futa Toro sparked a series of similar
revolutionary jihads in which educated Sufi Muslims seized political power across West Africa and into
Central Africa (Lovejoy 2016, Robinson 2000). At the peak of the transatlantic slave trade, West African
revolutions were also connected to an Islamic renaissance. Pedagogical systems were developed helping
to spread literacy and knowledge of Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî traditions among women and men of all
social classes. Islamic literature flourished in African languages such as Fula (also known as Pulaar or
Fulfulde) spoken by the Fulbe people (also known as Toucouleur, Peul, or Fulani).
Yet, these jihads were controversial for breaking longstanding alliances with non-Muslim rulers in
the name of a more rigid understanding of Islamic orthodoxy. More controversial still in terms of Islamic
law was the declaration of jihad against corrupt and despotic Muslim rulers. In Islamic history there have
been many wars between Muslims, but the relatively peaceful spread of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa had
made it easier for Muslims there to remain very attached to legal injunctions against fighting fellow
Muslims. In response to these controversies, revolutionary scholars embarked upon ambitious projects
of revisiting jurisprudence to justify their political actions. In the process, they also contested prevailing
views concerning issues such as women’s rights and slavery.
‘Abd al-Qâdir Kan, the scholar and leader of Senegambia, not only strictly applied the well-known
injunction against enslaving other Muslims, he and his fellow revolutionary Mâlikî legal scholars argued
for abolishing the institution of slavery altogether (Ware III 2014, 113-117). Kan’s prohibition of slavery
included refusing passage through his dominion to Europeans seeking slaves further inland. Before the
French Revolution even began, Muslim Africans had led a successful revolution against corruption,
despotism, and slavery. Yet, because of their schooling, many Pan-Africanists and revolutionaries from
227

the Global South are more familiar with the French Revolution, which was arguably less ambitious. 118
And English-speaking liberals focus on British and U.S. American abolitionism. In the words of Ware
(2014):
Rather than learning abolitionism from Christian Europeans, these African Muslims showed
them how it was done. Evidence suggests that in 1787, when the Society for the Abolition
of the Slave Trade held its first meeting in London to discuss how to gradually end the
trade, the Almaami ‘Abdul-Qâdir Kan had already abolished it in Senegambia. The British
did not abolish the slave trade for another twenty years. Moreover, the leading member
and founder of that society, the Reverend Thomas Clarkson, knew all about the African
abolitionists as early as 1789, and he wrote publicly of the Almaami ‘Abdul-Qâdir,
proclaiming him as a new role model for the Christian kings of Europe. (2014, 114) 119
In the West, perhaps the best known of the revolutionary African jihad states is the Sokoto Caliphate
(c. 1808-1903) in Hausaland, which stretched over present-day northern Nigeria and surrounding
regions (Lovejoy 2016, 68-101). Usman dan Fodio (ʿUthmân Ibn Fûdî in Arabic, 1754-1817, r. 1808-1817)
was the founder of this revolutionary state (Balogun 1975, Moumouni 2008). Springing from a
distinguished lineage of scholars from the same Fulbe ethnic group as the Senegambian revolutionaries,
he belonged to the Qâdiriyya Sufi order and was a scholar of Mâlikî jurisprudence and Ash’arî creed.
Masses of followers rallied around dan Fodio in his war against the longstanding Muslim rulers of
Hausaland, widely resented for being unjust and oppressive. Dan Fodio believed that the Islamic
traditions of justice had been corrupted over time in his lands and wanted to build an Islamic state
which was spiritually, morally, economically, and politically strong enough to protect both Muslim and
non-Muslim subjects.
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Someone like Fanon was certainly very aware of contemporary African struggles. After all, he participated in the
Algerian Revolution. The reference here is to historical precedents. Having been educated in the French system, he
would necessarily have known about the French Revolution in detail. West African jihads however were not
extensively covered in the curriculum.
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While much has been written about how colonial subjects are influenced by ideas from the metropole, and
often turn these ideas against their colonial oppressors in pursuit of freedom, the influence of ideas from the
periphery on the core is less commonly acknowledged. For a study of how anticolonial insurgents influenced and
shaped discourses of dissent inside imperial Britain, see Gopal (2019).
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One of Dan Fodio’s major concerns was to promote the well-being and education of women within
an Islamic framework. He wrote:
Muslim women, do not listen to the speeches of those who are misguided, who sow the
seeds of fallacy in the hearts of others. They deceive you when they preach obedience to
your husbands, without telling you of the obedience, that is primarily due to Allah and His
Prophet. They seek only their own satisfaction, and that is why they impose tasks upon you,
that the law of Allah and His Prophet never intended for you alone. These are the
preparation of food, the washing of clothes and other duties they impose upon you, while
at the same time they neglect to teach you what Allah and His Prophet have in truth
prescribed for you. (Azuonye 2006, 70)
These words should not be read as an innovative progress, in the modern/colonial Eurocentric
sense, but as the expression of one current within the Islamic tradition. Dan Fodio came from a
long family tradition of learned women, and he passed this tradition on to his descendants.
Dan Fodio’s daughter Nana Asma'u (1793-1864) was a major Muslim scholar, poet, Sufi,
and social reformist. She authored eight classical poems and three prose works in Arabic, fortytwo long poems in her mother tongue Fula (Fulfude), and twenty-one poems in Hausa, the
language most commonly spoken in the Sokoto caliphate. English-speaking readers have access to
these works thanks to the extensive translation and historical research of Jean Boyd and Beverley
B. Mack Boyd (Mack and Boyd 2000, Boyd 1989, Asma'u 1997). U.S. American historian David
Robinson (2000) asserts that “she probably accomplished more thoroughgoing Islamization in the
northwestern part of Hausaland than anyone else in the caliphate” (139). Nigerian born scholar
Chukwuma Azuonye (2006) contextualizes Asma’u’s significance:
[P]erhaps a better way of understanding the uniqueness of Nana Asma'u is to contrast her
undisguised performance as a poet, intellectual, and social activist to the disguises worn by
her nineteenth-century contemporaries in England—women writers who were forced by
the prevalent sexism of their society to write under masculine pseudonyms (such as George
Eliot or Currer Bell) in order to ensure that their works were not denigrated as the
fulminations of the weaker sex. The fact that Nana Asma'u needed no male disguise says a
lot about the character of the intellectual and social milieu in which she operated. (56)
Azuonye continues:
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Asma'u is deserving of recognition as a versatile and competent Arabic Islamic poet but also
(and more importantly) as the mother of the Hausa-Fulfiide ajami tradition of poetry. An
important measure of the importance and seminal value of this legacy is the fact that, even
today in the morning of the twenty-first century, her poems are still being actively
performed by oral artists who have committed them to memory as well as being circulated
by professional and nonprofessional copyists as well as conventional publishers among the
masses throughout northern Nigeria and even beyond, in southwestern Nigeria, especially
among the Muslim community of Lagos, the former capital of Nigeria. (60)
Asma'u was considered a Sufi saint. She travelled across the Sokoto Caliphate to initiate and train
groups of women disciples and students in the various Islamic sciences and disciplines including Sufism.
Her poetry praised the power, knowledge, and piety of Sufi women. Her lineages of women scholars and
initiates survive to this day. Azuonye (2006) contends that “women in non-European or Eurodiasporic
societies can learn from the example of Nana Asma'u, especially in their present-day struggle against
socially repressive forces of sexism (73). Much like Lebbady argues for Sayyida al-Ḥurrah in the Northern
Moroccan context, Azuonye portrays Asma’u as an exemplar of traditional feminism in Africa, in
contrast to colonial Eurocentric feminism. While dominant modern/colonial discourses largely equate
traditionalism with conservatism, these scholars observe revolutionary currents within traditional
Northwest African Islam.
The Sokoto Caliphate became a model for Islamic revolutionary movements led by the Fulbe
peoples of West Africa, including Seku Amadu Bari (Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abū Bakr ibn
Saʿîd, c. 1775-c. 1844, r. c. 1818-c. 1846), who founded a state in Masina, the middle delta of the Niger,
and the better known Ḥajj ‘Umar Tall (1797-1864, r. 1848-1864) who attempted to unify West Africa in
an Islamic confederation. Tall was a guide in the Tijâniyya Sufi Order which was rapidly gaining influence
in the West African region previously dominated by the Qâdiriyya Order. He traveled extensively across
West Africa, spending time in the various Islamic states which had arisen in his century. After returning
from a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, where he was authorized to spread the Tijâniyya path in West
Africa, he stayed from 1831 to 1838 in the Sokoto Caliphate, where he married Maryam Bello (n.d.), the
daughter of the Caliph Muḥammad Bello (1781-1827, r. 1817-1837). After years teaching and initiating
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members into the Tijaniyya Order across West Africa, Tall launched a jihad against non-Muslim polities
in West Africa in 1852. In contrast to other revolutionary movements who overthrew corrupt Muslim
regimes, Tall’s successes against non-Muslim regimes made him very popular among Muslims as far off
as Morocco.
However, unlike Dan Fodio, Tall was more focused on war than state or institution building, and
his war against non-Muslim regimes eventually pitted him against their Muslim allies. Many Muslim
scholars were unconvinced of the validity of his war against the Muslim Fulbe state of Masina in 1862,
which he justified by accusing its leaders of apostasy for supporting his non-Muslim enemies. Tall was
killed in 1864 during this bloody conflict which dragged on after his death and eventually came to divide
the very West African communities he had sought to unite. While fighting fellow Africans on many
fronts, he was unable to prevent increasing French expansion in the Senegal valley.120 Islamic scholars
and Sufis who advocated disengagement from politics, felt that their views on the corrupting nature of
worldly power had been vindicated by the tragic outcome of his jihad. Robinson (2000) remarks:
It is important not to forget the less spectacular contributions of Muslim teachers who
stuck to more traditional and less “jihadic” ways. In fact, the overwhelmingly Muslim
identity of the savanna region today may be more a product of their efforts and of the
desire of West Africans to affirm a recognizable identity in the face of European colonial
rule. (144)
Indeed, traditional tensions between politically engaged and disengaged currents within
Northwest African Islam seem complementary. Each tendency keeps the other in check, allowing for a
certain overall equilibrium. For instance, representatives of both these currents contributed to the
massive Islamization of West African societies, during which Islam penetrated every sector and class.
Paradoxically, this Islamization occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, precisely when
European interference was seriously destabilizing the region. Even more paradoxically, this Islamization

120

To be fair, few African polities were able to resist European colonial conquests in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. Tall was not exceptional in this regard.
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gained momentum under direct European colonial rule. For this reason, even when looking at worldsystems in the longue durée, it is wise to avoid oversimplified narratives of civilizational success, failure,
rise, or decline. Often, one level of human activity is rising whereas another is declining within the same
society.

Muslim Resistance and Revolutions in North America
Examining the experiences of African Muslims before they were enslaved, as well as the
conditions in which they were enslaved is crucial to understanding their actions, inspirations, and
motivations in the Americas (Diouf 2013 [1998], 37-64). General solidarity among African Muslims
seems to have kept their numbers low in comparison to non-Muslim victims of the transatlantic slave
trade. Muslims who were enslaved tended to be men captured while travelling outside their native
regions for purposes of trade, war, or religious instruction, as teachers or students. Moreover, many of
the warriors who fought in the African jihads were religious experts motivated by a deep sense of piety.
Their experiences and self-perception naturally followed them to America, even if white Christian
society regarded them simply as black slaves. With an expertise in fighting non-Muslims many of these
men simply continued to fight those they saw as the enemies of Islam, regardless of the continent. And
with few enslaved Muslim women to marry in the Americas, they frequently had no family attachments
to hold them back from revolting.
During the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804), Muslims played a leading role (Diouf 2013 [1998],
216-220). In the years leading up to the revolution, colonial settlers in France’s wealthiest overseas
colony of Saint Domingue faced increasing pressure from maroons and rebels. Muslims led many of the
major maroon armies, sometimes with thousands of fighters, pillaging plantations and white
settlements. Diouf (2013 [1998]) explains:
The most famous of the pre-Revolution maroon leaders was without a doubt François
Makandal, formerly employed on a sugar plantation. One day, as he was working the sugar
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mill, one of his hands got caught in the wheel and had to be severed. As he could no longer
cut the cane, he became a cattleman, later running away. For eighteen years Makandal was
at large, living in the mountains but making frequent incursions on the plantations to
deliver death. He organized a network of devoted followers and taught them how to make
poison, which they used against their owners or against other slaves in order to ruin the
slaveholders. His reputation was such that a French document of 1758 estimates—with
much exaggeration, no doubt—the number of deaths he provoked at 6,000 over three
years. (215-216)
Francois Makandal (n.d.-1758) was not just an angry young man. He was a literate West African Muslim,
probably of Mandingo ethnicity. He was learned in Arabic, and may have been considered a Sufi, since
he was reputed to have predicted the future, received divine inspirations, and provided his fighters with
powerful amulets which came to be called makandals in popular parlance. Far from a chaotic rebellion,
he shared with his followers a strategic vision for long-term organized resistance of blacks against
whites. After two decades of war, he was captured and burned at the stake in 1758. Much like Sufi
warriors in West Africa, Makandal drew upon a long tradition of religious knowledge, ritual expertise,
and martial techniques in his armed struggle.
With their reputed supernatural powers and military prowess, Muslim leaders instilled fear
in settlers and galvanized the revolutionaries. Fluency in Arabic allowed them to provide
protective amulets with Qur’anic verses to rebels and to communicate without being understood
by the enemy. It appears that even Boukman (n.d.-1791), the legendary popular leader of the
Haitian Revolution, may have been Muslim. He is credited with launching the general slave revolt
“when he galvanized a large assembly of slaves gathered on the night of August 14, 1791, in a
clearing in the forest of Bois-Caiman” (219) before being killed in battle a few months later.
Although this forest gathering is remembered as a Vodun ceremony, Diouf offers an alternative
explanation:
There are indications that Boukman was a Muslim. Coming from Jamaica, he had an English
name that was rendered phonetically in French by Boukman or Bouckmann; in English,
however, it was Bookman. Bookman was a “man of the book,” as the Muslims were
referred to even in Africa—in Sierra Leone, for example, explained an English lieutenant,
the Mandingo were “Prime Ministers” of every town, and they went “by the name
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bookman.” It is likely that Boukman was a Jamaican Muslim who had a Qur’an, and that he
got his nickname from this.121 As many Muslims had done, and would continue to do, he
had reached the top of the slave structure. He was a trusted professional. He was also at
the top in another way: he was recognized as a priest. He has passed down in history as a
Vodun priest, but this does not mean that he was such. Because the Muslim factor largely
has been ignored, any religious leader of African origin in the Caribbean has been linked to
Vodun or Obeah. (219-220)
Military successes by Muslim revolutionaries in West Africa and Haiti encouraged other rebellions
in America. They set in motion a wider Atlantic Revolution. For example, a series of slave rebellions
erupted in the northeastern Brazilian region of Bahia, and in Cuba, from 1804 to 1844 (Barcia 2013,
2014). During the Muslim revolts in Bahia, the insurgents who wore white skull caps and tunics, “could
have been mistaken for the troops of the almani of Futa Toro on their way to war a few years earlier”
(Diouf 2013 [1998]), 108). Moreover, the ongoing revolts and revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic,
in which African Muslims played no small role, were affecting white capitalists. In an age of uprisings,
slavery was increasingly costly, both financially and in terms of public opinion. Abolition was in the air.
While some enslaved Africans and their descendants hoped to put an end to the transatlantic
slave trade and work towards building a better future in North America, others wanted nothing else but
to go home to Africa. First generation Muslims generally resisted assimilating into the dominant culture
or developing a creole identity. Understandably, in such a hostile environment it was difficult for them
to transmit Islam to their descendants in North America, let alone to proselytize among non-Muslims.
Simply preserving one’s own sense of identity was hard enough, and the hope of going home must have
been a powerful survival mechanism. Yet, very few were able to fulfill this dream at first. This would
change.
Ayuba Suleyman Diallo (Ayyûb Sulaymân Diallo, c. 1701-1773), also known as Job Ben Solomon,
was the first well-known case of an African returning home from enslavement in the Americas (Austin
1984, 73-120, Diouf 2013 [1998], 233-234, Turner 1997, 25-26). Born in the Futa Toro kingdom in
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present-day Senegal, Diallo was a religiously educated merchant from the same Fulbe ethnic group as
the great West African Muslim revolutionaries of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In 1729, he
was captured by Mandinka slave traders and sold to the British slaving enterprise, the Royal African
Company. He was transported to Maryland to work in a tobacco plantation. In 1731, he escaped his
slaver but was quickly caught and imprisoned. Reverend Thomas Bluett (1690-1740), an attorney, judge,
minister, and missionary, met Diallo in prison and was astonished by his erudition and fluency in
languages such as Arabic and Wolof. Bluett helped free Diallo after returning him to his slaver.
Eventually, James Oglethorpe (1696-1785), then director of the Royal African Company, bought and
freed Diallo, who left Maryland for London. There, he frequented the social elite, was introduced to the
royal court, and worked as an Arabic translator for Hans Sloane (1660-1753) the president of the Royal
Geographical Society. In 1734, Diallo returned to Africa, ironically to work for the very company which
had sent him to Maryland and later freed him. That same year, Bluett published Diallo’s autobiography,
Some Memories of the Life of Job, which became famous as one of the earliest primary sources on the
life of enslaved Africans in America. These memoirs would provide inspiration for abolitionists in the
nineteenth century. They became a classic of an entire literary genre, the slave narrative.
Diallo was a forerunner for the increasing number of free blacks who would return to Africa from
North America, especially after U.S. American Independence. In 1817, the American Colonization Society
(ACS) was established to send free blacks, most of whom had been born in America, to Africa. This
society founded the colony of Liberia in 1821, after having sent a first group of colonists to the British
colony of Sierra Leone in 1820. The white men who founded the ACS felt that whereas free blacks
represented a danger for U.S. American society, they could become useful in Africa as proponents of
civilization and Christianity. And they could serve U.S. American political and economic interests in West
Africa.
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Among the thousands of African Americans who sailed to Africa under ASC sponsorship, was
Ibrahima Abd al-Rahman (Ibrahîm ‘Abd al-Raḥmân, 1762-1825), a Fulbe prince from the Futa Jallon, in
present-day Guinea (Austin 1984, 121-263, Turner 1997, 27-32). He had been captured while leading an
army of two thousand against the neighbouring Hebohs. In New Orleans, this enslaved son of a powerful
African king was put to work on a tobacco and cotton plantation. After numerous attempts at escaping,
Abd al-Rahman chose to improve his condition by rising though the ranks to the position of overseer,
and marrying a woman called Isabela (n.d.). They had nine children. In 1827, a letter Abd al-Rahman had
written in Arabic, containing passages of the Qur’an, was shown to the king of Morocco, ‘Abd al-Raḥmân
Ibn Hishâm (1789/90-1859, r. 1822–1859). The monarch arranged for his fellow Muslim to be liberated
in 1828, in exchange for releasing some U.S. American prisoners. Isabela was also emancipated.
However, Abd al-Rahman still needed to finance his return home, so he convinced wealthy members of
the ASC that he had converted to Christianity and would become a missionary in Africa. Immediately
upon arrival in Liberia, in 1829, he returned to practicing Islam. Tragically, he fell ill and died a few
months later without having returned to his kingdom. His story shows how an educated African Muslim
prince and warrior could utilize his skills and intellectual resources to outwit his oppressors in a hostile
land.

Conclusion
In the seventeenth century, while Northwest Europe replaced Southwest Europe as the core of
the modern/colonial world-system, Muslims in the Atlantic world experienced the very worst aspects of
European dominance. Matters only worsened during the next two centuries, when England, France, and
the Netherlands consolidated their power and expanded their influence globally. Understandably, the
Muslim Atlantic developed into one of the strongest countercurrents of coloniality/modernity.
Northwest African Muslims fought Europeans on land as well as in the waters of the Mediterranean and
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the Atlantic. In the Maghrib, they continued to take to the seas to fight Europeans, in the ongoing
defensive war Europeans called Barbary piracy, which only ended in the early nineteenth century
(Tinniswood 2010). Through a series of Islamic revolutions during this period, Muslims in West Africa
tried to reorganize their societies, which were increasingly destabilized by the transatlantic slave trade
and European encroachment. But the Americas were the bloodiest battle ground. Drawing on the
dynamic resources of Western traditional Islam, enslaved Muslims in the Americas organized revolts,
revolutions, and a variety of efforts to resist assimilation into Euro-American Christian society, including
a movement to return to Africa.
In the second phase of colonial modernity, North American Muslims had a very different
perspective on European power than did Muslims east of the Atlantic or west of the Pacific. Outside
America, many Muslims wondered whether the secret to Europe’s seemingly unstoppable expansion
was in its science, culture, secular philosophy, or rational systems of governance. It was possible for
them to be impressed by European claims of universal enlightenment, asserted in grand statements
such as ‘I think therefore I am.’ Yet, the daily experience of Muslims in North America revealed to them
that behind the white man’s thinking ego there is a darker conquering and exterminating ego. North
American Muslims knew that European power derived in good part from the labour of enslaved
Africans, and the extermination of Indigenous Americans. They did not need to wait for European
theories such as Marxism to understand that uniquely ruthless and systematic oppression and
exploitation gave Europeans the conditions in which to develop astonishing new science, technology,
arts, and socio-political systems. As Ottomans, Persians, and Egyptians began to consider policies of
defensive developmentalism (Gelvin 2008, 73-87),122 essentially imitating the West to catch up with it,
Muslims in America were fighting for their very survival against white supremacy. Although some
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These policies began to be implemented in the early nineteenth century, but they were the product of a long
reflection by Islamicate elites concerned with Western European power. That reflection can be traced back to the
fifteenth century in the Western Islamicate, but further east it began in the seventeenth century.
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American Muslims may have admired certain aspects of dominant Western civilization, their conditions
were more conducive to deep distrust. The seeds of a distinctly North American Muslim tradition of
critical suspicion towards Eurocentric modernity were sown. However, Muslims on every continent
would soon also be confronted with the dark side of modernity/coloniality.
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Section III—Traditionalism: Atlantic Muslim Approaches to Tradition in the Global Colonial Age (Since
1865)
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Chapter 6- Exhaustion: Atlantic Muslims and Global Colonialism
س َيجۡ عَ ُل ٱ ﱠ ُ َبعۡ َد
ً ِف ٱ ﱠ ُ ن َۡف
ُ ّعلَ ۡي ِه ِر ۡزقُهُ فَ ۡليُنف ِۡﻖ مِ ﱠما ٓ َءاتَىٰ هُ ٱ ﱠ ُۚ َﻻ يُكَل
َ سعَ ِته ِۖۦ َو َمن قُد َِر
َ ۚسا إِ ﱠﻻ َما ٓ َءاتَىٰ َها
َ سعَ ٍة ِ ّمن
َ ِليُنف ِۡﻖ ذُو
عسۡ ٍر ﱡيسۡ ًرا
ُ
Let the affluent man expend out of his affluence. And let he whose provision has been
straitened for him, expend of what God has given him. God does not charge any soul save
except with what He has given it. God will assuredly bring about ease after hardship.
(Qur’an 65:7)
Section Three of this dissertation discusses the rise of traditionalism in the Muslim Atlantic, as a
response to the utter disruption of tradition which occurred in the first and second phases of
coloniality/modernity, examined in Section Two. As discussed in Section One, the dominant Islamic
tradition which had developed in Northwest Africa and Southwest Europe in the premodern/precolonial
period, arose from the convergence of sharifism, Mâlikî jurisprudence (fiqh), Ash‘arî theological doctrine
(‘aqîda), and Junaydî Sufism (taṣawwuf). These four currents provided metaphysically centred meaning
to the diverse sciences, occupations, practices, and ways of being in the Western Islamicate world.
Muslims drew on this holistic tradition when responding to the genocidal expansion of Western Europe.
Those Muslims who crossed the Atlantic, often as enslaved captives, perpetuated this tradition and
dynamically adapted it to their circumstances. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, traditional Islamic resistance in the Atlantic world, especially in the Americas, became
increasingly exhausted as the modern/colonial world-system entered what I would categorize as its third
phase, which lasted from approximately the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Since the
focus here is on North American Muslims, 1865 can be given as the symbolic start of the third phase,
with the end of the U.S. American Civil War and the official abolition of slavery throughout the
country.123 1965 can represent the end of this phase, with the signing of the American Immigration and
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The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which officially abolished slavery throughout the
nation in 1865, must be understood as the continuation of centuries of efforts throughout the Atlantic World.
Rhode Island had abolished slavery as early as 1652 and, as discussed in Chapter Five, the creation of the Society
for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in London, in 1787, was inspired by Muslim abolitionists in West Africa. For a
discussion of the slave trading and slave breeding industry in the United States, see Sublette and Sublette (2016)
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Naturalization Act, which opened the way for massive immigration from non-European countries,
including Mexico and the Caribbean.124 This was a significant event in the transition of the world-system
from a regime of global colonialism to one of global coloniality (Quijano 1991, Grosfoguel 2011).
During the third phase of coloniality/modernity, every region of the globe became integrated
into the Eurocentric world-system. In most of the Americas, European settlers assumed full control of
their colonial project by seceding from Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands.
(Eurocentric history depicts this as the end of the colonial period in the New World, but for Indigenous
peoples for whom this is the Old World, such narratives are both farcical and sinister.) Muslims on both
sides of the Atlantic became increasingly disconnected, as abolitionist victories ended the steady flow of
Africans to the Americas, and African societies attempted to resist the newest wave of Western
European colonial expansion into Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. As Western Europeans and their
descendants around the world achieved unprecedented power and wealth, and the Eurocentric
narrative of modernity appeared triumphant, traditional Islam in the Atlantic world faced its worst crisis
ever. In America, where Muslims were a relatively small minority, this crisis could be described as a
religious, cultural, and epistemic holocaust.125 Yet, discontent with the modern/colonial world persisted,
even among many Europeans with a continued attachment to the notion of tradition. Whereas respect
for tradition in the first two phases of modernity had been a somewhat natural continuity of premodern
modes of being, it became explicitly conceptualized as antimodern traditionalism in the third phase. In
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Similar immigration policies were being adopted elsewhere in the core of the world-system during the same
decade. For example, Canada established the “point system” in 1967, which assessed immigrants applying as
skilled workers and professionals according to their abilities and qualifications, rather than their race. In 1965, the
Canadian flag was changed, abandoning the Red Ensign with the Union Jack, and replacing the cross with a maple
leaf, in an effort to represent Canada as ethnically and religiously inclusive. In 1967, during the Centennial
Celebrations of Canadian Confederation, and the Universal and World Exhibition in Montreal, commonly known as
Expo 67, the Canadian government made a concerted effort to present Canada as an inclusive and pluralistic,
rather than Christian and white society (Miedema 2005). And multiculturalism was a major policy priority for Pierre
Elliot Trudeau (1919-2000), who was elected Prime Minister of Canada in 1968.
125
American religious historian Jon Butler writes of a generalized “African spiritual holocaust” in the period
spanning from 1680-1760, at least in the area now called the United States (1990, 129-163). My contention is that
the end of the transatlantic slave trade in many ways worsened the effects of this holocaust.

241

other words, I am proposing that traditionalism is the conscious defense of tradition, in the face of the
celebration and promotion of modernity known as modernism. As it became identified with specific
intellectual movements or networks, this traditionalism (with a small initial t) became Traditionalism
(with a capital T). Traditionalist Islam is one of these currents.
Traditionalism is one of many reactions to triumphant modernity/coloniality. In the core of the
world-system, it is generally associated with conservative Catholicism, including Anglican trends
favourable to Catholicism. It interprets modernity as a violent disruption of European forms of art,
literature, and a hierarchical social organization centered around the Church, manual trades, rural
occupations, monarchy, and the patriarchal family (Jodock 2000). Since hostility towards the
Reformation is one of the defining characteristics of this current, similar Protestant movements are
perhaps better described as conservative rather than traditional or traditionalist. Moreover, while
vigorous movements in favour of tradition exist within Eastern churches, they are epistemically situated
in the semi-periphery and periphery of the world-system. Catholic Traditionalists, even when socially
located in peripheries such as Latin America, can be located epistemically in the core, since their
movement is broadly Eurocentric. Yet their social location in a way favours a minimal conscience of the
colonial dimension of modernity which is much rarer in the core. In fact, since Catholicism provided the
ideological justification for European conquests in the first phase of modernity, Traditionalist Catholics
tend to depict this period as traditional. Sometimes, premodern nostalgia is even associated with the
second and third phases of modernity, before the great social upheavals of the 1960s. However, such
cases are often manifestations of social conservatism rather than traditionalism. Of course, neglect of
modernity’s colonial aspect is not particular to traditionalism in the core. The same can be said of many
other currents, including anarchism, socialism, fascism, liberalism, and neo-liberalism, except when they
are appropriated by people in the peripheries. Dominant discourses on the peripheries are such that
even modernists there generally feel the need to explicitly address the issue of colonialism or
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imperialism, even if apologetically. Predictably, the negative impacts of modernity and its colonial
dimension are emphasized by proponents of tradition epistemically located in the periphery, such as
Hindus, Buddhists, Anishnawbes, and Mayans. But the focus here is on Muslims.
Before the appearance of Traditionalist Islam as an identifiable intellectual current, a more
diffuse movement to defend traditional ways of being, knowing, and behaving existed in the third phase
of modernity/coloniality, among Muslims everywhere. This is traditionalism with a small t. And it
represents the broader trend within the world-system, out of which a French metaphysician named
René Guénon emerged as the first Muslim Traditionalist—capital T—in the West. Guénon, whose life
and work are the subject of Chapter Seven, was socially constructed as a white man, born into a Catholic
family, in a country which occupied many Islamicate societies at the time, notably in Northwest Africa.
His positionality necessarily shows in his writings, primarily intended for French readers familiar with
Catholic Traditionalism, Occultism, Theosophy, academic Orientalism, and other discourses within which
the dichotomy between tradition and modernity is only marginally related to the colonial question.
While Guénon does propose a harsh critique of European colonialism, it is not central to his oeuvre.
However, I am arguing here that this theme underlies Guénon’s critique of modernity, whose genealogy
can be traced to North African Sufis engaged in anti-colonial resistance. A Sufi champion of tradition
thus emerged in the West during the very period in which Sufism and traditional Islam were most
contested in Islamicate societies. Like European renegades had done for centuries, Guénon eventually
left Europe to live among Muslims. In Egypt, he humbly blended into society, and his writings had little
immediate impact (Accart and Lançon 2001). But Guénon’s Traditionalism inspired several intellectuals
and spiritual seekers in Europe, who would eventually spread his views to Northwest Africa, parts of
Asia, and North America. The present chapter critically examines the conditions in which Guénonian
Traditionalism emerged.
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Muslims in the Age of Global Colonialism
In the nineteenth century, as European settlers were creating their own states across most of the
Americas, to pursue their colonial projects independently, European states intensified their imperial and
colonial ventures elsewhere. With their interests considerably reduced in the Americas, European
powers abolished the transatlantic slave trade and implemented strategies for the complete geopolitical
and economic domination of Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. During the first and second phases of
modernity/coloniality, Western European powers had been content to exert pressure in these regions
through a network of small colonies and trading posts supported by powerful naval forces. During the
third phase, power dynamics between Western Europe and the rest of the African-Eurasian world
became nearly as asymmetrical as previous ones in the Americas. This made possible the massive
integration of targeted societies into the modern world economy. In the process, new
economic and political structures and new forms of social organization compatible with the
modern world economy emerged in those societies […] In other words, wherever European
imperialists set foot, they left behind market economies and the framework of modern
states. (Gelvin 2008, 88)
Previously, European imperialism in most of Islamdom had been “carried out through
investments, loans, and the creation of spheres of influence; and by diplomatic coercion, through which
Europeans acquired capitulatory rights or forced treaties favorable to their interests on weaker states”
(ibid.). But in the mid-nineteenth century, these imperial pressures had become so effective that
European powers could envisage moving from indirect to direct rule over most of Africa, Asia, and the
Pacific. The relatively autonomous Ottoman territory of Algeria was conquered by France between 1830
and 1848, after which it became fully integrated into the French State until 1962. In India, the British
ousted the fatigued Muslim Mughal Dynasty in 1858. Although some regions remained nominally
independent, India was ruled by the British until 1947 (Hodgson 1974c, 333-356). Algeria and India
established a template for a century in which European colonialism would become fully globalized. Only
a few countries, such as present-day Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, successfully avoided direct rule of
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their entire territory by Europeans, but their sovereignty was seriously limited by global European
hegemony. Such countries experienced Western coloniality without colonialism. Other countries
retained a degree of autonomy as protectorates, rather than official colonies, but this was mostly a
masquerade. For instance, despite the maintenance of the monarchy in Morocco during the
protectorate period, which lasted from 1912 to 1956, everybody knew that the French and Spanish were
truly in charge, albeit in the face of continuous popular uprisings and armed resistance in various regions
(Zaki and Charqi 2008, Julien 2011 [1978]).
At this point, it is important to note that few Islamicate societies have experienced European
settler colonialism, as is the case in places such as Canada, the United States, and Australia, where
settler populations seek to eliminate and replace indigenous ones (Simpson 2014, Wolfe 2006, Veracini
2010). It is true that the elimination of Muslims and Jews in al-Andalus, by settlers from northern Iberia,
can be categorized as settler colonialism, as can the ongoing elimination of Palestinians in their
homeland. Nevertheless, most instances of European colonialism in Islamicate societies can be
categorized as exploitation or extractive colonialism, in which a minority of colonial settlers rules over
an indigenous majority with the intention of profiting from their labour and resources, rather than
eliminating them from the territory. This nuance can be illustrated by France, which practiced settler
colonialism in New France, but exploitation colonialism in Africa (Bigon and Njoh 2018). 126 In Northwest
Africa, the French ruled over huge Muslim populations, as did the British in other parts of the continent.
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Algeria represents an interesting case. Although it was annexed as an official department of France in 1848, a
discriminatory law code gave much greater rights to Europeans than to indigenous Algerians (Beggar 2007, 154155), both in Algeria and in the metropole. European settlers took over most of the arable land in Algeria, where
they generally considered themselves fully and rightfully at home (ibid., 166). Native Algerians faced extreme
economic, political, and social marginalization. However, settlers never represented more than an eighth of the
Algerian population (ibid., 155), and their colonial project did not entail eliminating the natives. Therefore, Algeria
did not fully fit the description of a settler colony although it was inhabited by significant numbers of colonial
settlers.
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Map 3—Africa Showing Extent of Conquest by 1880 (Boahen 2000 [1985], 2)
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Map 4—Africa in 1914 (Boahen 2000 [1985], 43)
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As in most of Asia, the power dynamics in Africa were not asymmetric enough for Europeans to
attempt a project of wholesale elimination of indigenous populations, but they did facilitate the
establishment of exploitation colonies. The period stretching from circa 1880 to circa 1914 is known as
the Scramble for Africa, during which Europeans went from ruling over a mere 10 percent, to about 90
percent of the continent:
By 1914, with the sole exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole of Africa had been
subjected to the rule of European powers in colonies of various sizes which were generally
much larger physically but often bore little or no relationship to the pre-existing polities.
But it was not African sovereignty and independence alone that had been lost at that time.
It represented also an assault on established cultures. (Boahen 2000 [1985], 1)
European colonialism set in place a system of domination which went beyond economic extraction and
political rule and attempted to subordinate every aspect of indigenous life to colonial power. From
fashion to faith, everything was to be supervised, rejected, authorized, or reorganized by colonial
authorities.
While Western Islamdom entered its greatest crisis ever between 1880 and 1914, Central
Islamdom, mostly ruled by the Ottoman Empire, entered its most critical stage between 1914 and 1918,
during the period known as World War I (Hodgson 1974c, 247-356), although it should be clear at this
point that Western Europe had already been waging a world war for centuries. In any case, the conflict
begun in 1914 had enormous repercussions for Muslims in European colonies dragged into the war by
their metropoles, as well as populations still directly ruled by Muslims:
It has been estimated that the per capita losses in the Ottoman Empire and Persia were
among the highest of all nations affected by the war. While Germany and France lost,
respectively, about 9 and 11 percent of their populations as a result of the war, estimates
for Ottoman losses run as high as almost 25 percent—approximately five million out of a
population of twenty-one million. These casualties occurred both on and off the battlefield.
As a matter of fact, four out of every five Ottoman citizens who died were noncombatants
[…] Although Persia was officially neutral in World War I, estimates put its per capita
wartime losses in the same range as those incurred by the Ottoman Empire. (Gelvin 2008,
172)
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A pertinent comparison can be made between the Ottomans and the Russians who entered this
war as empires on the margins of the Western core of the modern/colonial world-system (Tlostanova
and Mignolo 2012, 4). Like the Spanish and Portuguese of Southern Europe, the Eurasian Russian
Empire, which became the Soviet Empire after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, can be categorized as a
semi-peripheral power. If we consider its military might, the Ottoman Empire could be similarly
categorized, but in terms of racial configurations it is perhaps better to situate it at the margin of the
periphery which is closest to the semi-periphery of the world-system. While the Russians suffered
enormous losses, they came out of the war with enough power to pursue an imperial policy which
would set them up as a military superpower later in the twentieth century. Indeed, during the Cold War
(c. 1945-1991), the United States and its allies in the core of the world system became known as the
First World, the Soviets and their European allies as the Second World, and the colonial periphery as the
Third World. However, the latter term was initially intended to designate nations which refused to enter
into firm alliances with either the Soviet Union or the United States. Popular usage of these terms show
how Southern Europe became categorized as part of the First World, even though countries such as
Spain were quite poor, while Islamicate countries were generally lumped together as Third World,
despite the relative wealth of countries such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Racial categories, including the
racialization of Muslim identities, are crucial in the categorization of the core, the margin of the core,
the semi-periphery, the periphery, the margin of the periphery, and the extreme periphery. And these
racialized identities partly explain the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and progressive rise of the
Soviets after World War I.
It is hard to overemphasize how disastrous World War I was for central Islamicate civilization,
which Hodgson (1974a, 60-61) describes as the basin of “Irano-Semitic” culture, extending between the
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Nile and Oxus rivers, and inherited by the Arabian Muslims during their early imperial expansion. 127
Indeed, it can be argued that “World War I was the single most important political event in the history of
the modern Middle East” (Gelvin, 2008, 172). In the aftermath of the war, the Ottoman Empire was
dissolved (1922) and the Caliphate abolished (1924) as Turkey became an independent republic
governed by a Eurocentric secular elite (Hodgson 1974c, 259-271). Although the Ottoman Caliphate was
not recognized by all Muslims, for most Sunnis it represented the continuation of an institution which at
least symbolically united the pan-Islamic community (umma) under the leadership of a man said to be
the political successor of the Prophet Muḥammad. Abolishing the Caliphate after thirteen centuries had
spiritual, social, and political implications which left many Muslims disoriented and to an extent
traumatized. Under the pressure of British and French imperialism, the ethnically plural Ottoman Empire
was replaced by several nation-states in which dominant ethnic and religious groups have since tended
to erase or eliminate minorities (ibid., 272-302). Ever since, the modern/colonial logic of elimination has
increasingly manifested itself in Islamicate societies. On the level of representation, this elimination has
entailed erasing the contributions and sometimes the existence of minority groups. For instance, Arab
nationalism has tended to neglect Nubians, Copts, Amazighs, and other communities living alongside
Arabs in the same lands. But on a more concrete level, there have also been several cases of civil war,
ethnic cleansing, and genocide throughout the region, pitting Kurds, Arabs, Turks, and other ethnic
groups, as well as various religious communities, against one another.
At the end of World War I, the British occupied most of the Central Islamicate lands. For
instance, they occupied all of Persia, and the Qâjâr dynasty (1794-1925) fell apart. In its stead, a proBritish strongman by the name of Reza Khan (1878-1944) founded the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) and
proclaimed himself Shah (ibid., 330-332). He oversaw the creation of the modern state of Iran, and
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Although Hodgson excludes Western Anatolia in present-day Turkey from the “Irano-Semitic” cultural zone, it
was the metropole of the Ottoman Empire, which did extend over much of this zone.
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implemented secularist, authoritarian policies, deliberately modeled on those of Italian leader Benito
Mussolini (1883-1945, r. 1922-1943) and other fascists (Gelvin, 2008, 194). In 1920, the Charter of the
League of Nations, negotiated by the victors of World War I, established several mandates authorizing
member nations to govern previous German colonies and Ottoman territories. France was mandated to
govern present-day Syria and Lebanon, whereas Britain was mandated to govern most of present-day
Palestine/Israel, Jordan, and Iraq. Through a series of events whose detailed description would lead
away from the focus of this dissertation, the British gained increasing influence in shaping the future
states in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the controversial ethno-religious nation-state of Israel
established in 1948. Similarly, the British were instrumental in the emergence of modern nation-states
in the Arabian Peninsula, including Saudi Arabia in 1932. Like Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is
based on a modern nationalist interpretation of religion, ethnicity, and governance. In the Saudi case,
the state was named after the ruling tribe (Âl Saʿûd) and it adopted the rigid interpretations of Islam
established by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhâb (1703-1792) as its official ideology. 128
Although motivated by very different ideologies, the modern nation-states of Turkey, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia, which emerged between World War I and II, share many similarities. Their interwar
transformation did not represent a complete rupture with the past, and they all remained intellectual,
cultural, and spiritual hubs whose influence is felt throughout the Islamicate world, as they had been for
centuries.129 Neither of these lands was ever fully colonized by European powers. All three states
pursued aggressively pro-Western foreign policies and authoritarian domestic policies. Turkey and Iran
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Oil was only a minor consideration in the British policy towards the emerging Saudi state (Leatherdale 1983).
However, it became the central factor in the strong alliance, or special relationship, which developed between the
United States and Saudi Arabia from 1933 to 1950 (Anderson 2014). The phenomenal wealth generated by oil and
the geopolitical protection provided by the United States made it possible for the Wahhâbi religious mission to
shift from a marginal Islamic current to a dominant one in the second half of the twentieth century (Commins
2006).
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Concerning adaptation to historical circumstances through a dynamic process of change and continuity, in
Islamicate contexts, see Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Voll 1982).
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adopted a fiercely secular ethnic nationalism. Saudi Arabia also adopted a brutally exclusivist ideology,
which was religious rather than secular. While Turkey and Iran suppressed ethnic minorities and
attempted to eliminate expressions of overt religiosity, Saudi Arabia privileged certain tribes and
attempted to eliminate Islamic currents other than Wahhâbism. In all three countries, many traditional
Islamic arts, sciences, and institutions were suppressed, despite the preservation of certain religious and
cultural customs. One of the traditional Islamic dimensions most violently repressed by these modern
states was Sufism. Nationalist movements in the Western Islamicate, seeking independence from
European colonial rule, also became progressively anti-traditional and anti-Sufi during this period,
although less vehemently so.

Sufism and Anti-Sufism
In the third phase of the modern/colonial world-system, the role of Sufism (taṣawwuf), as the
traditional Islamic current concerned with cultivating beautiful excellence (iḥsân) among believers,
became increasingly contested, although tensions had long existed between Sufism and other fields of
Islamic expertise. Understandably, specialists in other fields have often been uncomfortable, perplexed,
and even disturbed by certain historical developments within Sufism, and even some of its basic
characteristics (Sharify-Funk, Dickson and Xavier 2018, 35-61). During the initial imperial expansion of
Islam, Sufis positioned themselves as ascetics who rejected the worldliness of their Muslim peers,
thereby ostensibly belittling the endeavours of all the other specialists trying to improve, regulate, or
govern the Muslim community. Indeed, some of the recurring themes in Sufi discourse across the
centuries have been the futility of worldly pursuits, the absurdity of superficial legalism, and the
hypocrisy of morally corrupt scholars and political leaders. It is true that many such critiques are
tempered by asserting the relative value of worldly occupations, but even socially engaged Sufis make
claims of supra-rational and experiential knowledge which are difficult to verify. While other
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specializations require long difficult periods of education or training, Sufis claim that it is possible for
someone to receive metaphysical knowledge in an instant. Divinely inspired Sufis are believed to have
deep insight into both spiritual realities and worldly affairs, and to perform miracles. Inevitably, some
Muslims have rejected these claims, but historically the more typical attitude has been to fear excesses
and abuse. How does one distinguish real and fake Sufis? Failing to make such a distinction makes one
vulnerable to charlatanism. Blind obedience to undeserving guides can also lead to excessive and
strange behaviour which contradicts social and religious norms. Sufis have themselves articulated some
of the most stringent warnings against such dangers and abuses. For instance, one prominent feature of
apologetic literature arguing for the orthodoxy of Sufism is to denounce unorthodox abuses, but also to
call for the reform of Sufi movements slipping into unorthodoxy. In short, several factors have provoked
ongoing historical debates among Sufis as well as between Sufi and non-Sufi Muslims about the role of
Sufism (Jong and Radtke 1999, Geoffroy 2004). I would argue that these debates attest to the internal
plurality of traditional Islam and its healthy capacity for self-correction and reform. However, as
Islamicate societies became progressively integrated into the periphery of the modern/colonial worldsystem, once healthy debates transformed into increasingly violent rejections of Sufism (Dickson and
Sharify-Funk 2017, 86-91).
Critiques against popular Sufi deviations sharpened considerably in the eighteenth century:
There was a widespread sense of decline and concern over the debasement of Sufism
among the masses, sunk in superstition and entranced by the extravagant claims of
wonderworking charlatans. But this apprehension led also to vigorous reform efforts, both
by individuals and mass movements, gaining momentum into the nineteenth century. Such
efforts would have far-reaching results for the revitalization of Islamic spirituality within the
central lands of Islam. They would also work for the spread of the faith into those
peripheral areas only superficially Islamized and, in some cases, not previously reached: in
Africa South of the Sahara, South East Asia and on the northern borders in the Caucasus
and the steppes of Central Asia and across into China. (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 1)
Sufi reformers were among the most active in denouncing abusive behaviours and heterodox beliefs
among people associated with Sufism, including so-called saints.
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One such reformer was the Moroccan Sufi Aḥmad ibn Idrîs (c. 1760-1837), who rejected fanatic
obedience to anything other than canonical scriptures—first the Qur’an and secondly the hadiths. (ibid.,
8-11). His staunch adherence to early articulations of Islam seems to have facilitated his acceptance in
the Arabian Peninsula, where he spent the last three decades of his life, during the very period in which
the vehemently anti-Sufi early Wahhâbî movement was spreading across the region (Commins 2006, 1050). While he found the Wahhâbîs excessive in their condemnation of other Muslims, Ibn Idrîs shared
their concern that deviant practices and beliefs had infiltrated Islam. But rather than reject traditional
currents such as Sufism, Ibn Idrîs sought to reform them. For instance, he trained a new generation of
Sufis who would found reformist orders:
Three of his closest students would go on to become the founders of such orders: the North
African Muḥammad b. ‘Alî al-Sanûsî of the Sanûsiyya in Libya, the Meccan Muḥammad
‘Uthmân al-Mîrghanî of the Khatmiyya in the Sudan, the Sudanese Ibrâhîm al-Rashîd of the
Rashîdiyya and its offshoots in the Sudan and Somalia. (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 8)
These new orders would play a pivotal role in anti-colonial resistance in Northeast Africa, just as would
the Tijâniyya Order in Northwest Africa, founded by Aḥmad al-Tijânî (1737-1815), who was born in the
southern Algerian oasis of ‘Ayn Mahdî but spent much of his life in Fez.130 Disciples of the Tijâniyya are
expected to closely follow the prescriptions of Islamic law and abandon all ties to other Sufi orders.
While the litanies and devotional practices of the order require serious commitment, disciples engage in
society and avoid asceticism (Skiredj n.d.). Tijânî himself entertained good relations with the Sultan of
Morocco and lived very comfortably in Fez (ibid., 16-20).
These eighteenth-century Sufi reformers, who insisted on strict adherence to the law, and
disciplined spiritual practice without asceticism, may seem very modern. Yet the same notions were
taught by premodern Sufis such as Shâdhilî in the thirteenth century, and his spiritual continuator
Aḥmad Zarrûq in the fifteenth century (Kugle 2006). Moreover, European powers had not yet begun the
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His mausoleum in Fez is an important pilgrimage site.
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massive colonial conquest of Islamdom in the eighteenth century. Sedgwick (2006a) argues that many of
the most famous reformers of this era, such as Tijânî and Ibn Idrîs, neither ever mentioned the West nor
“ever met a Westerner” (80). Emphasizing historical continuity, he observes that “[t]he two basic styles
of religious life in Islam, then, are consensus-based hierarchical ritualism and periodic challenges to this
that are puritan and derive their authority from scripturalism or divine inspiration, or perhaps from a
mixture of the two” (79). Once established in formal institutional settings, Sufism, theology,
jurisprudence, and other areas of specialization are vulnerable to “periodic challenges to established,
consensus-based, hierarchical ritualism” by reformers who are also responding “to contemporary
conditions” (80). Yet, these reformers may not be aware of all the conditions influencing their actions,
especially the impact of events in distant lands, such as the Americas.
A decolonial world-systems analysis contradicts the notion that the eighteenth century was
“before the impact of Europe” (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 1-26). Indeed, much of Islamdom began to
experience the effects of Eurocentric coloniality well before colonialism. Need it be reminded that
[b]y the seventeenth century, after the discovery of the Americas had shifted the center of
gravity of world trade westward and the importance of the newly emerged Atlantic
economy had surpassed the importance of the Mediterranean economy, Britain, France,
and the Netherlands eclipsed their Mediterranean rivals. (Gelvin 2008, 43)
Muslim elites were aware of the shift in power which was peripheralizing them in the global economic
system:
Imperial governments stumbled from financial crisis to financial crisis, often seeking cures
that were worse than the disease. Warlords asserted themselves against weakened central
governments, refused to send taxes or tribute to the imperial capital, and often waged war
against representatives of the imperial government and on each other […] Middle Eastern
sultans, shahs, and local dynasts […] were not blind to the fact that the balance of
international power had shifted to the West. (ibid., 73)
Religious malaise among many eighteenth-century Muslims was related to modern/colonial Western
power. Islamicate societies were in a crisis. Traditional Islamic ways of being, knowing, and behaving
seemed incapable of preventing the geopolitical and economic decline of Muslims. Many Muslims saw
255

otherworldly mysticism and superstitious practices, commonly associated with Sufism, as blameworthy
distractions preventing a return to the early days of Islamic might. Without denying that Sufism had
become associated with several questionable practices over time, there is considerable evidence that
Sufis were becoming scapegoats in an era of increasing social malaise and economic decline inexorably
connected to modern Eurocentric coloniality.
The most obvious example of virulent anti-Sufism is the religious reform instigated by
Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb (1703–1792), a legal rigorist from the historically peripheral Arabian
province of Najd. In his quest to purge Islam of all aberrant practices, he was inspired by Aḥmad ibn
Taymiyya (1263-1328), a Damascene scholar and polemicist who nearly five centuries earlier had
denounced the corruption and excesses of Sufis, theologians, jurists, and political elites he accused of
deviating from the initial teachings of Islam. But Ibn Taymiyya did not completely reject traditional
Sufism or jurisprudence (Sharify-Funk, Dickson and Xavier 2018, 40-45). ‘Abd al-Wahhâb was much
more extreme in his revivalism (ibid., 45-48). He ended up declaring most Muslims apostates, including
all Sufis. Sufism was not problematic or deviant for him; it was completely un-Islamic and needed to be
eliminated, along with Shiism, and traditional schools of jurisprudence. Veneration of sharifs or Sufi
masters was dangerous idolatry, and visiting their tombs completely forbidden.131 In 1744, ‘Abd alWahhâb’s ideas were adopted by the Âl Sa‘ûd clan, who led his followers on a military campaign against
those they saw as apostates. They conquered much of Arabia, including Mecca and Medina, terrorizing
and often slaughtering those who dissented from their radical views:
Wahhabism overturned an ancient tradition of religious learning and that was achieved, in
part, by force. Many ulama left their homes in Najd and resettled in southern Iraq, where
they incited Ottoman ulama to wage a propaganda war against the Wahhabi doctrine. In
turn, Wahhabi sheikhs discouraged travel to Ottoman lands, whose inhabitants they
deemed idolaters, and subjected visitors to close scrutiny for hints of doctrinal
contamination. The uprooting of the old scholastic tradition and the quarantine on travel
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The destruction of mausoleums and shrines, instigated by al-Wahhâb, has since become a common feature of
various Salafî movements throughout Islamicate societies, and represents an enormous loss of material culture
and heritage (Beránek and Ťupek 2018).

256

made it possible for Wahhabism to attain a monopoly on religious thought and practice in
most of Najd. Thus, by the mid 1800s, the Wahhabi mission formed a regional religious
culture with its own doctrine, canon, leadership, cadre of ulama and centre of learning. Its
dependence on dynastic power had diminished so that when Al Saud collapsed in the 1880s
and 1890s, the mission did not collapse with it. True, Najd’s new rulers did not make a show
of supporting the doctrine; but they did not try to suppress it either. Wahhabism was not
merely the dominant doctrine in Najd. It was practically the only one. (Commins 2006, 3-4)
The Ottomans and their semi-autonomous Egyptian vassals fought the Wahhâbîs for decades and
ended up defeating them militarily in the late nineteenth century. But the Âl Sa‘ûd clan and the
followers of ‘Abd al-Wahhâb regrouped and began progressively reconquering territory from 1902 until
the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. This process was facilitated by the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire. Situated in the broader world-system, the Wahhâbî movement can be
understood in part as a response to modernity/coloniality which interprets the failure of traditional
institutions as a symptom of the progressive deviation, over centuries, from the fundamentals of
religion. For this reason, it seems justifiable to borrow the term fundamentalism from American
Protestantism to describe movements which respond to modernity by rejecting centuries of tradition
and trying to revive the fundamentals of their religion.132 Wahhâbî fundamentalism emerged as a
virulently anti-traditional alternative to powers such as the Ottomans who were fighting a losing battle
against Western imperialism and colonialism.
Polities in Central Islamdom needed to respond to the challenge of European expansion without
rejecting the traditional institutions which gave them their legitimacy—for instance Sufi orders. In the
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In a similar vein, political theorist Roxanne Euben (1997) contends that “just as there are ‘modernities’ that
must be specified, the deployment of ‘fundamentalism’ cross-culturally requires explanation, particularly because
the term arose in connection with the early twentieth-century American Protestant movement that called for
religion based on a literal interpretation of the Bible. In the context of a history of Western colonialism and
imperialism, the application of a specifically Western and Christian term to the Islamic world is rightfully suspect.
Yet, the Western origins of such terms as nationalism and socialism have not limited their usefulness in other
cultural contexts. More importantly, however, the word fundamentalism is useful across cultures inasmuch as it
evokes a concern with fundamentals, origins, foundations. I employ fundamentalism, then, to refer to
contemporary religio-political movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the community,
excavating and reinterpreting these foundations for application to the contemporary social and political world.”
(432)
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nineteenth century, the Ottomans, the Persian Qâjârs, and the Egyptian Khedive governors, only
nominally ruled by the Ottomans, all faced this conundrum. And they all made attempts at defensive
developmentalism, a process involving the modernization of armies, bureaucracies, and economies, by
borrowing techniques and strategies from Western European powers (Gelvin 2008, 73-87). One
consequence of this process was the emergence of new Muslim elites whose fascination with Europe
extended well beyond science, technology, and management. All of Western culture, from philosophy to
fashion, became in vogue among these elites:
By the second half of the nineteenth century it was becoming ever more difficult for
Muslims to prevent not only the physical, but also the intellectual, invasion of the umma
from the West. It was increasingly impracticable to insulate the spiritual life of Muslim
communities from all contact with modern Western thought. In the Ottoman Empire the
ideas of the French Enlightenment had been seeping into the circle of Westernizing
bureaucrats and technocrats from soon after their inception and had become common
currency, despite a spirited religious opposition that included many Sufis. In India, while
both Sufi and anti-Sufi reformers endeavoured steadfastly to reject the language and
culture of the British rulers, it became harder for many educated Muslims to avoid all
influence, when they received more secular education and worked in the imperial
administration. Elsewhere different levels of exposure produced varying degrees of concern
to contain the dangers to Islam seen to be presented by the penetration of European ideas.
(Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 54)
States needed to balance the conflicting needs of these new elites and the traditional ones who were
deeply suspicious of Westernization, as was much of the population. Of course, since modernization was
equated with Westernization it could only increase dependence on the West.
By adopting a strategy of catching up and trying to select which aspects of Western culture they
would adopt or reject, defensive developmentalists eventually facilitated Western colonial
encroachment. Hallaq (2018, 114-118) describes the Ottoman case in the nineteenth century as a
“structural genocide” caused by European hegemony. This type of genocide is well adapted to states
which remain nominally independent but “deeply affected by the global colonial system—therefore by
coloniality” (Sparkes 2015, 390). The Ottoman case exemplifies coloniality without colonialism. Internal
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reforms conducted in the Ottoman Empire, under the pressure of European coloniality, aimed at
creating a modern state and turning Muslims into citizens:
The Muslim subject was being steadily transplanted out of a technology of care of the self
and its inner psychological operations into an internally disciplined but externally formed
citizen. The new state technologies of training, discipline, and control came to seize the
body and create for it a new identity, a new human, and a new way of being in the world.
This was the colonized subject […] (Hallaq 2018, 118)
Although it remained an officially independent political entity until after World War I, the Ottoman
Empire underwent a structural genocide
that was as aggressive and expedited as that which India underwent under the British rule.
The Ottoman structural genocide was no less successful than any other. By the time Europe
was finished with the Ottoman Empire, and after several decades of relentless domination
and manipulation, there was virtually nothing left of it except a distant and distorted
memory. Not only was it demolished institutionally, socially, economically, culturally,
intellectually, and concomitantly, politically, but even its memory was tarnished to the core.
(ibid., 216)133
However, Muslim rulers were neither slow nor dimwitted as the stereotypes associated with the theory
of decline would suggest. Often, they showed enormous creativity, dynamism, and adaptability in an
extremely difficult global context (Quataert 2003).
In any case, as modern/colonial thought penetrated Islamicate cultures, it amplified the
apprehensions many Muslims were developing about traditional Islam, particularly its Sufi aspect. Under
the increasing influence of European notions of rationalism, science, and progress, many Muslim
intellectuals found it difficult to accept the supra-rational truth claims of Sufis. Many who felt
sentimentally attached to the cultural manifestations of Sufism, including music and poetry,
nevertheless rejected popular devotional practices, as well as the belief in miracles and the direct
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This model of structural genocide, without direct colonial administration, has become the dominant one across
the Global South since the mid-twentieth century. While I agree that structural genocide can be devastating, I
think that here and in The Impossible State (2013), Hallaq overstates the degree of destruction in the Islamic world.
While Hallaq writes of “the totalistic erasure of a mode of existence out of the world” (2018, 217), this dissertation
argues that Islam’s traditional institutions and central paradigm have survived the formidable and ongoing attack
but are severely fragilized and often left in a state of confusion. However, despite diverging on the extent of
destruction, Hallaq and I agree on the existence of this structural genocide.
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experience of metaphysical truths, as superstition (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 54-111). This left them with the
choice of either distancing themselves from religion altogether, and adopting a secular outlook, or
reinterpreting their religion as fundamentally rational and progressive. In the latter case, beliefs and
practices which were irreconcilable with this rationalist interpretation became framed as deviations
from the early message.
Modernist Islam thus emerged as another type of fundamentalism. It became designated as
Salafism, as it proposed a return to the teachings and practices of the pious salaf (ancestors or
predecessors) of the early Islamic era (Sharify-Funk, Dickson and Xavier 2018, 50-52). Two influential
figures in the development of Salafism are the Persian Pan-Islamist activist Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî
(1838-1897) (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 65-74), and his Egyptian student Muḥammad ʿAbduh (c. 1835-1905)
(ibid., 86-98). In 1899, ʿAbduh became Grand Mu i of Egypt (the highest Islamic legal authority in the
land) with the support of the colonial British authorities who appreciated his modernism and his
willingness to cooperate with them. ʿAbduh mentored Rashîd Riḍâ (1865-1935), an Islamic scholar born
in present-day Lebanon (ibid. 98-102). In 1897, Riḍâ founded Al-Manâr (The Lighthouse), a newspaper
based in Cairo, through which he and like-minded thinkers could disseminate their ideas. Although
Afghânî took a reformist position towards Sufism, ‘Abduh134 and especially Riḍâ became progressively
hostile to Sufism as a whole. This can be seen in their reading of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), which in
many ways resembles that of ‘Abd al-Wahhâb. In fact, Riḍâ was an apologist and supporter of the
Wahhâbî movement in the 1920s, despite certain ideological differences. His ideas were highly
influential in the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, in 1928. Over time, the connections
between modernist Salafism, Wahhâbism, and the Muslim Brotherhood have become so great that they
are currently understood to be rival currents within the broader Salafist movement (Dickson and SharifyFunk 2017, 88-91).
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‘Abduh’s ambivalent position on Sufism actually fluctuated rather than going in a unilaterally hostile direction.
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In Islamicate societies, the convergence of Wahhâbî type fundamentalism, modernist
fundamentalism, and outright secularism presented an enormous challenge to Sufism. If such extremely
different intellectual currents agree that Sufism is deviant and superstitious, at least in its contemporary
forms, could they all be wrong? Such a convergence was so intellectually potent that
[it] has only recently become possible to begin to locate this conceit [of the golden age and
decline theory] in the historical conditions of modernity, in which academic discourse on
Sufism and Islam forms part of a process involving European colonialism, the rise of Salafi
reformism and fundamentalism, and secular modernism. (Ernst 2006)
As the third phase of modernity/coloniality progressed, the anti-Sufi and anti-traditional
convergence progressed, especially among urban elites. In the debris of World War I, and under the
close watch of Britain and France, the nation-states which succeeded these traditional polities tried to
push modernization even further. In Turkey, this meant throwing away the constraints of tradition by
forbidding such practices as women covering their heads with a veil or men wearing a Fez (a conic red
hat). It also meant abolishing traditional institutions such as the Sufi orders, associated with the failed
ancient regime. Many of the anti-colonial movements in Islamicate societies still under European rule
between the two World Wars became increasingly dominated by Westernized elites who wished to fight
Europe on its own terms and achieve liberation by catching up with Western “progress.” Secular and
Salafist modernism, often influenced by Egyptian thinkers, spread to the Maghrib in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century. Anti-Sufi sentiment was part of this trend (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 105-108).
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa Sufism did not suffer from as much criticism, as it remained historically
associated with reforms and even revolutions against internal and external oppressors.

Anti-Colonial African Sufis
During the colonial Scramble for Africa, Europeans faced fierce resistance from Sufis. In the
Maghrib and West Africa, where Sufis had been involved in resisting Western European conquerors,
slavers, and imperialists for centuries, France became the main colonial power. Napoleon led French
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troops into a military campaign in Egypt, in 1798 and 1799. Although short-lived, this occupation
increased awareness of European power in the Islamicate heartlands. French culture has ever since
inspired a certain degree of awe among elites in Egypt and other territories once ruled by the Ottomans.
However, the French did not become a major colonial power in Africa until 1830 with the invasion of
Algeria.
Despite their overwhelming military advantage, the French were prevented from occupying all
of Algeria for seventeen years because of the staunch resistance led by ʿAbd al-Qâdir, whose role as a
traditional Islamic scholar and Sufi is discussed in Chapter Two (Bouyerdene, Geoffroy and Simon-Khedis
2012). After having been an autonomous Ottoman province for three centuries, Algeria crumbled before
the invading army. By 1832, the French were firmly established in eastern Algeria and the western
region was in a state of chaos, without any effective governance. Following some deliberation, the tribal
chiefs of Western Algeria selected a sultan only 24 years of age to lead the fight against the French. This
sharifian noble was known as Amîr (Prince) ʿAbd al-Qâdir, son of Muḥyî al-Dîn and Zahrâʾ. His father was
a Sufi shaykh from the Qâdirî Order, and his mother a pious, literate woman who actively participated in
ʿAbd al-Qâdir’s education and stayed close to him as a mentor and advisor when he became a man. The
Amîr organized a state whose legitimacy rested upon a network of tribes, Sufi Orders, and sharifian
nobles. Under his rule, Islamic prohibitions against such activities as gambling and drinking were strictly
enforced. ʿAbd al-Qâdir led the Algerian anti-colonial resistance for fifteen years (Dickson and SharifyFunk 2017, 55-59).
While the French pursued a merciless scorched earth policy, slaughtering populations
favourable to the Amîr and destroying their land and belongings, ʿAbd al-Qâdir became internationally
renowned for both his military prowess and his chivalry. Even in Britain and France, he gained a
legendary stature for his unflinching justice, kindness towards prisoners, compassion, courage, and
diplomatic skills. In both the West and the Islamicate world, the only other figure to have ever gained
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such a reputation for chivalry is Saladin (Ṣalâḥ al-Dîn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb, c. 1137-1193), who fought the
Christian Crusaders and recaptured Jerusalem from the Franks in 1187. However, ʿAbd al-Qâdir did not
only have admirers. Even some of his fellow Muslims in Algeria and Morocco thought he was reckless in
provoking the mighty French, while others thought he was too prone to diplomatic compromise. It
seems the former critics were closer to the Amîr’s position, since he surrendered to the French in 1847,
considering it impossible to defeat them and hoping to negotiate an end to the suffering of his people
devastated by the war. But even as he accepted defeat, French authorities allowed him a moral victory
by betraying their promise to resettle him in Egypt. Sympathy for ʿAbd al-Qâdir only increased, even in
France:
During his exile in France, between 1847 and 1852, a time when many members of his
family and followers died of ill-health due to the limited resources they were given, ʿAbd alQadir’s celebrity only grew. From French generals and bishops, to those who guarded, met
or corresponded with him, all were impressed by his stoic serenity, impeccable manners
and graciousness, and dignity in a time of hardship. When his most implacable and brutal
foe, General Bugeaud died, ʿAbd al-Qadir wrote a letter of condolence to the General’s
family, sharing the many ways in which he respected the old French warrior. (Dickson and
Sharify-Funk 2017, 59)
In January 1853, with enormous public sympathy in France and an increasing number of
powerful allies, including Napoleon III (1808-1873, r. 1850-1870), ʿAbd al-Qâdir and his entourage were
permitted to leave France for Bursa, in Turkey. Two years later, in 1855, ʿAbd al-Qâdir attended the
Exposition Universelle in Paris, an international exhibition showcasing modern science, technology, and
culture. ʿAbd al-Qâdir was impressed by much of these achievements but not uncritically. In fact, he
chose this occasion to give the President of the Société Asiatique the manuscript of his Letter to the
French (Abd el-Kader 2007 [original Arabic 1855]), a scholarly treaty in which he reflects on science,
technology, tradition, and modernity. He also proposes a new form of relations between the French and
the Arabs, in which both sides benefit from the expertise of the other. While he recognizes that French
and more broadly Western people have developed impressive technical expertise which produces
considerable material benefits, the Algerian thinker warns that true science must be metaphysically
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rooted to meet the multidimensional needs of human beings. His letter does not address political
leaders. It is intended as a scholarly treaty for scholars; an appeal to intelligent minds capable of
appreciating a magisterial exposition of Islamic epistemology and science. The author does not position
himself as a subaltern thinker, and his critique of Western thought is produced without recourse to
Western anti-systemic or revolutionary ideologies. Islam is the tradition from which he comfortably
proposes an inter-epistemic dialogue to the West. Unfortunately, the triumphantly racist arrogance of
most Western scholars in the nineteenth century prevented this dialogue from occurring on any
significant scale.
ʿAbd al-Qâdir’s position within the classical Islamic debates about rationalism seems to
prophetically announce the eventual transition in the West from the certitudes of modern rationalism to
the confusion and doubt of postmodern thought. He writes about
those who are astray and perplexed because they try to grasp the essence of Allah with
their mind: amongst them are the philosophers and the rationalist theologians. And they
are truly astray and perplexed at each hour and moment. They draw conclusions and then
undo them. They build and then destroy what they built. They make grave statements after
long search and great efforts. Then they put these statements into doubt. Then they
convert their doubts into new statements, and, finally, they doubt their doubts… Such is
their condition: always running back and forth between affirmation and negation… And this
is the state of the perplexed who are astray. As for the perplexity of the people of
knowledge (‘ârifûn), it is not the same as the perplexity of the rationalists. For it results
from the differentiation of the Divine Self-Disclosures (tajalliyât) which are always
changing, following each other with great speed, contrasting, varying. The ‘ârifûn do not
arrest them, their knowledge is not the result of imposing judgement on them, and, thus,
their perplexity is the perplexity of knowledge, not of ignorance. (Makhlouf 2012)
Despite the similarities with the postmodern critique of rationality and the instrumental view of reason,
which arises from a state of rootless confusion and doubt, ʿAbd al-Qâdir’s critique is grounded in
traditional Islamic thought. His epistemic position is not anti-rational; it is supra-rational. Living in exile,
far away from the battlefield, allowed the prince to develop as a metaphysician critically engaged with
the debates of his age.
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Once established in Syria, ʿAbd al-Qâdir devoted himself to worshipping, writing, and pursuing a
critical but sincere inter-civilizational and interfaith dialogue with Jews, Christians, Freemasons and
scholars from a variety of intellectual schools. Through his actions and words, ʿAbd al-Qâdir was
demonstrating his belief in the mercy and justice contained in the prophetic model he aspired to as a
Muslim and Sufi. In 1860, when deadly anti-Christian riots broke out in Damascus, he and his entourage
of Algerian exiles offered refuge to thousands of local Christians. In response, ʿAbd al-Qâdir received
praise and honours from around the world, including from Napoleon III, who bestowed upon him the
French Legion of Honour. One of the many letters ʿAbd al-Qâdir received lauding his courageous act was
written by Imam Shâmil (c. 1797-1871), a Sufi from the Naqshabandî Order, who led the Caucasian anticolonial resistance to Russia from 1834 to 1859. Shâmil and ʿAbd al-Qâdir later met when they attended
the official inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869. ʿAbd al-Qâdir was an enthusiastic promoter of the
canal’s construction, a fact which demonstrates once again that his commitment to the Islamic tradition
did not contradict the benefits of technical progress and critical engagement with modernity.
It could be argued that ʿAbd al-Qâdir’s anti-colonial struggle ended when he surrendered to the
French in 1848. Despite French betrayal of the rendition agreement, the Algerian prince kept his word
and deferred to their authority. He even became friends with Napoleon III and accepted lifelong
financial assistance from France during his exile. Perhaps he went from being a resister to a collaborator.
Yet, I would argue that he was following the prophetic example by negotiating peace agreements when
fighting is no longer advisable. Sometimes, it is wise to retreat and prepare the ground for better
conditions in the future. Moreover, ʿAbd al-Qâdir did not cease to resist Western dominance. He simply
accepted his fate and adapted to his circumstances by shifting from political and military resistance to
defending his tradition on a spiritual, intellectual, and cultural level. By critically engaging Eurocentric
modernity, he refused to be a subaltern colonial subject and to surrender to the intellectual or epistemic
colonialism which tends to invade the minds, hearts, and souls of the defeated. This is a very different
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attitude than that of the many modernist Muslims who would lead the struggles for political
decolonization in the twentieth century.
ʿAbd al-Qâdir’s shift from armed resistance to cautious cooperation with colonial rulers
represents a pattern followed by many Sufis in the third phase of modernity. In Sudan, a Sufi shaykh of
the Sammâniyya Order began an anti-colonial military campaign against the British and their Egyptian
vassals in 1881 (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 35-38). His name was Muḥammad Aḥmad (1844-1885), but he
became known as al-Mahdî (the Guided One). At the start of his anti-colonial campaign, he declared that
he had divine a mandate to renew and purify Islam. This mission entailed abolishing corrupted
institutions, including the traditional schools of jurisprudence as well as the Sufi Orders, which he
banned in 1884. Sufism was to be revived and unified under his sole leadership. He defeated the British
in 1885, and before dying that same year established an Islamic state over a vast territory which
stretched into Central Africa. The state survived until 1898, when the British reoccupied Sudan. At that
time, the Sufi Orders publicly re-emerged and responded to colonial occupation in various ways,
including resistance, cautious isolation, and cooperation.
In the borderlands of present-day Mauritania and Mali, a Tijânî shaykh and sharif called
Ahmedou Hamahoullah (1882-1943) resisted French colonialism without engaging in armed conflict
(Traoré 1983). He was born less than two decades after the death of ‘Umar Tall, the Tijânî leader
discussed in Chapter Five who led a jihad against non-Muslim polities in West Africa and their Muslim
allies. Tall’s followers represented a rival Tijânî faction who disagreed with Hamahoullah about the
correct recitation of certain spiritual litanies. But this conflict over ritual technicalities was part of a more
complex disagreement about spiritual succession and authority, which also had serious sociopolitical
repercussions due to the widespread adherence of West Africans to the Tijânî Sufi Order. These conflicts
split tribes and families apart and eventually led to deadly clashes and riots. Hamahoullah’s popularity
and saintly reputation seem to have disturbed some Sufi leaders within and outside the Tijânî Order.
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Unfortunately for Hamahoullah, many of his rivals were known for cooperating with the colonial regime.
The French intervened in this religious dispute by siding with the followers of ‘Umar Tall, who became
known as Omarists, against the followers of Hamahoullah, known as Hamallists. Indeed, French
authorities in West Africa were actively involved in Islamic religious affairs and attempted to present
themselves as defenders of Islam and religious arbitrators. Indigenous religious leaders, including
teachers, jurists, and Sufis responded to the French in three ways: (1) close cooperation; (2) neutrality
(the majority position); and (3) resistance, usually through non-violent means (ibid., 108-113).
Hamahoullah was a non-violent anti-colonial resister. His disdain for French authority followed
the historical model of Sufis across Islamdom who opt for isolation from corrupt worldly affairs rather
than political confrontation (Heck 2009). Although he paid his taxes, the shaykh lived as a recluse and
avoided all contact with dignitaries and elites, be they indigenous or colonial, unless his presence was
officially demanded (Traoré 1983, 118). While he could have used his considerable influence to lead an
insurrection, Hamahoullah was conscious of France’s enormous military superiority. Consequently, he
adopted a subtler strategy of resistance. The shaykh resisted morally by refusing to accept any gifts or
privileges from political authorities, culturally by refusing to admit his children to a French school, and
politically by speaking out against the legitimacy of colonial rule by non-Muslims over Muslims.
Moreover, he expressed spiritual resistance by shortening his ritual prayers, as Islamic law allows for
those threatened by severe danger (ibid., 20). Indeed, the French persecuted Hamahoullah in many
ways, by exiling him on more than one occasion, imprisoning him, and harassing his followers. One of
these followers was Tierno Bokar Tall (1875-1940), a Tijânî shaykh and descendant of ‘Umar Tall, who
was isolated from his family and tribe, and persecuted in various ways by colonial authorities for
accepting Hamahoullah’s spiritual guidance (Bâ 1980). Clearly, the colonial regime represented a mortal
threat to Hamahoullah, but his public recognition of this fact, expressed through shortened prayer
cycles, only further infuriated the French. In 1941, the French captured Hamahoullah, exiled him to
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France, and imprisoned hundreds of his followers in detention camps. Dozens of his disciples, including
his two sons, were executed by firing squad. Two years later, Hamahoullah died in France (Traoré 1983,
187). Although Hamahoullah did not take arms against the French, his non-violent resistance inspired
decolonial struggles in West Africa. For his biographer, Traoré (1983), Hamahoullah’s very existence was
an affront to colonial rule, and his refusal to assimilate to the dominant colonial culture revealed the
potential for Sufism to act as a vector for cultural, spiritual, and even political liberation (221).
There are significant similarities between the situation of Hamahoullah and Amadu Bamba
(1853-1927), who founded the Muridiyya Order in present-day Senegal:
From the beginning of his calling, Amadu Bamba had reiterated to colonial authorities his
lack of interest in ruling people, his willingness to submit to whatever rulers God chose for
him so long as he was guaranteed freedom of worship, and his commitment to limit his
actions to guiding his disciples in the right path. He did not see himself as a competitor with
the colonial administration for the control of bodies; he was interested in educating the
soul and spirit of people. As he wrote in 1910, he was neither a friend nor an enemy of the
French. However, though he remained loyal to the colonial administration, Bamba also
wanted to limit his contacts with them, just as he had done with Wolof chiefs and other
precolonial rulers. In conformity with Suﬁ tradition, he was willing to act when ordered to
do so in domains that did not infringe on Islamic teachings or when he felt that neutrality
could be interpreted as a gesture of hostility or rebellion. (Babou 2007, 181)
Decisions by French authorities made a crucial difference in determining the different fates of
Hamahoullah and Bamba. Whereas the French violently suppressed Hamahoullah’s order, they
eventually adopted a more balanced in response to the enormously popular Bamba. After years of
persecuting Bamba and his followers, colonial authorities realized their policy was backfiring. They
opted to pursue a policy of accommodation and rapprochement with the Muridiyya:
French administrators’ accommodation to the Muridiyya was their realization that coercion
was futile. The conﬁnement of Amadu Bamba to eleven years of exile in Gabon and
Mauritania and ﬁve years of house arrest in Senegal, along with the continuing pressure on
Murid sheikhs, achieved the opposite of the intended outcomes. The Muridiyya became
more and more powerful in spite of, and perhaps because of, colonial repression. To the
founder’s image as a sage and saint was now added that of a martyr and resister who
confronted and foiled sinister French plans. Amadu Bamba’s ability to survive the ordeal of
exile and colonial adversity further convinced people that he had been elected as a wali
Allah who beneﬁted from divine protection. Similarly, his disciples’ faith in his baraka and
spiritual power was reinforced. (ibid., 181)
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Bamba and his followers responded positively to the shift in policy which allowed them to continue
cultivating spiritual, intellectual, and cultural autonomy, despite the vicissitudes of colonial rule. Bamba
did not like being ruled by non-Muslim foreigners, but he adapted to his circumstances, which evolved
differently than those of other shaykhs such as Hamahoullah. Today, the Muridiyya Sufi Order boasts an
estimated 4 million disciples (ibid., 1).
Several other examples of Sufi resistance and adaptation to colonial rule in West Africa could be
given, but the case studies presented here suffice to assess the success of these responses. Through
their creative adaptation to changing circumstances, West African Sufis played a pivotal role in the most
important spread of Islam in the region’s history. They achieved this under enormously difficult
conditions. Generally, Sufis focused on their core mission to preserve the metaphysical tradition of Islam
and to both guide and admonish the rulers and the ruled. By prioritizing the spiritual needs of their
communities over worldly pursuits, they were able to assess when and how it was possible to engage in
overtly political resistance. Like ʿAbd al-Qâdir, they responded dynamically to circumstances and
engaged in politics only when they considered it the wisest course of action. Naturally, Sufis had diverse
opinions as to the advisability of direct political activism, neutrality, or cooperation with colonial
authorities, just as they had when Portuguese and Spanish armies conquered Northwest African coastal
towns in the first phase of coloniality/modernity. In analysing these diverse positions, one should be
careful not to apply reductive binaries contrasting heroic armed resisters with opportunistic
collaborators, or even power-seeking revolutionaries versus independent Sufis. People with good, bad,
or mixed intentions can be situated along the whole range of Sufi responses to colonial rule. Indeed, it is
possible to seek worldly power and success through revolution, reform, avoiding confrontation, and
cooperating with authorities, just as all these strategies can be adopted by people selflessly committed
to the greater good. If Sufism is very widespread and generally viewed positively in West Africa to this
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day, it is surely thanks to the dynamic adaptability of traditional Sufis in the third phase of
coloniality/modernity.

The Decline of Anti-Colonial Sufism in Morocco
Despite their central role in the development of traditional Islam throughout Northwest Africa,
Moroccan Sufis emerged from the colonial period with much less popular support than their West
African peers. Morocco holds a peculiar position within the modern/colonial world-system. It was both
the site of the first protomodern colonies in Africa, starting in 1415, and one of the last African
territories to be colonized in the Scramble for Africa, after five hundred years of anti-colonial resistance
in which Sufis played a major part (Julien 2011 [1978]). Unable to control popular unrest throughout
Morocco, Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥafîẓ (c. 1875-1937, r. 1908-1912) signed the Treaty of Fez in 1912, requesting
protection from France. During the two and a half centuries leading up to the protectorate, colonial and
imperial powers vied for influence in Morocco. These included Atlantic powers such as France, Spain,
Britain, Portugal, and the United States, but also continental ones such as Italy, Russia, and Germany
(Zaki and Charqi 2008, 8). Moroccan authorities attempted various strategies to resist foreign
domination, such as exacerbating rivalries between foreign powers, and a mix of resistance and
cooperation according to circumstances. However, the state was not the only political player in
Morocco. Tribal chiefs, jurists, and Sufis also exerted power and influence. Many Sufi orders led armies
in battle against foreign powers, sometimes against the will of the monarchy. At times, the state
supported interventions by these orders, but at others it tried to clamp down on them and re-establish
its authority. Some Sufi orders did not recognize the authority of the state, while others avoided politics
and accepted state authority. Other orders were especially concerned with fighting foreigners and allied
themselves with the state only when it pursued a hawkish foreign policy (Ḥarakât 2017). At the dawn of

270

the protectorate period, Sufis remained at the forefront of anti-colonial resistance in Morocco, but their
political influence would wane considerably thereafter (Julien 2011 [1978], 151-152).
During the protectorate, the French ruled over most of Morocco, but they recognized Spanish
authority over much of the North as well as the southern Sahara region. Tangier was governed as an
international zone by Britain, France, Spain, and sometimes other Western European powers. The
protectorate was a de facto colonization (Laroui 1970, 269-346), but authorities were perpetually faced
with revolts and insurrections in various parts of Morocco. Since Morocco has always been notoriously
hard to govern, this is not exceptional. Centralized authority has never fully established itself over the
entire territory, with its mountain chains, deserts, and long coastal line; a land inhabited by nomads and
settlers of various Arab and Amazigh tribal origins, not to mention Andalusian refugees, European
converts to Islam, and people of various other ethnic and religious heritages from Africa and the
Mediterranean. Even today, the Western Sahara is a disputed territory not fully controlled by the
Moroccan state.
One particularity of anti-colonial resistance during the protectorate period was the rise of
modernist nationalism, both secular and Salafist, and the pacification of the Sufi orders (Julien 2011
[1978], 152-158). Influenced by Egyptian Salafism, many Islamic scholars of the Qarawiyyîn University in
Fez expressed increasing hostility towards Sufism and worked to marginalize its place in the curriculum.
In the Northern Moroccan Rif region, a Salafist Amazigh leader named Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd aI-Karîm alKhaṭṭâbî (c. 1882-1963) led a vigorous jihad against the Spanish, between 1920 and 1926 (Julien 2011
[1978], 120-127, Zaki and Charqi 2008, 281-289). He was known for his hostility towards many Sufi
orders. As Salafists and Western-educated secularists became increasingly vocal in their opposition to
Sufism, the colonial regime sought to co-opt the orders. This was part of the overall strategy of the first
French Resident-General in Morocco, Louis-Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854-1934) to position himself as
the defender of local tradition. During his mandate as the de facto governor of Morocco, which lasted
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from 1912 to 1925, Lyautey was the champion of the monarchy, aristocracy, and traditional institutions
which he perceived as timeless, static, and essentially non-French. To his credit, Lyautey’s respect for
the distinctiveness of Moroccan civilization set in place a form of French colonial rule which was much
less invasive than in Algeria. But he remained a colonial ruler seeking to co-opt and pacify Sufi orders
and other traditional institutions. His traditionalism was very much a form of Orientalist folklorization. If
native populations could go on with their allegedly timeless customs, the French could assume control
of the emerging modern economic and political institutions needed to fully integrate Morocco as a
colonial periphery serving the interests of the metropole (Julien 2011 [1978], 95-128, Rivet 2012, 306310).
As colonial authorities manifested a keen interest in the preservation of many practices
associated with popular Sufism, Salafism seemed to represent a newer, less corrupt form of indigenous
resistance. At the same time, many members of the French-educated Moroccan elite became
progressively convinced that they were just as qualified as the French to modernize the country (Rivet
2012, 312-316). Many of these Frenchified Moroccans wanted to replace their colonial masters in ruling
over a population they considered quaint but massively ignorant.135 Arabic and Amazigh became partly
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American anthropologist Paul Rabinow (1984 [1977]) writes about “Frenchified Moroccan intellectuals; half
torn out of their own ill-understood traditions, and afflicted with a heightened and unhappy self-consciousness”
(143). These observations from his fieldwork in 1968 and 1969 could very well have been written today. Indeed, I
have observed the power dynamics between those who look to Paris, Madrid, London or New York for inspiration,
those who look to Fez, and those who look to Riyadh or Doha. However, I am in no way arguing that Moroccans
should feel guilty for speaking French or accessing any cultural heritage they wish. Contrarily to Lyautey, I do not
believe Moroccans should be frozen in a folkloric pseudo-tradition, preserved and segregated from the broader
global community. Like Rabinow, I recognize that there is “a class of Moroccans who have successfully played a
mediating role between the French and their own community without succumbing to the debilitating confusion
which usually accompanies the colonial presence” (23). Moreover, it is possible to move beyond the notion of
learning a foreign language to mediate between two cultures imagined as somewhat impermeable. Despite their
struggles with cultural and intellectual decolonization, many Moroccans are remarkably adept at allowing
themselves to be transformed through contact with foreign cultures, while remaining respectful of their own
internally diverse heritage. For better or for worse, French, Portuguese, and Spanish cultural elements can no
longer be considered foreign in Morocco. Cultural decolonization requires challenging the power dynamics
associated with this reality, not rejecting history. These remarks concerning Morocco are intended to illustrate the
challenges of cultural, intellectual, and spiritual decolonization present throughout the global world-system.
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constructed as the languages spoken by people involved in strange rituals and customs. Progressively
associated with such alleged backwardness, Sufism was rapidly becoming irrelevant in the power
struggles of the elites. In 1946, ‘Allâl al Fâsî (1910-1974) became leader of a newly formed organization
called the Istiqlâl (Independence) Party. This moderate Salafist politician played a crucial role in leading
Morocco to independence in 1956 (Sirriyeh 2013 [1999], 107-108). Despite five centuries of anti-colonial
resistance, Moroccans increasingly blamed Sufism and other traditional institutions for not only failing
to prevent the European conquest, but even collaborating with foreign occupiers. The future appeared
to be a choice between Westernized progress or Salafist reformism.
Political configurations in contemporary Morocco still reflect these divisions. In recent decades,
state sponsorship of Sufism, as a “safe” alternative to militant Salafism, has helped perpetuate the
perception held by many Moroccans that Sufis are the allies of power and corrupt bureaucracies.
Furthermore, pitting Sufism as “good” apolitical Islam opposed to “bad” political Islam is a strategy
employed by Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and several other states
participating in the Global War on Terror declared by the United States in 2001 (Muedini 2015, 2012).
Political instrumentalization and co-optation of Sufism by modern nation-states, of which Lyautey was a
pioneer, can be traced to historical developments in the third phase of coloniality/modernity. The
politics of Sufism represent but one way in which colonialism disrupted Muslim communities in Morocco
and the rest of the Western Islamicate. This disruption also affected Muslims on the Western side of the
Atlantic.

Black Muslims
The Scramble for Africa and the gradual abolition of the transatlantic slave trade left Muslims in
the Americas increasingly cut off from the African homelands of the Western Islamic tradition described
in Section One. During the second half of the nineteenth century, many of the Muslims coming to the
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Americas were Asian. South Asian Muslims often came as indentured labourers to the Caribbean.
Moreover, Muslim migrants from Asia as well as Southeast Europe settled in North and South America,
generally in search of economic opportunities which would be difficult to pursue by associating with the
most disadvantaged members of society, the descendants of enslaved Africans racialized as black. Asian
and European Muslims generally tried to assimilate as quickly as possible into the dominant Eurocentered society, often concealing their Islam and pretending to be Christian or at least non-religious. By
and large, these immigrants worked hard to be considered white. This was necessary, for instance, to
acquire U.S. American citizenship (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 150-164). Their presence was usually of very
little help to descendants of African Muslims in the Americas having difficulty perpetuating the heritage
of their ancestors. Although I contend that this heritage was severely embattled but never completely
lost, others are more pessimistic. Diouf (2013 [1998]) argues powerfully that it disappeared:
With a documented presence of five hundred years, Islam was, after Catholicism, the
second monotheist religion introduced into the post-1492 Americas. It preceded
Lutheranism, Methodism, Baptism, Calvinism, Santeria, Candomble, and Vodun to name a
few. All these religions are alive today and are followed by the vast majority of the Africans’
descendants, but not one community currently practices Islam as passed on by preceding
African generations.
Islam brought by the enslaved West Africans has not survived. It has left traces; it has
contributed to the culture and history of the continents; but its conscious practice is no
more. For the religion to endure, it had to grow both vertically, through transmission to the
children, and horizontally, through conversion of the “unbelievers.” Both propositions met
a number of obstacles. (251)
Vertical or intergenerational transmission of Islam in the Americas was made extremely difficult
by “the very structure of the slave trade, with the disproportionate importation of men, the physical toll
that enslavement took on the Africans, and the selling off of family members,” which “placed
tremendous obstacles in the path of the constitution and perpetuation of families” (252). In short, even
those enslaved Muslims who were able to have children did not have appropriate conditions to teach
them their traditions. As discussed in Chapter Five, enslaved Muslims went to great lengths to practice
their religion, resist assimilation, and sometimes even return to Africa. This left little time to teach
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others Islam. Individual survival was difficult enough. Research suggests that, even when Muslims did
transmit some basic notions to their children, these teachings mostly did not reach their grandchildren
and great-grandchildren:
In general, the grandchildren of Muslims recalled the exterior manifestations of Islam, such
as prayers, but do not seem to have had precise ideas about the religion and, as far as can
be ascertained by the published interviews, did not mention the religion by its name. (253)
Even in regions of the Caribbean and Latin America with established Muslim communities, the pressure
for the children to conform resulted in massive conversions to Christianity. For instance, “[t]he lack of
interest of the youngsters in the religion of their parents, who had gone to great lengths to preserve it,
was deplored by the Muslim clerics of Trinidad” (253). And if it was difficult to transmit Islam to one’s
own children, it is easy to understand how it was even more difficult to convert non-Muslims. In short,
Diouf argues that Islam had “survived in the Americas due to the continuous arrival of Africans” (256).
Once these voyages stopped, so did the African Islamic tradition in the Americas.
It is hard to argue with Diouf’s (2013 [1998]) evidence. Indeed, once Africans stopped coming to
the Americas in significant numbers, during the third phase of modernity/coloniality, the descendants of
enslaved Africans evolved into a Black community with a common history in America, rather than a
heterogenous group of Africans of diverse ethnic origins.136 As survivors of a spiritual, cultural, and
epistemic holocaust, they rarely knew their lands of origin or the language of their ancestors. Yet,
descendants of Muslims did not all reject their ancestral faith. In fact, despite forgetting much about the
Western Islamic tradition, they perpetuated many aspects associated with their old lifeways and
worldviews. Many of their symbols, practices, and even beliefs were incorporated into “a number of
African-based or African-derived religions” which have emerged in the Americas (259). Diouf writes in
detail about these “Islamic survivals in other religions” (259-270). She also observes “Islamic survivals” in

136

Once the initially heterogenous group of people racialized as black develop into a distinct North American
community, the use of an initial capital B is justified in the word Black.
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musical forms such as the blues (270-275). Survivals from Islamicate Africa can also be observed in food,
clothing, storytelling, poetry, intellectual history, and other aspects of Black culture in the Americas.
Nevertheless, these survivals do not constitute a complete Islamic tradition. Diouf estimates:
In the British and French possessions, the last African Muslims must have passed away in
the 1880s or 1890s, and the indentured laborers shortly thereafter. In the United States,
Brazil, and Cuba — where the slave trade (legal and illegal) and slavery lasted longer — the
last Muslims probably disappeared between 1920 and 1930. (276)
But Diouf’s assessment is slightly pessimistic. It may be true that intergenerational transmission of
traditional Islam by Africans in the Americas either ended or dwindled enough to be historically
insignificant. However, there continued to be a form of traditional Islam which would have been
recognized as orthodox by most African Muslims. There were new waves of Muslim migration
throughout the Americas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These included a small
number of free African Muslims who came to the United States in the decades following the American
Civil War (Nyang 2002, 250-252). In the early twentieth century, some of these African Muslims joined
Black American Muslims in establishing Sunni institutions (Bowen 2013, 2010, 409-410, ‘Abdur-Rashîd
2010, 8-9). As discussed in Chapter One, Muslims from all Islamicate lands are connected by intellectual,
commercial, economic, and religious networks. And they pray together in large numbers every day in
Mecca and Medina. Traditional Islam did not die in the Americas at the turn of the twentieth century; it
adapted to new circumstances.
In the early twentieth century, a new movement emerged in the United States which combined
a vigorous Black nationalism and Islamic identity. Diouf (2013 [1998]) contends that these new Black
Muslims were completely unrelated to the African Muslims who were dying out in the same period. She
argues that “[t]hough there were still Muslims and their children alive in the early 1900s, and though
African American Muslims today represent a quarter of the American Muslim population, no hard
evidence so far shows any direct connection between the two groups” (277-278). She is undoubtedly
correct in asserting that the Moorish Holy Temple of Science, founded in 1913 by Noble Drew Ali (1866276

1929), was radically different from traditional Islam in Africa. By presenting himself as a new Prophet,
and producing a new Qur’an, he was acting in a way which would be considered completely un-Islamic
by the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Africa, Europe, and Asia. His belief system drew upon
various sources, such as Buddhism and Freemasonry. Although unverifiable, it is safe to assume that
Diouf is right to in assert that “[t]he few African Muslims who were still living in the early years of his
movement would not have recognized what Noble Drew Ali presented as Islam” (278). The same can be
said of the Nation of Islam, founded in circa 1931. Followers of this movement believed their founder
W.D. Fard (c. 1877- c. 1934) was Allah and his successor Elijah Muhammad (1897-1975) was his Prophet.
Once again, Diouf points out how these claims contradict the most basic beliefs of most Muslims:
According to Islam, nothing is more unforgivable and heinous than shirk, the association of
others — such as Fard — with the worship of God. Likewise, to believe that other prophets
— such as Noble Drew Ali and Elijah Muhammad — follow Muhammad cannot be
reconciled with orthodox Islam. These affirmations are not differences of interpretation;
they are contrary to the most fundamental teachings of the religion. For that reason, it is
improbable that the last African Muslims would have been involved in these organizations.
There is no documented continuity between the Islam brought by the African Muslims and
the early twentieth-century movements that claimed to be Islamic. Neither Noble Drew Ali
nor Elijah Muhammad mentioned that he was an heir to an Islamic tradition passed on by
his parents or grandparents; in fact, Muhammad’s father, William, was a Baptist preacher.
(279)
By categorizing the Moorish Holy Temple of Science and the Nation of Islam as unorthodox,
Diouf is taking sides in a theological dispute and refusing the self-representation of minority groups
claiming to be Muslim. Defining boundaries is inevitable, and Muslims are entitled to defend their
understanding of what constitutes Islam and what does not. However, it is more problematic for a
historian such as Diouf, writing in a non-confessional setting. Professor of African American Religious
History, Richard Brent Turner (1997) takes a very different approach. He writes that self-signification is
“the counter-conception to the hegemonic discourse of an oppressive majority community; for it
identifies an ideological fulcrum which has enabled this community to achieve independence from the

277

dominant culture” (3). Moreover, he observes continuities between various forms of Islamic identity
claimed by Africans and African Americans:
Signification (the issue of naming and identity) is not only the interpretative thread that
runs through the historical narrative of Islam in black America, it is also the key to
understanding that history in the context of global Islam […] signification became a central
aspect of Islam in West Africa and the Middle East before modernity. In these contexts,
black peoples’ signifying themselves as the people they wanted to be, through their
embracing of Islam, was the result of the adaptation of the religion to local cultures that
was integral to global Islam. In America, signification continued to be central in AfricanAmerican Islam. There is a difference, of course, between a people who manage their own
society and who themselves determine, on a selective basis, which aspects of an Arabian
Islamic tradition they wish to practice and a religious organization of people, drawn from a
numerical minority of a society who nominally declare themselves to be separate from that
society. However, in both America and in West Africa, naming and renaming became
controlling acts that documented black peoples’ struggles to define themselves in the
context of global Islam. (2)
Denying African Americans the legitimacy to name themselves is deeply problematic; yet, Turner’s
portrayal of Muslims freely selecting which aspects of Islam they wish to practice seems to neglect the
sincere intention of many to adapt to Islam rather than adapt Islam to themselves. The question is
whether people embrace Islam “to be the people they want to be” or to be the people they believe
Allah wants them to be. For many Muslims, conforming to God’s will requires following the prescriptions
of revelation. This usually entails determining which aspects of Islam can be adapted or modified
according to circumstances and which are non-negotiable. While there are diverse opinions concerning
this distinction, it seems problematic to describe Muslims as basing their religious convictions on
utilitarian motivations.
A balanced analysis should allow for the existence of both utilitarian and idealistic intentions
among Muslims determining orthodoxy and community boundaries. This is one example of how the
notion of an internally diverse tradition developing and adapting to circumstances can be useful. As
traditions and sub-traditions evolve over long historical periods within world-systems, the agency of
individuals and even communities is both real and limited. People make choices within the possibilities
they perceive. These possibilities are constrained by a variety of factors, including beliefs which may be
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simultaneously accepted but uncomfortable. When Muslims determine what constitutes orthodoxy,
heterodoxy, and outright apostasy, they are not necessarily motivated by the desire to impose
hegemonic views on oppressed minorities. Indeed, sincerely held convictions have often led Muslims to
endanger themselves by admonishing others to conform to what they believe is the will of Allah,
thereby making themselves vulnerable to the potentially violent reactions of both powerful elites and
unconvinced masses.
Social scientists must be cautious to deny neither convictions of minority groups who identify as
Muslims, such as the Nation of Islam, nor those of others who identify as Muslims. In doing so, it is both
useful and fair to mention which beliefs are more widely held. For this reason, Diouf is correct to affirm
that many Black Muslim groups in the United States are unorthodox according to the standards of the
overwhelming majority of Muslims in the world, including in West Africa. Likewise, Turner correctly
points out that hegemonic discourses should not be uncritically advocated by historians of religion.
While it is natural to discuss the limits of orthodoxy at the mosque or in educational institutions
dedicated to Islamic sciences, scholars of Islam have a different mandate when working in nonconfessional settings. They are expected to address scholars, students, and other learners who espouse
diverse worldviews, without proselytizing or addressing them as if they were all Muslims. This requires
neither abandoning nor concealing one’s positionality. It just means respecting one’s mandate according
to context.
Whichever position one takes in the debate about orthodoxy among Black American Muslims, the
discussion itself reveals how Muslims of African descent living in the United States and elsewhere in the
Americas, during the third phase of coloniality/modernity, were largely cut off from the traditions of
their ancestral homelands. They had little to no access to the institutions developed over centuries in
Northwest Africa to perpetuate traditional Islamic knowledge, artistry, and skill. Nevertheless, African
expressions of Islam continued to resonate with many people on the American side of the black Atlantic
279

world examined by Gilroy (1993). Exchanges between the two shores of the black Atlantic and the
partially overlapping Muslim Atlantic were severely disrupted during this period. Those seeking to
perpetuate Islam in the Americas were more or less on their own. It should be no surprise that many of
their attempts to live as Muslims in this context developed in ways which would be surprising, shocking,
and even scandalous on the other side of the Atlantic. But the intention of Muslims now categorized as
Black was nearly always expressly to reconnect with the Islamic traditions developed in Africa. In fact, in
the fourth phase of modernity, discussed in Chapter Six, many Black Muslims accepted the critiques of
those Muslims from around the world accusing them of straying from orthodoxy. Thanks to a massive
wave of Muslim immigrants to the Americas, greater accessibility to international travel, and major
improvements in global communication, Black Muslims in the Americas were able to connect to the
global umma. And many came to embrace the basic views and practices of Sunni internationalism. Of
course, others did not. But despite their differences, Black American Muslims have continued to
massively self-signify as perpetuating the traditions of their African ancestors.
My contention is that African Islam did not die in the third phase of modernity; it underwent a
major crisis. Perhaps an analogy can help to clarify this contention. If people from a given community
were in the habit of sending some of their youth to study at, say, Cambridge University in England, for
generations, they would be perpetuating what would be commonly described as a local tradition, or
perhaps better a custom. In any case, this custom or tradition would not be considered to have died if
one or two generations were unable to go to Cambridge, but subsequent generations did. It would not
even be considered to have died if the children did not always come from the same families, as long as
they came from the same community. Similarly, the impossibility of African Muslims in the third phase
of modernity/coloniality to transmit their traditions to their children or convert their peers did not
represent the death of these traditions, which actually thrived during the same period in Northwest
Africa. When contact increased once again between the two shores of the black Atlantic, American
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Muslims gained easier access to the Western Islamic tradition as perpetuated in its historical heartland,
as well as the global umma. Many enthusiastically embraced this opportunity and adjusted their
understanding of Islam. The conversion of el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz (1925-1965), also known as Malcolm
X, from Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam to a more internationalist Sunni practice, is a famous
example of this type of adjustment.137 Moreover, his continued engagement in the social and political
struggles of Black Americans, as well as Pan-Africanism, demonstrates that this conversion signified an
adjustment rather than a rupture. The same can be said of most other African Americans who embraced
Sunni Islam. But this subject is covered in Chapter Eight.

Whiteness and Islam
In the third phase of coloniality/modernity, while African Muslims and their descendants in the black
Atlantic diaspora struggled to perpetuate their traditions, Islam continued to attract and fascinate a
minority among people of European descent, now firmly racialized as white. In previous eras, hostility
towards Islam among Europeans on both sides of the Atlantic had been so strong that converts generally
assimilated into Islamicate societies and had limited impact in their native lands. However, during the
Romantic Period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, many Europeans became
fascinated with non-Christian worldviews. As notions of religious tolerance developed throughout the
nineteenth century, a certain degree of Islamophilia became socially acceptable among whites. While
conversion to Islam was far from socially encouraged, a small number of white Muslims 138 were
choosing to remain in their homelands after conversion. More commonly, the influence of Islam was
observable among non-Muslim enthusiasts of occultism, esotericism, and various forms of liberally-
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Malcom X was in contact with many Muslims connected to African Islamic lineages, including a New York Imam
from Brooklyn, Daoud Ahmed Faisal (1891-1980), who seems to have been a representative of the Algerian
‘Alawiyya Sufi Order, connected to the Shâdhilî lineage (Haroon c. 2015, 4).
138
I do not capitalize the w in white Muslims, because contrarily to Black Muslims, they do not represent a
community with a distinct culture and institutions.
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oriented spirituality, such as Transcendentalism. This influence could also be observed in certain British
and U.S. American Masonic lodges, such as the Shriners (Bowen 2015, 115-138). Sufism was particularly
popular among Western adepts of both exotic and esoteric religion who tended to view it as a universal
or even Indo-European spirituality serving a somewhat subversive role within Islam. In a sense, they
were whitening Sufism by de-Islamifying it. While Sufism was being whitened by non-Muslims, many
Muslim immigrants coming to the West attempted to whiten their Islamic identity as a response to
hegemonic Eurocentrism. For instance, Muslims emigrating to the United States from the Ottoman
Empire and India fought several legal and political battles to be officially recognized as white, thereby
circumventing racist immigration and citizenship laws (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 135-164).
Until the early nineteenth century, white fascination with Islam had been much more common in
Europe than in the American colonies. Although there must have been some European Muslims on the
ships traveling back and forth across the North Atlantic in earlier centuries, there are no documented
cases of white U.S. American converts to Islam before 1803 (Bowen 2015, 30-32). Most whites in North
America had very negative views of Islam, a religion they usually encountered only among enslaved
Africans or through narratives about white Christians captured and enslaved by Muslims in the
Mediterranean. Such narratives were in fact popularized through a new literary genre:
All of this was contributing to the increasingly popular American ‘captivity narrative’ literary
genre, in which non-Christian, dark-skinned ‘savages’—usually Native Americans—
imprisoned and assaulted innocent white Americans. By linking the image of the Native
American with the Muslim, the white North Americans were not only legitimizing the
dehumanizing and aggression towards both groups, they were also defining true freedom—
a core value in the US American identity—as something that could only be produced and
protected by white Christian Americans. (Ibid., 6-7)
However, perceptions of Islam shifted somewhat with the U.S. American Revolution (1775-1783)
and its promotion of religious freedom and tolerance. Subsequently, the gradual abolition of both
the transatlantic slave trade and the North African trade of enslaved Europeans had the effect of
disassociating Islam with slavery in the dominant white discourse. Instead, Islam came to be
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generally perceived as an Oriental or Eastern religion, rather than an African one, as a new wave
of Muslims migrated to the Americas.
In the late nineteenth century, Muslims from across Eurasia sought economic
opportunities in the Americas. In the Caribbean and Latin America, these included Asian Muslims
hired as indentured servants to replace slave labour, as well as workhands and merchants from
the Ottoman province of Syria, which extended over most of the Eastern Mediterranean lands
now known as Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/Israel, and Jordan (Narbona, Pinto and Karam 2015, 8). In
the United States, an estimated 60,000 Muslims migrated between 1890 and 1924 including a
significant number from Ottoman Syria (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 136). They were generally Arabspeaking and tended to blend in with the larger number of Christian immigrants from the same
countries (ibid., 138-143). But there were also Yemeni, Kurdish, Eastern European, and South
Asian Muslims, in smaller numbers (ibid., 144-150). Similar Muslim immigration patterns are
recorded in Canada during the same period, although in much smaller numbers (Hamdani
1984).139
Muslims coming willingly to white-supremacist settler colonial societies, such as Canada
and the United States, had and continue to have very different interests and expectations than
Africans who were taken here by force and their descendants. Those who choose to migrate in
search of a better life are often willing to make enormous sacrifices to succeed. In the third phase
of colonial modernity, it would have been completely illogical for Muslim economic migrants from
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The historical record tends to present these as the first Muslim communities in Canada, despite the high
probability that Muslims would have been present among the free and enslaved Africans present centuries before.
Indeed, there had been Africans in British North America and New France since at least 1604 (Cooper 2006, Divine
2007). In the extremely Christian-centric and white-supremacist settler colonial context, white perceptions of black
Muslims would have ranged from disinterest to hostility. Muslim Africans already oppressed for their skin colour
would have had little incentive to publicize their faith or share their worldview with whites who in any case
generally saw blacks as subhuman (Sharify-Funk and Sparkes [Forthcoming], Best 2019, 8-9, Mugabo 2016, 167168).
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Eurasia to seek to integrate Black Muslim communities, positioned at the very the bottom of the
racial hierarchy. In order to make the sacrifice of leaving their families and homelands behind
worthwhile, economic migrants were compelled to seek inclusion into the dominant white
society. This put them at odds with the Black Muslims whose predecessors had come to the
Americas centuries before. Indeed, while Black Muslims had every reason to be critical of the
racial hierarchy of North American society, newly arrived Muslim communities often championed
white supremacy. In their struggle to be racialized as white, immigrant Muslims shared the
material interests of other immigrants, such as Asian Christians or Hindus. For example, in the
United States “Syrian Americans and Indian Americans put aside religious and caste differences
among themselves to unite and mobilize a national response to governmental challenges to their
right to citizenship” (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 153). In the face of naturalization and citizenship laws
favouring whites and frequently forbidding or severely restricting non-whites, these communities
mounted numerous legal battles to be officially recognized as white. But these legal battles were
only one aspect of a broader struggle for inclusion into white society. And although they were not
always successful in their struggle, immigrant communities such as Indians and Syrians in the
United States, generally improved their material conditions over time and across generations:
This is ironic because […] Muslim immigrants managed to do relatively well for themselves
in the United States despite the xenophobia and institutional prejudices they faced. It was
presumably because of the prosperity that these Indian and Syrian immigrants realized in
the United States that they fought to maintain their right to American citizenship. Yet,
despite the prosperity these immigrants realized as non-whites and non-Protestants in the
United States, they defended their eligibility to citizenship, not on the basis of their
accomplishments and contributions to American society, but by arguing that they should be
considered white, and in the case of Syrians who were predominantly Christian, they
appealed to the nation’s Christian sensibilities to be considered eligible for U.S. citizenship.
In other words, they did not challenge the racism and bigotry involved in the conflation of
whiteness, Protestantism, and progress; rather, they argued for their inclusion within this
matrix. They not only argued that they were “white” but they also believed it.
(GhaneaBassiri 2010, 153).
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However, Muslim communities never gained access to the totality of white privilege in the
United States and Canada,140 despite certain legal victories. Socially, only Northern European
Protestants were considered fully white among the dominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant
(WASP) elite. In the third phase of coloniality/modernity, Catholics and Orthodox Christians did
not have access to the totality of white privilege in these lands. Their whiteness was questioned
and often even denied. No matter how white they looked, Muslims could not be expected to be
racialized as fully white. Instead, they were constructed as “Eastern” (“Oriental” in Europe). This
logic still applies today throughout the North Atlantic world. Indeed, if Islam is not considered a
white religion, its adherents cannot be truly white. Even white converts become racialized as
“not-quite-white” (Moosavi 2015), or perhaps I would say off-white race traitors whose
predecessors were once designated as renegades who had become Turks or Moors when they
changed religion. To be clear, off-white remains a shade of white and indeed white people do not
become racialized black or brown when they convert to Islam; they simply move to the margins of
whiteness.
Yet, despite the stigma surrounding Islam, many North Americans of Western European
origin discovered Islam through contact with Eurasian Muslim immigrants. Indeed, while these
new Muslim immigrants usually tried to assimilate into the dominant culture and be identified as
white, many of them adhered to traditional Sunni Islam, of which Northwest African Islam is a
subtradition. In U.S. American working-class neighbourhoods, Christians and Muslims began to
develop personal bonds. Beginning around the 1930s, some working-class whites began to
convert to Islam and even marry into immigrant Muslim families (Bowen 2015, 231-259). White
converts often assumed leadership positions in the institutionalization process of North American
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In Latin America and the Caribbean, racial and religious hierarchies are different. For instance, Catholics of
Southern European origin are the dominant racial group in the region overall. Consequently, Muslims have faced
different successes and difficulties in gaining access to white privilege.
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Sunni Islam, which gained momentum in the 1940s (ibid., 260-289). Contrarily to the many
middle-and-upper-class whites attracted to Sufism, the “vast majority” of white working-class
Muslims “had little or no interest in esotericism.” (ibid., 3). However, starting in the 1960s,
interest in Sufism surged among a new wave of white converts who tended to discover Islam
through contact with international students, diplomats, and Muslim professionals, rather than
working-class immigrants. While this interest in Sufism among white elites was more widespread
in the fourth phase of coloniality/modernity, discussed in Chapter Six, it was not a new
phenomenon.
It is true that Western and Islamic thought have been interconnected since the early
Islamic period, and Western fascination with Sufism can be traced to at least the thirteenth
century (Sedgwick 2017). However, this fascination grew considerably in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, but only after Sufism had been largely constructed as an exotic “Eastern”
spirituality with deep connections to “Western” esotericism and occultism. For instance, the
short-lived adherence of Amîr ʿAbd al-Qâdir to a Masonic Lodge in 1864, largely as an attempt at
interfaith and inter-civilizational dialogue (Kebache 2012), gave credence to a growing belief that
Sufism was the form Masonry had adopted in the Islamic world (Bowen, 2015, 116-118). Indeed, a
certain degree of Islamophilia was developing at that time in several British and U.S. American
Masonic lodges (ibid., 115-138). For instance, the website of the Shriners, a U.S. American
Masonic organization, explains that “[T]he fez is one of the most recognizable symbols of Shriners
International and was adopted as the Shriners’ official headgear in 1872. Named after the city of
Fez, Morocco, the hat represented the Arabian theme the fraternity was founded on” (Shriners
International 2018).
More commonly, the influence of Islam was observable among non-Muslim enthusiasts of
an eclectic variety of spiritual forms, loosely belonging to a broader countercultural religious and
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intellectual current which developed for centuries in Europe alongside mainstream Christianity.
This current includes various types of secretive and elitist movements such as esotericism,
occultism, and Gnosticism. However, in the context of U.S. American pluralism, this current has
adopted a more populist and democratic religious form, designated by Catherine Albanese (2007)
as “American Metaphysical Religion.”
In the United States, this “Metaphysical Religion” became identified with New Age
spirituality in the late twentieth century but is rooted in nineteenth century movements such as
Transcendentalism, Spiritualism, Christian Science, New Thought, and Theosophy. It is also
influential throughout the Americas. Yet, despite its particularities, it cannot be fully separated
from the transatlantic context, since American societies remain after all predominantly European
settler colonies. Already, European intellectuals and artists associated with the Romantic
movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century had sought spiritual inspiration
from the civilizations of the colonial periphery. Islamic texts, especially Sufi ones, inspired many
seminal authors in both Europe and North America (Einboden 2014, Aminrazavi 2014). Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), the famous German artist, poet, and polymath, was an
outspoken Islamophile (Dickson and Sharify-Funk 2017, 77-81). He was especially fond of Persian
Sufi poets such as Muḥammad Shams al-Dîn Ḥâfiẓ (c. 1325-c. 1389). U.S. American
Transcendentalist author Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) was equally fond of Persian Sufi
poetry, as an expression of exotic metaphysics and mysticism: “Like the German Romantics,
Emerson saw in the East an ancient heritage and wisdom” (ibid. 81). Yet interest in Sufism did not
always entail Islamophilia in the Atlantic World. In fact, it was often accompanied by
Islamophobia.
Dominant Eurocentric discourses in the third phase of coloniality/modernity tended to deIslamify Sufism as a universal or perhaps even Indo-European spirituality only superficially Islamic:
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Although Goethe clearly saw the connection between Persian Sufi poetry and Islamic
scripture and practice, in general, European Orientalists largely saw Sufism as something
separate from Islam, associating Islam more with rigid dogmatism and legalism rather than
individualistic and satirical poetry. This separation drawn between Sufism and Islam
developed alongside the remarkable discovery of linguistic families, and the racial theories
that would later develop based on this discovery. These racial theories would then play a
key role in crystalizing the distinction between Sufism and Islam among Orientalists. (ibid.
83-84)
Scholarly Orientalist discourse tended to view Islam as a so-called “Semitic” religion which is
essentially legalistic and incapable of authentic spirituality. According to such views, Sufism must
have infiltrated Islam as a foreign body, sometimes manifest as esotericism and at other times as
popular devotion. Eurocentric de-Islamification of Sufism occurred at the very time Europeans
colonized most of Islamdom (Ernst 2006). It reinforced anti-Sufi sentiment among Muslims,
especially in places such as Morocco, where colonial policy sought to co-opt Sufi institutions, as
discussed earlier in this chapter.
In this context, it became possible for a universalist Sufi current, mostly removed from its
Islamic context, to arise in the West. A prime example of this current is The Sufi Order of the
West, founded by Inayat Khan (1882-1927), an Indian musician associated with the Chistiyya Sufi
Order. Khan traveled from India to the United States in 1910, where he became known as a Sufi
teacher. Having rapidly gathered an American following, primarily among white artists and
intellectuals, Khan left for Europe in 1912. He founded The Sufi Order, in London, in 1918, and The
Sufi Movement in Geneva, in 1923, which became the international headquarters of the Sufi
Order of the West. Many contemporary universalist Sufi orders trace their lineage to Khan, such
as The Inayati Order based in Richmond, Virginia (The Inayati Order 2018).
The success of Khan’s mission was consciously and strategically connected to the deIslamification of Sufism:
Inayat Khan deliberately disassociated his teachings from Islam and framed his message in
the context of the more acceptable discourse of “universal religion,” shaped by liberal
Protestant theology and metaphysical interpretations of religion. By adopting the discourse
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of “universal religion” he was able to transcend his race and the stigma of Islam, which by
now he no longer regarded as his religion but the accidental religion of his birth.
(GhaneaBassiri 2010, 130)
Despite his dark skin-tone, Khan’s Sufism was appealing to many whites, in large part thanks to its
disassociation with Islam, understood as a non-white religion, and its association with the discourses of
white liberal religion and spirituality:
Inayat Khan’s experiences in the United States demonstrate personally how the
inclusionary theologies and practices of the late nineteenth century may have left the gate
of religious pluralism ajar, but the non-Protestant religions that slipped in did not challenge
Americans’ triumphalist conflation of race, religion, and progress. Muslim newcomers, such
as Inayat Khan, had to color their teachings with unspecific metaphysical claims of
universality in order to cloak their stigmatized racial and religious backgrounds, and in the
process they helped maintain the status quo. (ibid., 131)
Whereas de-Islamification meant whitening, Islamification meant losing white privilege as can be
observed in the failure of the American Islamic Propaganda, the first official Islamic missionary
organization in the United States. It was founded in New York City in 1892, by a white convert named
Mohammed Alexander Russel Webb (1846-1916). This U.S. American diplomat, who first approached
Islam as a Theosophist interested in Eastern spirituality, became Muslim in 1888 during his service as
United Sates Consul to the Philippines. He was the single representative of Islam at the World
Parliament of religions, held in Chicago in 1893 (Abd-Allah 2006). Webb’s status as a member of the U.S.
American white elite may have convinced the Asian Muslims who financed his missionary enterprise
that he was an ideal person to spread Islam in the West, but his organization closed in 1897. Liberal
elites in white America were simply not interested in Islam (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 126).
The same antipathy towards Islam was observable among whites outside the United States.
However, in Western Europe there was a longer history of conversion to Islam. After all, Western
Europe is much closer to Islamdom, and has its own Islamic history in places such as Spain, Portugal,
France, and Italy. Moreover, European imperialism and colonization of Islamdom lands in the nineteenth
and twentieth century resulted in increased contact with Muslims. Several European artists and
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intellectuals influenced by Sufism converted to Islam during this period. Perhaps the most influential of
these was the French metaphysician René Guénon, although this influence has been mostly observable
among educated elites seeking spiritual inspiration outside mainstream Eurocentric Christianity (Piraino
2016).

Conclusion
During the third phase of the modern/colonial world-system, traditional Islamic resistance in the
Atlantic world, especially in the Americas, became increasingly exhausted as new wave of European
colonialism and imperialism triumphed around the world. While European settlers in the Americas took
control of their colonial project by seceding politically from their European metropoles, and with the
abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, African Muslims on each side of the Atlantic became
increasingly disconnected. This accelerated the transformation from African diasporic culture to Black
culture in North America and led to the emergence of a Black Muslim identity. Black Muslims engaged
with their African roots despite experiencing a generalized rupture with their tradition, imposed by
historical circumstances. During this veritable religious, cultural, and epistemic holocaust, Black Muslims
were mostly left to their own devices in shaping their religious identity, as Muslims overseas were
engulfed in responding to renewed and vigorous European colonialism and imperialism. Muslim
immigrants from Eurasian Islamicate societies, seeking economic opportunities in North America, did
not generally stand in solidarity with Black Muslims, being more concerned with integrating the
dominant white culture and obtaining citizenship. In working-class neighbourhoods, North American
whites developed personal bonds with immigrant Muslims, and occasionally converted to Islam.
Moreover, there developed among white elites in North America as well as Europe, a certain fascination
for Islam, understood as an exotic religious culture, and Sufism, seen as a universal, de-Islamified
spirituality. This occurred at the very time during which Sufism was intensely contested in many
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Islamicate societies. Muslim reformers, revivalists and modernists converged with Western Orientalist in
portraying Sufism as a foreign influence within Islam. Under siege in places such as North Africa, Sufis
went from being champions of traditional Islam, often engaged in anti-colonial resistance, to a
marginalized minority, sometimes co-opted by the colonial and eventually postcolonial state.
Yet, just as traditional ways of being, knowing, and behaving appeared least capable of
responding to the challenges of the day, nostalgia for tradition and discontent with modernity were
growing on both sides of the Atlantic, among Muslims and non-Muslims. This attachment to tradition
became explicitly conceptualized as traditionalism, which can be described as the conscious defense of
tradition in the face of modernism. When associated with discernable discourse communities, such as
Traditionalist Islam, traditionalism with a small initial t can be labeled Traditionalism with a capital T.
Before becoming an identifiable discursive community, traditionalist Islam, with a small t, was already
attempting to respond to the challenges of modernity/coloniality. The pivotal figure in the emergence of
Traditionalism, as a distinct intellectual current in the West, is the French metaphysician René Guénon
who embraced Islam and lived his final years in Cairo, thereby following the precedent of European
renegades established centuries before. The next chapter is devoted to his oeuvre.
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Chapter 7- René Guénon: Founding Figure of Traditionalist Islam
ُۚ
صراطٍ ﱡمسۡ تَق ِۡي ٍم
ِ ِ ّ ﱠ ِ ۡٱل َم ۡش ِرقُ َو ۡٱل َم ۡغ ِرب َيہۡ دِى َم ۡن ﱠي َشا ٓ ُء ا ِٰلﻰ
[…] To God belong the East and the West. He guides whomever He will to a straight path.
(Qur’an 2:142)
In the first part of half of the twentieth century, tradition found a champion in the person of René
Guénon. He was born in 1886, in the small historical city of Blois, to a devout Catholic family. After years
frequenting proponents of conservative Catholicism, occultism, esotericism, and world religions, as a
young adult in Paris, he joined the Shâdhiliyyah ‘Arabiyyah Sufi Order in 1911. Two decades later, in
1930, he moved to Cairo, where he lived another two decades until his death in 1951. In Egypt, he was
better known as Shaykh ʿAbd al-Wâḥid Yaḥyá. ‘Abd al-Ḥalîm Maḥmûd (1968) wrote of him as an
exemplary Shâdhilî saint. This is no small compliment coming from a man who was to become Grand
Imam of al-Azhar Mosque and University from 1973 to 1978, a position widely regarded as the highest
religious authority in the Sunni world. Maḥmûd was also familiar with French academia, having
completed a doctorate degree at La Sorbonne, in Paris. Yet, Guénon did not have a major impact in the
Egyptian religious and intellectual milieu. During his two decades in Cairo, he lived as somewhat of a
recluse, blending into traditional society in the way he worshipped, dressed, and interacted with others
(Accart and Lançon 2001). Today, his modest grave continues to be visited by occasional pilgrims but is
unknown to most Cairenes (Khalil 2018). After all, this city is home to the mausoleums of thousands of
Muslim saints. Guénon remains best known in the West.
Other notable Europeans became Muslims in Guénon’s era, such as Isabelle Eberhardt (1877–
1904) and Abdullah William Henry Quilliam (1856-1932). Eberhardt was a Swiss-born journalist and
author who traveled extensively across North Africa, often disguised as a Muslim man, and eventually
joined the Qâdiriyya Sufi Order. Her life of rambunctious adventure ended abruptly at the age of 27,
during a flash flood in Algeria (Kobak 1988). Quilliam was a solicitor and journalist from Liverpool who
embraced Islam in his early 30s, prompted among other factors by a trip to Morocco. After his
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conversion, he devoted himself to promoting Islam in Britain, where he founded The Liverpool Muslim
Institute in 1893. He wrote extensively and published a weekly Muslim newspaper with international
distribution, as well as a monthly journal. Whereas Guénon and Eberhardt ended up living in North
Africa, following the historical model of the European renegade, Quilliam established a small but vibrant
British community with a mosque, a school, and an orphanage, thereby becoming a pioneer of Islam in
modern Europe (Gilham and Geaves 2017, Geaves 2010). Yet Guénon’s impact on Western intellectual
and religious culture is unique among the European Muslims of his epoch. He is a pivotal figure in the
development of Islamic thought, Sufism, metaphysics, comparative religion, and especially as the
founding figure of contemporary Traditionalism.

Metaphysics, Tradition, and Modernity
The intellectual current identified by Sedgwick (2004) as “Guénonian Traditionalism” (22) is
centered on a discourse championing tradition in the face of modernity. It is “a movement in the loosest
sense of the word. The Traditionalist movement has no formal structure [...] It is made up of a number
of groups and individuals, united by their common debt to the work of René Guénon” (22). This eclectic
bunch includes conservative Catholics, occultists, Italian fascists, Russian neo-imperialists, British
royalty, pacifists, socialists, artists, poets, academics, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sufis. Yet, despite
their heterogeneity, they share a similar understanding of tradition and modernity. While many
consciously borrow from Guénon, others may unknowingly adopt Guénonian views which are common
in milieus such as many of the branches of the Shâdhiliyya in Western Europe and North America
(Sedgwick 2005).
Guénon (2009) draws upon diverse Western and non-Western thought currents to produce a
coherent defense of tradition in a period of triumphant modernity. His writings refer to a primordial
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tradition which is the ‘original’ tradition behind all other traditions.141 Moreover, he contends that “the
origin of tradition, if indeed the word ‘origin’ has any place at all in such a case, is as ‘non-human’ as is
metaphysics itself” (90). Thus, the primordial tradition is metaphysical. It is beyond history just as
metaphysics is beyond physics—beyond nature (78). “It is the primary source and the common
foundation of all particular traditional forms which proceed from it by adaptation to the particular
conditions of peoples and times” (113). These traditional forms are commonly referred to as religions.
However, Guénon only applied the label religion to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. For him, only these
three traditions combine an esoteric dimension, which is purely metaphysical, with an exoteric
dimension, which encompasses extra-intellectual elements of a moralistic or sentimental order. He
categorizes the exoteric dimension as a “religious viewpoint” which is absent in Eastern metaphysical
doctrines like Hinduism (95).142
It is also important to understand that traditional forms degenerate, according to Guénon and his
intellectual continuators. Nasr (1987b) writes that “the earthly life of a tradition can come to an end—
and traditional civilizations do decay. But that decay, as well as the presence of contending schools of
thought, which have always existed in traditional civilizations, are still within the framework of tradition”
(13-14). From this perspective, orthodoxy is understood as harmony with metaphysical principles, and
unorthodoxy as an incorrect relation or opposition to such principles. Heretical, counter-traditional, and
pseudo-traditional currents are understood to exist in all traditional civilizations, which leads to all types
of abuse; yet, a civilization remains traditional if its fundamental principles are metaphysical, no matter
how obfuscated they may be:

141

In English-language Traditionalist literature, terms such as Primordial Tradition, Tradition, and Perennial
Philosophy are sometimes written with initial capitals and sometimes not. I generally use capitals only when
referring to a specific discourse or discursive community, and not a general qualification or description.
142
Guénon’s refusal to use the blanket-term “religion” to categorize all non-secular worldviews attests to the
subtlety of his thinking. Drawing upon a very different epistemology, he is in a way a precursor to more recent
thinkers who deconstruct religion as a modern Eurocentric category (Asad 2003, 1993, Masuzawa 2005).
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In civilizations of a traditional nature, intellectual intuition lies at the root of everything; in
other words, it is the pure metaphysical doctrine that constitutes the essential, everything
else being linked to it, either in the form of consequences or applications to the various
orders of contingent reality. Not only is this true of social institutions, but also of the
sciences, that is, branches of knowledge bearing on the domain of the relative, which in
such civilizations are only regarded as dependencies, prolongations, or reflections of
absolute or principial knowledge. (Guénon 2001 [1927], 42)
It should be noted that Guénon did not identify as a Traditionalist. Always meticulous about
terminology, he distinguished between having a “truly traditional spirit” and being a “traditionalist,”
identifying the latter with vague and fanciful notions about the past, often associated with the
thoroughly modern political current called conservatism (Guénon 1970 [1945], 277-286, 1968 [1927],
42) (1968 [1927], 42). However, many of his continuators have come to identify—perhaps grudgingly—
as Traditionalists (sometimes without the capital t). Others call themselves Perennialists (sometimes
without the capital p), in reference to the philosophia perennis (perennial philosophy), a term coined in
1540 by Italian humanist Agostino Steuco (1497-1548) to explain the view of Marsilio Ficino (14331499), a Neoplatonist Catholic priest (Nasr 1989 [1981], 65-66, Sedgwick 2004, 23-24). According to this
intellectual current, philosophy and religion are in essence the same:
For Ficino, God lay behind both Christ and Plato, and the Perennial Philosophy preceded
(and so united) both. All religions shared a common origin in a single perennial (or primeval
or primordial) religion that had subsequently taken a variety of forms, including the
Zoroastrian, Pharaonic, Platonic, and Christian. (Sedgwick 2004, 23-24)
Guénon’s idea of a primordial tradition manifesting itself historically through multiple forms can be
traced to much older discourses in Western thought and, Perennialists would argue, is also present in
other civilizations, albeit articulated differently.
As discussed in Chapter Eight, many scholars have questioned the Islamic orthodoxy of
Guénon’s Perennialism. Sedgwick (2004) asserts that “[t]hough any Muslim who subscribes to any form
of universalism is departing from what is generally accepted to be the consensus of Islam, many
Traditionalists might be judged Muslim by Muslims on the basis of their practice” (271). Indeed, there is
little doubt that Guénon observed Islamically prescribed forms of worship, at least in his Cairene period.
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Yet, while he discussed a variety of subjects—including Catholicism, Gnosticism, Freemasonry,
occultism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Taoism—he did not write much about Islam, at least explicitly.
British Muslim Martin Lings (2009) (1909-2005)143 who frequented Guénon while teaching at the
University of Cairo from 1940 to 1951, offered the following explanation:
Now Guénon put himself the question: Since these people have rejected Christianity would they
be able to accept the truth when expressed in the Islamic terms of Sufism, which are closely
related to Christian terms in many respects? He decided that they would not, that they would say
that this is another religion; we have had enough of religion. However Hinduism, the oldest living
religion, is on the surface very different from both Christianity and Islam, and so he decided to
confront the Western world with the truth on the basis of Hinduism. (xix)
Another aspect of Guénon’s work, which may seem problematic from a decolonial perspective, is
his positionality as a white man from the core of the modern/colonial world-system, speaking with
authority about ways of being, knowing, and behaving from around the world.144 It is true that he was a
trenchant critic of Orientalism and the academic field of religious studies, which he described as
intellectually myopic and, using different terminology, Eurocentric (Guénon 1987 [1921], 267-280).
Nevertheless, being a white Frenchman during the height of the modern/colonial period gave Guénon
access to multiple locations in a way few peripheral thinkers could hope for. Inevitably, he found himself
in conversation with other intellectuals from the core of the world-system, whose project of comparing
and categorizing phenomena from around the world was inextricably linked to the greater colonial and
imperial project of their civilization. In short, Guénon’s discourse was limited by the possibilities of his
discourse community, and even his anti-Orientalism could not be formulated completely outside the
Orientalist framework. Sedgwick (2004) argues:
The general Traditionalist view of the Orient is in many ways an inverse form of Orientalism.
Both Traditionalism and Orientalism are dualistic systems, both derive from the nineteenth
century, and both share the important methodological failing of overreliance on texts and
underreliance on observation. Like Orientalism, Traditionalism tends to portray the world
outside the West as the mirror of the West. The difference is that the comparison is
complimentary toward the non-West. Instead of contrasting a Middle East peopled by
143
144

Lings wrote more extensively and explicitly about Islam than Guénon.
The same could be said about the author of this dissertation.
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childlike irrational beings incapable of organization and self-discipline to a mature,
disciplined, scientific and rational West, Traditionalism contrasts a West characterized by
modernity, materialism, and mere technical skill to a Middle East of tradition, spirituality,
and wisdom. This understanding of the Middle East is arguably no more accurate than that
of the classic Orientalist. (266)
While Sedgwick tends to be categorical in his judgments and has been accused of focusing excessively
on the mysterious, dark, strange, and shocking underbelly of Traditionalism (Zaidi 2005), his
presentation of the shared discursive framework of Guénonian Traditionalism and Orientalism is worthy
of deep reflection. Still, Guénon’s sharp critique of Orientalism, modernity, and Western arrogance
cannot be reduced to unsophisticated dualism. It should become clear by the end of this chapter that his
thought is deeply complex and is not reducible to its anti-modern or even anti-colonial aspects.
Although Guénon’s thought offers decolonial avenues to delink from the dominant Eurocentric
intellectual framework, other readings of his work are certainly possible, including fascist, colonial, and
Islamophobic ones. For instance, the Italian philosopher Giulio Cesare Andrea Evola, better known as
Julius Evola (1898-1974) drew heavily upon Guénon in theorizing a form of extreme right-wing political
Traditionalism. He sought to influence Italian Fascism and German Nazism in the years leading up to
their defeat during World War II (Sedgwick 2004, 98-109). However, Evola’s elitist Traditionalism was
“hardly compatible with the mass character which the Fascist and Nazi regimes assumed” and was never
more than “an unfashionable minority strand” within these movements (ibid., 108). Furthermore, his
differences with these regimes seem to have allowed Evola to survive their downfalls after World War II
and continue to influence extreme right-wing political philosophy for decades (ibid. 179-188). In any
case, Evola’s Eurocentric and political strand of Traditionalism separates it “definitively from Guénonian
Traditionalism which was essentially apolitical” (ibid., 267) and critical of European exceptionalism. To
this day, Guénon is admired by some right-wing theorists associated with white nationalism and
Islamophobia, such as U.S. President Donald Trump’s former Chief Strategist Steve Bannon (Green 2017,
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204-208). However, they are reading Guénon through an Evolian lens. Guénon would certainly have
rejected their political activism, nationalism, racism, and indeed late modern colonialism.

The Crisis of Coloniality
While Guénon’s positionality as a European man in the modern/colonial world-system needs
consideration, as do the debates about the Islamic orthodoxy of Perennialism, his relevance to this
decolonial analysis is based upon four main reasons.145 First, he draws on non-European traditions,
notably from Asia and Africa, to criticize both modernity and—although often less explicitly—coloniality.
Though averse to political activism, Guénon is highly critical of European colonialism. Second, his contact
with Islam gives Guénon an added critical distance to the West, and his final departure from Europe to
live in Egypt can be situated in continuity with a long lineage of European renegades who “turned Turk.”
Like many of these predecessors, Guénon assimilated into an Islamicate society but maintained links
with the West (Graf 2017). Third, his Sufi lineage includes notable anti-colonial resisters. Guénon was
initiated into Sufism by Swedish painter Ivan Aguéli (1869-1917), who was himself initiated by the head
of the Shâdhiliyya ‘Arabiyya Sufi Order, and scholar of Mâlikî jurisprudence at al-Azhar University, the
Egyptian Shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmân ‘Illaysh (1840-1921). Both Aguéli and ‘Illaysh were expressedly
opposed to British colonialism in Egypt. In fact, when exiled in Damascus, ‘Illaysh became close to the
famous Algerian ‘Abd al-Qâdir whose anticolonial struggle is examined in Chapter Six (Sedgwick 2004,
59-62). Fourth, as discussed in Chapter Eight, Guénon is a pivotal figure in later Traditionalist Islamic
discourse. His critique of modernity and promotion of traditional metaphysics have been crucial in the
development of Traditionalist Islamic responses to coloniality/modernity.

145

Considerations, such as the way right-wing ideologues have drawn upon his work or his often-unspoken
influence on several Western intellectuals, are not of immediate interest here despite their broader significance.
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According to Lumbard (2004b), “Guénon’s The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times
stands as a watershed event in European intellectual history, providing an acute philosophical
assessment of the presuppositions of modernity and detailing the deleterious results of their
applications” (xiv). In this book, and throughout his oeuvre, the French metaphysician presents a
densely written and thorough critique of modernity from an unconventional perspective, at least in
terms of modern Western scholarly conventions. Because of its significance in Western intellectual
history, but also more specifically in Traditionalist Islamic discourse, Guénon’s critique of modernity
merits a close examination with extensive quotations here. While such an examination is not a novel
contribution to the study of Guénon, the focus on his decolonial dimension is.
For Guénon, the modern West is heading towards a cataclysmic end unless it can somehow be
reconnected to metaphysics. Moreover, as the West’s modernizing influence spreads, the entire world
risks being led towards the same cataclysm, which will probably manifest itself through war,
environmental disaster, or both. Only modern Western civilization is anomalous since it is unique in
having completely broken with its own metaphysical tradition. In other words, the West was once a
normal traditional civilization. Before the modern period, there was no need for a stark conceptual
dichotomy between a relatively normal—if perhaps decadent—Orient or East, and the abnormal West.
Every traditional society occupies its own civilizational space—rather like a world-system—which serves
as a holistic matrix in which people can pursue their spiritual, intellectual, emotional, and physical
needs.
Guénon (2001 [1927]) situates the early fourteenth century as the beginning of the modern
anomaly in Europe:
For us, the real Middle Ages extend from the reign of Charlemagne to the opening of the
fourteenth century, at which date a new decadence set in that has continued, through
various phases and with gathering impetus, up to the present time. This date is the real
starting-point of the modern crisis: it is the beginning of the disruption of Christendom,
with which the Western civilization of the Middle Ages was essentially identified: at the
same time, it marks the origin of the formation of ‘nations’ and the end of the feudal
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system, which was very closely linked with the existence of Christendom. The origin of the
modern period must therefore be placed almost two centuries further back than is usual
with historians; the Renaissance and Reformation were primarily results, made possible
only by the preceding decadence […] (15)
While decolonial theory generally situates the birth of the modern/colonial world-system in 1492,
Guénon is describing the spiritual and intellectual transformations which may have predisposed
Western Europeans to establish this new world order through formidably violent means. The
fourteenth century gave birth to modernity as a concept which gestated within Europe until the
late fifteenth century, when material conditions allowed it to be born as a new world-system. But the
birth metaphor is problematic. Guénon (2001 [1927]) describes the alleged rebirth of the Renaissance as
an “artificial” and “incomplete restoration” of the Greco-Latin civilizational forms “whose real life had
gone out of them centuries before” (15). During this transitional phase, “the traditional sciences of the
Middle Ages” died completely, to be replaced by “profane” philosophy and science, which he depicts as
the negation of true intellectuality, the limitation of knowledge to its lowest order, namely,
the empirical and analytical study of facts divorced from principles, a dispersion in an
indefinite multitude of insignificant details, and the accumulation of unfounded and
mutually destructive hypotheses and of fragmentary views leading to nothing other than
those practical applications that constitute the sole real superiority of modern civilization—
a scarcely enviable superiority, moreover, which, by stifling every other preoccupation, has
given the present civilization the purely material character that makes of it a veritable
monstrosity. (16)
However, Guénon (2001 [1927]) accepts the relative legitimacy of technologies, understood as
practical applications of knowledge, arguing that “what is illegitimate is only the abuse that arises when
things of this kind absorb the whole of human activity, as we see them doing at present.” He further
states that “[o]ne could even conceive, in a normal civilization, of sciences based on an experimental
method being attached to principles in the same way as other sciences, and thus acquiring a real
speculative value” (47). In fact, premodern Islamicate civilization, which Guénon deems “normal,” made
huge technological advances, as knowledge was understood to be of value only insofar as it was
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beneficial. It is the limitation to—or even prioritization of—material pursuits which appears problematic
to Guénon, just as it does to ʿAbd al-Qâdir (Abd el-Kader 2007 [original Arabic 1855], 83-84).
Once Western European Christendom ceased to be a metaphysically centred traditional
civilization, Guénon (2001 [1927]) suggests that it was no longer able to see beyond the material needs
of the human. Humanism divorced humans from the holistic cosmos in which they are but one type of
life form among many others, united by a metaphysical Absolute:
Humanism was the first form of what has subsequently become contemporary secularism;
and, owing to its desire to reduce everything to the measure of man as an end in himself,
modern civilization has sunk stage by stage until it has reached the level of the lowest
elements in man and aims at little more than satisfying the needs inherent in the material
side of his nature, an aim that is in any case quite illusory since it constantly creates more
artificial needs than it can satisfy. (17)
Guénon’s depiction of Western man situating himself and his needs at the centre of reality gives
further depth to the decolonial argument presented in Chapters Four and Five, according to which white
man has become a false god. In fact, Guénon describes the ideological constructs legitimating the
Eurocentric world-system as idolatrous, arguing that the modern usage of terms such as “Science,”
“Progress,” “Civilization,” “Right,” “Justice,” and “Liberty” are given “a sort of mysterious power,
independent of their meaning.” Wary of how such “high-sounding words” are used, he writes:
They are not really ideas, because many of those who pronounce these words with the
greatest conviction have in thought nothing very clear that corresponds to them; actually
there is nothing there in most cases but the expression, one might even say the
personification, of more or less vague sentimental aspirations. These are veritable idols; the
divinities of a sort of “lay religion,” which is not clearly defined, no doubt, and which cannot
be, but which has none the less a very real existence: it is not religion in the proper sense of
the word, but it is what pretends to take its place; and what better deserves to be called
“counter-religion.” (Guénon 2001 [1924], 27-28)
It is important to note that Guénon is not arguing here that terms which are used in an idolatrous way,
are of themselves meaningless. For instance, he recognizes that civilization is a convenient term of
“recent creation,” with the caveat that there are many civilizations rather than a single universal one
(15). Similarly, he accepts the notion that, as they develop, civilizations witness “progresses” in certain
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areas, “but just as there are progresses, there are also regresses, and sometimes the two are brought
about at one and the same time in different domains” (16). The danger for Guénon arises when terms
such as civilization and progress are used in an absolute sense:
We insist, then, that all this is eminently relative; if the same words are accepted in an
absolute sense they no longer correspond to any reality, and it is then that they come to
represent these new ideas which have existed for barely a century and a half, and then only
in the West. Certainly “Progress” and “Civilization”, with capital letters, may be very
effective in certain sentences, as hollow as they are rhetorical, most suitable for imposing
on a mob, for which words are rather a substitute for thought than a means of expressing
it, thus it is that these two words play one of the most important parts in the battery of
formulas which those “in control” today use to accomplish their strange task of collective
suggestion without which the mentality that is characteristic of modern times would indeed
be short-lived […] No doubt the power of words has been more or less made use of in other
times than ours; but what has no parallel is this gigantic collective hallucination by which a
whole section of humanity has come to take the vainest fantasies for incontestable
realities; and, among these idols of modern worship, the two which we are at the moment
denouncing are perhaps the most pernicious of all. (2001 [1924], 15-16)146
While Guénon’s critique is unique for its implacability as well as for its grounding in nonWestern epistemologies, other Western thinkers share Guénon’s concerns that modernity is grossly
materialistic and anti-spiritual. This is observable in much secular and humanist discourse:
The widespread romantic and late nineteenth century suspicions that the two greatest
accomplishments of European modernization—modern natural science and technology,
and a progressive, liberal democratic culture—were also slowly and inexorably enervating
and spiritually destroying that very culture, have been with us now for some time and seem
to be re-animated periodically in various twentieth century critical methodologies. Some
aspect of this sort of "mood" (the experience of modernization as a kind of spiritual failure,
of modernity as loss) has been quite prominent in much European high culture of the last
hundred years. (Pippin 1999, 495)
However, Guénon’s firm entrenchment in Eastern epistemologies, and his outright rejection of
secularism as a Western aberration, set him apart from other Western thinkers. Even the vociferously
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If we consider Guénon’s depiction of modern idolatry in relation to Islamic critiques of the white man as the
prominent modern/colonial idol, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five, perhaps we can imagine the idolized
White Man heading the idolatrous pantheon of idols such as Civilization and Progress. Moreover, we can apply
Guénon’s argument that idolatry occurs when the relative is given absolute qualities by suggesting that, just as
progress and civilization are not problematic in their relative sense, being a man with pale skin is not a problem in
itself.
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anti-modern traditionalist Catholics147 he frequented in Paris, early in his career, were scandalized by his
praise for non-Christian “Eastern” religions, and assertions that the Church had degenerated into an
utterly anti-intellectual and anti-metaphysical institution. For Guénon, the Catholic Church has become
too Eurocentric and worldly, and Protestantism is a modern deviation (Sedgwick 2004, 29-32).
In rejecting modernity, Guénon is also condemning the colonial world-system. I would
label him a decolonial thinker engaged in a deep epistemic critique of the West. He participates in
the Orientalist discourse of his day as a “subversive author” (Hallaq 2018, 138-178) whose
contrasting of a spiritual East with a materialistic West is neither atemporal nor colonial, since
there was no reason for opposition between East and West as long as there were
traditional civilizations in the West as well as in the East; the opposition has meaning only
as far as the modern West is concerned, for it is far more an opposition between two
mentalities than between two more or less clearly defined geographical entities. In certain
periods, of which the nearest to us is the medieval, the Western mentality was much more
akin, in its more important features, to what is still the Eastern mentality than to what it
has itself become in modern times; Western civilization was then comparable to the
civilizations of the East in the same way as these are comparable to one another. (Guénon
2001 [1927], 22-23)
Once the West ceased to exist as a spiritually healthy civilization in the modern period, it positioned
itself in opposition to the East.148 By deploring this historical development, Guénon is both and antimodern and anti-colonial.
Guénon (2001 [1927]) observed the early signs of what contemporary decolonial analysis presents
as the switch from global colonialism to global coloniality (Grosfoguel 2011), as Western power became
more subtle, insidious, and indeed destructive than in the period of formal colonial administrations:
The modern confusion had its origin in the West, as we have already said, and until the last
few years remained in the West. But now a process is taking place, the gravity of which
should not be overlooked: the confusion is spreading everywhere, and even the East seems
to be succumbing to it. It is true that the encroachments of the West are nothing new, but
hitherto they have been confined to a more or less brutal domination over other peoples,
147

For a historical discussion of Roman Catholic traditionalism and modernism, see Jodock (2000).
A more recent and I would say more complete formulation of this dichotomy is “the West and the Rest” (Hall
2010 [1992]), which also includes the Global South, Indigenous America, and racialized minorities within the core
of the world-system.
148
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whose effects went no deeper than the domain of politics and economics: despite all the
efforts of a propaganda that worked under many different guises, the Eastern attitude of
mind remained unaffected by all deviations, and the ancient traditional civilizations
survived intact. Today, on the contrary, there are Easterners who are more or less
completely 'Westernized', who have forsaken their tradition and adopted all the
aberrations of the modern outlook, and these denatured elements—led astray by the
teachings of European and American universities—have become a cause of trouble and
agitation in their own countries. At the same time, their importance, at least for the
moment, should not be exaggerated: Westerners are apt to imagine that these noisy but
not very numerous individuals represent the East of today, whereas actually their influence
is neither very widespread nor very deep. This mistake is easily explained, since the real
Easterners make no effort at all to become known, and are therefore ignored by the West,
while the modernists, if one may so call them, are the only ones who thrust themselves
forward, make speeches, write, and indulge in all manner of outward activity. It is
nonetheless true that this anti-traditional movement may gain ground, and all eventualities,
even the most unfavorable, must be considered. (97)
The theoretical binary opposing East and West leads Guénon to critique such issues as Westernization,
which are also examined by Marxist critics of colonial alienation, such as Fanon (2002 [1961], 1952). 149
Yet from a Guénonian perspective, beliefs in progress and secularism, which underlie Fanon’s
work, appear rather modern and Western:
What may seem remarkable, and even contradictory, is that these same individuals who
become the auxiliaries of 'Westernism' from an intellectual point of view—or, more exactly,
in opposition to all real intellectuality—sometimes come to the fore as the opponents of
the West in the field of politics. But there is nothing surprising in this, for it is they who
strive to introduce the idea of ‘nation’ in the East, and all nationalism is essentially opposed
to the traditional outlook; they may wish to resist foreign domination, but in order to do so
they make use of Western methods, such as are used by the various Western peoples when
fighting among themselves; and it may be that in this fact lies the justification for their
existence. Indeed, if things have reached a point where the employment of such methods is
inevitable, the sort of work involved can only be carried out by those elements of the
community that have severed all connection with tradition. It is possible therefore that
these elements may be temporarily utilized to this end and then eliminated, like the
Westerners themselves. Moreover, it would be quite logical for the ideas spread by
Westerners to turn against them, since they are of a kind that can never beget anything but
149

Guénon’s somewhat essentialist description of Easterners and Westerners offers an opportunity to critically
reflect on the Western secular genealogy of anti-essentialist critique. Although anti-essentialism has proven
extremely useful in confronting racist colonial discourses such as Orientalism (Said 2003 [1978]), it should be noted
that many subaltern discourses which are equally essentialist can also be useful to this end. Failure to recognize
this might stem from a flaw described by German sociologist and expert on Foucault, Thomas Lemke (2002), as
“essentialization of the critique of essentialism” (61). Lemke further explains: “When social and political scientists
increasingly claim the importance of categories like ‘invention,’ ‘fiction,’ and ‘construction’ for their work, they
often double the theoretical attitude they initially set out to criticize: they hold that the ‘poststructuralist’ or
‘antiessentialist’ stance they adopt does signal a ‘right’ or ‘true’ knowledge” (61).
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division and ruin. It is through these ideas that the modern world will perish in one way or
another; it is of small importance whether this be by way of quarrels among Westerners
themselves, quarrels between nations, between social classes, or, as some people assert,
through the attacks of 'Westernized' Easterners—or, another possibility, as the result of a
cataclysm brought about by the ‘progress of science’; in any case, the dangers facing the
Western world are entirely of its own making and proceed from itself. (2001 [1927], 98)
Relentless, Guénon (2001 [1927]) sees the West as a danger to itself and the world. “The only
question to arise is this: will the East, as a result of modern influence, have to undergo a merely
transitory and superficial crisis, or will the West involve the whole of mankind in its own downfall” (99)?
These passages should not be interpreted as prophesy. Guénon is simply applying his metaphysically
centred analytical framework to the circumstances he observes. And what he observes is raw
destructive colonial power entering a new phase:
But let us cease anticipating and turn to present events: the West is undeniably
encroaching everywhere; its influence first made itself felt in the material domain, since this
comes most directly within its reach, working through conquest by violence or through
commerce, and by securing control over the resources of other countries; but now things
are going still further. Westerners, always animated by that need for proselytism which is
so exclusively theirs, have succeeded to a certain extent in introducing their own
antitraditional and materialistic outlook among other peoples; and whereas the first form
of invasion only affected men's bodies, this newer form poisons their minds and kills all
spirituality. In point of fact, it was the first kind of invasion that made the second one
possible, so that it is ultimately only by brute force that the West has succeeded in
imposing itself upon the rest of the world, as, indeed, must necessarily be the case, since in
this sphere alone lies the superiority of its civilization, so inferior from every other point of
view. (99)150
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Modern materialism, capable of producing weapons of mass destruction and other disruptive technologies, is
different from the usual propensity of humans, throughout history and around the world, to seek material gain
through violent means. Guénon is referring to a qualitatively different outlook. Hallaq (2018) concurs: “A familiar
and persuasive argument in this connection goes to the effect that had other ‘nations,’ ‘states,’ or ‘empires’
possessed such a technology at earlier points in human history, they would have committed the same or similar
acts as did the Nazis or the European colonialists. But this does not account for the very raison d’être and
genealogy of this kind of technology. Nor are the acts of violence committed by means of these weapons incidental
to their invention. The architecture and epistemology of this very invention, on the one hand, and use of these
weapons on the other, are both integral to a structure of thought that made such weapons possible in the first
place” (204). Moreover, the Westernization of other civilizations observed by Guénon entails that other
civilizations now share a similar relation to technology. This can be easily demonstrated by the policies favouring
industrial and military modernization in the periphery, which had already begun in Guénon’s day.
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Furthermore, the epistemic and spiritual Westernization of the world, aptly expressed by the
more recent term coloniality, has eschatological implications for Guénon:
The Western encroachment is the encroachment of materialism under all its guises and
cannot be other than this; none of the more or less hypocritical veils, none of the moralistic
pretexts, none of the humanitarian declamations, none of the wiles of a propaganda that
knows how to be insinuating the better to achieve its destructive ends, none of these things
can gainsay that Western encroachment is the encroachment of materialism; this could be
disputed only by the gullible, or by those who have an interest in aiding a process that is
truly 'satanic' in the strictest sense of the word. (100)151
In the face of such cataclysmic danger, Guénon does propose solutions. Rather than prone
revolutionary politics as do many anti-colonial and even decolonial thinkers, he asserts that
metaphysically-based knowledge can literally save the world:
As we have said many times already, the starting-point of everything should be knowledge;
and thus what appears to be most remote from the practical order is nevertheless the most
potent even within this order, since it is impossible here as anywhere else to accomplish
without it anything of real value or anything that will prove more than a vain and superficial
agitation. But to return more particularly to the question that concerns us here, it may be
said that the modern world would immediately cease to exist if men understood what it
really is, since its existence, like that of ignorance and everything that implies limitation, is
purely negative: it exists only through negation of the traditional and supra-human truth.
Thus, through knowledge, the change could be brought about without the intervention of a
catastrophe, a thing that seems scarcely possible in any other way; is it then not right to say
that such knowledge can have truly incalculable practical consequences? (108)
The task of restoring true liberating knowledge which can guide the West out of its destructive frenzy is
to be carried out by what Guénon calls an elite, not of rich and politically powerful people, but of
spiritually enlightened ones. While he conceives that it is theoretically possible to revive the truly
metaphysical dimension Catholic Church to save Western civilization, Guénon also affirms that the West
might have to be guided by an elite drawing on Eastern spirituality (107-117). But being led by an
Eastern elite could mean the end of Western civilization as we know it. However, some of his Muslim
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In a footnote, Guénon (2001 [1942]) explains that “Satan, in Hebrew, is the 'adversary', the one who 'turns
things upside down'; this is the spirit of negation and subversion, which is identical with the descending or
'downward' tendency (tamas)—'infernal' in the etymological sense of the word—and which governs beings in this
process of materialization, upon which the whole development of modern civilization is based.” (100)
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continuators suggest that Islam, as a universal tradition which is neither fully Eastern or Western, is the
only basis from which to develop a spiritual elite capable of saving the West, and thereby the world
(Valsan 2003 [1953], 171-172, Gilis 1998 [1989], 203-213). Guénon does not state this explicitly but may
allude to it in passages such as the following:
Eastern civilizations are alike traditional in character. To give a more definite idea of these
civilizations, we will repeat here the general division between them that we have already
laid down elsewhere, and which, though possibly somewhat simplified for someone wishing
to enter into detail, is nevertheless correct in its main outlines: the Far East is represented
essentially by the Chinese civilization, the Middle East (that is, India) by the Hindu, and the
Near East by the Islamic. It should be added that in many respects this last is to be regarded
as occupying an intermediate position between East and West, and that it has many
features in common with Western civilization as it was in the Middle Ages; if one considers
Islam in relation to the modern West, however, one cannot but see that it is just as
opposed to it as are the properly Eastern civilizations, with which, from this point of view, it
must therefore be classed. (Guénon 2001 [1927], 22)152
From a Guénonian perspective, it seems reasonable to conclude from this passage that Islam may serve
as the ideal tradition to restore the West as a traditional civilization.

Guénon the Muslim
Although Guénon’s writings only occasionally cite Islamic sources, and hardly address the great
intellectual or cultural diversity within the tradition, he remains a Muslim thinker. After all, he chose to
live the last decades of his life in Egypt, as a practicing Muslim among Muslims. Islam informs his oeuvre
at least implicitly. Moreover, some passages of his writing are explicitly devoted to Islam and lay the
foundations for much of the subsequent development of Traditionalist Islamic discourse in European
languages. Some of these passages were published posthumously in book form alongside reflections on
Taoism (Guénon 1973); others are scattered across his oeuvre.
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Guénon’s East needs to be completed by Indigenous America, Oceania, and the Pacific, for a truly global,
decolonial, and pluriversal critique of Western exceptionalism and world domination.
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For instance, Guénon (1996 [original French 1931) dedicates The Symbolism of the Cross, an
ostensibly Christian topic, to his Sufi shaykh ‘Abd al-Raḥmân ‘Illaysh, and attributes to him “the first idea
of this book” (iv). In fact, Guénon argues that the cross is far from an exclusively Christian symbol:
Most traditional doctrines symbolize the realization of "Universal Man" by a sign which is
everywhere the same, because, as was said at the outset, it is one of those directly
attached to the Primordial Tradition. That sign is the sign of the cross, which very clearly
represents the manner of achievement of this realization by the perfect communion of all
the states of the being, harmoniously and conformably ranked, in integral expansion, in the
double sense of "amplitude" and "exaltation". In fact, this double expansion of the being
may be regarded as taking place horizontally on the one hand, that is, at a certain given
level or degree of existence, and vertically on the other, that is, in the hierarchical
superimposition of all the degrees. Thus, the horizontal direction represents "amplitude" or
integral extension of the individuality taken as basis for realization, an extension which
consists in the indefinite development of a given group of possibilities subject to certain
special conditions of manifestation; and it should be clearly understood that in the case of
the human being, this extension is in no way confined to the corporeal part of the
individuality, but includes all its modalities, of which the corporeal state is properly only
one. The vertical direction represents the hierarchy, likewise and a fortiori indefinite, of the
multiple states, each of which, when similarly considered in its integrality, is one of those
groups of possibilities corresponding to one of the " worlds " or degrees, which are included
in the total synthesis of "Universal Man ". In this cruciform representation, the horizontal
expansion therefore corresponds to the indefinitude of possible modalities of one and the
same state of the being, regarded integrally, and the vertical super-imposition to the
indefinite series of states of the total being. (10-11)
In this extremely dense passage, typical of Guénon’s metaphysical discourse, the horizontal line
represents states of “amplitude” within the world, and the vertical line represents transcendent states
of “exaltation.” Both types of state converge in the cross, which represents the “Universal Man.”
Guénon acknowledges that he is drawing upon Islamic metaphysical formulations and terminology here,
and adds that
this will also explain the words uttered about twenty years ago by a personage who then
occupied a very high position in Islam: " If Christians have the sign of the cross, Moslems
have the doctrine of it." We would add that, in the esoteric order, the relationship between
" Universal Man " and the Word on the one hand, and the Prophet on the other, leaves no
room, as regards the actual basis of the doctrine, for any real divergence between
Christianity and Islam. It would seem that the ancient Persian conception of Vohu Mana
also corresponded to that of "Universal Man". (11)
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Elsewhere, Guénon (2009) discusses Jewish and Islamic formulations of tradition by drawing upon
Arabic and Hebrew etymology:
The term Kabbalah in Hebrew means nothing else than “tradition” in the most general
sense, and although it generally designates the esoteric or initiatic tradition when used with
no further precision, it also sometimes happens that it may be applied to the exoteric
tradition itself […] The root QBL in Hebrew and Arabic signifies essentially the relationship
of two things placed face to face with one another, and from this come all the varied
meanings of the words derived from it, as for example those of encounter and even
opposition. From this relationship also comes the idea of a passage from the one to the
other of the two terms, whence ideas like those of receiving, welcoming, and accepting
expressed in the two languages through the verb qabal; and Kabbalah derives directly from
this, that is to say “that which is received” or transmitted (in Latin traditum) from one to
the other. Here there appears, along with the idea of transmission, that of a succession; but
it must be noted that the primary meaning of the root indicates a relationship that can be
simultaneous as well as successive, spatial as well as temporal. And this explains the double
meaning of the preposition qabal in Hebrew and qabl in Arabic, which signify both “in front
of” (that is, “facing” in space) and “before” (in time); and the close relationship of these two
words, “in front of” and “before”, even in French, clearly shows that there is always a
certain analogy between these two different modalities, one in simultaneity and the other
in succession. This also allows the resolution of an apparent contradiction: although the
usual idea when it comes to a temporal relationship is that of anteriority, which relates
therefore to the past, it also happens that derivatives from the same root designate the
future (in Arabic mustaqbal, that is to say literally that toward which one goes, from
istaqbal, “to go toward”). But do we not also say in French that the past is “before” [avant]
us, and the future is “in front of” [devant] us, which is quite comparable? In sum, it suffices
in every case that one of the two terms considered be “in front of” or “before” the other,
whether it be a question of a spatial relationship or a temporal one. (197-198)
As is common in both Sufism and Kabbalah, Guénon utilizes etymology as a starting point for spiritual
discussions. He further notes that “qiblah is also known in Islam to designate the ritual orientation” and
that “the word qiblah is exactly identical to that of the Hebrew qabalah” usually transliterated in French
or English as Kabbalah (200). In conclusion, he clarifies that
the idea that must especially be highlighted here is that of a regular and uninterrupted
transmission, which is therefore properly expressed by the word “tradition”, as we noted at
the beginning. This transmission constitutes the “chain” (shelsheleth in Hebrew, silsilah in
Arabic) that unites the present to the past and that must continue from the present into the
future; it is the “chain of tradition” (shelsheleth haqabbalah) or the “initiatic chain”. . . ; and
it is also the determination of a “direction” (we find here the meaning of the Arabic qiblah)
which, through the course of time, orients the cycle toward its end and joins it again with
its origin, and which, extending even beyond these two extreme points by the fact that its
principial source is timeless and “non-human”, links it harmoniously to the other cycles,
forming with these a greater “chain”, that which certain Eastern traditions call the “chain of
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worlds” into which by degrees is integrated the entire order of universal manifestation.
(200)
Such passages may give the impression that Guénon (2009) is mainly a theorist. However, he
considers concepts as mere entry points towards the holistic realization of metaphysical realities,
understood as infusing one’s being. “Initiatic doctrine,” from this perspective “has nothing to do with
‘erudition’ and could never be learned by the reading of books in the manner of ordinary or ‘profane’
knowledge” (211). Echoing the voices of countless Sufis from the Junaydî tradition examined in Chapter
One, he affirms that theory only benefits those actively engaged upon a traditional path:
Indeed, it is necessary above all to possess certain innate dispositions or aptitudes which no
amount of effort can replace; then, it is necessary to have an attachment to a regular
silsilah, for the transmission of the “spiritual influence” that is obtained by this attachment
is, as we have already said, the essential condition, failing which there is no initiation, even
of the most elementary degree. This transmission, which is acquired once and for all, must
be the point of departure of a purely inward work for which all the outward means are no
more than aids and supports, albeit necessary, given that one must take the nature of the
human being such as it actually is into account; and it is by this inward work alone that a
being, if capable of it, will ascend from degree to degree, to the summit of the initiatic
hierarchy, to the “Supreme Identity”, the absolutely permanent and unconditioned state
beyond the limitations of all contingent and transitory existence, which is the state of the
true ṣûfî. (211)
It is important to note, that although he considers outward means such as rituals and books to be
secondary in importance to inward work, they are necessary. Laude (2010) explains that Guénon
practiced what he preached, adding that "one of the fundamental features of Guénon’s concept of Islam
is the emphasis placed by him on the necessary complementarity between the legal, religious domain,
and the esoteric, spiritual dimension" (9). Indeed, Guénon (2009) writes about this complementarity:
Of all traditional doctrines, perhaps Islamic doctrine most clearly distinguishes the two
complementary parts, which can be labeled exoterism and esoterism. In Arabic
terminology, these are the sharî‘ah, literally the “great way”, common to all, and the
ḥaqîqah, literally the “inward truth”, reserved to an elite, not because of some arbitrary
decision, but by the very nature of things, since not all men possess the aptitudes or
“qualifications” required to reach knowledge of the truth. To express their respective
“outward” and “inward” natures, exoterism and esoterism are often compared to the
“shell” (qishr) and the “kernel” (lubb), or to the circumference and its center. The sharî‘ah
comprises everything that in Western languages would be called “religious”, and especially
the whole of the social and legislative side which, in Islam, is essentially integrated into the
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religion. It could be said that the sharî‘ah is first and foremost a rule of action, whereas the
ḥaqîqah is pure knowledge; but it must be well understood that it is this knowledge that
gives even the sharî‘ah its higher and deeper meaning and its true raison d’être, so that
even though not all those participating in the religion are aware of it, the ḥaqiqah is
nevertheless its true principle, just as the center is the principle of the circumference. (206)
Guénon then introduces the term ṭarîqa to designate “the ‘way’ or ‘path’ leading from the sharî‘ah to
the ḥaqîqah” (206). Thus, a Sufi “order,” usually designated as a ṭarîqa, can be conceived as a bridge
between external practice and metaphysical realization (206). Moreover, Guénon specifies that the
Arabic term taṣawwuf “can only be translated precisely as ‘initiation’” (207).
By emphasizing the necessity for those seeking spiritual enlightenment of attaching themselves
through initiation to a spiritual order, with a regular silsila (chain) of guides leading back to the Prophet,
Guénon fully inscribes himself in the Shâdhilî school of Junaydî Sufism discussed in Section One. Similarly
to the case of the Algerian ‘Abd al-Qâdir, discussed in Chapter Two, Guénon was already a renowned
metaphysician when he felt it necessary to pledge allegiance to a Shâdhilî shaykh. However, he
recognized the theoretical possibility of spiritual development without initiation, stating that
the necessity for an initiatic affiliation is not one of principle but only of fact, though one
that is nonetheless rigorously indispensable in our present state and which we are
consequently obliged to take as a starting-point. Besides, for the men of primordial times
initiation would have been useless and even inconceivable, since spiritual development in
all its degrees was accomplished among them in an altogether natural and spontaneous
way by reason of their proximity to the Principle; but as a result of the “descent” that has
occurred since then, in conformity with the inevitable process of all cosmic manifestation,
the conditions of the cyclic period in which we find ourselves at present are altogether
different, and this is why the restoration of the possibilities of the primordial state is the
first of the goals that initiation sets for itself. It is therefore in taking account of these
conditions such as they are in fact that we must affirm the necessity of an initiatic
affiliation, and not in a general way and without further qualification as to the conditions of
the age or, even more, of the world concerned. (Guénon 2009, 252)
Following his habit of illustrating general principles with examples from specific traditions, it seems
possible to translate into Islamic terms Guénon’s description of people in “primordial times” who were
too close to the “Principle” to require initiation. It can be argued from a Guénonian perspective that the
first generations of Islam did not require Sufism as an institutionalized spirituality to attain iḥsân.
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However, in periods of general spiritual decline, Guénon (2009) thinks it is best for even inspired and
knowledgeable individuals to evolve within institutional frameworks:
Whoever presents himself as a spiritual teacher, without attaching himself to a definite
traditional form, or without conforming to the rules established by the latter, cannot truly
possess the qualifications he attributes to himself; according to the case, he may either be a
common imposter or a “deluded” person ignorant of the real conditions of initiation, and in
this latter case even more than in the former it is greatly to be feared that he is only too
often nothing more than an instrument in the service of something that he himself may not
suspect. (261-262)
Among those seeking to join an initiatic order embedded in an orthodox tradition, according to
Guénon’s written teachings, many have concluded that Islam with its Sufi orders is the best choice,
although several others have tried to revivify Christian esotericism and metaphysics. If the traditions we
commonly refer to today as world religions are all in a process of gradual decay, as they stray over time
from the metaphysical primordial tradition, the question for a spiritual seeker convinced by Guénon’s
arguments is which tradition to follow now. Guénon was initiated by Muslims, and the tradition whose
prescriptions and prohibitions he ultimately followed was Islam. Considering his aversion to superficial
erudition disconnected from experiential knowledge, it is important to keep his Islamic practice in mind
when reading Guénon. A close reading of Guénon’s oeuvre may lead one to conclude that among the
many traditions to which modern Westerners have access, Islam is the best, and possibly only option.
From a Guénonian perspective many traditions, such as Judaism, and the traditions of India and east
Asia, are best suited to other contexts, despite the validity of their doctrines. Modern Christianity
appears as overly sentimental and removed from pure metaphysics, as understood by Guénon. And he
presents most other Western religious movements, such as spiritualism, occultism, and esotericism as
either pseudo-traditional or anti-traditional. Sedgwick (2004) summarizes how, despite recognizing a
wide variety of traditional doctrines as orthodox, Guénon rejects most contemporary traditional forms
as inoperative or decadent, and accuses other movements of being counterinitiatic, in other words evil:
Guénon never recommended any particular initiation in print, though he excluded
organizations he saw as devoid of initiatic validity—the Catholic Church, various neo-Hindu
312

groups in the West, and of course anything counterinitiatic. He also pointed out the
practical difficulties that anyone not born a Hindu would have in following any form of
Hinduism. By implication, that left only two choices: Freemasonry […] or Guénon's own
personal choice, the Sufi path within Islam. (80)
Guénon seems to accept the possibility that Freemasonry might be regenerated and returned to its
medieval function as an initiatic order suited to a Christian context (ibid., 82-83). However, he becomes
gradually convinced that contemporary Freemason lodges are either unconnected to a regular initiatic
chain, or severely corrupt and far from their metaphysical source (Guénon 1964). By the end of his life,
Guénon had lost hope in the regeneration of Freemasonry, just as his Shâdhilî predecessor ‘Abd al-Qâdir
had become disenchanted after a brief exploration of Freemasonry (Kebache 2012). If even
Freemasonry is no longer viable, one could conclude that only Islam remains a feasible option for
Guénon.
Europeans who have become Muslim after reading Guénon have often joined a Sufi order
affiliated to the Shâdhilî lineage. Guénon never initiated or guided aspiring Sufis. While white converts
to Islam and other non-Western traditions have been known to rapidly take on positions of power as
religious experts, Guénon comported himself as an ordinary Muslim among Muslims during his years in
Cairo, expressing himself authoritatively mostly in writings intended primarily for non-Muslim
Europeans. Although he adhered to another Shâdhilî order, Guénon directed some seekers to Shaykh
Aḥmad al-‘Alawî (1869-1934). This Algerian shaykh was attached to the Darqâwî branch of the Shâdhilî
lineage (Lings 1971), as was his predecessor and compatriot ‘Abd al-Qâdir. Several of ‘Alawî’s disicples
went on to found branches of the order in other parts of the world, such as Syria, Jordan, and indeed
Western Europe and North America. To this day, a significant number of Western Muslims actively
engaged in Traditionalist discourse follow one of several orders connected to a Shâdhili lineage through
‘Alawî’. Some of these are admirers of Guénon and hold Perennialist views (Sedgwick 2005). Others are
less explicitly Guénonian in their approach, and may for example reject Perennialism, but formulate
defenses of tradition and critiques of modernity in typically Guénonian ways (Mathiesen 2013).
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Conclusion
René Guénon is pivotal in the development of Traditionalism in the West because four
intellectual and spiritual currents converge for the first time in his life and work. The first two currents
are European Perennialism and anti-modernism, and the second two are North African traditional Islam
and anti-colonialism. Other currents, such as Vedanta, are also important but for the purpose of this
analysis can be subsumed under his Perennialism as expressions of the primordial tradition. While
Guénon claims to be an expositor of primordial metaphysical truths rather than a theorist, he is clearly
expressing himself within a given context. In fact, he affirms throughout his oeuvre that, when
expressed, universal truths are automatically adapted to various contexts. This is the very reason for the
existence of multiple traditions. Therefore, even a Guénonian should not be opposed to considering
how his thought is both enabled and limited by the grammars, conventions, and genealogies of the
discourses within which it is situated. But it is also important to examine how Guénon influences and to
an extent transforms these discourses. His impact can be attributed to inspiration and intelligence as
well as the unique perspective offered by drawing upon such diverse discourses. Guénon proposes an
inter-epistemic exploration which inevitably broadens the parameter of each discourse and generates
new formulations.
As a Muslim, Guénon followed the Islamic recommendations, prescriptions, and prohibitions he
learned from North African guides and teachers. In fact, he consciously erased himself as a Muslim
among Muslims in Cairo. The Islamic influence in his writing, primarily intended for Western readers, is
deep but subtle. A close examination of this influence reveals that Guénon is in many ways an inheritor
and perpetuator of such North African luminaries as Shâdhilî and ‘Abd al-Qâdir. This is observable in his
metaphysics as well as his insistence on initiation as a necessary precondition for spiritual realization in
times of spiritual decline, such as the modern period. His trenchant critique of modernity is also a
condemnation of European colonialism and imperialism. He can be considered an early decolonial
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Muslim figure in the West, and a successor to ‘Abd al-Qâdir, who ultimately abandoned military anticolonial resistance for an epistemic and spiritual jihad, as observed in Chapter Six.
It is true that Guénon’s writings draw more upon Hinduism than Islam. And aspects of his
oeuvre can be interpreted as Orientalist or diverted towards political directions such as rightwing
extremism. Nevertheless, a close examination of his writing and biography reveals that Orientalist,
colonial, or rightwing readings of Guénon diverge from his intended purposes. Ultimately, Guénon is
neither rightwing nor leftwing. Anyone rigidly committed to such political currents should find some
aspects of his work disturbing and other aspects inspiring. This is arguably because right and left are
modern/colonial ideological constructs in need of decolonization. Traditionalist Islam, inspired by
Guénon, can contribute to such epistemic decolonization.
Guénon’s legacy is mixed but Muslims living in the West represent a core constituency among
his intellectual and spiritual inheritors. While his non-Muslim admirers tend to focus less on the Islamic
aspect of his life and work and more on his Perennialism, many Muslims tend to downplay his
Perennialism. But all are influenced by his views on tradition and modernity (Sedgwick 2004, Piraino
2016). There is a trend among his successors to become attached to African Islamic lineages, such as the
many orders affiliated to the Shadhilî Sufi path, but also schools of Mâlikî jurisprudence and Ash‘arî
theology. Some enthusiastically espouse Guénon’s teachings, but for others his influence is more subtle.
Today, many Muslims in the West only agree with aspects of his oeuvre or would formulate similar ideas
in a more explicitly Islamic way. Others may be unaware that they conceptualize traditional Islam in a
Guénonian manner. They may not even have read him. However, Guénon’s influence does not seem to
have decreased. Rather it has become more discreet as it expands throughout an evolving Islamic
discourse about tradition and modernity. In a way, Guénon has become like one of the roots of a
growing tree—not everybody notices him, but he is present. For instance, although Guénon lived in

315

Europe and Africa during the third phase of the modern/colonial world-system, his legacy has continued
to thrive during the fourth phase, in North American Traditionalist Islamic scholarship.
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Chapter 8- Epistemic Resistance: North American Traditionalist Muslim Critiques of Modernity
ً۬ َ
ُسو ِل ِهۦ ثُ ﱠم ي ُۡد ِر ۡكه
َ ض ُم ٰر
ُ اج ًرا اِلَﻰ ﱣ ِ َو َر
ِ س ِب ۡي ِل ﱣ ِ َي ِج ۡد فِﻰ ۡٱﻷ َ ۡر
ِ غ ًما َكث ِۡي ًرا َوﺳ َعﺔ َو َم ۡن ي ۡﱠﺧ ُرجۡ مِ ۡۢن َب ۡي ِت ِهۦ ُم َه
ِ و َم ۡن ﱡي َه
َ اج ۡر ف ِۡﻰ
َ
ۡ
ُ
َ
ۡ
َۡج
ِ
غف ۡو ًرا ﱠرحِ ي ًما
َ ُ علﻰ ﱣ ؕ َوكَانَ ﱣ
َ ۡٱل َم ۡوتُ فَقَد َوق َع ا ُر ٗه
Whoever emigrates in the way of God will find in the earth many refuges and abundance;
whoever goes forth from his house as an emigrant to God and His Messenger, and then
death overtakes him, his wage is then incumbent upon God; surely God is ever Forgiving,
Merciful. (Qur’an 4:100)
North American Traditionalist Islam is one of many peripheral responses to the transformations
which occurred in the modern/colonial world-system during the current period categorized here as its
fourth phase.153 From a North American perspective, the symbolic start of this phase can be situated in
1965, when the American Immigration and Naturalization Act opened the way for massive immigration
to the United States from non-European countries, including Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and
Asia. Such policy changes, which to a great extent deracialized the eligibility to reside legally in a country
and eventually obtain citizenship, were taking place throughout the core of the world-system, following
the period known in Eurocentric history as World War II.154 Massive migration from the periphery to the
core of the system began at the very moment masses of Western Europeans living in colonial territories
were forced to return to their ancestral homelands by the forces of decolonization sweeping through
most of Asia and Africa.
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Perhaps the end of the Cold War in 1991 or the start of the Global War on Terror in 2001 represent the
transition into the fifth phase of the modern/colonial world-system, but it is too early to tell. The longue durée
trends of history can only be seen at a distance.
154
As mentioned in Chapter Six, from a decolonial perspective the West has been waging war with the Rest for
over five centuries, and on a fully global scale since the nineteenth century. World War I arguably began in 1492
and is ongoing. If World War I never ended there could be no World War II. Looking at the world from an Antillean
standpoint, Aimé Césaire (1972 [1955]) reflected on the rise and fall of Hitler: “Yes, it would be worthwhile to
study clinically, in detail, the steps taken by Hitler and Hitlerism and to reveal to the very distinguished, very
humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler
inside him, that Hitler inhabits him, that Hitler is his demon, that if he rails against him, he is being inconsistent and
that, at bottom, what he cannot forgive Hitler for is not crime in itself, the crime against man, it is not the
humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact
that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of
Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa.” (3). For many on the colonial periphery, the racist horrors of
the so-called Second World War are business as usual.
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However, this process of decolonization remains incomplete. In fact, just as many non-European
peoples put an end to direct political rule by Europeans on a national level, the elites of the worldsystem shifted the structures of global power in order to ensure minimum effective sovereignty in the
peripheries. Throughout the so-called Cold War (c. 1945-1991),155 global coloniality emerged from the
ruins of global colonialism (Quijano 1991, Grosfoguel 2011). Consequently, and to this day, the
modern/colonial power dynamics developed over centuries have been perpetuated despite the relative
success of anti-colonial revolts, armed struggles, and national liberation movements. Faced with an
energized global coloniality, many in the periphery have concluded that colonial forms of knowledge,
which rank the world and its inhabitants along racist lines, must be resisted and countered for the
process of decolonization to be complete. Epistemic resistance is crucial.
Following in the footsteps of the ‘Abd al-Qâdir, who resisted European epistemic hegemony with
vigour for years after his military defeat in Algeria (see Chapter Six), Traditionalist Muslims can be
considered epistemic warriors. Knowledge of the transcendent principles underlying traditional ways of
being and behaving is essential in the struggle to survive annihilation of Muslims as a distinct umma, or
global community. Traditionalist survival strategies are distinct from fundamentalist and modernist
ones. Moreover, within each of these three broad categories, diverse political and social attitudes can
be observed, which range from active militancy to prudent isolation from society.
The Traditionalist Islamic currents examined here, whose intellectual genealogies can be traced at
least partially to Guénon, converge in a distinct discourse. Born in Western Europe, this discourse
eventually spread to other continents, often as a discreet undercurrent within other discourses, such as
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Once again, terminology is not neutral. The war opposing a Soviet-centred communist block to a U.S. American
capitalist one may have seemed ‘cold’ in the core and to some extent the semi-periphery of the world-system, but
it was scorching in Vietnam, Lebanon, Algeria, the Congo, Nicaragua, Haiti, and a long list of other peripheral
locations where people’s flesh was regularly burned by explosives, napalm, and other technologies of death.
Through proxy wars, the heat produced in the modern/colonial core and semi-periphery was largely exported to
the periphery.
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religious studies. It emerged in North America in the 1950s and 1960s (Sedgwick 2004, 148-149). From
the 1970s until the end of the century, Traditionalist Islam became well established in the United States,
largely thanks to the efforts of the founder of the Maryamiyya Sufi Order, Frithjof Schuon (1907-1998).
Schuon attracted many adepts, particularly among white intellectuals, but also among Westerneducated non-European Muslims, such as his Iranian American disciple Nasr.
While Nasr and other scholars attached to the Maryamiyya present Islam as one perennial
expression of universal truth (Sedgwick 2004, 161-170), there are also many non-Perennialist Muslim
scholars, in North America and elsewhere, who share much of Guénon’s understanding of tradition and
modernity. Despite their divergences with Perennialists about the contemporary validity of traditions
other than Islam, they can be categorized as Traditionalists, or at least active participants in
Traditionalist Islamic discourse. Moreover, there are movements which draw upon both Perennialism
and Islam, especially Sufism, which are not Traditionalist. These Universalist movements, such as the
Sufi Order of the West discussed in Chapter Six, do not consider attachment to a normative tradition,
and the application of its religious norms, as necessary conditions for spiritual realization. However, such
views are rejected by both Perennialist and non-Perennialist Traditionalist Muslims. Interestingly,
Traditionalist Perennialism and Universalist Sufism are especially popular among whites. A decolonial
analysis can provide some explanation for this tendency.
In the age of global coloniality, Western elites in the core of the world-system and their
Westernized allies in the periphery often categorize Muslims according to a reductionist good/bad
binary (Mamdani 2004, Birt 2006). In such ideological constructions, ‘good’ Muslims are broadly
associated with whiteness, Western power, spirituality, liberalism, and capitalism, whereas ‘bad’
Muslims are associated with blackness, brownness, legalism, fundamentalism, and socialism. Moreover,
‘good’ Muslims are moderate, whereas ‘bad’ ones are extreme, since too much Islam is presumed to be
undesirable. Naturally, such constructs are unstable and change according to geopolitical and social
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circumstances. Nevertheless, if one observes mainstream Western and Westernized discourses, ‘bad’
Muslims are generally associated with several of the negative qualities listed above, and ‘good’ ones
with several of the positive ones. Another way of separating ‘good’ from ‘bad’ Muslims according to this
binary is by associating egalitarian understandings of gender, sexuality, and family structure with ‘good’
Muslims and hierarchical ones with ‘bad’ ones. Accordingly, when examining how Muslim identities are
constructed within modern/colonial discourses, it is useful to consider questions of gender, sexuality,
family structure, class, and race. On one end of the spectrum, one can imagine a caricatural
representation of the ‘good’ Muslim, in twenty-first century North America, as a gay, white, Universalist
Sufi, feminist, and of the ‘bad’ Muslim as a heterosexist, dark-skinned, polygamous, fundamentalist.
Such reductionist binaries also affect North American Traditionalist Muslims, whose responses to
coloniality/modernity are examined throughout this chapter, in relation to other Muslim responses.

Decolonization and Migration
The fourth phase of the modern/colonial world-system has been marked by huge population
displacements. In previous phases, Europeans migrated in large numbers to the colonial and imperial
peripheries. But in the mid-twentieth century, many white European settlers, including those born and
raised in the colonial periphery, were forced to return to Europe when anti-colonial struggles
throughout much of Asia and Africa resulted in the creation of modern states led by indigenous elites. 156
However, the process of colonization and genocide was too advanced by this time for an exodus of
white colonial settlers from South Africa and the Americas, as well as Oceania and much of the Pacific
(Wolfers 2012). At the same time, many non-Europeans migrated to the West in search of better
material conditions than those their newly independent nations could offer. In fact, these so-called post-
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In some cases, settlers from other parts of the colonial periphery, such as many South Asians in East Africa, also
had to emigrate after the end of direct colonial rule.
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colonial polities, modeled on the Western nation-state, never gained effective independence from
modern/colonial power structures, despite the heroic struggles of their peoples and the significance of
their political accomplishments.
Decolonization and migration, during and after the so-called Cold War, need to be understood in
the context of a reconfiguration of the global order, which allowed for the perpetuation and even
consolidation of modern/colonial power dynamics in the face of challenges from the periphery:
The old national liberation and socialist strategies of taking power at the level of a nationstate are not sufficient, because global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or
absence of a colonial administration or to the political/economic structures of power. One
of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of
colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth
of a “postcolonial” world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place
over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of
the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same “colonial power
matrix.” With juridical-political decolonization, we moved from a period of “global
colonialism” to the current period of “global coloniality.” Although “colonial
administrations” have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is
politically organized into independent states, non-European people are still living under
crude European/Euro-American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of
European versus non-Europeans remain in place […] (Grosfoguel 2011, 14)
In this passage, Grosfoguel succinctly describes the transition from “global colonialism” to “global
coloniality.” The link between the historical survey presented in the first three sections of this
dissertation and the contemporary debates analysed in Section Four cannot be fully apprehended
without understanding the crucial nuances in terminology Grosfoguel uses to describe this
transition:
Coloniality allows us to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the
end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the
modern/colonial capitalist world-system. “Coloniality of power” refers to a crucial
structuring process in the modern/colonial world-system that articulates peripheral
locations in the international division of labor with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy and
Third World migrants’ inscription in the racial/ethnic hierarchy of metropolitan global cities.
Peripheral nation-states and non-European people live today under the regime of ‘global
coloniality’ imposed by the United States through the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank (WB), the Pentagon, and NATO. Peripheral zones remain in a colonial
situation, even though they are not any longer under a colonial administration. (14-15)
321

As people on the periphery have become increasingly aware of how little sovereignty their
societies have effectively achieved, many have concluded that the only way to improve their material
conditions is to migrate to the centres of wealth and power in the core of the world-system. Peripheral
peoples often have little opportunity to enjoy the benefits of national independence under the despotic
rule of Westernized elites, educated in the West, speaking European languages, and following sociocultural fashions from the West. Facing severe economic and political difficulties in their homelands,
many prefer to face the vicissitudes of life as racialized minorities in the West. While Westernized elites
represent pockets of the core within the periphery of the world-system, many of the neighbourhoods in
Western metropoles—such as London, Paris, New York, Toronto, or Sydney—are peripheral pockets
within the core.
Decolonial world-systems analysis provides a useful framework to theorize the role of migration
in the shift from global colonialism to global coloniality, because it demonstrates how the radical
reconfiguration of human communities and territory did not fundamentally transform modern/colonial
hierarchies. For instance, the association of racism and eugenics with Hitlerism made it less acceptable
after the so-called World War II to propose biological explanations for the division of human beings
according to class, race, gender, religion, and other such categories. It became more common to
categorize groups with lower status as socially or culturally deprived, rather than biologically depraved.
Yet, the premises of such power dynamics were not undone by the replacement of biological
explanations by social and cultural ones. The same usual suspects have continued to be constructed as
inferior (McCloud 2007, 75-101). Non-European minorities living in Western nations are among those
usual suspects, now victims of a dominant cultural racist discourse which
does not even mention the word “race.” It is focused on the cultural inferiority of a group of
people. Usually it is framed in terms of the inferior habits, beliefs, behaviors, or values of a
group of people. It is close to biological racism in the sense that cultural racism
naturalizes/essentializes the culture of the racialized/inferiorized people. (Grosfoguel and
Mielants 2006, 4)
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Minorities racialized as non-white in the West necessarily experience migration, adaptation, and
settlement differently than do minorities racialized as white. Therefore, different conceptual lenses
need to be applied in each case:
Migrants do not arrive in an empty or neutral space, but in metropolitan spaces that are
already ‘polluted’ by racial power relations with a long colonial history, colonial imaginary,
colonial knowledge and racial/ethnic hierarchies linking to a history of empire; in other
words, migrants arrive in a space of power relations that is already informed and
constituted by coloniality. (Grosfoguel, Oso and Christou 2015, 7)
To begin the task of differentiating migrants through a decolonial framework, three broad
categories of migrant in the core of the world-system can be identified, which can then be further
nuanced through intersectional analyses which consider such factors as class, gender, sexuality, and of
course religion. The first broad category is composed of “colonial/racial subjects of empire”, which can
be described as the domestic minorities that were directly colonised and that live now inside the
Empires” (8). These populations are central to the “colonial imaginary, racial/ethnic hierarchies and
racist discourses” since “[t]he ‘coloniality of power’ of the metropolitan country is organised around and
against these colonial subjects with a long history inside the empire.” This category includes Northwest
Africans in France and South Asians in Britain. In Canada and the United States, it includes Indigenous
peoples, African Americans, and people from the Caribbean and Latin America. People belonging to
these communities often find themselves “at the bottom of the urban racial/ethnic hierarchies even if in
many cases they are formal citizens of the metropolitan country where they live” (8).
The second broad category in this conceptual framework is designated by generic term
“immigrants.” It refers to migrants from Europe or of European origin, who generally “experience
upward social mobility in the first or second generation” thanks to their capacity to assimilate into “the
dominant White metropolitan populations” (8). Anti-communist Cubans or Japanese executives in the
United States are “honorary whites” according to this categorization. When migrants benefit from white
privilege, they are more easily able to improve their social and economic conditions in their countries of
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adoption. Any analysis of migration and immigration which neglects these colonial and racial aspects will
unfairly compare various communities and tend to consider adaptation strategies or cultural traits to
explain their successes or defeats rather than their positionality within the modern/colonial order.
The third category is “colonial immigrants” from the global periphery “who, although never
directly colonised by the metropolitan country they migrate to, at the time of arrival are ‘racialised’ in
similar ways to the ‘colonial/racial subjects of empire’ who were already there” (Ibid., 8). People from
the Southern Mediterranean are all seen as Algerians in Paris or Turks in Berlin. All Latinos become
Puerto-Rican in New York or Mexican in Los Angeles. And people of Sub-Saharan ancestry become
Haitian in Montreal.
Whether they live in the countries which once colonized their ancestral lands, or those which
colonized other lands, people of non-European ancestry living in the West are “policed in their
communities, incarcerated in large numbers, discriminated against in housing and labour markets, etc.
This is not due to a problem of ‘terrorism’ or ‘illegality’ as immigrants, but rather of racial
discrimination” (ibid., 9). The hardships people from the modern/colonial periphery endure when they
migrate to the core contrast enormously with those from the core seeking a better life in the periphery,
where they are categorized as expats rather than economic migrants or refugees. It is true that “expats”
usually intend to return to their homelands eventually, but many “colonial immigrants” also dream of
returning home one day. But just as the conditions of departure are different depending on one’s
position in the world-system, so are the possibilities of return.
While it is important to consider the motivations of migrants, it is also crucial to examine the
interests of recipient societies. Immigrants were needed throughout the West to rebuild after the great
war. They represented crucial human resources in a period of prolonged economic boom which
culminated in the sixties. The American Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, which loosened
restrictions on immigration to the United States from the global periphery, was one of many similar laws
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being enacted in the core. Canada began to officially represent itself as multicultural and religiously
plural, rather than Christian and white, in the mid sixties, and adopted a new immigration policy in 1967
(Miedema 2005). As most of its colonies reclaimed their political sovereignty in the postwar period,
Great Britain allowed former colonial subjects to enter the United Kingdom through a long and often
contradictory legislative processes which fluctuated between assuaging xenophobic voters and
attracting much-needed human resources. In the late sixties, a clear policy of multiculturalism began to
be defined in Britain. However, ethnic and religious ‘others,’ such as Muslims, were simultaneously
included and excluded by a multicultural discourse representing them as minorities, essentially different
from mainstream society and culture (Poynting and Mason 2007, 64-66). During the same period,
Australia gradually ended its ‘White Australia Policy,’ implemented in 1901. In order to meet enormous
labour demands, it moved towards a multicultural policy despite considerable and ongoing resistance
(ibid., 66-67).
In short, the massive political decolonization of non-European territories in the mid-twentieth
century forced the world-system to adapt in order to survive, and perhaps even be invigorated. Western
and Westernized elites still needed cheap labour and physical resources from the global peripheries.
Consequently, the world-system was restructured by allowing peripheral minority pockets within the
core, and by putting in place an international system which distributed power unevenly among nations.
Peripheral nations, which became known as the Third World, were dominated by First World/core ones
and Second World/semi-peripheral ones, namely the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree China.
Institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization considerably restricted the sovereignty of peripheral nations. During
the so-called Cold War, Westernized capitalist or socialist local elites ruled over the same peoples
recently governed by European foreigners. These non-European elites were generously compensated in
their homelands with the same sort of privileges European overlords and settlers used to have.
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Muslims have mostly continued to be positioned in the periphery of the world-system in the age
of global coloniality, as they were in the age of global colonialism. Despite the shift from biological
racism to cultural racism in dominant liberal discourse, and even when they migrate from Islamicate
countries to the West, Muslims continue to be victims of Islamophobia:
In the new cultural racist discourses, religion has a dominant role. The contemporary tropes
about “uncivilized,” “barbarian,” “savage,” “primitive,” “underdeveloped,” “authoritarian,”
and “terrorist” inferior people are today concentrated in the “other’s” religious practices
and beliefs. By focusing on the “other’s” religion, the Europeans, Euro-Americans and EuroIsraelis manage to escape being accused of racism. However, when we carefully examine
the hegemonic rhetoric in place, the tropes are a repetition of old biological racist
discourses and the people who are the target of Islamophobic discourses are the traditional
colonial subjects of the Western Empires, that is, the “usual suspects.” (Grosfoguel and
Mielants 2006, 4)
To be clear, disagreeing with Islamic certain doctrines or practices does not make one a racist. If it did,
all non-racists would become Muslim. However, a decolonial analysis of Muslim experiences in the
development of the modern/colonial world-system over six centuries, such as the one proposed in this
dissertation, reveals how “Islamophobia and cultural racism are entangled and overlapping discourses.”
As discussed in Chapter Four, premodern religious disagreements have long become reframed along
racist lines. Today, it “is absolutely impossible to de-link the hate or fear against Muslims from racism
against non-European people” and the “association of Muslims with the colonial subjects of Western
empires in the minds of white populations is simply a given.” Islamophobia is inextricably connected to
“an old colonial racism that is still alive in the world today, especially in the metropolitan centers” (4).
Moreover, this racism perpetuates itself and adapts to different political regimes in the West. For
instance, the “abstract ideals” of both “the British multicultural model or the French Republican model”
are severely contradicted and arguably destroyed by the “corrosive process” of racism (ibid., 5). What
has been labelled “boutique multiculturalism” (Fish 1997) celebrates the quaint aspects of diversity—
from ethnic restaurants to colourful costumes—without allowing Eurocentric ways of knowing, being,
and behaving to be fundamentally unsettled or decentred:
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In the case of the Anglo-American world, multiculturalism and diversity operate to conceal
white supremacy. The racial minorities are allowed to celebrate their history, traditions and
identity as long as they leave intact the white supremacy’s racial/ethnic hierarchy of the
status quo. The dominant system in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States is
an institutionalized and concealed “white afﬁrmative action” that beneﬁts whites on a daily
basis and at all levels of social existence. It is so powerful that it has become normalized to
the point of not being stated as such. (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006, 5)
The French Republican model attempts to avoid the conflictual aspects of multiculturalism, which it
perceives as communitarianism, by proposing a model of equality based on the notion that cultural and
religious differences should be relegated to the private sphere. Neutrality becomes the guarantor of
equality in the public sphere. However, the behaviours and manners of white men become the default
expression of this alleged neutrality. In practice, the theoretical response to communitarianism becomes
the imposition on all communities of white male communitarianism, or “communautarisme masculin
blanc” (5). By concealing their positionality in terms of race, culture, gender, sexuality, class, and other
social formations, dominant elites can accuse marginalized populations of communitarianism and
perpetuate a unique type of “racially-blind racism” which is both “institutionalized and normalized” (5).
In other words, it is supported by a series of social norms and even laws, such as those regulating which
type of clothing Muslim women are allowed or not to wear in various circumstances.
In Canada, the Anglo-American multicultural model of institutionalized racism dominates,
except in the province of Quebec, inhabited by a French-speaking majority, where the French
Republican model is also influential. However, focusing on this internal divide conceals the fact that the
entire country is a settler colony in which Indigenous peoples continue to be victims of genocide, and
non-Indigenous racialized minorities, including Muslims, continue to face discrimination (Zine 2012,
Helly 2004).157 While national and regional particularities are significant, they remain connected to race
formations and articulations of modern/colonial power.

157

The old soft racism of White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites, against Catholics and Europeans from the
Mediterranean, informs popular tropes in much of Canada according to which French-speaking Quebeckers are
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The Cold War Context
During the so-called Cold War, a specific type of racializing discourse emerged which reduced
Muslim identities to a good/bad binary. In the First World, which represented the core of the worldsystem, ‘good’ Muslims were constructed as religious, capitalist, pro-Western, and against Godless
communism. They were opposed to socialist and nationalist ‘bad’ Muslims, who resisted Western
hegemony. In the semi-peripheral Second World, the same binary was simply reversed, ascribing
goodness and badness to the opposite camps (Mamdani 2004). Like other peoples in the global
periphery, Muslims were pressured to take sides between the U.S. American-led First World and the
Soviet-led Second World. At the Asian African Conference of Bandung, in 1955, Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser (Jamâl ʿAbd al-Nâṣir, 1918-1970, r. 1954-1970) was one of the many leaders of
recently decolonized states promoting a common front of Third World countries refusing to enter
exclusive alliances with either of the two superpowers. This project of global resistance from the
periphery was formalized in 1961, through the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement. However,
the periphery was not able to resist the enormous might of the superpowers, supported by
transnational and global institutions which perpetuated colonial power dynamics. Muslim such as
Nasser shared the same fate as other Third World leaders who eventually had to choose a side,
generally through coercion.
In the Islamicate world, Nasser became the champion of socialism and Arab nationalism. He
influenced Arab leaders such as the Libyan Muʿammar al-Qadhdhâfî, (1942-2011, r. 1969-2011), the
Algerian Ahmed Ben Bella, (Aḥmad bin Billa, c. 1916-2012, r. 1962–1965), and the Iraqi Ṣaddâm Ḥusayn
(1937-2006, r. 1979-2003). The Soviet Union and to an extent China offered such leaders and their
regimes protection in international organizations like the United Nations, as well as various forms of

less tolerant and indeed more racist than English-speaking Canadians. Anti-Quebec or anti-French soft racism can
be understood as a variation of the old Black Legend, in which the British relieved their colonial conscience by
positing that Iberian colonialism was more brutal.
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economic, military, and educational assistance. Capitalist regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and other petromonarchies, as well as a weakened post-Nasser Egypt, benefitted from similar protection and assistance
from the United States and its Western allies. Yet, superpower patronage came with a price. Third World
elites were severely pressured, through fear and enticement, to serve the interests of their powerful
patrons, often to the detriment of their own national interests and sovereignty. Moreover, the United
States and the Soviet Union exacerbated conflicts and fought proxy wars throughout the Third World.
For example, they were involved in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88),
and the endless and ongoing Arab-Israeli wars begun in 1948, with the establishment of a settler
colonial state in Palestine.
Of all the proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, the most globally
significant was perhaps the first phase (1978-1992) of the protracted Afghanistan War (Gibbs 2000,
Mamdani 2004, Rosa 2006). This conflict is ongoing. Its most recent phase, which began with the U.S.
American invasion of the country in 2001, is in many ways a continuation of events which began with a
Marxist coup d’état in April 1978. Nearly immediately, the new Afghani regime faced several insurgent
groups fiercely opposed to communism. Most of these groups framed their struggle as an Islamic jihad
(jîhâd), and were referred to as mujahideen (mujâhidîn, “people engaged in jihad”). In December 1979,
the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to suppress these mujahideen. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017),
then National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter (r. 1977-1981), later explained the importance
of these events within the U.S. American grand strategy to win the so-called Cold war. Brzezinski’s
revelations during a 1998 interview are significant enough to merit a long quote:
Question: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs that the
American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan six months
before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to
President Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin began
during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24,
1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July
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3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the
pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the President in which I
explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military
intervention [emphasis added].
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself
desired this Soviet entry into war and looked for a way to provoke it?
B: It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly
increased the probability that they would [emphasis added].
Q: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight
against secret US involvement in Afghanistan, nobody believed them. However, there was
an element of truth in this. You don’t regret any of this today?
B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing
the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets
officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: “We now have the
opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war” [emphasis added]. Indeed, for almost 10
years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime, a conflict that
brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.
Q: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given
arms and advice to future terrorists?
B: What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet
empire? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold
war? (Gibbs 2000, 242-241)
Mahmood Mamdani (2004) offers a thorough examination of the final years of the Cold War,
when “America tried to harness extreme versions of political Islam in the struggle against the Soviet
Union” (119). For more than a decade, the United States, along with allies such as Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, recruited, trained, and financed international Muslim militants to join the Afghan Jihad.
Motivated by extreme versions of Wahhâbîsm and similar fundamentalist ideologies, these militants
saw Afghanistan as a steppingstone in a broader Islamic war against evil and Godlessness. Such so-called
mujahideen—the legitimacy of their jihad is highly contested among Muslims— were described by
President Ronald Regan in 1985 as “the moral equivalent of America’s founding fathers” (119). They
were trained to fight mercilessly, without differentiating military from civilian targets. “The
legitimization of violence against civilians was a direct consequence of something the CIA manual called
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training in ‘strategic sabotage’” (169). These terrorist techniques included kidnap of women, rape,
marriages of convenience, and other forms of violence against civilians.
Yet, there were other mujahideen in Afghanistan, who rooted their struggle in regional Islamic
traditions rather than extreme internationalist ideologies:
The traditionalists generally came from the religious leadership, whereas the ideologues
came mainly from the ranks of political intellectuals. Traditionalists tended to treat
doctrinal distinctions—as those between Shi’ah and Sunni—as non-political; in contrast, the
tendency of ideologues was to turn doctrinal and cultural differences into political divisions.
(154)
Mamdani (2004) observes that these traditionalists received relatively little foreign assistance although
they were deeply engrained in Afghani society and culture. Their leadership “came from the historic
elite of Afghanistan, who were either heads of Sufi orders (the Qadiriyya or the Naqshabandi tariqa) or
traditional alims (legal scholars) versed in Islamic jurisprudence” (156). However, U.S. American,
Pakistani, and Saudi intelligence agencies saw radical Sunni extremists, engaged in an international
struggle, as a counter force to both Iranian Shi‘a revolutionary forces and the Soviet Union. The
international anti-Soviet coalition “marginalized mainstream traditionalist/nationalist Muslim
organizations and elevated highly ideological but exiled Islamist factions, even if they were on the
fringes of Afghan society” (156). For tactical reasons, the United States even tolerated anti-American
groups.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving many of
its allies on the ground to fend for themselves in the ensuing power vacuum, and opening the way for
many of the hardcore internationalist mujahideen to leave the country. These foreign fighters
proceeded to globalize the terrorist techniques they had developed with U.S. American support. Their
efforts culminated in the 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. Eight years into the Global
War on Terror, in 2009, U.S. American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognized that her country was
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partly responsible for the rise of groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Her declaration in Congress
was quite candid:
I mean, let's remember here, the people we are fighting today, we funded 20 years ago.
And we did it because we were locked in the struggle with the Soviet Union. They invaded
Afghanistan and we did not want to see them control central Asia. And we went to work.
And it was President Reagan in partnership with the Congress led by Democrats who said,
you know what? Sounds like a pretty good idea. Let's deal with the ISI [Inter-Services
Intelligence of Pakistan] and the Pakistani military and let's go recruit these Mujahideen.
And that's great.
Let's get some to come from Saudi Arabia and other places importing their Wahhabi brand
of Islam so that we can go beat the Soviet Union. And guess what? They retreated. They
lost billions of dollars and it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. So there is a very strong
argument which is it wasn't a bad investment to end the Soviet Union, but let's be careful
what we sow because we will harvest. (Cable News Network 2009)
Clinton’s words describe how Afghanistan was caught amid a struggle between modern/colonial
superpowers. Afghanistan’s previously pluralistic society, organized through localized and decentralized
traditional networks, was destroyed by globalized ideologies such as Marxism, capitalism, and Islamic
fundamentalism. Muslims throughout the world suffered a similar fate, to greater or lesser degrees.
During the so-called Cold-War, Muslims increasingly fled the chaos of the global periphery by
migrating to such places as Canada and the United States. Often, they benefitted from the freedoms of
the global core to pursue political projects for which they could be persecuted at home. Two opposing
Cold War ideologies, leftist secularism and fundamentalist Islamic revivalism, were especially influential
among the new wave of Muslim students, refugees, and immigrants to North America. The first
ideological tendency included various types of socialists, such as Arab nationalists and communists, and
the second included Wahhâbîs, Salafîs, and other fundamentalists committed to a global Pan-Islamic
revival. Some revivalist projects were explicitly political and others not. Moreover, not all political
revivalists condoned violent militancy. Often, the revivalists were enthusiastic proponents of neoliberal
capitalism, following the model of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States espousing both revivalism and
capitalism. Leftist secularists tended to engage in secular political, social, or cultural associations, such as
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the Arab Students Association. Revivalist Muslim students played the crucial role in the emergence of
explicitly Islamic national and continental institutions such as the Muslim Students Association and the
Islamic Society of North America (GhaneaBassiri 2010, 265-270, Hussain 2001, 121-127).
Many devout Muslims felt marginalized by the newly arrived revivalists, who were often wellorganized, university educated, and financially comfortable. Those marginalized included second or third
generation immigrants as well as Black American Muslims, which are distinct from more recent African
immigrants who do not share the Black American cultural heritage. It was perhaps easier for newly
converted Black Muslims to embrace the dominant revivalism, than for those who had practiced Islam
earlier in the century. The same logic also applies to white converts. Moreover, many newly arrived
Muslim immigrants, including those with leftist political views, remained devout and committed to their
faith, but did not espouse Pan-Islamic revivalist views. Non-revivalist Muslims often felt pressured to
either silently accept the leadership of revivalists, remain in ethnically or racially homogenous Islamic
spaces, or worship in the privacy of their homes.
Older Islamic institutions in North America, which had often accommodated a great diversity of
religious and cultural expressions, were increasingly taken over by revivalists with negative views of
Sufism and the traditional diversity of legal and theological schools. For instance, historian Sally Howell
(2014) contends that this was the case in Detroit:
Nowhere is documentary evidence of old Muslim American institutions richer than in
Detroit, where new arrivals from Europe, Asia, Africa, and the American South converged to
build the nation’s first mosque in 1921; launch the NOI [Nation of Islam] in 1930; develop
immigrant Muslim enclaves in the 1930s that still exist today; establish a network of Muslim
institutions to teach and sustain the faith; and create a vibrant Muslim American
consciousness that, by the 1950s, had given rise to prominent local and national
organizations that could accommodate several distinct Islamic traditions. (2)
This pluralism was put to the test in the late twentieth-century, when a new type of Muslim began to
take over or marginalize existing institutions in Detroit or build new ones with a more restrictive
outlook:
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By the late 1970s, new immigrants from South Asia and the Middle East and new black
converts to Islam were rapidly becoming the majority of US Muslims. In Detroit, as
elsewhere, these new American Muslims came to view the city’s established Muslim
institutions as undesirable, representative of an older, Americanized Islam that now looked
alien, assimilationist, accommodationist, and increasingly unorthodox. This shift in
perspective coincided with developments among Muslims overseas, as their religious values
once located most immediately in communal ritual, a shared social life, and (for rank-andfile Muslims) a comparatively unlettered relationship to the Qurʾan and religious learning—
in short, a tradition-oriented, old Islam— gave way to a more educated, activist, reformoriented, and objectified understanding of the faith. This new Islam was articulated through
clearly delineated intellectual and political movements that stressed the primacy of
scriptural interpretation as a guide for everyday life and revivalist modes of religious
authority and practice. (3)
Such trends did not only occur in Detroit. For instance, Edmonton, which is home to the first
official mosque in Canada (Waugh 2018), witnessed similar waves of immigration during and after the
Cold War, and the development of a similarly restrictive form of institutional leadership. Canadian
ethnomusicologist and specialist of Sufism Michael Frishkopf (2009) observes:
I have heard even practicing Muslim friends and acquaintances complaining about “Salafi”
attitudes prevailing in local Edmonton Sunni mosques. Sermons often (though not always)
exhibit a conservative and sometimes even intolerant line: railing against liberal society;
warning against making non-Muslim friends; generally opposing “us” (Muslims) to “them”
(others)… Sufism is not acknowledged in official mosque discourse, and informally
statements rejecting Sufism (e.g. “Sufism has nothing to do with Islam”) are commonly
heard. Even when not hostile to outsiders, the wisdom of caution lies heavily upon the
community’s public practice. (49)
Frishkopf relates how Muslim devotional, folkloric, or classical music are generally not welcome in
Islamic spaces such as mosques and schools.158 He further remarks:
Such an Islam is not to the liking of several immigrant Muslim acquaintances whose concept
of Islam remains defined by practices they grew up with. Nor is it acceptable to the more
liberal-minded among them. Some of these have therefore abandoned the mosques.
Others attend Friday prayers as a matter of habit, without expecting much spiritual
sustenance. Among the second (and subsequent) generation Muslim community, however,
the “silence of the mosque” is more accepted, since many have not experienced anything
else. (50)
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Perhaps Edmonton’s Islamic spaces are becoming more inclusive today. In 2018 and 2019, I attended several
gatherings in Edmonton, which featured chanting and poetry by Muslims from various traditions, including Sufism.
I also noticed that such events were promoted in local mosques and sometimes even held there.
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In North American contexts dominated by such exclusivist Islamic leadership, music and other
artforms have tended to become detached from their traditional Islamic contexts. Instead, they are
frequently repackaged as cultural expressions, to be appreciated in such secular spaces as museums and
universities. In other instances, they are commodified for the global market:
Such music is not manufactured for Muslims per se, but rather for World Music consumers,
the vast majority of whom are non-Muslim Europeans and North Americans of eclectic
musical tastes. “World Music” is thus not music of the world as such, but music drawing
upon the vast range of non-Western sounds—suitably selected, transformed, and fused so
as to appeal to a Western audience. (66)
World Music responds to a niche market of “music consumers” in search of traditional “authenticity,”
“exoticism,” “spirituality” and “creative fusion.” It allows “the global music industry” to proclaim “its
respect for cultural diversity, while simultaneously closing the leaks in its oligarchic control” (66). 159
Yet, although traditional Islam has been embattled by the forces of global capitalism and
reductionist ideologies hardened during the so-called Cold War, it has survived with its dizzying diversity
of spiritual and cultural expressions. It is true that, despite intense efforts by Muslims towards
decolonization, modern/colonial ideological constructs deeply colonized their ways of knowing, being,
and behaving. For instance, the battle between secularism and fundamentalism has divided many
Muslim households on every continent, including North America. But traditional Islam has not
disappeared. It has continued to evolve and adapt in a variety of ways to the challenges of the age.
Champions of this traditional diversity can be described as traditionalists.

Traditionalism Comes to America: Perennialists and Non-Perennialists
A central argument in this dissertation is that traditionalism, as a broad trend, is a response to
the modern/colonial disruption of tradition, and that North American Traditionalist Islam is a specific
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Similarly, the Sufi poetry of Rumi (Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî, 1207-1273) has become commodified as a universalist
spirituality packaged mostly for middle-and-upper-class white liberal Westerners (Sharify-Funk, Dickson and Xavier
2018, 140-181).
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discourse partly inspired by the thought of René Guénon. Participants in this discourse, who promote
traditional Islam and are critical of modernity, do not all identify as Traditionalist Muslims. In fact, many
are critical of certain ideas within Traditionalist discourse, especially the Perennialist notion that
religious traditions other than Islam remain effective paths to salvation and spiritual enlightenment
today. Nevertheless, Guénonian influences are observable in the scholarship of many North American
Muslims promoting tradition, who neither identify as Traditionalist nor as Perennialist. While it is
important to recognize different positions within North American Traditionalist Islam, the focus here is
on the underlying critique of modernity and its decolonial implications.
In the second half of the twentieth century, Schuon was the most influential early figure to
introduce Guénonian notions of tradition to North Americans. During a visit to Algeria in 1932, Schuon
was initiated into the Sufi order of Shaykh Aḥmad al-‘Alawî, from the Darqâwî branch of the Shâdhilî
lineage, discussed in the previous chapter. Schuon then initiated several Europeans and eventually
Americans into the ‘Alawiyya Order. After a series of visions of the Virgin Mary, he founded his own
order called the Maryamiyya in the mid 1960s, after which he became known by his Muslim followers as
Shaykh ‘Îsâ Nûr al-Dîn Aḥmad al-Shâdhilî al-‘Alawî al-Maryamî. Schuon had a following in Europe,
especially in his native Switzerland, as well as France and England; however, he was contested among
European Guénonians. In the last three years before his death in 1951, Guénon became increasingly
convinced that Schuon was leading the European branch of the ‘Alawiyya Order in an unorthodox
direction. In Cairo, Guénon received several reports from European disciples of Schuon which deplored
increasing departures from basic Islamic practice, such as fasting during the month of Ramadan, and
abstaining from alcoholic beverages. In 1950, Guénon encouraged European disciples of the ‘Alawiyya to
break with Schuon. He criticized Schuon’s community in Lausanne, Switzerland, writing that “ritual
practices have been reduced to the strict minimum” (Sedgwick 2004, 129). However, while Schuon faced
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growing defections in Europe in the mid-twentieth century, he eventually gained many followers in the
United States.
One of the reasons Schuon became ever more active in the United States was his fascination
with Native American spirituality. In 1959, he visited the country for the first time, in response to an
invitation by Thomas Yellowtail (1903-1993), a Medicine Man from the Crow tribe. 160 Sedgwick explains
that Schuon participated in several Native American rituals and dances and is said to have been adopted
by the Sioux and named Wicahpi Wiyakpa (Bright Star) before returning to Switzerland (149). This claim
of adoption is historically significant:
By the late 1960s, then, Schuon was a Traditionalist with two esoteric initiations. He was a
Muslim with a Sufi initiation from the Alawiyya, appointed shaykh of a Sufi order in a vision,
but he was also a universalist with a primordial initiation from the Sioux, appointed to a
universal mission by the Virgin Mary in another vision. (Ibid., 152).
In 1981, Schuon moved to the United States where he spent much of the rest of his life leading a
community of disciples in Bloomington, Indiana. This community became the hub of Perennialist
Traditionalism in the English-speaking world, as manifest in the prolific output of texts produced by
World Wisdom, the publishing company established in Bloomington in 1980 by Schuon’s followers.
Schuon played a pivotal role in transmitting the spiritual Shâdhilî lineage and the intellectual approach
of Guénon to North America, but also in disseminating the Perennial philosophy in a more universalist
sense.
Schuon’s biography is surrounded by controversy. Doubts have been expressed about his Islamic
orthodoxy and legitimacy as a Sufi guide, and he has been accused of misconduct with disciples
(Sedgwick 2004, 124-129, 170-178). While the focus here is not on such controversies, Schuon’s pivotal
role in the emergence of Traditionalist Islam in North America makes necessary at least some
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Yellowtail was one of the eight sun dance chiefs of the Crow tribe. After having been outlawed by the settler
colonial government in the late nineteenth century, the sun dance was gradually forgotten among the Crow, until
it was revived by Yellowtail and some of his companions in the mid twentieth century.
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consideration of his biography, rather than a simple exposition of his ideas. Laude (2010), whose
scholarship on Traditionalism and Perennialism is openly sympathetic, alludes to the controversies
surrounding Schuon’s Islamic orthodoxy. For example, when mentioning the special connection of both
Guénon and Schuon with Mâlikî jurisprudence and Shâdhilî Sufism, he recognizes that Schuon pushed
universalism to a degree that made many traditional Sufis on his path uncomfortable. He writes of
Schuon’s relations with the Algerian ‘Alawiyya:
His relationship with the brotherhood, the tarîqah in Mostaghanem became somewhat
more distant with time, as there appeared differences of views concerning the function of
the tarîqah and Schuon’s vocation. The Shaykh Mahdî, who succeeded the Shaykh ‘Adda at
the helm of the brotherhood, understood the function of the tarîqah in the West in a more
outward, public, way than did Schuon, for whom the order was primarily to exercise an
inner “action of presence” in Europe without associating with any outer da’wah or
“invitation” to Islam." (10)
Laude further remarks that his "universalist and essentialist orientation, which was not without being
misunderstood by some of his early disciples better disposed toward a more strictly confessional
outlook, did not prevent Schuon from continuing to seek the benefits of the traditional barakah
(blessing) of Islam" (10).
Even Nasr (1999), Schuon’s disciple and successor as guide of the North American Maryamiyya,
addresses these controversies:
No matter how much some might seek to aggrandize some of the deviant currents and
eddys and aberrations that surrounded him in his very old age and try to present him as a
figure that had gone ‘beyond’ the Islamic form, Schuon was and remained rooted in the
Islamic tradition to the moment of his death and knew more than anyone else that one
cannot live beyond the world of forms or the level of forms while living in the world of
forms, and that even the ‘beyond’ is determined by the tradition within which one has lived
in this world. Only the Ultimate Beyond, beyond the beyond, is above all forms in the
Supreme Unity which lies beyond all distinctions. (44-45)
Nasr concedes that his shaykh was surrounded by “deviant currents and eddys and aberrations.”
Nevertheless, regardless of these biographical scandals, the longue durée emergence of Traditionalist
Islam in North America is the primary concern here, and from this perspective Schuon needs to be
recognized as a trailblazer.
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Schuon is in many ways a continuator of Guénon, having introduced English-speaking North
Americans to Guénonian understandings of both tradition and Islam. Both authors draw upon peripheral
epistemic perspectives to criticize Western-centric modernity. Like Guénon, Schuon (1986 [original
French 1961]) portrays modern civilization as a monstrous anomaly. He argues that “modern thought, or
the culture engendering it, is only an indeterminate flux, which in a sense cannot be defined positively
since it lacks any principle that is real and so related to the Immutable” (32). Moreover, modern thought
appears to Schuon as determined by its own technological creations and scientific experimentations.
Science and machines usurp the role of God and seem to create the human. From this viewpoint,
humanism is an illusion since “once man abandons his prerogatives to matter, to machines, to
quantitative knowledge, he ceases to be truly ‘human’” (33). For both Guénon and Schuon, a true
civilization must be suprahuman in origin and truly civilized people have an acute sense of the sacred.
Without these qualities, modern people and their societies have become sick. It is impossible to make a
better world in these conditions which
can only end in the abolition even of what is human, and consequently the abolition of
happiness too. Reforming man means binding him again to Heaven, re-establishing the
broken link, it means plucking him from the kingdom of the passions, from the cult of
matter, quantity and cunning, and re-integrating him into the world of spirit and serenity—
even it might be said into the world of his own sufficient reason.” (33)
But Schuon and Guénon are also very different. Guénon’s writing focuses on metaphysics in a detached
and occasionally dry way. Schuon expresses himself with more formulaic genius, and his writing more
thoroughly examines aspects of the Islamic tradition which are secondary from a metaphysical
perspective, such as art, ambience, dogma, and law. Interestingly, Guénon seems to have been more
personally immersed in these aspects, having spent the last decades of his life in Cairo, whereas Schuon
practiced Islam outside the matrix of the traditional Islamicate world.
Despite their differences, both Schuon and Guénon write about similar topics for primarily nonMuslim Westerners. Although Schuon writes more than Guénon about Islam, he constantly compares it
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to Christianity and translates concepts formulated in Arabic into terms which might seem less
particularistic and strange to Europeans. For instance, he observes that in the Islamic worldview, the
human, which he refers to as “man,” is “a theomorphic being endowed with an intelligence capable of
conceiving the Absolute and with a will capable of choosing what leads to the Absolute” (1986 [original
French 1961], 13). In this passage, Schuon does not use the Arabic term fiṭra, which perfectly conveys
the notion of essential human innocence and purity he is describing. While Schuon’s language may be
appropriate for educated Westerners of his generation, many Muslims living in the West today might
find the term fiṭra quite straightforward and the above passage somewhat convoluted.
Guénon and Schuon developed language with which to discuss tradition at a time when few
Muslims lived in the West. The geographical borders between Islam and the West were relatively fixed
and Islam seemed quite foreign to Westerners. Consequently, Islamic expressions of universal concepts
required some translation, both conceptually and linguistically. However, since the mid-twentieth
century, the West has became home to millions of Muslims of diverse origins, and the increased speed
of globalization—noticeable for instance in media, communications, migration, and travel—has made
the borders between Islam and the West much fuzzier. In this context, it is easier to present traditional
Islam on its own terms, which are quite capable of expressing universal concepts. Since the last decades
of the twentieth century, scholarship promoting traditional Islam on both sides of the Atlantic has
tended to present Islamic principles with less comparisons to other worldviews such as Christianity.
European disciples of Schuon, such as Burckhardt, Lings, and Michon, did not abandon the
comparative approach to tradition, but they often drew upon Islam as a main reference without
extensive comparison or reference to the perennial philosophy. Lings wrote several books on Islam and
Sufism, including a biography of the Prophet Muḥammad (2006 [1983]) and one on Shaykh Aḥmad al‘Alawî (1971). Burckhardt, a fellow Swiss and childhood friend of Schuon, wrote extensively on world
religions, including some insightful works on Islamic spirituality, cosmology, art, and craftsmanship. His
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writings on Morocco and Spain are especially relevant here (1992 [1960], 1972 [1970]), as is his
translation of letters written by Muḥammad al-‘Arabî al-Darqâwî (1760-1823) a major figure in his own
Sufi lineage (Darqâwî 1978 [c. 19th century]). Michon was a close associate of both Guénon and Schuon.
He wrote an introductory textbook to traditional Islam (Michon 2008) and translated writings by
Moroccan Sufi Aḥmad Ibn ‘Ajîba al-Ḥasanî (1747-1809), including the autobiography whose translation
introduced many Western readers to this major figure of the Darqâwî Shâdhilî Order (Ibn ʻAjîbah 1973
[c. 1809]).
In North America, the most famous Muslim Perennialist is Nasr. Actually, he is a native Iranian,
but during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, he was forced to return to the United States where he had
studied from 1945 to 1958. Nasr has mentored countless other scholars of traditional Islam, including
the couple Murata and Chittick, who both teach at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
They met Nasr when pursuing graduate studies in Iran. Murata’s areas of specialization include Chinese
Islam and gender relationships in traditional Islamic thought, about which she has written a truly
foundational work (1992). Chittick specializes in Islamic thought, Sufism, and Shi’ism. He is one of the
leading Western translators and interpreters of the Sufi writings of Muḥyî al-Dîn ibn al-ʿArabî (11651240), (Chittick 2006, 1989, 1994), and Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî (1207-1273) (Chittick 2005, 1983).161 A younger
U.S. American Muslim scholar who has worked with Nasr and follows a similar approach is Lumbard
(2004a, 2015).162 Although not averse to comparative work, all these scholars can engage with the
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Chtiick has chosen to present two of the most famous medieval Sufis to Western readers. Born in Andalusia,
IbnʿArabî traveled extensively throughout Western and Central Islamdom and is remembered as the most
renowned yet controversial Islamic metaphysician. Rûmî was an Afghani poet who settled in Anatolia and whose
primarily Persian poetry remains famous today, throughout the Islamic world and beyond.
162
Lumbard worked under Nasr with a team of scholars to produce The Study Quran, an English translation
accompanied by commentaries drawn from 41 classical exegeses, including Sunni and Shia texts interpreting the
scripture from a variety of angles, such as grammar, history, law, doctrine and metaphysics (Nasr, Dagli, et al.
2015). Nasr (2015) acknowledges that the work is intended to “represent traditional Islam and therefore it
excludes both modernistic interpretations and fundamentalist interpretations of the Qur'an.” The publication has
been criticized for presenting a Traditionalist or Perennialist bias. According to one reviewer, The Study Quran “has
regrettable instances in which it has departed from consensus, namely, with respect to lapidation and
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complexities of the Islam tradition without constantly comparing it to other traditions. But not all
traditional Muslims identify with this intellectual lineage.
While Guénonian concepts are clearly observable in contemporary Traditional Islamic discourse,
the trend is to focus on Islam without mention of the primordial tradition or extensive comparison to
other religions. This is the case with Yusuf (2005) who believes one’s salvation rests upon accepting the
Qur’anic message once exposed to it, and indeed becoming Muslim. Although he rejects the notion that
other religions represent valid contemporary paths to salvation, Yusuf admires the piety and intellectual
contributions of Perrenialist Muslims such as Lings and Nasr. He writes:
The Perennialist Muslims in the West constitute a highly educated cadre largely made up of
converts, who have done some of the finest work on Islamic materials and have presented
Islam in a beautiful and illuminating manner that has made it accessible to people it would
normally not have reached, and with an aesthetic and intellectual dimension that is sorely
absent from many of the mainstream efforts. In spite of the aforementioned concerns, to
dismiss their noble endeavours is unconscionable and mean-spirited. (56-57)
It is interesting to note that in the list of the world’s 500 most influential Muslims (Schleifer 2019),
compiled since 2009 by the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre in Jordan, only two North Americans
have made the top 50 every year: Yusuf and Nasr. They may not agree on Perennialism, but both men
are committed proponents of Traditional Islam.
The Muslim debate surrounding Perennialism is largely about the degree of degeneration of nonIslamic forms. Guénon himself condemned a huge number of religious movements he considered
deviated, pseudo-traditional, or anti-traditional. Moreover, there is general agreement among Muslims
that the revelation given to the Prophet Muḥammad is a reiteration of the basic message sent to every
Prophet before him, from Adam to Jesus:
ُ ِى َم ۡن َيشا ُء ۚ َوه َُو ٱ ۡلعَ ِز
يز ٱ ۡل َحكِي ُم
َ ُض ﱡل ٱ ﱠ ُ َم ۡن َي
ۡ شا ٓ ُء َو َيهۡ د
ِ ِسان قَ ۡومِ ِهۦ ِليُ َب ِّينَ لَ ُهم ۖ فَي
َ َوما أَر
ِ سلنا مِ ن َرسو ٍل إِ ّﻻ ِبل

soteriological pluralism. In both cases, traditional theological methodologies have been jettisoned in favor of
extenuating considerations and questionable heuristics that contradict normative orthodox religious teachings”
(Vaid 2015, 118).
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And We have not sent any Messenger except with the tongue of his people, that he might
make [the Message] clear to them; God then sends astray whomever He will and He guides
whomever He will; and He is the Mighty, the Wise. (Qur’an 14:4)
Different peoples have received revelations which are slightly different in form but the same in principle.
This is not the issue, even for a vehement critic of Perennialism such as the U.S. American Shaykh of the
Hâshimî Darqâwî Shâdhilî Order, Nuh Ha Mim Keller (1996). In question is which traditions are still
operative today as means to salvation. Contemporary Traditionalist Islamic discourse encompasses a
diversity of positions within the broad centre of a spectrum ranging from rigid exclusivism to complete
inclusivism. Traditionalism tends neither towards rigid exclusivism, in which all other perspectives are
viewed with suspicion or hostility, nor towards universalism detached from the constraints of tradition
or orthodoxy. In fact, such extreme positions are portrayed within Traditionalist discourse as antitraditional modern aberrations.

Traditionalism and Competing Fundamentalisms
From a Traditionalist perspective, rigid exclusivism is a characteristic of fundamentalism and nontraditional universalism a characteristic of Eurocentrism, which typically conceals its own particularism
and indeed exclusivism. This corroborates Grosfoguel’s (2010) contention that Eurocentrism is the
hegemonic form of fundamentalism in the modern/colonial world-system, in a passage cited in the
introduction, but worth repeating here:
Those Third Worldist fundamentalisms (Afrocentric, Islamist, Indigenist, etc.) that emerge in
response to the hegemonic Eurocentric fundamentalism […] are subordinated forms of
Eurocentric fundamentalism insofar as they reproduce and leave intact the binary,
essentialist, racial hierarchies of Eurocentric fundamentalism. (31)
Grosfoguel’s depiction of Muslim fundamentalism as a subordinated form of Eurocentric
fundamentalism resembles claims by Traditionalist Muslim scholars that modernism and
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fundamentalism are “two sides of the same coin” (Lumbard 2004c, 69).163 Such affirmations may seem
surprising since contemporary Islamic discourses pejoratively depicted as fundamentalist clearly draw
upon theological, legal, and sociopolitical currents which predate modernity. However, these
premodern currents are reorganized and, in many ways, transformed in the modern/colonial period by
the challenge of a hegemonic Eurocentric discourse to which they are systemically subordinated in
terms of global influence.
Traditionalism presents itself as a third way, better suited than modernism and fundamentalism
to respond to the challenges of modernity. British Muslim scholar Abdal Hakim Murad (2016), also
known as Timothy Winter, draws upon Evola and Guénon to examine these challenges. He explains that,
whereas Evola did not become Muslim, “others like the fabled René Guénon, ʿAbd al-Wâḥid Yaḥyá, did
in their very selective and possibly idiosyncratic sense move in the direction of Islam, which they took to
be Europe’s third neglected heritage, a last repository of tradition.” Murad thinks Muslims can learn
from thinkers such as Evola or Guénon without agreeing with them on all issues. Their critique of
modernity and discussion of the loss of tradition is a case in point. Drawing upon a metaphor made
famous by Evola (2003 [original Italian 1961]), Murad (2016) suggests that Muslims have been left
wondering whether they can “ride the tiger of modernity.” In other words, is it possible for Muslims to
“appropriate the modalities and structures of modernity?” While modernism enthusiastically jumps
onto the back of the beast, fundamentalism and traditionalism are more hesitant. But in the end,
Traditionalist Islamic discourse depicts fundamentalism as unwittingly trying to ride the beast, thereby
resembling modernism in many ways.
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A variety of other terms are also used in the discourse. But these three somewhat simplistic categories of
traditionalism (with or without a capital t), modernism, and fundamentalism can serve as ideal types in the
Weberian sense, or better yet in the Guénonian sense that the world of manifestation is always more diverse than
the world of principles.
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On the one hand, modernist Islamic discourse tends to encourage Muslims to manage their
communities along Western lines, an attitude perhaps best expressed by the English idiom “if you can’t
beat them join them.” Lumbard (2004c) writes that modernists reject essential elements of the Islamic
intellectual tradition “because they have capitulated to the mental habits of their conquerors,
conditioned as they are by relativism, scientism, and secular humanism” (41). In his view, modernism
entails surrender to colonial epistemologies. Perhaps inevitably, much nuance is lost in these
examinations of broad trends which seem built on reductive binaries such as tradition and modernity.
The term modernist refers in Traditionalist discourse to diverse currents, including progressive Islam,
which often proposes its own critiques of modernity drawing in part from postmodern theory. 164
Moreover, most Muslim proponents of modernism remain attached to certain Islamic spiritual or ethical
values as well as local habits to which they are accustomed. They are often proud of the great artistic,
cultural, and intellectual achievements of Muslims. However, the typical stance within the Traditionalist
Islamic discourse we are discussing is that, as far as organizing society is concerned, Islamic modernism
remains deeply committed to models imported from the West, such as secularism, liberalism, socialism,
capitalism, communism, and an endless range of other “isms.”165 According to this perspective, apart
from a rather vague spirituality and cultural identity, modernists perhaps unwittingly espouse nonreligious ideologies which they try “to foist upon others by reading them into their own traditions or
simply by adding the adjective ‘Islamic’” (68).. Committed Traditionalists generally consider that,
although modernists “may call upon the Qur’ân and ḥadîth as proof texts for their assertions, they are
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For a more positive portrayal of currents depicted here as modernist, see Progressive Muslims (Safi 2003),
Modernist Islam (Kurzman 2002), and Liberal Islam (Kurzman 1998).
165
One may retort that Traditionalism is itself another such “ism.” However, the analytical category of
Traditionalist Islam, which I use in reference to a specific Islamic discourse about tradition, is not generally
embraced as an identity. Like Guénon, most of the scholars examined here are more interested in Islamic
traditions or traditional Islam than in Traditionalism. To be fair, fundamentalism and modernism are also analytical
categories which few Muslims would embrace as an identity.
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rooted in mental habits that developed in a secular universe that rejects the centrality of revelation, if
not its very veracity” (68).
On the other hand, fundamentalism is portrayed in Traditionalist Islamic discourse as a rather
angry and superficial rejection of all things Western, combined with a desire to reform Islamic societies
to make them strong once again. This reform generally entails rejecting many aspects of traditional
Islam, associated with otherworldly spirituality or folkloric deviations, and returning to what is perceived
to be the pure religion of the first three Muslim generations. The English term fundamentalism is useful
because it refers to an analogous movement in Protestant Christianity, but it imposes a somewhat
Christian-centric reading of an Islamic phenomenon. Yet, the same can be said of other terms borrowed
from the Western universe, such as “puritanical reformist” favoured by Lumbard (2004b and 2004c).
Arabic terms such as salaf (ancestors or predecessors) present the advantage of referring to specific
Islamic currents, such as the appropriation of medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya by Salafists. Nuh Keller
(1995) explains that “controversies in tenets of faith (‘aqida) and literalist interpretations of the
attributes of Allah […] have been resurrected in our times as Salafism or ‘return to early Islam’ by
moneyed supporters of the Wahhabi sect, whose differences with Ahl al-Sunna consist almost entirely
of the ideas of Ibn Taymiya.”
Like modernism, fundamentalism should be cautiously used as an analytical category which
refers to a variety of often conflicting movements with certain common features. Nasr (1987b)
recognizes this complexity:
Only during the past few decades has a new phenomenon appeared which necessitates
distinguishing rigorously between traditional Islam and, not only modernism, but also that
spectrum of feeling, action and occasionally thought that has been identified by Western
scholarship and journalism as ‘fundamentalist’ or revivalist Islam. There were, needless to
say, revivalist movements going back to the 12th/18th century. But this earlier
‘fundamentalism’ associated with, let us say, Wahhabism or the Deoband school of India,
was more a truncated form of traditional Islam, in opposition to many aspects of the Islamic
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tradition and highly exoteric but still orthodox, rather than a deviation from the traditional
norm. (12)166
Nevertheless, he contends that some broad categories are necessary despite these caveats:
Needless to say, that which is branded as ‘fundamentalism’ includes a wide spectrum, parts
of which are close to the traditional interpretation of Islam. But the main thrust of that type
of politico-religious movement now called ‘fundamentalism’ is different in such a basic
manner from traditional Islam as to warrant the sharp distinction drawn between them
here, despite the existence of certain areas where some types of ‘fundamentalism’ and
certain dimensions of traditional Islam are in accord. (12-13)
Hardline Islamic fundamentalist discourse generally depicts Muslims who do not espouse strict
literalist views as apostates. And it often advances that rigid religious interpretations should be enforced
by Muslim political leaders. Some currents within the discourse condone the use of violence to advance
political projects. Traditionalist Islamic scholars broadly condemn the fundamentalist “ideologization” of
Islam for reducing the religion to a political project which bears more resemblance to Western
revolutionary utopias such as the French Revolution, fascism, communism, or socialism than to premodern Islamic political models (Nasr 1987b, Lumbard 2004a, Yusuf 2011, Murad 2002). In recent years,
the seeming expansion of the most violent fundamentalist fringes has been especially alarming. Yusuf
(2016) writes:
New versions of our ancient faith have sprung up and have infected the hearts and minds of
countless young people across the globe. Imam Adel Al-Kalbani, who led prayers in the
Haram of Mecca for several years, has publicly stated that these youth are the bitter
harvest of teachings that have emanated from pulpits throughout the Arabian Peninsula,
teachings that have permeated all corners of the world, teachings that focus on hatred,
exclusivity, provincialism, and xenophobia. These teachings anathematize any Muslim who
does not share their simple-minded, literalist, anti-metaphysical, primitive, and
impoverished form of Islam, and they reject the immense body of Islamic scholarship from
the luminaries of our tradition.
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It is interesting that Nasr considers early Wahhâbism as a deviation within orthodox traditional Islam, but not
fundamentalist, since contemporary Wahhâbism is popularly depicted as the epitome of fundamentalism. As
discussed in Chapter Six, there is some debate as to whether Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhâb was even aware of
Western-centric modernity, and therefore whether he could be responding to it. My argument is that he did not
need to be fully conscious of the emerging modern/colonial world-system to be affected by it and react to it.
Therefore, it is possible to interpret his thought as an early fundamentalist response to the crisis of
modernity/coloniality.
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Although it does not explicitly examine the relation of this Imam to the Saudi regime which historically
played such an important role in the spread of such extreme exclusivism, this passage summarizes a
typically Traditionalist opposition to fundamentalism. Murad links this extremism to broader trends in
late modernity. He explains that the current deconstruction of the sovereign self, constructed during the
so-called Enlightenment, is provoking violent reassertions of the ego (nafs) expressed through identity
politics. This facilitates the rise of fundamentalism, xenophobia, and extremism in all cultures. Shakir
(2013) makes a similar argument when he asserts that so-called Islamic terrorists are “children of
modernity, not children of Islam as it’s been traditionally understood.167 They’ve lost meaning and to
summarize they seek meaning in murder. This epitomizes the conditions that modernity creates.”
Yet most Muslim fundamentalists, such as the elites of the Gulf States, reject revolutionary
militancy. They can also seem quite modern in their preference for modern science and technology over
traditional metaphysics, arts, and crafts, not to mention their apparent enthusiasm for global capitalism.
Nasr (1987b) writes:
Their attitude toward science and technology is in fact nearly identical with that of the
modernists, as seen on the practical plane in the attitude of Muslim countries with modern
forms of government compared to those that claim to possess one or another form of
Islamic government. There is hardly any difference in the manner in which they both try to
blindly adopt modern Western technology, from computers to television, without any
thought for the consequences of these inventions upon the minds and souls of Muslims.
(19)
Yusuf (2013) ridicules such modern consumerism as an intellectually vacuous philosophy of “I shop
therefore I am.” His concerns are echoed by Murad (2016), who deplores how the magnificent depths
of tradition are being replaced by a two-dimensional “bland consumer void” which appeals to the
passions and desires of our lowest nature. Such Traditionalist critiques, which are strikingly Guénonian,
reveal the connections between Eurocentric modernism and Islamic fundamentalism as two faces of the
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By portraying terrorists as “children of modernity, not children of Islam” Shakir seems to be referring to the
genealogy of their ideology rather than declaring them apostates.
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same modern/colonial coin. These connections include a tendency towards consumerism and a passion
for the most materialist applications of science. Yet, it is worth asking to what extent Traditionalism can
detach itself from modernity and its colonial underpinnings.

Political Dimensions of Traditionalism
As a response to the modern/colonial disruption of tradition, Traditionalism is inevitably
entangled in the discourses and power dynamics of the contemporary world-system. From a decolonial
perspective, it can be considered one of many
relatively exterior spaces not fully colonized by the European modernity. These exterior
spaces are not pure or absolute. They have been affected and produced by European
modernity, but never fully subsumed or instrumentalized. It is from the geopolitics of
knowledge of this relative exteriority, or margins, that “critical decolonial thinking” emerges
[…] (Grosfoguel 2011, 28)
The critical decolonial potential of Traditionalist Islam can only be realized if its proponents are aware of
their own positionality within the modern/colonial world-system, even if they understand the source of
their tradition as purely metaphysical and unconstrained by time or space. Tradition itself manifests in
time and space. It is therefore entangled with the vicissitudes of existence. Discourses about tradition
are produced by interlocutors from a variety of locations within the modern/colonial world-system and
affected differently by its complex power dynamics. Without reducing these interlocutors to their
sociohistorical identities, or ignoring the transcendent aspects of their discourse, it is worth examining
their positionality in terms of race, class, gender, and other “socially habituated subjectivities” (McCloud
2007, 168). In short, it is worth examining the political dimensions of Traditionalism.
As a distinct discourse, North American Traditionalist Islam (with a capital t) is genealogically
connected to Guénon, a Frenchman whose best-known early intellectual successors were mostly fellow
Europeans. Becoming Muslim somewhat reduces the racial privilege of people such as Guénon, Schuon,
Lings, Burkhardt, and Michon, but it does not erase their whiteness. Within the modern/colonial world349

system, they can be situated in a long lineage of Europeans constructed as renegades and race traitors
who had turned Turk or become Moors by embracing Islam. Through association with Islam, white
Muslims become off-white; their whiteness is questioned but not annihilated. Their liminal racial status
makes them—I should say us—well positioned to be considered authoritative informants about
Muslims. Being a man also helps, as does being educated in a Western university. And if one does not
have all these traits, it helps to have some or most of them. For example, Nasr may not be European,
but he is a fair-skinned, upper-class Iranian educated in the United States.
U.S. American philosopher and convert to Islam Muhammad Legenhausen (2002) offers a tough
critique of Traditionalism as presented by Nasr. For instance, he blames Traditionalists for rejecting
much of what is good in modernity based on an exaggeratedly nostalgic and romantic view of tradition.
He argues that “nothing should be accepted or rejected merely because it is modern and likewise,
nothing should be accepted or rejected merely because it is traditional” (ibid., 6). Yet, the basic
Traditionalist Islamic position is neither that everything produced in the modern period is to be rejected,
nor that everything premodern is to be celebrated. Rather, it considers that most of what has been
destroyed by modernity is more valuable than what has replaced it. The overall disadvantages of
modernity—not least of which is the increasing probability of a global cataclysm—outweigh its
advantages.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering his own status within the academic establishment of the postrevolutionary Republic of Iran, Legenhausen also considers Nasr’s political views reactionary. Indeed,
Nasr’s loyalty to the pre-revolutionary Iranian monarchy, with whom he had close personal ties, can be
intriguing. Despite ostentatious displays of imperial pomp, couched in rhetoric of continuity with ancient
Persian civilization, the monarchy pursued a ruthless policy of modernization which weakened
traditional social networks. With regards to this regime, Nasr (1987b) might have considered his own
advice to distinguish “not only between the traditional and the modern, but also between authentic
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tradition and that pseudo-tradition, which is also counter-traditional, but which also displays certain
characteristics outwardly similar to the traditional” (18). Without reducing everything to power and
politics, it is possible to examine the political implications of even an apolitical stance. Nasr’s suspicion
of modern political ideologies and revolutionary utopias can be interpreted as quietism, as can Guénon’s
aversion to politics.
Additionally, Traditionalist Perennialism can be interpreted as a colonial and imperial discourse.
Schuon’s (1948) notion of a transcendent unity of religion, which builds upon Guénon’s notion of a
primordial tradition, has been criticized for projecting modern Western notions about universal truth
and religion onto the diverse worldviews of peripheral peoples. Gregory Lipton (2018) contends that
Schuonian Perennialism is “inscribed by European imperialism and its attendant colonization of
knowledge under the auspices of a civilizing mission” (4).168 Citing decolonial thinker Mignolo, he
reminds us that formulations of universalism produced in the West often conceal their own
particularism and provincialism. Lipton’s considerations are extremely important when discussing the
decolonial potential of Traditionalist Islam. It is worth asking whether Traditionalist Islamic discourse,
especially its Perennialist variety, inadvertently participates in the ongoing extinction of spiritual,
intellectual, and cultural diversity, in favour of a Western-centric monoculture. However, Traditionalist
Perennialism explicitly rejects any attempt to create a universal religion. The unity of traditional forms is
understood to be found only in unmanifest principles, which are often ineffable. In fact, the diversity of
traditional manifestations which are all unique, are understood to attest in their uniqueness to the
unicity of their transcendent core. One cannot be automatically accused of colonialism or imperialism
simply for believing that One Absolute Reality underlies and indeed produces the diversity of the

168

In his recent book, Rethinking Ibn ‘Arabi, Lipton (2018) reformulates many of the findings from his doctoral
thesis (2013) and a subsequent article (2017).
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phenomenal world. This belief has been held by many people, from diverse parts for the world, since
well before the modern/colonial period.
Nevertheless, Lipton’s (2018) critique of Schuonian Perennialism cannot be easily dismissed.
Lipton refutes portrayals of Ibn ‘Arabî as “a proto-Perennialist.” While Ibn ‘Arabî believes “that even
those in eternal damnation will eventually find contentment and bliss,” Lipton argues that the shaykh’s
“positions on the religious Other reveal a traditionally derived supersessionism based on the exclusive
superiority of Islam and its abrogation of all previous religious dispensations.” This contradicts
“prominent universalist and Perennialist readings” (5). Lipton contends that Ibn ‘Arabî’s “unitive
mysticism of love” is “intertwined” with “a universal political metaphysics that discursively absorbs all
religio-political competition” (6).
Carl-Albert Keller (1920-2008) also refutes anachronistic misrepresentations of the thirteenth
century Andalusian Sufi. Keller (1999) reminds us of a letter written by Ibn ‘Arabî urging the Sultan of
Konya, in Anatolia, not to allow Christians “to ring their bells, to build churches, monasteries, or
hermitages, be it in the town or in the neighborhood, nor to repair churches and other buildings
threatened with decay.” According to this letter, Christians should not only be prohibited from
proselytizing, but should also “be obliged to entertain Muslims during three days in their churches”
(189). This hardly seems compatible with contemporary Perennialist readings of the medieval shaykh.
For instance, Keller reprimands Nasr’s student Chittick (1994) for neglecting to mention this letter when
promoting a vision of religious pluralism based on the work of Ibn ‘Arabî. According to Keller (1999),
“the picture that emerges from Chittick’s otherwise very penetrating observations is rather one-sided”
(189).
However, Chittick (1994) does address the discrepancy between the type of pluralism he is
promoting and Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of other religions:
If the Shaykh’s pronouncements on other religions sometimes fail to recognize their validity
in his own time, one reason may be that, like most other Muslims living in the western
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Islamic lands, he had little real contact with the Christians or Jews in his environment, not
to speak of followers of religions farther afield. He had probably never met a saintly
representative of either of these traditions, and he almost certainly had never read
anything about these two religions except what was written in Islamic sources. Hence there
is no reason that he should have accepted the validity of these religions except in principle.
But this is an important qualification. To maintain the particular excellence of the Qur’an
and the superiority of Muhammad over all other prophets is not to deny the universal
validity of revelation nor the necessity of revelations appearing in particularized
expressions. (125-126)
The basic argument that Ibn ‘Arabî did not know practitioners of other religions well enough to
appreciate their faiths is surprising from Chittick, who writes in the same book that “Ibn al-’Arabî did not
acquire the sciences contained in his work by study or discursive reasoning. They were simply given to
him when God opened the door” (8). Recognizing him as the Greatest Master (Shaykh ak-Akbar),
Chittick explains that “no one after Ibn al-’Arabî has come close to matching his profundity, freshness,
and the detail of his vision” (9). He even specifies that Ibn ‘Arabî regularly met with all the Prophets in
his visions (10). If the Shaykh received his knowledge through direct spiritual inspiration, would he need
constant physical contact with people of other religions to form an opinion?
Perhaps even an inspired master has limitations, but another question which arises from Chittick’s
explanation is whether Ibn ‘Arabî’s position was truly motivated by lack of contact or the type of contact
he had with people of other faiths. After all, he travelled extensively throughout the very cosmopolitan
Western and Central Islamicate world, from his birthplace in Murcia, Andalusia, to the great cities of the
Eastern Mediterranean. Another explanation, which might also explain his letter to the Sultan of Konya,
is that Ibn ‘Arabî’s many encounters with non-Muslims made him wary of their ways. He lived from 1165
to 1240, at precisely the period, described in Chapter Three, during which Muslims were suffering
devastating defeats at the hands of ruthless enemies. From the east came the pillaging Mongols, who
would ultimately destroy Baghdad in 1258, less than two decades after Ibn ‘Arabî’s death. Catholic
crusaders disrupted the Eastern Mediterranean societies and were in the process of conquering most of
al-Andalus between 1212 and 1252. Generally, the invaders were installing brutish tyrannies in the place
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of sophisticated and pluralistic polities led by Muslims. Ibn ‘Arabî’s belief that Islam is superior to the
other worldviews he encountered was informed by both Islamic doctrine and experience.
While it is true that from a Sufi perspective all things are equally insignificant before God, even
heaven and hell, it is difficult to refute the charge that Perennialists and their sympathizers tend to
overstate their argument in presenting Ibn ‘Arabî as an egalitarian religious pluralist. The same applies
to the poetry of Rûmî who arguably considered Islam “the only path […] truly willed by God” although
his writings express that “in the drunkenness of divine Love or in the total silence beyond thoughts and
concepts, that is in the ineffable essence of God, all religions vanish and do no more have any
pertinency” (Keller 1999, 187).
Many proponents of traditional Islam share such reservations about Perennialism. For instance,
another Keller (1996)—the Shâdhilî Shaykh, not the Professor—similarly accuses Chittick of cherry
picking and ignoring passages in which Ibn ‘Arabî affirms the more common Islamic position according to
which “Islam is the only remaining valid or acceptable religion.” Shaykh Keller sternly reminds Muslims
that “to believe anything other than this is unbelief (kufr) that places a person outside of Islam.” His
warning directly concerns followers of Guénon and Schuon:
As for “others disagree,” it is true, but is something that has waited for fourteen centuries
of Islamic scholarship down to the present century to be first promulgated in Cairo in the
1930s by the French convert to Islam Rene Guénon, and later by his student Frithjof Schuon
and writers under him. Who else said it before? And if no one did, and everyone else
considers it kufr, on what basis should it be accepted? (ibid.)
This passage reveals the diversity of interpretations within Traditionalist Islamic discourse.
There is also a variety of Traditionalist Islamic perspectives on political and social engagement,
despite accusations of reactionary quietism by detractors such as Legenhausen (2002). After all, the
anti-colonial struggles of Guénon’s Sufi mentors, or Michon’s work with UNESCO were hardly apolitical.
Traditionalists generally call for political prudence, precisely because they are concerned with the
gravity of the modern condition. They warn against brash reactions which risk making matters even
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worse. Amid what they perceive as excessive anger, violence, and materialism, they are not interested in
what they consider the false promises of utopian political projects. Yusuf (2011) affirms that “we need
an Islamic state of mind more than an Islamic state.” For Winter (2004; i.e. Murad), this entails restoring
“that sophisticated classical consensus which was worked out over painful centuries of debate and
scholarship” (294). But this consensus
can only be retrieved when we improve the state of our hearts, and fill them with the
Islamic virtues of affection, respect, tolerance, and reconciliation. This inner reform, which
is the traditional competence of Sufism, is a precondition for the restoration of unity and
decency in the Islamic movement. (294)
Such a focus on individual inner reform need not necessarily entail political quietism.
Many North American Muslims racialized as black are favourable towards social and political
activism framed by traditional Islamic principles. Citing both Christian and Muslim thinkers, such as
Cornell West and Sherman Abdul Hakim Jackson, Shakir (2010) draws upon an African American heritage
of religiously guided “moral activism.” He exclaims that “we as a community of faithful have to speak in
a prophetic voice and say we are going to make it unprofitable to profit from the suffering, the
oppression, the exploitation of other human beings” (ibid.). But the struggle must respect traditional
Islamic principles: “Socially, we have to give priority to the politics of cooperation over the politics of
conflict. And individually we have to give priority to salvation over even liberation” (ibid.). Scholar and
activist Dawud Walid (2016) warns that “American Muslims activists must be extremely careful not to
get swept away in the current sea of populism which has produced unsavory actions. Constant reanchoring in what is and what is not Prophetic character is a means of safety from being washed away.”
He argues that North Americans follow the prophetic model of compassion and good behaviour; they
must engage in “sacred activism” (Walid 2018).
Aversion to political engagement seems more common among white (or off-white)
Traditionalists. They often describe modernity as the final phase in the leadup to an eschatological
cataclysm. Indeed, why bother engaging with society at all if modernity is inevitably leading to the end
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of time? Murad (2016) thinks it is unwise to “embrace technology” or the “enormous monster” of late
modernity. He recommends coexisting with the modern tiger, but not trying to ride it. Since Muslims
cannot fully escape the modern system exteriorly, the only option is to withdraw inwardly to the
spiritual, intellectual, and artistic depths of their tradition and avoid the surface, which has become
mostly uninhabitable. Outwardly, Murad recommends prudent and compassionate engagement with
society, following the Sufi notion of spiritual seclusion (khalwah) in the middle of a crowd. The challenge
with such “engaged detachment” is to be “distinct and different without having a superiority complex”
which inflates the ego (ibid.). This can be avoided by “looking out for the needs of others and to find
things in other human beings that are loveable” (ibid.). In a sense, the superficial chaos of modernity is
an opportunity for Muslims to dive to the depths. Therefore, as is typical within the discourse, Murad
emphasizes the crucial role of Sufism as the key to what Yusuf (2013) calls “guidance in the latter days.”
Yet, race is not the only factor determining Traditionalist Muslim positions towards political and
social engagement. Muslims of Western European origin did not invent the notion of seclusion in a
crowd. It is a typical position of ‘sober’ Sufi paths such as the Shâdhiliyya and the Naqshabandiyya. For
instance, it was the way recommended by ‘Abd al-Ghanî al-Nabulusî (1641–1731), an eminent
Damascan scholar, poet, and Naqshabandî Sufi (Sirriyeh 2005). He makes this argument in a work
entitled The Perfection of Good Qualities Through Remaining in One’s Home (Takmîl al-Nu‘ût fî Luzûm
al-Buyût), translated as The Virtues of Seclusion in Times of Seclusion by U.S. American Muslim of
European descent Abdul Aziz Suraqah (al-Nabulsî 2017 [1685]). In his preface, Suraqah explains the
Shaykh’s position:
Shaykh 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi brilliantly weaves together the hadith reports, and
counsels of the Salaf169 concerning spiritual self-preservation and presents a viable third
option between unrestricted social interaction and absolute isolation from civilization. He
speaks to us about the virtues of sitting things out, of keeping busy with personal and
familial concerns, of minding our business, of staying out of trouble and staying clear of
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controversy and strife. If we are not yet in a time where complete withdrawal is called for,
there is a still the prophetic mandate to shun fitna (controversy, strife, negativity) and avoid
getting in conflict with others, whether the “others” are groups, organizations, individuals,
or governments.
This work is not a call for quietism or defeatism. Rather, it a call for taking careful stock of
where we are spiritually and assessing where exactly our sphere of influence is and not
overextending ourselves to our own detriment and the detriment of our loved ones. (Ibid.,
iv-v)
Suraqah alludes to the eschatological Islamic notion according to which the world is rapidly advancing
towards the final hour. There will come a time during which there is so much chaos and strife in the
world that believers will need to remain as isolated as possible in order to preserve their sanity and
respect their basic religious obligations. In the period leading up to the end days some level of isolation
is also necessary. This has been the position of many Muslim scholars and Sufis, including some of those
mentioned in this dissertation, such as Hamahoullah, whose case is discussed in Chapter Six.
Moreover, some Muslims of European origin seek to revive traditional Islamic institutions and
counter the chaos of modernity through economic, social, and political projects. This is the case with
Scottish Shaykh Abdalqadir as-Sufi, born Ian Dallas, leader of a Western branch of the Moroccan Habîbî
Darqawî Shâdhilî Order, and founder of the Murabitun World Movement which has established
mosques in England, Spain, and South Africa. His Shâdhilî spiritual lineage and virulent critique of
modernity solidly situate as-Sufi as a participant in the Traditionalist discourse examined here. However,
he is much more engaged in political polemics than most Western Muslim Traditionalists, and is highly
critical of Guénon, Schuon, and their followers (Westerlund 2004, 22). As-Sufi has written extensively
about the need to re-establish Islamic economies which are independent from Western-centric usury
and capitalism (As-Sufi 2000), and Islamic political institutions, such as the Caliphate (As-Sufi 1996).
Moroccan institutions perpetuating the Western Islamic tradition serve a crucial function in his
Islamic response to modern crises:
Against this menace the Muslims have to recognise the enormous and resilient power of a
religion founded 1400 years ago and is still spreading. As a world community we are bound
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together in the unassailable foundations, as defined by the Amir al-Muminin, 170 King
Muhammad VI of Morocco, as “The Madhab of Imam Malik, the Aqidah of Al-Ashari, the
Tassawuf of Al-Junaid and the Imara171 of the Believers – the figure of the Amir al-Muminin
who covers and protects the other three.” Thus the Amir al-Muminin stands guard over all
the world’s Muslims. At the same time the Hajj, with its rites and rituals, is protected and
defended by King Salman who sane Muslims recognise as the Guardian of the Haramayn, 172
secured and unassailable in the hands of his inheritor the Crown Prince Mohammad bin
Salman.
We can declare the Amir al-Muminin King Muhammad VI in Rabat and the Guardian of the
Haramayn in the hands of King Salman, may Allah protect them both, as being our security
as Muslims. (As-Sufi 2016)
Despite his aversion to Wahhâbism, as-Sufi is a royalist who prefers the rule of King Salman to the
revolutionary movements of the so-called Arab Spring, which he interprets as a broader plan to “abolish
Islam” (ibid.). But in as-Sufi’s view the King of Morocco remains the true leader of the Muslims, in a
spiritual and political sense, and the Moroccan model is the one to follow. Furthermore, the political and
economic dimensions of the Islamic tradition must not be neglected in favour of its spiritual or
intellectual aspects.
As-Sufi has been influential in the North American discourse on traditional Islam. In 1977, his
followers established a centre in Berkeley, California. After the 1994 Zapatista uprising in the contested
Mexican state of Chiapas, several hundred local Mayans converted to Islam under the guidance of
followers of as-Sufi from Granada, Spain (Zeraoui 2011). U.S. American followers have included the poet
Daniel Abdal-Hayy Moore (1940-2016) and Aisha Bewley, a prolific American translator of classical
Arabic texts into English. Like her shaykh, she virulently condemns the political and economic system
produced by the deified modern self:
The major problem facing all mankind is that man has forgotten his position in the cosmos.
From the inception of the modern state, and particularly since the Enlightenment, he has
devoted his energies to seeking power, mastery and unlimited gain. He has tried to become
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in the world by Muslims.
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the Lord of all, and forgotten who the Lord of all really is. By attempting to control
everything by rational definition—often based on erroneous concepts and assumptions—or
by sheer unrestrained will and greed, he has turned everything and everyone into objects.
By refusing any natural restraints on his god-like mastery of all, he has in fact become
bestialised, and this is reflected in the political form which modern man has chosen—liberal
democracy. The end result of democracy is despair because you have no power and all your
relationships are unimportant. The only possible end that this can have is political
decadence, in which one resorts to elaborate methodology, structuralism and codification
in a vain attempt to find some meaning in it all. (Bewley, n.d.)
Bewley’s portrayal of idolatry, as the epistemic underpinning of the modern political system, echoes
Guénon’s depiction of elites sentimentally manipulating the masses by making false gods out of
concepts such as science, progress, and liberty (Guénon 2001 [1924], 27-28). Murata and Chittick (1994)
argue that “only in modern times has reform been taken to mean the remaking of human beings, not in
the form of the God of the Koran, but rather the form of the gods of progress and democracy (as
revealed to the modern West)” (333). And Yusuf (2013), who was once a follower of as-Sufi, criticizes
the modern cult of desires linked to the stomach and genitals, exclaiming that “if you are obeying these
desires, you are making these desires your God.” His critique of capitalism and consumerism echoes
Guénon’s (2009) warning that “modern civilization aims at creating more and more artificial needs, and
as we have already said, it will always create more needs than it can satisfy, for once one has started on
this path, it is very hard to stop, and, indeed, there is no reason for stopping at any particular point”
(39). The implications of a system incapable of stopping its destructive course are apocalyptic. Indeed,
the tribulations of modernity, Guénon’s (2001 [1927]) “crisis of the modern world,” are often
interpreted in Traditionalist Islamic discourse as signs of the end times. Murata and Chittick (1994)
explain that “knowledge of the way in which time will unfold and come to an end” represents “an
Islamic view of history” (xxxiv). However, Traditionalist scholars who draw upon Islamic eschatology to
understand confusion, chaos, and strife are not by and large nihilistic or unhopeful. In fact, they draw
upon the same epistemic resources to promote beauty in the face of ugliness, compassion in the face of
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violence, and hope in the face of despair. These principles guide their diverse responses to the crises
unleashed by the modern/colonial system.
But, as we discussed above, Muslims are not solely guided by principles in their responses to the
fourth phase of modernity/coloniality; they are also affected by their positionality within the system. In
North America, racial constructions based on colour are so important sociologically and historically that
they must be considered when examining the emergence of Islamic movements. Sedgwick (2006b)
claims that “[j]ust as the Nation of Islam is really American Black nationalism dressed up in Islamic
clothes, there is also a movement called Traditionalism that is really Western anti-modernism dressed
up in Islamic clothes” (184). Although this formulation oversimplifies both the Nation of Islam and
Traditionalism, and completely disregards the sincerity of their adherents as self-identified Muslims, it
does express the reservations many Muslims have about Black Nationalist Islam and Traditionalism,
whose early figures were mostly European men. Both these movements aspired to perpetuate Islamic
traditions, but they emerged in the early twentieth century in a milieu far removed from the heartlands
of Islam.
Later, with the massive arrival of immigrants from Islamicate societies, North American Muslims
became more aware of notions of Islamic orthodoxy which were widespread around the world. Many
Black Nationalist Muslims and Traditionalists adjusted their views accordingly. When Malcom X rejected
the Nation of Islam as an unorthodox and racist movement, and embraced Sunni Islam, it was a
watershed moment for Black American Islam. Ever since, North American Muslims racialized as black
have increasingly embraced various Pan-Islamic currents of Islam, including fundamentalist, progressive,
and traditionalist ones. The same can be said of white Muslims, many of whom were early advocates of
Traditionalist Perennialism in a Western context. Today, several proponents of traditional Islam reject
Perennialism as either completely unorthodox (Keller 1996) or at least dubious (Yusuf 2005).
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But these adjustments do not represent a total rupture. To begin, neither exclusivist Black
Muslim theologies of race, nor Perennialism have disappeared. Both survive as minority currents among
Muslims. Moreover, many contemporary Muslims consider early Black Nationalists as well as
Traditionalists forebears in the emergence of Muslim communities now solidly implanted throughout
North America. Traditionalist Islam in contemporary North America now draws on René Guénon as well
as Malcolm X. These forerunners continue to inspire Muslims who often reject only some of their views.
The valorisation of African cultures, including those of the diaspora, and the struggle against anti-black
racism continue to be crucial priorities for many North American Muslims today, be they black, white,
Asian, Latino, or Indigenous. And Muslims from diverse backgrounds continue to critique the antimetaphysical, anti-traditional, and colonial aspects of modernity. Guénon’s notion of modernity as a
global crisis with eschatological dimensions still thrives in Muslim discourse.

Traditionalist Islam After 9/11
With hardly one step into the new century and millennium (according to the dominant,
modern/colonial, Gregorian calendar), 9/11 sent shockwaves throughout the entire world-system. It was
a pivotal moment whose historical repercussions are still too early to fully appreciate. The symbolic
significance of 9/11 was enormous although the actual scale of the terrorist attack was relatively
insignificant in comparison to instances of politically motivated violence in the periphery of the worldsystem. Acts of terror committed by state or non-state actors in the periphery, often in contexts of war,
genocide, and ethnic cleansing, generally result in civilian deaths counted by the hundreds of thousands,
and even millions, rather than the thousands.173 However, on 9/11 militant Muslim fundamentalists
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It should be clear that assessing the relative historical or geopolitical significance of an event on a quantitative
scale, such as the number of deaths, in no way belittles the horror of any crime such as the attacks of 9/11. Indeed,
the Islamic notion that when any innocent person is murdered it is as if all humanity has been murdered (Qur’an
5:32) expresses a sentiment felt by any human with a functional moral compass.
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from the periphery terrorized the core of the world-system by attacking two hubs of the global
economic and military order: the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. And Muslims were going to pay
for this affront. But not only Muslims. The entire world has since been reorganized under a new regime
of securitization, surveillance, and human rights abuse, under the auspices of the Global War on Terror
launched by the United States and its allies after 9/11.
Since 9/11 North American Muslim communities have had to cope with the reality of being the
target of foreign terrorists, but also being associated with these terrorists in popular discourse. It does
not matter that Muslims were counted among the victims of these attacks. Nor does it matter that
Muslims have been the principal victims of most other attacks around the world, by terrorists claiming
to fight for Islam, since the terrorists consider most Muslims to be apostates. Dominant discourses do
not seem to consider the fact that such violent fundamentalists were supported and trained by the
United States and its allies, and unleashed against other Muslims during the Cold War, which ended only
a decade before 9/11. A general climate of suspicion surrounds Muslims in North American society,
which is often exacerbated by Islamophobic government policies.
U.S. American Professor of Political Science Anne Norton (2013) claims that the “Muslim
Question” is the central issue of our era:
In our time, the figure of the Muslim has become the axis where questions of political
philosophy and political theology, politics and ethics meet. Islam is marked as the
preeminent danger to politics; to Christians, Jews, and secular humanists; to women, sex,
and sexuality; to the values and institutions of the Enlightenment. In relation to Muslims
and Islam, liberty, equality, and fraternity become not imperatives but questions: Liberty?
Equality? Fraternity? They are asked of Muslims and Islam. They are asked of us all.
The liberal and social democratic states of our time hesitate before Muslims: hesitate to
include them, hesitate to extend them the rights and privileges of citizenship. Though we
maintain our belief that law is neutral, that the Constitution secures rights, and that
America has true freedom of religion, American citizenship has not protected America’s
Muslim citizens from surveillance, detention, unlawful searches, and the assaults of
discrimination. The American confrontation with the Muslim question has exposed nonMuslim Americans to the same threats of discrimination, surveillance, detention, and
imprisonment when they act as allies. (2-3)
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As the current core of the core of the global world-system, the United States plays a central role in both
formulating the “Muslim question” and responding to it. However, Norton argues that ultimately this
question is only ostensibly about Islam, since “in the most fundamental sense, what is at stake is the
value of Western civilization. The figure of the Muslim stands like a sentinel marking the limits of the
West: the state system, human rights, civil freedoms, democracy, sovereignty, even the simple
requirements of bare life” (5). This places a huge burden on Muslims in places such as North America.
Self-described “de-colonial Islamic thinker” Hatem Bazian (2019) discusses the deeply racist
premises of the “Muslim Question” (Bazian 2017, 293-295) and its psychological implications for
Muslims:
Events in the Arab and Muslim world direct me again back to W.E.B. Du Bois and the
pressing question in his book, The Souls of Black Folk– how does it feel to be a problem?
The question posed by Du Bois in relation to African Americans and the problem of race in
America has not ended and is as intense today as it was at the time he wrote the book.
Inspired by Du Bois’s framing, I ask a similar question– how does it feel to be Muslim today?
To listen, watch and read news about Muslims is a daily act bringing with it a process of
self-doubt and devastation. (285)
Yet, Bazian is also a perfect example of the major shift which has occurred in the North American
Muslim intellectual landscape since 9/11. In 2009, this Palestinian American co-founded the first North
American Muslim liberal arts college, Zaytuna College, in Berkeley, along with “the white American
convert Mark ‘Shaykh Hamza Yusuf’ Hanson, [and] the African American convert Ricky ‘Imam Zaid
Shakir’ Mitchell” (Kashani 2014, 12). This ethnically diverse team of scholars founded what has become
a model North American “pluralistic, traditionalist learning community” (Newlon 2017, 177). Such
ambitious engagement of Traditionalist Islamic scholarship with North American civil society and public
life, exemplified by Zaytuna College, only arose in the post-9/11 era. Fundamentalist currents, which had
dominated the major North American Islamic institutions for decades, suddenly became broadly
associated with terrorism in public discourse. Many Muslims who had espoused or been sympathetic to
Salafism or Wahhâbism were both horrified by the acts committed in their name and forced to face a
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social backlash. New voices contesting Islamic fundamentalism suddenly arose within the institutional
landscape of North American Islam. These voices included those who identify as Shias, Progressive
Muslims, Sufis, and even cultural Muslims.174 One such voice belonged to Canadian Muslim scholar
Ingrid Mattson, who is known for drawing on traditional Sunni sources to critique extreme
interpretations of Islam, be they fundamentalist or progressive. She became the first woman president
of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 2006. Many of her views coincide with those of the
Traditionalist Islamic subcurrent which has been labelled “Anglo-American Traditional Islam” (Mathiesen
2013). Although this subcurrent emerged in the 1980s, it has only gained widespread popularity in
recent decades, among English speaking Sunni Muslims in North America as well as the United Kingdom.
Hamza Yusuf embodies the rise of Traditionalist Islamic scholarship from the margins to prominence,
and even celebrity (Kashani 2014, 114-124).
After two decades of globetrotting to learn traditional Islamic sciences, Yusuf returned to the
United States, where he co-founded and led the precursor of Zaytuna College, Zaytuna Institute, in
1996. He gained some notoriety as a young scholar teaching in the relatively informal context of Zaytuna
Institute. His teachings emphasized individual pietism and disengagement from modern society, which
he often condemned in stark apocalyptic terms. However, since 9/11 Yusuf has changed his approach to
actively engage with society. The terrorist attacks convinced Yusuf that scholarship rooted in traditional
Islamic sources needs to reclaim the public space too often dominated by extremists. Now, as President
of a Muslim liberal arts college, he presents himself as an authoritative figure who seeks to contribute to
broader society while speaking truth to power. He embraces a dual U.S. American and Muslim identity
and even presents traditional Islam as championing basic American values (Yuskaev 2013). Rather than
isolation from the vicissitudes of modernity, Yusuf now explicitly affirms the importance of drawing
upon Islamic tradition to face modern conditions. This vision is expressed in his institution’s mission
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Cultural Muslims identify more with Islamicate civilization than normative Islamic doctrines and practices.
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statement: “Zaytuna College aims to educate and prepare morally committed professional, intellectual,
and spiritual leaders who are grounded in the Islamic scholarly tradition and conversant with the
cultural currents and critical ideas shaping modern society” (Zaytuna College 2018). Several other
Islamic educational institutions, which share a similar purpose and whose members frequently
cooperate with Zaytuna, have arisen in recent years. For instance, SeekersGuidance is a “Global Islamic
Seminary” offering classes in Toronto, as well as free online courses, podcasts, a blog, and online
answers to questions about Islamic belief and practice (SeekersGuidance 2019). Another example is the
Lamppost Education Initiative, whose Founder and President Ali, an important source for this
dissertation, is also Assistant Professor at Zaytuna College. Based in Philadelphia, Lamppost’s mission
statement typifies the sort of socially committed engagement with tradition demonstrated by many
contemporary North American Muslims:
Lamppost provides a window into the rich Islamic tradition through the eyes of
contemporary American Muslim scholars, intellectuals, activists, and leaders. We offer to
the public: live and pre-recorded webinars, classes, books, essays, and onsite enrichment
programs dealing with the topics of Islam, Muslims, and the socio-cultural dynamics of
American society. Our contributors offer expert analysis of current events which affect
Muslims in the West as well as offerings in the classical Islamic disciplines. (Lamppost
Education Initiative 2018).
Traditionalist Islam in North America has moved from being mostly a scholarly discourse to
becoming a religious community with a shared culture. U.S. American scholar of Religious Studies
Brendan Newlon (2017) observes that it is one of the three major Muslim communities, in the United
States, which “reflect competition among contemporary Islamic religious modes, or approaches to
interpreting Islam and envisioning an authentically Islamic lifestyle. Each mode represents a different
response to the challenges of modernity.” These modes “are Neotraditionalism, the ProgressiveMuslims movement, and Salafism” (10), terms which correspond very closely to the terms Traditionalist,
modernist and fundamentalist used in many of the sources cited here so far. Progressive Islam and
Salafism are indeed terms with which adherents and sympathizers usually identify more readily.
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Modernism and fundamentalism are more polemical, and consequently used more frequently by critical
outsiders. Moreover, Newlon warns that these terms do not
represent groups, schools, sects, orders, or denominations. Rather, they refer to the
different ways contemporary Muslim communities understand Islam and relate to Islamic
tradition. Other terms from the technical vocabulary of Islamic Studies (eg. madhhab,
minhâj, ṭarīqa, furqah, etc.,) carry meanings and connotations that would also misrepresent
the topic. (11)
According to Newlon, tradition remains a pivotal theme in the way North American Muslims gather in
communities and form networks.
The distinction I make between Tradition and Traditionalism is basically the equivalent of how
Newlon uses Traditionalism and Neotraditionalism:
Neotraditionalism is essentially the uninterrupted continuation of Traditionalism in the
context of modernity. However, it is only after the advent of modernity that
Neotraditionalism faced the imperative of defending its normativity against religious
reforms other communities have advocated in response to modern challenges. This
reaffirmation of traditionalism in the face of modern alternatives has been termed
Neotraditionalism in several scholarly works. I have adopted this usage here, using the term
“Traditional” when describing premodern phenomena, and “Neotraditional” to highlight
the reaffirmation of tradition's value in the face of choices between traditional and
alternative ways. (11)
One author cited by Newlon is Ali, who makes a similar distinction between these terms. Ali’s
(2012) explanation is important because it comes from an authority within the discourse. First, he
identifies as a “neo-traditionalist” and offers a definition:
When I say that I am a “neo-traditionalist”, what I mean by it is that I incline towards and
participate in the movement to return to the classical adherence to the schools of Islamic
law (4 Sunni Schools), the study and contextualization of mainstream Sunni doctrine (viz.
Ash’ari, Maturidi), and the study and practice of traditional text-based Islamic spirituality
(historically referred to as Sufism). This being so is not to be understood that I am in favor
of any sort of dogmatic adherence to any of the three forms of Islamic thought (fiqh, ‘aqida,
and tasawwuf). Rather, one is to understand that any school of law, creed, or spiritual path
and/or order is merely a means, not an end in itself. Each has a long and complicated
history with respect to their formation, promulgation, and standardization. When I speak of
being a neo-traditionalist, I also mean the manner that one goes about acquiring Islamic
knowledge which is namely through direct contact with living human receptacles of
knowledge (at least at the start of one’s scholastic career). (ibid.)
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Then, Ali develops his sympathetic but flexible and critical approach to tradition. After refuting exclusive
and rigid adherence to schools of Islamic law, doctrine, and Sufism, he makes the argument which
informs Newlon’s usage:
Another reason that I characterize this particular orientation as “neo”-traditionalism is that
it is an attempt to restore things as they were (or at least as they are perceived to have
been) during the period of our sacred history. This orientation cannot rightly be called
“traditionalism” because truly authentic traditionalism can only be known and practiced by
those who have not been influenced by modern thinking. And all of us living today in one
way or another have been influenced by modern thinking. So the past cannot completely
ever be retrieved. Another reason is that “traditionalism” was not a monolithic
phenomenon when it actually did exist nor was it static. It was more dynamic than believed
to be today. (ibid.)
Since premodern approaches to tradition were dynamic and flexible, one wonders why it is
necessary to make such a distinction between traditionalism and “neo-traditionalism.” The usage
favoured throughout this dissertation does not distinguish between premodern and modern tradition.
Islamic tradition is understood here as rooted in the past and the belief in a timeless transcendent
source, but flowing dynamically into the present and future, constantly adapting to new contexts. In that
sense, adapting to the modern/colonial world-system is just one of many adjustments Muslims have
made in order to transmit a heritage deemed important. However, the specific response to the
modern/colonial attack on tradition merits a separate term. I have chosen traditionalism to designate
the defense of tradition in a modern/colonial context. The prefix neo seems superfluous to me. In fact,
this superfluity can be implied from Ali’s own contention that the innate flexibility of the Islamic
tradition justifies current innovations in terms of education and curriculum development, such as
learning online rather than face to face. My terminological choice is actually based on a similar
understanding of tradition to the one formulated by Ali (2012) when he concludes that
all of us in ways are influenced by modernity in such a way that it’s nearly impossible to
restore completely the way things once were, or the way we “imagine” they used to be. Or,
the case might be that the “tradition” is simply dynamic and adjusts accordingly with the
vicissitudes of time in those areas that are generally considered to be mutable.

367

Besides, adherents and sympathizers to the community identified by Newlon seem to identify
even more rarely as Neotraditionalists than they do as Traditionalists. Newlon (2017) explains:
I have discussed the use of this term with several Muslims who participate in the networks I
have identified as Neotraditional […] Most have said that “traditional” is the term they use,
however, upon hearing the definitions for “Neotraditional” […] everyone I have spoken to
has agreed that those definitions appropriately express their deliberate choice of traditional
religious ways in the face of modern alternatives. (23)
Such a flexible attitude towards terminology seems wise, as long as one specifies how a term is being
used in a given context. In the end, the most appropriate way of designating those who belong to this
community should be to accept their most common self-designation as “traditional Muslims” (usually
without the capital t) or simply believers committed to “traditional Islam.” Traditionalism best refers to
the scholarly discourse, not the members of this community.
Having clarified these terminological nuances, it should be easier to draw upon Newlon’s (2017)
fieldwork to verify my findings. Indeed, his attention to community and social networks completes the
picture offered by my cross-textual discourse analysis. Moreover, although I have not conducted
Newlon’s sort of fieldwork in Canada, my experience is that the Canadian context is very similar to the
U.S. American one he describes. For instance, one could easily include Canada in his observation that
Most mosque communities will include members that come together despite ethnic and
ideological differences simply because the local Muslim population isn't large enough to
provide significant numbers of people from the same background. For these communities
(and especially for younger community members and American converts to Islam), cultural
diversity has become the norm. (26)
In both Canada and the United States, the extreme diversity of the Muslim population encourages the
development of “networks of association that transcend the boundaries of sect, ethnicity, nationality,
class, age, geographic area, or politics.” Muslims in this context tend to relate
through modes of religiosity that are defined through discursive practices. These religious
modes reflect a phenomenon of voluntary association within identity categories that are at
once sufficiently well defined to be distinguishable by an informed observer and flexible
enough to accommodate internal diversity and fuzzy boundaries. (26)
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In fact, this analysis can probably be applied without much adaptation to many other multicultural
Western societies, such as the United Kingdom.
For Newlon (2017), (Neo)Traditionalism is a community of voluntary association connected by a
shared understanding that
the intellectual and social strategies developed by Muslim scholars in the past are also the
most effective means of addressing modern challenges. While those strategies are not lost
or inaccessible, they have become unfamiliar to many of the lay Muslims in recent
generations whose feelings of connectedness to tradition have been uprooted by the
effects of Colonialism, migration, and the distractions of modernity. (54)
Newlon and I agree that in this context “tradition is not a static vision of perfect imitative repetition of
the practices of the earliest generation” (65). Rather, it is “a recognition of an organic historical
community process that considers traits of constancy as well as change as a healthy and necessary part
of its lived expression” (66). Contemporary Islamic scholars committed to such an understanding are
expected to draw upon their tradition “to discover appropriate ways of meeting those new challenges
that are ultimately rooted in the exemplary guidance of the Prophet” (66). Since challenges arising in
diverse contexts necessarily require different responses, “traditionalist Muslims have historically
embraced heterogeneity in many details of religious practice as the manifest miracle of God’s revelation
of a religion for all people and all times” (67). In short, to preserve and perpetuate what they consider to
be core values and practices, proponents of traditional Islam must “introduce changes and revisions” in
certain areas and within certain boundaries, about which there is understandably much deliberation
(67).
Following his sources, Newlon categorizes “the Progressive-Muslims movement and Salafism” as
“two antitraditional modes” which approach tradition in a similarly negative way despite their
differences. He describes both modes as positing that “history and tradition must be negated to recover
the original, unadulterated values of Islam and to practice the religion in the way that God commanded”
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(77). This corroborates my understanding of Traditionalist Islamic critiques of competing discourses,
although I consider these positions somewhat reductionist.
Yet another of Newlon’s observations my research corroborates is that North American
exponents of traditional Islam are playing an increasingly significant role in transnational and even
global networks:
The community identity developed within the Neotraditional network in America has
persisted even as it has evolved into a global network, and the connections between
individuals in this network are less and less constrained to local contacts. Neotraditionalism
has already become a trans-local community, and this will become more pronounced as the
globally dispersed next generation matures to become leaders of the network. (53)
Indeed, North American Muslims benefit from their location in the core of the modern/colonial worldsystem, even if they live in peripheral pockets as racialized minorities. English has become a global
Islamic language, possibly even the most prolific one in terms of contemporary Islamic literature.
Traditionalist scholarship in the West produces countless original works in English, as well as translations
of classical Islamic texts. As the Jordanian Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad (2014) remarks, the way Islam is
discussed in Western sources, especially English ones, is “central to the very future of Islam because
80% of all Muslims in the world cannot speak or read Arabic, and because more Muslims speak English
than Arabic” (202). These conditions have allowed North American Traditionalist Islam to globalize, as
can be demonstrated by the involvement of its scholars in institutions such as the Royal Aal al-Bayt
Institute for Islamic Thought of which the aforementioned prince is Chair, and its affiliated Jordan Royal
Islamic Strategic Studies Centre. The Centre’s most renowned international publication, the Muslim 500
(Schleifer 2019) is written in English and edited by a U.S. American Muslim, Sulayman Abdallah Schleifer,
whose vision is clearly favourable to Traditionalist Islam. But the Perennialist current within
Traditionalism is only acknowledged with ambivalence. For instance, bin Muhammad includes
Understanding Islam (Schuon 1986 [original French 1961]) in his list of 100 recommended books on
Islam in English, but his description contains a note of caution about Schuonian Perennialism: “Islam
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from the point of view of ‘Perennial Philosophy’ by its foremost exponent, but contains metaphysical
insights about Islam not to be found in any other book” (bin Muhammad 2014, 205). As discourses
influenced by Guénonian Traditionalism become more widespread among Muslims worldwide,
Perennialism is sometimes dealt with as a family secret, with slightly embarrassed allusions.
Interestingly, Newlon (2017) makes no mention of Guénon or his most direct Perennialist
successors in Europe and North America, such as Schuon, Nasr, Lings, Burckhardt, and Lumbard.
Moreover, he only does not delve into the Northwest African genealogy of scholars he studies, such as
Yusuf and Shakir. For instance, he only briefly mentions Shâdhilî in citations, without further explanation
(130 and 174). Perhaps this is an indication of how these lineages are becoming less prominent, at least
ostensibly, in contemporary Traditionalist Islamic discourse. Yet, scholars such as Nasr and Lumbard still
actively engage with institutions like Zaytuna College, a fact that meets the approbation of bin
Muhammad (2014), who writes, “the fact that, despite being a predominantly Sunni College, they asked
the great Islamic philosopher, Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr to be their commencement speaker, is
undoubtedly an extremely positive, and hopeful sign, in sha Allah” (202-203). Although it is unclear
whether this passage is expressing surprise at Nasr speaking at Zaytuna because he is a Perennialist or
because of his Shia background—in fact, he now follows Mâlikî fiqh—it shows that Nasr remains a major
figure in Traditionalist Islam. And it suggests that lineages connecting Nasr, Schuon, Guénon, ‘Abd alQâdir, Hamahoullah, Sayyida al-Ḥurra, and Shâdhilî, across the Muslim Atlantic, should not be dismissed
too quickly.

Conclusion
The Traditionalist Islamic discourse genealogically connected to both the Northwest African
heritage examined in Chapters One to Six, and the oeuvre of Frenchman René Guénon discussed in
Chapter Seven, followed Atlantic networks into North America. This occurred as the fourth phase of the
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modern/colonial world-system began in the mid-1960s. During this time, international institutions such
as the United Nations, dominated by Western and Westernized elites, safeguarded colonial power
dynamics despite the end of direct rule in most of Africa and Asia. Western hegemony was perpetuated
as the world-system shifted from a situation of global colonialism to one of global coloniality, and while
the United States ascended to become the most powerful nation in the world, economically,
geopolitically, and even in terms of cultural influence.
The fourth phase of the modern/colonial world-system has seen massive migration to the core
from the global periphery, and the consolidation of Western power, led by the United States, during and
after the so-called Cold War. Migrants fleeing the difficult conditions of the periphery have provided a
strategic labour force, fuelling the development of Western Europe and Eurocentric settler colonial
states in such places as Australia, New Zealand, and of course the United States and Canada. In the first
decades of this phase, a global conflict pitted the semi-peripheral Soviet Union and its allies against the
United States and its allies in the core. Known as the Cold War, this conflict burned intensely on the
periphery, where the two superpowers spread unfathomable death and destruction, an endless series of
proxy wars, and forced weaker states into unequitable alliances. With the end of the Cold War in 1991,
the United States was able to increase its global influence and attack peripheral countries with impunity,
both economically and militarily. 9/11 provided a pretext for the United States and its allies to assume
even greater control of the global order, through a colossal regime of surveillance, securitization, and
military intervention, conducted under the guise of the Global War on Terror. Since then, Muslim
currents loosely labelled fundamentalist, which were once utilized as allies against the Soviet Block,
have become framed as the main threat to global order. Ironically, dominant Islamophobic discourses
now conflate the broader Muslim community with the type of violent extremists who have principally
targeted other Muslims since the rise of Wahhâbism in the eighteenth century. Muslims have been
collectively stereotyped as global bogeymen.
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This situation has been experienced in unique ways by Muslims in Canada and the United
States.175 They have witnessed first-hand the construction of renewed modern/colonial Islamophobic
discourses in the core of the world-system, during the Cold War and the Global War on Terror.
Moreover, they have experienced how Islamophobia is inextricably connected to other racial
formations, such as anti-Black and anti-Latino racism. Nevertheless, living in the core of the worldsystem has offered this extremely diverse community prime conditions in which to challenge
modern/colonial discourses and power dynamics. In Canada and the United States, Traditionalist
Muslims, along with Progressive Muslims, and various Muslim minority communities, such as Shia
denominations, have been at the forefront of mounting challenges to modern/colonial narratives and
social structures. Traditionalist Islamic discourse has refuted both Eurocentric and Islamic
fundamentalism. And it has challenged typical Eurocentric right/left binaries, by drawing upon epistemic
genealogies and counter-discourses which have been present in the Atlantic World since the very
beginnings of the modern/colonial world-system, centuries ago. Muslims from Central and Eastern
Islamdom came to North America later, but their descendants have gradually, subtly, and at times
unconsciously engaged with this tradition. They have engaged with Muslims of African descent, whose
predecessors resisted European hegemony on both sides of the Atlantic, and ones of European descent,
whose predecessors were once known as renegades. North American Muslims have struggled to
overcome centuries of internalized colonial racism to recreate a cosmopolitan community. Children of
ethnically diverse Muslim backgrounds are born today as they were centuries ago, when Sayyida alḤurra, discussed in Chapter Four, and the van Salee brothers, discussed in Chapter Five, lived away from
the homelands of their parents.
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Conditions are different for Muslims in the rest of North America (i.e. Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean).
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The Traditionalist Islamic discourse was introduced to North America by foreign-born
Perennialist Muslims, such as Schuon and Nasr. It initially attracted mostly middle-and-upper-class
whites, but has gradually become much more diverse, in terms of ethnicity as well as religious and
political views. After all, Schuon, Guénon, and other early European Traditionalists were connected to
Islamic lineages from Northwest Africa, which were also internally diverse. And anti-colonial currents
within these lineages remained observable in early European and North American Traditionalism, as
they do today. North American scholars of diverse origins, with diverging views on political engagement,
or the contemporary validity of traditions other than Islam, now participate in a vibrant discourse which
draws upon Islamic traditions from places such as Morocco, Senegal, Mali, and even Spain. They
produce robust critiques of modernity and its colonial underpinnings. Generally disillusioned with the
possibilities of direct political or military resistance, most Traditionalist scholars present epistemic
resistance as better suited to have a positive social impact in this era of weapons of mass destruction.
Indeed, the social impact of their discourse can be observed in the veritable trans-local and increasingly
global community of Muslims who champion traditional Islam in contradistinction to
fundamentalist/Salafist and modernist/Progressive Islam. This community, which once tended to stay
discreet and on the margins of major Islamic institutions in North America, has become increasingly
vocal since 9/11. It has become a dominant force in North American Islam.
Perhaps Guénon’s vision of a spiritual elite, constituted in the West but attached to nonWestern traditions, is coming true. Perhaps North American Muslims of diverse origins are helping save
the West from itself, and thereby contributing to save the world from being destroyed by a
modern/colonial cataclysm of eschatological proportions. The distinctions between East, West, North,
and South have become somewhat blurred by the global impact of Westernization, and the increasing
number of people from the global periphery migrating towards the core. But ongoing white-supremacy,
xenophobia, and racism, including Islamophobia, are preventing many Westerners from realizing the
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potentially salvific role of the diverse communities they disdain, pity, or tolerate as different, exotic and
manageable. As the decolonial process continues to unfold, and non-Western peoples gradually
challenge Western hegemony in all aspects of life, white nationalism rages on with renewed vigour.
Maybe these are the convulsions of dying privilege. And maybe the modern/colonial world-system will
finally come to an end. But what will replace it? And is there enough time before some cataclysmic
environmental catastrophe or nuclear war interrupts the longue durée of history?
These crucial existential questions about the most pressing issues facing humanity today inform
the very ambitious scholarly discourses of both Traditionalist Islam and decolonial world-systems
analysis. Sections One to Three of this dissertation have offered a thorough analysis of the emergence of
Traditionalist Islam as a discourse of resistance within the modern/colonial world-system. Traditionalism
has been presented as the conscious struggle to draw upon traditional ways of being, knowing, and
behaving, in response to the disruption caused by the emergence of the modern/colonial world-system.
While this system threatens to annihilate all forms of cultural, religious, epistemic, and environmental
diversity, Traditionalist Islamic scholarship celebrates the pluralistic currents within Islam. And it seeks
to prevent the eradication of traditional Islam by adapting it to contemporary conditions. Section Four
explores the decolonial potential of contemporary Traditionalist Islamic discourse. Chapter Nine
examines how this discourse is positioning itself and setting the parameters for a necessary intra-Islamic
decolonial conversation. The North American discourse is considered in relation to transnational and
global Traditionalist Islam. Having examined the intra-Islamic context in Chapter Nine, Chapter Ten
considers how Traditionalist Islam might better contribute to inter-epistemic decolonial conversations,
with scholars who draw upon extremely different genealogies but face similar challenges.
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Figure 5—Some Key Figures in the Intellectual Genealogy of North American Traditionalist Islam
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Section IV— Decolonization: Traditionalist Islam and Countering Coloniality
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Chapter 9- Traditionalist Islamic Decolonization
ِ ع ِن ٱ ۡل ُمن َ ِر َوتُ ۡؤمِ نُ ۡونَ ِبا ﱣ
ِ ُك ۡنتُمۡ ﺧ َۡي َر ا ُ ﱠم ٍة ا ُ ۡﺧ ِر َج ۡت لِل ﱠن
َ َاس ت َۡأ ُم ُرونَ ِب ۡال َمعۡ ُر ۡوفِ َوت َۡن َه ۡون
You are the best community brought forth to men, enjoining decency, and forbidding
indecency, and believing in God […] (Qur’an 3:110)
The Qur’anic description of “the best community” may be considered flattering by some Muslims,
but the subsequent qualifications of “enjoining decency, and forbidding indecency, and believing in
God” should also provide an opportunity for self-criticism. Are Muslims generally living up to this
description? If not, how can they meet the challenges of the day in terms of moral action and faith?
Such questions underlie Traditionalist Islamic critiques of modern/colonial conditions and situations.
They may lead to valuable answers which help advance the decolonial struggles of all peoples
peripheralized in the world-system, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Section Four examines the decolonial conversations to which Traditionalist Islam can contribute;
however, the objective is emphatically not to propose a systematic plan for decolonization or even for
decolonial conversations. Such an intervention by one scholar, born into and living in a colonial settler
community, would express arrogance in a delicate conversation requiring humility. Moreover, if I
thought I had all the answers or even all the questions, there would be no reason to argue for more
conversations. Instead, the purpose here is to reveal connections between diverse epistemic
communities committed to decolonization and to argue that dialogical approaches developed over
centuries in an Islamic context are a useful source to consider when agreeing on guidelines for
productive communication. My contribution in these emergent internal and inter-epistemic
conversations is purposely tentative and exploratory. Although I do share my perspective and critically
engage the sources I examine, the focus is on the conversations themselves.
Before people of diverse worldviews—whose ways of knowing have been fragilized by centuries
of modern/colonial disruption—can productively participate in the inter-epistemic conversations
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discussed in Chapter Ten, a certain amount of decolonial healing must take place within each
community.176 The present chapter discusses the mediating role of tradition and Traditionalism in the
internal decolonial process of the Muslim community, with a focus on North America. It engages in an
intertextual analysis of contemporary sources, understood in relation to the historical context presented
in Sections One to Three.
North America offers unique opportunities for critical Muslim thought. As home to Muslims of all
origins and heritages, it is a microcosm of global Islam. Contemporary North American thinkers whose
critiques of modern/colonial conditions and situations are deeply rooted in traditional Islamic
worldviews build upon centuries of work by African, European, Asian, and Indigenous American
Muslims. Moreover, North America includes countries from the modern/colonial core, namely Canada
and the United States, as well as countries in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America, situated in
the periphery. It offers a good regional viewpoint to observe the global world-system, as well as to
develop critical Muslim perspectives in an environment which is relatively uncensored in comparison to
most Muslim-majority countries, despite the intense gaze of the surveillance state and widespread
Islamophobia. Nowhere else can an equally diverse community of Muslims engage openly in a difficult
intra-Islamic conversation about tradition, modernity, and coloniality. Yet, few thinkers address all three
of these themes in a systematic manner, and many related discussions are taking place within scattered
epistemic communities. This chapter seeks to make connections and advance this conversation for the
benefit of Muslims as well as non-Muslims engaged in similar intra-communal discussions.
Three themes merit special attention. First is the disruptive spiritual, intellectual, cultural, social,
economic, and political impact of modern/colonial power dynamics upon Muslims and their traditions—
in other words, the colonization of traditional Islam and the need for decolonization. Second is the
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The Pakistani philosopher and poet Muhammad Iqbal (1953 [1918]) (1877-1938) insists on the importance of
community in fostering healthy individuals. For example, he writes “The Link that binds the Individual / To the
Society a Mercy is; / His Highest Self in the Community / Alone achieves fulfilment” (5)
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importance of tradition in the decolonial process, and the potential of Traditionalist Islamic
decolonization.177 Third is the unique position of North American Muslims in this process. Muslim
intellectuals drawing from the African American corpus have powerful contributions to make about such
issues as sacred activism and the necessity to transcend the Eurocentric divide between Left and Right.
Black Muslims drawing from the broader African American intellectual heritage are especially well
positioned in this regard.178 As established in Sections Two and Three, African Islam is the most
important historical source of North American Islam. No decolonial process among North American
Muslims can be successful without this recognition. Naturally, Muslims racialized as brown, white, or red
also have important contributions to make. A productive North American intra-Islamic conversation
about tradition, modernity, and coloniality must ultimately be multiracial, multiethnic, and
cosmopolitan.

Going with the Flow: Tradition, Islam, and Decolonization
Before envisioning a specifically Traditionalist Islamic decolonization, it is necessary to
understand how traditional Islam has been colonized and needs to be decolonized. Affirming that
traditional Islam has been colonized means acknowledging that traditional Islamic ways of being,
knowing, and behaving, developed over centuries, have been severely disrupted by the emergence of
the modern/colonial world-system explored in Sections Two and Three. Focusing on the epistemic
aspect of this colonization, Lumbard (2004c) writes:
In the modern period, the intellectual landscape of Islam has undergone dramatic changes
due to seismic shifts resulting from the challenges of foreign military, economic, and
cultural domination. Though not immediately apparent, the foremost of these challenges
are those posed by Western thought and its concomitant methodologies, for it is through
our ideologies that our institutions are formed. Yet despite its transformations, the Islamic
177

Perhaps this can be understood as traditionalizing decolonization, but such an expression might be too forceful
for those with less traditional views. Tradition should be taken seriously but not trump all other issues.
178
Although the focus here is on U.S. Americans writing in English, this heritage also includes others, such as
Antilleans Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, writing in French.
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world remains profoundly Islamic in so far as the culture, social mores, and worldview of
the people inhabiting it have been molded by the teachings of Islam. Nonetheless, the most
vocal trends of the modern period are in danger of removing even this from the Islamic
world, for they do not represent Islamic responses to the challenges of the West, responses
based upon islâm, îmân, and iḥsân. The solutions to the difficulties of the Muslim world lie
not in the complete capitulation or drastic rejectionism which characterize secularist and
radicalist movements respectively, but in the interaction with other civilizations on the
basis of traditional Islamic teachings. (66)
Lumbard’s passage summarizes much of Sections Two and Three of this dissertation, according to which
antitraditional modern/colonial power dynamics have severely fragilized Muslim spiritualities,
intellectual schools, cultures, societies, economies, and forms of governance. In short, traditional Islam
may not be dead, but it needs decolonial healing. The first step towards this decolonization is to develop
an understanding which counters pejorative modern/colonial portrayals of tradition. This will open the
way for the actualization of tradition as a positive and productive decolonial force. To this end,
Traditionalist Muslim scholarship represents an ideal discursive entry point.
Having already examined in Section Three the various continuities and discontinuities within
Traditionalist Islamic discourse, concerning the notion of tradition, it is now possible to propose a new
formulation intended to be as consensual as possible. For English-speaking North Americans, the idea of
going with the flow might represent a meaningful and idiomatic way of formulating a positive relation to
tradition. In this context, going with the flow means approaching tradition as an inspired dynamic flow
from the past into the present and future. A certain direction may be observed by those who witness
any tradition from a transcendent distance, but up close one perceives myriads of currents,
countercurrents, undercurrents, waves, whirls, and splashes. Going with the flow means surfing or
sailing without attempting to control time and space. It requires both flexibility and strength.
Modern/colonial definitions reduce tradition to fearful, ignorant conservatism, superstition, and
custom. But this is the problem with definitions—they are intended to limit, quantify, classify, and
control realities which often defy such petty rationalism. The brain is only one of the useful organs
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required in the pursuit of complex, nuanced, and supple knowledge described by Article 11 of the
Charter of Transdisciplinarity:
Authentic education cannot value abstraction over other forms of knowledge. It must teach
contextual, concrete and global approaches. Transdisciplinary education revalues the role
of intuition, imagination, sensibility and the body in the transmission of knowledge. (see
Appendix One)
Going with the flow often requires letting go, giving up, surrendering, indeed submitting—the
etymological meaning of islâm—to the deep and dynamic movements of reality. Letting go is a
necessary skill for those seeking knowledge of flows. Epistemically, going with the flow is
transdisciplinary. It challenges the rigidity of borders (not the borders themselves) between science, art,
and theology, or between prose and poetry. Ontologically, going with the flow entails neither holding on
to the past nor engineering the future. It is hopeful but not utopian; neither fully conservative nor
progressive. Realism understood in this sense entails humbly submitting to the real while trying to move
forward, survive, and perhaps be happy.
An Islamic perspective on tradition as a flow, inspired by Traditionalist scholarship, must include
an immanent or worldly dimension and a transcendent or metaphysical one. Nasr (1987b) explains:
As used by the ‘traditionalists’, the term [traditional] implies both the sacred as revealed to
man through revelation and the unfolding and development of that sacred message in the
history of the particular humanity for which it was destined in a manner that implies both
horizontal continuity with the Origin and a vertical nexus which relates each movement of
the life of the tradition in question to the meta-historical Transcendent Reality. Tradition is
at once al-dîn in the vastest sense of the word, which embraces all aspects of religion and
its ramifications, al-sunnah, or that which, based upon sacred models, has become tradition
as this word is usually understood, and al-silsilah, or the chain which relates each period,
episode or stage of life and thought in the traditional world to the Origin, as one sees so
clearly in Sufism. (13)
Here, the immanent dimension of tradition concerns the transmission of a prophetic trust through
lineages of noble blood; of sciences ranging from the metaphysics of oneness to the complex multiplicity
of physics; of arts; of a wide range of occupations and trades; and even of refined behaviours. This
transmission requires being firm on certain principles, such as the exclusive worship of One God. But it
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also requires suppleness and creativity to ensure the survival and flourishing of the prophetic trust in
continuously changing circumstances. Understandably, there is an inherent tension between the need
to transmit an inheritance through human lineages and the need to stay relevant and meet the
challenges of the day.179
Connecting to the transcendent dimension of tradition ideally allows Muslims to avoid rigid
formalism and ossification. It allows for perpetual renewal and actualization of the prophetic trust,
which is itself understood as a divine trust. And the divine in Islam is completely unlimited by time and
space. From a Traditionalist perspective, neither blind formalism nor rationalist reform is enough to
perpetuate the divine trust; inspiration is required. Formalism and rationalism are not excluded from
this worldview; they are simply incomplete. For this reason, the Traditionalist Islamic position should be
understood as attempting to incorporate and transcend, rather than oppose both fundamentalist/
conservative/literalist and modernist/progressive tendencies. By seeking higher ground, the false
modern/colonial binary between conservatives and progressives can perhaps be surpassed. 180
Historically, Sufism has been the dominant metaphysical tradition through which Muslims have sought
to transcend the conflicting forces of the world through direct experiential knowledge of divine unity.
The modern/colonial disruption of Sufism described in Chapter Six has been an attack on the
ontological and epistemic core of traditional Islam. As discussed in Section One, Sufism is the ultimate
science of being and of experiencing states which inspire and give meaning to the behaviour prescribed
in Islamic law. Consequently, the Traditionalist Islamic discourses examined in Chapter Eight tend to
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For a case study in how one Sufi lineage has approached the challenge of transmitting a heritage while adapting
to circumstances, see Sparkes (2016, 2013).
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Non-Muslim scholars, especially secularists, may understandably find it difficult to accept the transcendent
dimension of tradition from an Islamic perspective. The objective here is not to convince non-Muslims to believe in
Allah. However, it seems impossible to deny the historical role of mystics, artists, and others claiming inspiration,
in constantly renewing and adapting the Islamic tradition for over fourteen centuries. Without its transcendent
dimension, the Islamic tradition would arguably have died long ago. Even a non-reductive materialist approach to
religion can allow for some form of transcendence (Vasquez 2010). Surely, non-Muslim scholars can recognize a
transcendent dimension of traditional Islam, while disagreeing on the exact nature of this dimension and falling
short of converting to Islam or becoming theologians.
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present the revitalization of Sufism as the most pressing issue facing contemporary Muslims.
Decolonizing Sufism is thus a priority in decolonizing traditional Islam. As discussed in Chapter Six,
institutional Sufism often represented a counterbalance to state institutions in the precolonial period.
Sufis generally kept a disdainful distance from the halls of power, but they also occasionally challenged
specific policies. Moreover, despite sporadic attempts to subdue Sufis they believed threatened their
power, precolonial Muslim political rulers tended to recognize the relative autonomy of religious
specialists, such as Sufis and jurists. This is even true of the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires in
the modern/colonial period. Although they did develop state-controlled bureaucracies to manage
religious affairs, these polities still focused on governance and allowed private institutions to focus on
religion and education.181 But when countries such as France and England colonized places such as
Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt, they established the all-encompassing power of the modern/colonial
nation-state. As a rule, Sufi institutions were either persecuted or co-opted by colonial powers. The
same can be said of other institutions, such as schools of religious law.
So-called postcolonial nation-states have pursued these policies. For instance, the Supreme
Council of Sufi Orders established in 1903 to manage the activities of institutional Sufism in Egypt still
exists today. And the famous Azhar university was nationalized in 1961, thereby placing the institution
under the complete control of the Egyptian state. In the era of the Global War in Terror, countries such
as Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan have joined world powers such as the United Kingdom and the United
States in promoting and even sponsoring Sufism as a ‘good,’ ‘safe,’ ‘moderate,’ and ‘apolitical’
alternative to ‘bad,’ ‘unsafe,’ ‘extreme,’ and ‘militant’ Salafism (Muedini 2015, 2012, Bekkaoui and
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Hallaq writes that education in premodern Islamdom “was neither the province nor the jurisdiction of any
political power, although rulers did engage heavily in endowing waqfs (charitable trusts) for the benefit of
education” (2018, 76). Rulers could view these donations as occasions to encourage scholars to support and
legitimize their authority, “but this never, under any circumstance, meant that these rulers, as rulers, could decide
on the substance of educational material, who is to fashion it, and how to teach it, all of which always remained at
the hands of private scholars” (ibid., 76).
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Larémont 2011). In many ways, Sufism has been forced into an alliance with progressive
(post)modernism to counter fundamentalism. Sufism has even been described as an “antidote” to
fundamentalism (Geoffroy 2003, 8). Many governments in Muslim-majority countries now see Sufism as
a Western-friendly spirituality which is good for tourism and politically toothless. And multinational
corporations package Sufi poetry and music as universal spirituality for Western audiences, thereby
overrepresenting the significance of universalist currents within Sufism. These conditions do allow many
traditional Sufi orders to operate with relative freedom and attract adherents without provoking
excessive suspicion from the state. But in the process the stereotype of Sufis pandering to corrupt
powers is reinforced.
Traditionally, Sufis have been well served by focusing on metaphysics and spiritual realization,
their field of expertise, and keeping a safe distance from power. Many Sufi lineages have survived for
centuries, in Islamicate lands and beyond, despite the rise and fall of successive states. This disdainful
distance from power is illustrated by Ibn al-‘Arabî (2008 [13th cent., 1971 first English version]) who
relates how his paternal uncle renounced as ruler of the North African city of Tlemcen (Tilamsân) after a
conversation with a wandering holy man:
The king (Ibn Yughân) was in fine apparel and asked the Shaikh. "Is it lawful for me to pray
in these fine clothes I am wearing?" at which the Shaikh laughed and said, "I am laughing at
the feebleness of your intellect, your ignorance of yourself and your (spiritual) condition. In
my eyes you are like a dog sniffing around in the blood of a carcass and eating it with all its
filthiness, but lifting its leg when it urinates lest any soil its body. You are full of
unlawfulness and you ask me about your clothes when the sufferings of men are upon your
head." At this the king wept, dismounted from his horse, renounced his position and served
the Shaikh. (21-22)
This is not to say that Sufis generally contest the necessity of government, but they have tended to
consider it a dirty job they would rather avoid. Sufi institutions today would do well to ponder the
consequences of being too closely associated with modern/colonial political powers of any persuasion.
But considering the extreme invasiveness of contemporary nation-states, some level of interaction and
cooperation with governments seems inevitable for any institution to survive.
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Decolonial scholars and activists must bear in mind that while hegemonic Western and
Westernized institutions, representing the interests of the global core, are strong and need to be
vigorously challenged, traditional institutions on the periphery, such as Sufi orders and schools of Islamic
law, have been completely destabilized and fragilized by centuries of modern/colonial interference. This
even applies to an extent to governments on the modern/colonial periphery. Even violent or totalitarian
impulses within peripheral institutions must be understood in the context of their facing a perpetual
existential threat. Without justifying injustice, this understanding must inform analyses produced within
the relative safety of hegemonic modern/colonial institutions, such as the Western(ized) university, as is
the case with this dissertation. For centuries, institutions on the periphery have been suffering from
modern/colonial radical change, revolution, paradigm shifts, disruption, problematization, and even
deconstruction, often driven by the agendas of Western and Westernized elites. Such institutions
arguably need tender, patient, and compassionate transformation, not violent or radical change.
Without denying the inevitability of anti-colonial violence in certain circumstances (Fanon 2002 [1961]),
decolonial perspectives inspired by Traditionalist Islam generally remain cautious by necessity. The elites
of the modern/colonial system have mastered the arts of violence and destruction to the point of
threatening all earthly life with extinction. Responding using similar techniques seems unwise if not
utterly immoral. Walid (2018) suggests:
The famous saying of Malcolm X (may Allah have mercy upon him), “By any means
necessary” should be translated today as “by any means that are lawful within Islam and
adheres to the Prophetic example of the Prophet Muhammad (prayers and peace upon him
& his family). (45)
Caution and compassion do not contradict courage. Muslims in places such as North America,
who can still explore decolonial options and express themselves forcefully, have a lot to learn from the
multitudes in peripheral contexts whose very survival depends on their capacity to pursue their
interests, and ideally those of society, while remaining extremely prudent. It seems reasonable to
conclude that modern/colonial elites only tolerate challenges they do not perceive as existential threats
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to the system. When Muslims in the West are perceived as such a threat, for instance as terrorists, they
are treated similarly to those perceived as a threat in the global periphery. Perhaps it is best to share the
knowledge that the modern/colonial world-system has become an existential threat to all living beings
on earth, including elites. This might be more productive and transformative than posturing as
revolutionaries without being prepared to face the harsh realities of counterrevolution. 182
Anti-colonial figures such as ʿAbd al-Qâdir and Hamahoullah, discussed in Chapter Six, embodied
a model of decolonization characterized by endless softness and patience along with a certain amount
of toughness. Their example reminds us that traditions perpetuated by fragilized populations can often
only be reclaimed and activated through soft decolonization. Suppleness can be more powerful in
certain circumstances than rigidity, as is attested by the long-term shaping of rocky land by flowing
water, or the capacity of grass to bend rather than break under strong winds. Going with the flow may
be the only chance of survival for Muslims and all others facing the ruthless engineers of systems aimed
at disrupting, interrupting, and even annihilating ancient flows of human tradition and natural life.
Knowledge is key. The contention here is that becoming aware that tradition is a flow which has been
colonized is the first and most important step in re-establishing the surfing, sailing, and navigation skills
necessary to decolonize tradition. And a decolonized Islamic tradition can itself become the most
powerful resource for Muslims to contribute to global decolonization.
Traditionalist Islamic scholarship argues forcefully that, without reconnecting to tradition,
Muslims will remain deeply colonized. This reconnection entails drawing on Muslim lineages to produce
contemporary knowledge. But who are the models to follow? Sections Two and Three of this
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People in privileged locations and positions need to be just as cautious about encouraging revolts and
revolutions as they are about accusing the oppressed of being unreasonable when they revolt. For instance,
Westerners enthusiastic at the sight of middle-and-upper-class Egyptians organizing protests using expensive
smart phones, in 2011, might not have considered the repercussions of the revolution and counterrevolution for
poor Egyptians selling homemade sesame sweets or shining shoes in public squares. One day without income can
be deadly for them, let alone months and years of socioeconomic crisis. And they cannot afford a ticket to exile.

387

dissertation present several figures who can serve as links in an Atlantic-world decolonial Islamic
lineage, including but far from limited to Muḥammad Ibn Sulaymân al-Jazûlî , ‘Abd Allâh al-Ghazwânî,
Sayyida al-Ḥurra, Musṭafá al-Azammûrî Estebanico, Murâd Raʾîs van Salee, François Makandal, Usman
dan Fodio Don Fode, Nana Asma'u, ‘Umar Tall, ʿAbd al-Qâdir al-Jazâʾirî, Amadu Bamba, Ahmedou
Hamahoullah, René ʿAbd al-Wâḥid Yaḥyá Guénon, and el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz Malcolm X. The main
lesson we can learn from this lineage is that metaphysics and worship should be the priority for all
Muslims, a notion summarized by Shakir (2010) as giving “priority to salvation over even liberation.”
However, ethical conduct in social contexts is a form of worship, understood as action intended to
please God. After all, enjoining decent or good conduct and forbidding indecent or bad conduct are
prescribed in the Qur’an (e.g. 3:110).
A proper individual relation to the Absolute is traditionally understood by Muslim scholars as
the necessary basis for a relation to others characterized by both compassion and justice. Courage,
strength, intelligence, and adaptability, which are necessary for compassionate and just action, are
understood to be best cultivated through such a strong relation to God. Indeed, the traditional Islamic
paradigm puts Allah at the centre of a series of concentric relational circles also linking an individual to
family, neighbours, local community, regions, nations, the umma, humanity, and all of creation. Ethical
obligations are greatest towards those closest to each individual, beginning with family. Indeed, those
who are unkind to their parents, siblings, children, and neighbours are considered ill-positioned to
preach about social justice. Before they “speak truth to power” by condemning oppressive
socioeconomic and political systems, such individuals need spiritual healing. Their illness may be caused
in good part by unjust systems, but from a traditional Islamic perspective their healing must begin with
establishing a correct relation with God. Suspicion of power, as it is commonly understood throughout
the decolonial traditional Islamic lineage of the Muslim Atlantic presented here, begins with suspicion
towards one’s inner tyrants and enemies: the ego, worldly desires, unbridled passions, and Satan.
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People dominated by such inner despots will inevitably become as unjust as the oppressors they are
fighting in the world, if they succeed in their social struggles. Indeed, traditional psychology presents the
ego as prone to utilize noble pretexts to reach ignoble ends.183 One objective of becoming an apprentice
within a traditional lineage is to check the ego and its often-unconscious thirst for wealth, power, or
prestige. But are the lineages examined here legitimate and effective or mostly imagined and idealized?
Are they a case of invented tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983)?

From Africa to North America: Decolonial Flows in the Muslim Atlantic
Can we situate contemporary Traditionalist Muslims in North America in the same traditional
flow as their predecessors in the Muslim Atlantic centuries ago? Necessarily in movement, a flow
involves change. But if it is broken it may die. The issue here is whether the traditional flow of
Northwest African Islam was broken in North America. For instance, is the contemporary Mâlikî-Ash’arîJunaydî current in North America a completely imagined reconstruction of the ways of being, knowing,
and behaving of enslaved Muslim Africans, European converts, and other Muslims who came to the
Northwestern Atlantic shores before the twentieth century? If we take a narrowly North American
perspective, it does indeed seem that the flow was broken and that we are dealing with separate
phenomena connected mostly in the minds of contemporary Traditionalists. However, a world-systems
analysis reveals that, despite the historical difficulties of perpetuating this tradition and its occasional
disappearance in many parts of North America, the flow from East to West never stopped. Every time
this tradition died out in North America, it was eventually revived through contact with Northwest
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Sufis have traditionally been among the leading Islamic theorists and practitioners of psychology. In fact, Sufism
is commonly described as tazkiyat al-nafs (purification of the self). This process understood to require both
vigilance (murâqaba) and self-examination (muḥâsaba), developed in the early centuries of Islam, is eloquently
summarized by Ghazâlî (Al-Ghazālī, Shaker, Anthony F 2015 [c. 1097]). Some research has been conducted
regarding the similarities and differences between Sufism and such modern Western currents as Jungian
psychology, but this topic deserves more thorough examination (Nouriani 2017, Spiegelman, Khan and Fernandez
1991).
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Africa. Refusing to observe any such continuity seems a suspiciously colonial attitude. When contact
between France and certain French communities in North America has been periodically cut off, is there
no continuity to be found when links are re-established? Of course there is. The same logic applies to
North Americans connected to Muslim lineages and institutions in Northwest Africa.
By situating the diverse sources examined in this dissertation in a broad decolonial worldsystems framework, it becomes clear that Traditionalist Muslims in North America today are historically
and trans-historically connected to the Muslim scholars, Sufis, and warriors resisting European
aggressions in Northwest Africa since the early fifteenth century. They are connected to European
converts to Islam, fighting alongside North Africans against modern/colonial crusaders, and portrayed as
renegades in their native communities. They draw upon the same intellectual and spiritual sources as
enslaved West African Muslims organizing and leading revolts, at sea and on land, on both sides of the
Atlantic. And they are connected to past generations of North Americans from diverse origins,
unsatisfied with the dominant norms of their society, who turned to Northwest Africa in search of
alternative pasts from which to build new futures. Mâlikî-Ash’arî-Junaydî lineages have been a driving
force in the Muslim Atlantic, where their flows have overlapped with many other metaphysical,
intellectual, cultural, political, economic, and social currents.
Home to Muslims of every geographic, ethnic, and cultural heritage, as well as all major
spiritual, intellectual, legal, and political currents, North America is a microcosm of the global Muslim
community (umma). Preserving, perpetuating, and decolonizing traditional Islam in North America, and
making it relevant to our times, requires contributions from Muslims of African and European and origin,
present on these shores for centuries, as well as Asian Muslims, more recently arrived. Muslims
racialized as black, brown, and white have a heritage which can be accessed in the ongoing decolonial
struggle. The critical perspectives of the small but growing Indigenous Muslim community are also
crucial, as are those of Muslims in the colonial periphery of North America, that is the Caribbean,
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Mexico, and Central America. South American Muslim perspectives also need to be included.
Cosmopolitanism is a strength for Muslims. However, the evidence examined in Sections Two and Three
establishes Africans and their descendants racialized as black as the most significant historical
perpetuators of Islamic traditions in North America. Consequently, they must play a central role in any
decolonial struggle by North American Muslims. Their knowledge is key to formulating appropriate
responses to modern/colonial conditions, for example to decide how traditional Muslims should engage
with society.
While the advice to stay clear of political activism by Guénon and many of his European
successors in the Muslim Atlantic is certainly sensible and rooted in African and Asian Islamic tradition, a
more engaged approach may impose itself upon considering the experience of enslaved Africans who
came to North America by force. They had to face unfathomably unjust socioeconomic and political
conditions. Considering their experience more might nuance the position of a British Muslim, such as
Murad (2002), who advises against political and religious extremism:
Revelation, as always, requires the middle way. Extremism, in any case, never succeeds
even on its own terms. It usually repels more people from religion than it holds within it.
Attempts to reject all of global modernity simply cannot succeed, and have not succeeded
anywhere. A more sane policy, albeit a more courageous, complex and nuanced one, has to
be the introduction of Islam as a prophetic, dissenting witness within the reality of the
modern world.
Wise advice. But one wonders what would have happened if enslaved Africans and their descendants in
the Americas had avoided militant actions considered extreme by colonial elites. Would they have
survived long enough to play the role of dissenting witnesses today?
One African American Muslim proposing traditional Islamic parameters for what he calls “sacred
activism,” in a U.S. American and more broadly Western context, is Walid (2018). He holds that Muslims
have an obligation to engage in “social justice activism” (31-36). However, he also argues that partaking
in such activism requires certain prerequisites (37-43). First among these is checking one’s intentions to
make sure the objective is to please Allah rather than other people, or even to seek fame (37-39).
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Second, one needs to simultaneously be prudent and summon courage through prayer (39-40). Third, it
is necessary to prepare for action by acquiring classical Islamic knowledge of that which constitutes
good and evil (40-41). Fourth, activists must learn about the historical, cultural, and social particularities
of the environment in which they wish to intervene (41-42). Walid focuses on his own U.S. American
context:
Given that much of the history Americans are taught in public schools is whitewashed or
inaccurate and that implicit bias colors how different communities are viewed, it is
imperative to go into communities to learn about their history from their experts and elders
instead of merely reading books. For instance, going to indigenous tribes or First Nations to
learn about their history and contemporary struggles would be much more educational and
nuanced and would better inform American Muslims, of all ethnicities, about how our
community fits into the broader history of racial justice in the U.S.A.” (42).
The sixth prerequisite Walid suggests for sacred activism is verifying facts about causes for which one is
solicited to support or advocate since spreading rumours and backbiting are traditionally considered
major sins (42-43). Seventh, activism inspired by traditional Islamic precepts entails certain etiquettes
(45-49):
As with everything in the Islamic faith, there are etiquettes (Adab) involved with enjoining
the good and forbidding the evil. As important as the substance of what Muslims advocate
for and against is, the form in which such is endeavored also has significant value. (45)
These etiquettes include “holding oneself accountable” and striving not to embody the very immoral,
bigoted, violent, and oppressive behaviour against which one is ostensibly fighting (45-46); and
“inclining towards pardoning and tenderness and avoiding the ignorant” rather than being harsh and
engaging in useless disputation (46-49):
Success in all endeavors relates to holding on to one’s correct beliefs and maintaining
Prophetic etiquettes because the aim is to please Allah (Mighty and Sublime). Shouting
people down, spewing profanity and compelling those to relinquish microphones when
talking in the name of speaking one’s “truth” are not means of achieving true success and
bringing about healthy societal transformation. (49)
Speaking at the University of Waterloo, in Canada, Mattson expresses similar views. She reflects on the
state of activism among Muslims today, such as those fighting Islamophobia:
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I support so much what they are doing, but that’s not all that we have to do, because not all
darkness is external. We are not in every case a victim. We are not in every case only the
oppressed, but we also are oppressors. We also commit evil. We also are engaged in, you
know, occasions of rationalizing our violence stepping over the line. And we know that it’s
wrong, and perhaps that’s why sometimes I look at my young activist friends and I see a lot
of anger. I don’t see sometimes very much satisfaction in seeking justice. They have a
passion for justice, yet their souls are disquieted. And so, we need to return to something
that is a deep tradition that for generations all Muslims have followed and taught but is so
much neglected, and that is the purification of the heart, that is the collective examination
of the state of our community in relation to other communities. We need to institutionalize
that more because otherwise it is possible for us to simply miss the mark. (MacDonald and
Mattson 2016)
Many scholars making the case for social justice activism rooted in traditional Islamic values are
responding to what they observe as a tendency among Muslim activists in the West to engage in identity
politics based on a secular worldview. Walid (2018) argues that “sacred activism requires being Muslim
primarily as a faith identity and not a quasi-ethnic and socio-political identity relegating faith to the
backburner” (62). The basic tenets of Islamic faith and practice, understood as universal standards, must
not be sacrificed to the vicissitudes of contexts in which clashing identities emerge. Across the Atlantic,
Murad (2015) makes the same basic argument:
Muslim traditionalism does not appeal to the sort of comforting essentialist narrative
whose claims to objective truth are less important than its status as a definer of cultural
identity. Such was the typical error of the twentieth century’s various essentialisms,
particularly nationalism and fascism; and it is all too often the error of Muslim activists
whose alertness to spiritual realities is subordinated to or even replaced by the quest for
the pseudo-spiritual solace of authenticity.
As a European convert to Islam, Murad has reflected deeply about the reasons which attract people to
Islam. For him, a traditional approach firmly rooted in metaphysical unity, rather than identity politics,
offers the best tools to handle contextual diversity:
Those who come to Islam because they wish to draw closer to God have no problem with a
multiform Islam radiating from a single revealed paradigmatic core. But those who come to
Islam seeking an identity will find the multiplicity of traditional Muslim cultures intolerable.
People with confused identities are attracted to totalitarian solutions. And today, many
young Muslims feel so threatened by the diversity of calls on their allegiance, and by the
sheer complexity of modernity, that the only form of Islam they can regard as legitimate is a
totalitarian, monolithic one. (Murad 2014a)
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Walid (2018) also sees traditional Islam as a safeguard against reductive ideologies which cannot
tolerate diversity. Moreover, he worries that Muslims advocating for social justice in the West without
deeply rooting their activism in the matrix of Islamic tradition, are in fact capitulating to the Eurocentric
ideologies they are resisting. But being firmly committed to one’s heritage does not mean being insular:
This does not equal rejecting everything that does not derive from Islamic civilization; it is a
way in which Muslims can attempt to peacefully coexist in pluralistic environments without
wavering from the sacred principles that have been passed down by Islamic scholars with
sound chains of transmission for centuries. (62)
Agitated activism, rather than meaningful social engagement based on traditional Islamic
principles, also seems to characterize young Muslim fundamentalists Murad (2014a) observes:
These young people, who haunt our mosques and shout at any sign of disagreement, are
either ignorant of Muslim history, or dismiss it as a gigantic mistake. For them, the grace
and rahma [compassion] of Allah has for some reason been withheld from all but a tiny
fraction of the Umma. These people are the elect; and all disagreement with them is a
blasphemy against God.
We cannot hope easily to cure such people. Simple proofs from our history or our
scholarship will not suffice. What they need is a sense of security, and that, given the
deteriorating conditions of both the Muslim world and of the ghettos in Western cities, may
not come readily. For now, it is best to ignore their shouts and their melodramatic but
always ill-fated activities. Our psychic problems are not theirs; and theirs can never be ours.
Murad thinks it is best to avoid debating extremists. Simply developing traditional Islam patiently and
compassionately is the best course of action.
Walid (2018) expresses similar concerns, although he takes a more gradual approach to ending
dialogue. He suggests one should begin by giving the benefit of the doubt to others and engaging them
compassionately, even tenderly, before choosing to avoid them (47-49). This reflects his understanding
of the Qur’anic guidelines (e.g. 7:199) for interacting with ignorant, hostile, obstinate people who are
interested neither in true dialogue nor in agreeing to disagree. From Walid’s (2018) perspective, people
should be given a chance before being shut out:
Accepting that, in times of non-violent confrontation, those on opposing sides are human
beings that are fallible and have hearts and minds that can change is a critical first step
when engaging disagreeable persons or leaders within institutions. Being generous in
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pardoning and giving the initial benefit of the doubt are signs of strength, not a display of
weakness as is conventionally perceived in some political circles. (47)
For Walid, the default position is compassionate engagement, rather than detached witnessing, as long
as this engagement is undertaken by those who are firmly committed to their tradition and do not
compromise core principles.
Walid worries that Muslims entering alliances with non-Muslims in the struggle for social justice
risk advocating for causes which go against traditional Islamic principles. In such circumstances, he
suggests coalitions are better than alliances. Perhaps this is the most useful distinction he proposes.
Contemporary social justice activism in the West tends to promote allyship among marginalized groups,
based on an intersectional understanding of identity, according to which people oppressed for a variety
of reasons must stand together in overturning what Grosfoguel (2011) labels the ““Capitalist/Patriarchal
Western-centric/Christian-centric Modern/Colonial World-System” (13). Since the struggles of those
oppressed for their race, class, gender, sexuality, or religion are connected, many social justice
advocates enter alliances with the understanding “that good allies show up for those whom they are in
allyship with and vice versa” (Walid 2018, 51). Such quid pro quo alliances are problematic according to
Walid (2018):
After Allah (Mighty and Sublime) and his messenger, the primary allegiance that believers in
Islam are obligated to have is with fellow believers. This allegiance is based upon an affinity
for others who believe and seek to implement the spiritual healing and socio-political
guidance contained with the Qur’an and the Prophetic sunnah. In other words, allegiance is
rooted in a belief in transcendent values and ethics based upon sacred guidance, not simply
allegiance based upon identity politics. (52-53)
However, Walid (2018) recognizes that Muslims have a duty to work for the common good with nonbelievers and defend victims of oppression regardless of their beliefs. Coalitions are useful to this end:
From my vantage point, a coalition differs from an alliance because it is a collaboration
which is usually temporary in nature and is based upon a narrow focus of issue(s). Coalition
partners do not have to share the same belief systems and methodologies in order to
cooperate upon limited common goals. Moreover, coalition partners can be in partnership
on some issues while simultaneously be in opposition to each other on other matters. (54)
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Sexuality is one contentious issue about which Muslim social justice activists drawing upon
traditional Islamic values frequently find themselves at odds with activists espousing secular or
progressive values:
One of the most testing, and perhaps confusing, issues among many Western Muslims
relates to LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer) engagement. Among the
Progressive Left, members within the LGBTQ community have been among the most
aggressive in seeking to engage Muslim activists, from speaking out against anti-Muslim
hate crimes to even supporting the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement
targeting Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. Given that Islamophobia has steadily
increased in America since the tragedy of 9/11, Muslims have welcomed support from
those outside the community as a form of defense, and LGBTQ activists have been among
the most vocal persons speaking against hate and bullying against Muslims. (57)
This presents a dilemma for those Muslims whose understanding of traditional Islamic values consider
sex to be divinely forbidden outside the institution of marriage between a man and a woman. If LGBTQ
advocates promote religious freedom for Muslims, should Muslim activists necessarily promote LGBTQ
rights? Walid answers this delicate question by proposing a practical approach (57-66). He argues that in
a society which allows the consumption of alcohol, casinos, and heterosexual relations outside of
marriage, there is no reason for Muslims to single out LGBTQ as especially condemnable. However, he
warns Muslims against promoting any belief or conduct which goes “against fourteen centuries of
Islamic legal consensus” (58). Naturally, the very notion that such a consensus exists can be debated
(Kugle 2010), but Walid is certainly expressing the dominant view of sexuality and gender within both
the current Traditionalist and so-called fundamentalist discourses.
According to Walid (2018), one must be simultaneously firm and gentle when discussing an issue
such as LGBTQ rights:
Be upfront, resolute and kind in telling religious leaders and advocates where you stand on
this issue based upon normative Islamic beliefs and that it is acceptable for them to
disagree. Just as you are not trying to impose your beliefs upon them, you should
respectfully tell them that you have the right to not agree with all of their positions but can
work together with them when causes align. (65)
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In short, choosing one’s battles is important, as is differentiating between coalitions and alliances. And
Muslims should not shy away from entering coalitions to pursue specific objectives:
Feeding the homeless and providing healthcare for the poor are what sacred activism calls
for, irrespective of the morality of the indigent. Making sure that children are in safe, nonhostile learning environments is also a concern which has basis in Islamic ethics. In issues
such as these, assisting persons who identify as gay or transgender has a spiritual basis. (63)
While they are not the focus here, gender, sexuality, and family structures are so central to the
modern/colonial depictions of Muslims and tradition that they must be addressed to an extent through
critical engagement with the sources. Simply citing the position of certain scholars will not suffice.
Clearly, Eurocentric constructions and deconstructions of gender, sexuality, and family have been
utilized to justify unfathomable colonial violence upon Muslims for centuries. Westerners once
considered Muslims and ethnic groups such as Arabs to be overly licentious and far too prone to sexual
encounters between members of the same sex, or even men and boys. However, the rise of individualist
liberalism in the West reversed the stereotype. Rather than decadent, Arabs and Muslims suddenly
became widely viewed as prudish, retrograde, and intolerant (Massad 2007). Although both matriarchal
and patriarchal elements can be found in traditional Islamic understandings of family and gender
(Murata 1992, 79, 208, 322), Muslims and other communities living in Islamicate contexts during the
Victorian period were encouraged by Europeans to abandon the extended family model and espouse
the very patriarchal European model of the nuclear family.
Tamara Gray (2013), trained for decades in the traditional Islamic sciences as well as Western
academia, asserts that the “colonial period brought with it great detriment to the status of Muslim
women.” Interestingly, for a white U.S. American woman who lived in Syria for much of her life, Gray
refers first to the West African context for examples of precolonial Muslim women wielding economic,
political, and social power. She states that Europeans colonizing West Africa “brought with them
attitudes towards women and a woman’s role that began to change the attitudes of Muslims
themselves.” (ibid.). For instance, girls and women educated in Islamic schools, but not colonial Christian
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ones, were officially recorded as illiterate, thereby constructing them as ignorant. Gray (2017) offers
Nana Asma’u of the West African Sokoto Caliphate, examined in Chapter Five, as an exemplary Muslim
woman scholar and activist:
The history of Muslim women is a history of action, acumen and resilience. It is a history of
intelligence, interest and stamina. It is a history of personal power, community care and
global grit. And few exemplify this history like Nana Asma’u of the early nineteenth century.
Moreover, Gray depicts Nana Asma’u as a model of female empowerment facilitated by certain men in a
traditional Islamic context:
Her loving relationship with her father, brothers and husband, and the relationships of
mutual respect and admiration between her and other leaders of the continent, all
demonstrate a woman who was not fighting patriarchy in her inner circles, but rather
working to create the same culture of equality and respect at every level of society. Her
innovative educational system stood as a wall of justice, pushing back against misogyny and
uplifting women in every village and town. Nana Asma’u, in her writings, her relationships,
and her educational system, was a transformative leader, whose legitimacy came from a
traditional model […] (ibid.)
And the traditional West African Islamic model embodied by Nana Asma’u remains relevant for Muslims
today:
She leaves a legacy for young men and women around the world; a legacy of social change,
cultural development and spiritual enlightenment. Her legacy for Muslims is especially
poignant. As the community struggles to revive the female voice in scholarship, her words
echo forth and call us all to make space for our women scholars, to support our women
students of knowledge and to open our institutions for female leadership. The legacy of
Nana Asma’u lives on in every young woman who cares deeply for her community and
makes a lifetime commitment to scholarship and positive cultural change. (ibid.)
Yet, many contemporary Muslims have espoused modern/colonial conceptions of family, gender,
and sexuality, idealizing men at work, women at home, and children confined to sitting for hours
everyday at schools, being prepared to become productive members of the capitalist (or sometimes
socialist) economy. Cities such as Cairo or Casablanca are filled with apartment buildings containing
units only big enough for a couple with one to three children. The family model developed to meet the
requirements of nineteenth century Western European economies was progressively adapted in the
twentieth century to allow women to leave the home and join men as productive participants in
398

industrial capitalism. But this model no longer seems to fit the post-industrial capitalist phase at the core
of the modern/colonial world-system. New subjects are needed, namely consumers intent on pursuing
their desires. The stern patriarchal asceticism of the Protestant work ethic is no longer in vogue. New
directives are being sent to the periphery from the modern/colonial core: live your dreams and follow
your desires as free individuals; seek pleasure; identify with the specific ways through which you seek
pleasure; be enticing; consume and be consumed. As always, non-compliance with modern/colonial
directives can have disastrous consequences for peripheral societies. Muslims know that Westerners,
including sexist men, have long used women’s rights to justify political, economic, and even military
intervention in Islamicate societies. They can use LGBTQ for the same purpose today. Indeed, LGBTQ
subjects are often seen as worthy of protection by Western elites, including conservatives, only insofar
as they now symbolize the counterpart of the colonial other embodied by such bogeymen as Muslim
migrants in Western metropolises (Haritaworn 2015, Butler 2008).
It has been argued that Islamic norms based on scripture as well as jurisprudence were
traditionally much more inclusive of sexual diversity than is acknowledged by most Muslims today
(Kugle 2010). But it is also clear that expressions of gender and sexuality which contradict dominant
norms have often been met with violent opposition in Muslim communities, as they have elsewhere.
And misogyny exists among Muslims, as it does elsewhere. Without proposing any answers to these
difficult questions, I can only argue here that this conversation should be held among Muslims, without
seeking to please outsiders, especially Western and Westernized authorities. However, it is nearly
impossible for most Muslims to have this conversation calmly and productively in the current context
characterized by intense pressures from both the Eurocentric Left and Right. These concerns inform my
reading of Traditionalist scholarship on issues of sexuality, gender, and family.
Walid (2018) thinks Muslims with traditional views should not abandon their beliefs on issues
such as sexuality to please those in “liberal circles” who would label them “as a bigot, a kind of phobe,
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regressive, closed-minded or not ‘woke’. Ironically,” he argues “there is a form of intolerance within
these circles that mirrors their own critique of the intolerance of conservatives” (64). He suggests that
sacred activism, rooted in traditional Islam, entails keeping a cautious critical distance from both the Left
and the Right in Western contexts, but presents the influence of the Left as more insidious:
Be prepared to hear Islam itself, not just Muslims, being called homophobic and patriarchal
because of issues such as the opinion on homosexuality, men being obligated to pay
women a dowry in marriage but not the opposite, and the permissibility of polygyny but
not polyandry. Remember that soft anti-Islam sentiments exist within the Left in relation to
how it sees traditional Islamic theology and jurisprudence conflicting with Liberalism. This is
subtler than the overt racism against Muslims being just a non-white group. (66)
In response to pressures from the Left or Right to abandon core beliefs or principles before entering
coalitions, Walid reminds Muslims that their priority is to please God, not humans.
Another thought-provoking claim by Walid (2018) is that, among U.S. American Black Muslims,
traditional interpretations of sexuality and the religious impermissibility to advocate for LGBTQ rights
represent “the overwhelming position” (60). However, he only supports this contention with his
personal observations. He argues that this trend within his community can be explained by “the nonseeking of acceptance of the status quo within society and general pessimism, based upon historical
evidence, towards a legal system that simply does not protect minorities, black folks in particular, as it
does white folks who hold positional power within the dominant culture” (60). Indeed, Black Muslims in
North America have tended to keep a critical distance from both Left and Right ideologies, which are
after all Eurocentric constructs born from the French Revolution. Many of them have learned through
experience to be wary of mainstream politics. For this reason, the Black Muslim intellectual tradition,
with its critical prudence, is the ideal place to begin when seeking to decolonize the Right and the Left
from a North American Traditionalist Islamic perspective.
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Foxes and Wolves: Black Muslims Decolonizing the Left and the Right
On June 18, 2018, I discussed tradition, modernity, and the importance of decolonizing the Right
and the Left, with a scholar from the North American Black Muslim intellectual tradition, Abdullah Bin
Hamid Ali (2018), whose work is presented in the introduction and throughout this dissertation. He
insists that “[t]here is so much to learn from just the Black American community and our intellectual
tradition.” Although this tradition, which is not limited to Muslims, is not acknowledged enough, Ali
suggests that it offers a valuable critical perspective on “America’s sociopolitical and cultural DNA”
(ibid.). This perspective is characterized by a healthy dose of cynicism. Ali explains, “A lot of black
people are very cynical. Like myself. I can be cynical at times about the degree of commitment that the
establishment has to actually change the way that they operate” (ibid.). For instance, Ali is unsurprised
by U.S. American President Donald Trump’s attempt to prevent people from certain Muslim-majority
countries from entering the country, known as the Muslim Ban. Unimpressed, Ali reminds me that he
and generations before him have expected very little from the establishment. Moreover, he argues that
the policies of the previous President, Barack Obama (r. 2009-2017), similarly targeted Muslims.
In describing the Right/Left divide in the United States, epitomized by Trump and Obama, Ali
uses the metaphor of wolves and foxes, proposed half a century ago by Malcolm X. Commenting on the
1964 presidential election in which the Democratic candidate Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-1973, r. 19631969) defeated the Republican Barry Goldwater (1909-1998), Malcolm X writes that “as far as the
American black man was concerned they were both just about the same” and that “it was for the black
man only a question of Johnson, the fox, or Goldwater, the wolf” (X and Haley 2015 [1965]), 380). Both
animals are dangerous. Therefore, within this binary “the American black man only needed to choose
which one to be eaten by, the ‘liberal’ fox or the ‘conservative’ wolf—because both of them would eat
him” (380-381). Yet, one needs to be especially careful with foxes, because they are so sly:
I didn't go for Goldwater any more than for Johnson—except that in a wolf's den, I'd always
known exactly where I stood; I'd watch the dangerous wolf closer than I would the smooth,
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sly fox. The wolf's very growling would keep me alert and fighting him to survive, whereas I
might be lulled and fooled by the tricky fox. (381)
In fact, the wolf seems to demand a certain respect from Malcolm X:
Goldwater as a man, I respected for speaking out his true convictions—something rarely
done in politics today. He wasn't whispering to racists and smiling at integrationists. I felt
Goldwater wouldn't have risked his unpopular stand without conviction. He flatly told black
men he wasn't for them—and there is this to consider: always, the black people have
advanced further when they have seen they had to rise up against a system that they
clearly saw was outright against them. Under the steady lullabies sung by foxy liberals, the
Northern Negro became a beggar. But the Southern Negro, facing the honestly snarling
white man, rose up to battle that white man for his freedom—long before it happened in
the North.
Anyway, I didn't feel that Goldwater was any better for black men than Johnson, or viceversa. I wasn't in the United States at election time, but if I had been, I wouldn't have put
myself in the position of voting for either candidate for the Presidency, or of recommending
to any black man to do so. It has turned out that it's Johnson in the White House—and
black votes were a major factor in his winning as decisively as he wanted to. If it had been
Goldwater, all I am saying is that the black people would at least have known they were
dealing with an honestly growling wolf, rather than a fox who could have them halfdigested before they even knew what was happening. (381)
Sometimes Ali (2018) seems to be channeling his predecessor. Concerning Trump, he says “I
actually enjoy the fact that he’s a wolf, because see when the wolf is coming, he’s barking, he’s growling
you know, you have time to prepare yourself, to get away and protect yourself.” But when the fox
shows you his teeth, he “makes you think he’s smiling but he’s getting ready for a meal” (ibid.). Like
Malcolm X, Ali is unconvinced by liberal sweet talk and charm. He points out that although Obama
allowed for the strict surveillance of U.S. American Muslims during his presidency, Muslims “loved him
to death” (ibid.).
According to Ali, those Muslims who see themselves as part of an alliance with the Left are
deluded. He describes a real alliance as one in which he can support the right of others to live the way
they want while remaining entitled to hold these lifestyles to be immoral. However, he does not think
leftists are prepared to agree to disagree with Muslims on issues such as sexuality:
But the very fact that Muslims who claim to be in an alliance with the Left are not able
come out publicly and say those type of things, and offend the sensibilities of people they
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claim to be in an alliance with, shows or proves to me that they actually are under the
umbrella of them […] They are acting as sycophants to the Left. (Ibid.)
Although he observes similar tendencies with Muslims working with the Right, Ali appears more
concerned with the Left, partly because Muslims are already aware of the openly Islamophobic positions
of the Right. Moreover, he considers values to be the “most important aspect of our community, what
makes it distinct”, but Muslims working with the Left “have completely sacrificed our values for physical
protection from the Right” (ibid.). This is an important distinction: Ali sees the Left as a moral threat to
Muslims and the Right as a physical one. On the one hand, the so-called alliance with the Left can lead to
Muslims losing their religion in order to blend in with liberal secular values. On the other hand, Muslims
are threatened by physical violence from those on the Right whose understanding of religious freedom
is often reduced to “preserving the freedom to be Christian” (ibid.). Ali rightly points out that white
Christians have historically benefitted the most from religious freedom in America. Like the right to bear
arms, freedom of religion has racially specific implications in practice, despite its universal pretenses.
In any case, Ali’s hesitation to enter alliances with either the Right or the Left does not prevent
him from engaging them in dialogue or entering what Walid would call coalitions. His suspicion and
cynicism do not lead him to endorse the fear and hatred he believes “drives most of the political
decisions” made by people, including Muslims, who are generally “trapped by fear” (ibid.). Furthermore,
he states that because Muslims today “lack imagination,” and “lack courage to sort of think out of the
box” (ibid.), they are driven into unholy alliances:
We believe that the way to protect our community is by placing ourselves under the
umbrella of either the Right or the Left rather than us saying “you know what, no, we have
our own value system, we have our own interests, and sometimes those values and
interests they overlap with the Right and sometimes with the Left.” (Ibid.)
While Ali accepts binaries rooted in Islamic scripture, such as the notion that Allah created
human’s male and female (Qur’an 49:13), he suggests current political binaries lack nuance. He observes
that today you are immediately identified as conservative or liberal just for posting a quote from
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somebody associated with either camp. Adding that he has been harshly criticized for posting quotes on
social media by Jordan Peterson or Ben Shapiro, pubic intellectuals generally portrayed as conservative,
Ali says he is able to find value in people and their thinking form a variety of political perspectives.
Unless a person is vulgar or entirely unreasonable, Ali refuses to stop communicating in response to
views he finds deeply problematic, such as Shapiro’s uncritical endorsement of Zionism.
Ali (2018) rejects political reductionism and values his independent thinking. He also wishes to
avoid overarching moral judgments based on certain disagreements or classifications of a person:
You see, that’s my religious perspective: Every human being is redeemable. And I refuse to
allow this sort of cognitive dissonance that we suffer because of misclassification to
influence the way that I evaluate an individual person. […] We’re supposed to be about
transformation. Religion is about that. Religion is about trying to see the good in people,
trying to see what’s redeemable in people.” (ibid.)
His sense of traditional Islamic compassion and etiquette prevent Ali from caving into pressure to
categorically reject a person such as Peterson. However, he remains critical, stating that Peterson “talks
about how he is against all these ideologues, but he becomes an ideologue at times” when discussing
issues such as Islam or the Palestinians (ibid.).
Islamic values also inspire Ali (2018) to be critical of how people from racialized minorities
interact with dominant groups. For example, he condemns “anti-white” response to white supremacists,
and worries about groups who attack others physically simply for saying offensive statements. According
to him, vigilantism and physical violence are unacceptable responses to violent hate speech. When
asked whether he endorses the notion that it is not the duty of the oppressed to teach their oppressors,
Ali refers to Islamic history. “Look at what happened to the Mongols!” he exclaims, referring to the
progressive but massive conversion of Mongols who invaded Central and Eastern Islamdom in the late
medieval period. Indeed, teaching oppressors has been a constant in Islamic history since the very first
generation of Muslims, who began as a persecuted minority in Mecca but ultimately witnessed the
conversion of their foes to Islam.
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Ali (2019) thinks engaging in dialogue and seeking common ground with non-Muslims whenever
possible is important. For example, he acknowledges that many modern ideologies rooted in secular
epistemologies, such as “Marxism, socialism, feminism, and critical race theory,” propose valid ideas (1).
However, agreeing on certain important ideas does not mean uncritically espousing such ideologies:
Take, for instance, the fact that feminism, especially in its earliest waves, promoted
women’s agency, self-determination, suffrage, and the right to own and earn wealth.
There’s no fundamental or valid reason to believe that Islam is opposed to such aims. So, it
makes sense that many Muslim women, unwittingly, refer to themselves as feminists. One,
however, must take care not to assume that such a label sufficiently summarizes the
mission of the Prophet Muhammad in light of his embrace of the betterment and social
well-being of women. Such characterizations are a danger, which could lead one to
blasphemy.
One must, also, remain skeptical of the putatively inherent and universal applicability of
such overarching ideologies since one can mistake the forest for the trees, considering that
their epistemic foundations often clash with Islam’s moral vision and truths. (1)
Race is another topic about which Ali (2016, 2019) argues Muslims need to develop their own
approach. Indeed, this is one of his main fields of scholarly expertise. His approach only partially
overlaps with the type of critical race theory (CRT) developed since the 1970s by scholars who build “on
the efforts and insights of a number of minority civil rights activists; critical legal studies; radical
feminism; and European philosophers” (Ali 2019, 2). Ali explains:
CRT’s greatest utility, like certain other aspects of postmodern philosophy, is its ability to
deconstruct and identify “problems” and “social inequities.” Also, like other postmodern
philosophies, it is not good at re-constructing after it deconstructs. In other words, the fixes
offered to society’s problems are almost always superficial and fundamentally undermine
the very project of CRT. (2)
According to Ali, the main problem with CRT is that it paradoxically and somewhat unwittingly
reproduces the racist and essentialist constructs it seeks to refute:
While one may agree that contemporary “race” is “largely” a social construct (biology does
play a limited role), CRT’s definition conflicts with Islam in that after rejecting notions of
race or color-based behavioral determinism for “coloreds”, CRT’s proponents suggest and
sometimes aver that to be white is to be “privileged” and “racist”, knowingly or
unknowingly. In other words, while it is a goal of CRT to dismantle white supremacy and
white privilege, it reinforces and solidifies it by claiming that the members of one “race” of
people are motivated and guided by things the other races are not and cannot be. This
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solidifies the otherization of “whites” who cannot truly be white without the existence of
their “colored” opposite(s) who in turn become permanent counterpart(s) also. (3)
By acknowledging anti-white racism, Ali once again echoes the words of Malcolm X after his
pilgrimage to Mecca and his adoption of Sunni Islam, “I no longer subscribe to racism. I have adjusted
my thinking to the point where I believe that whites are human beings” (X and Haley 2015 [1965], 420).
Malcolm X is not trying to give a pass to whites or deny that white racism has historically been
incomparably more harmful than anti-white racism. He clearly states that “[t]he American Negro never
can be blamed for his racial animosities—he is only reacting to four hundred years of the conscious
racism of the American whites” (348). In most circumstances, Malcolm X (X 1990 [1965]) thinks that
“the black racist has been produced by the white racist” and that “black people have shown less racist
tendencies than any people since the beginning of history” (195). Moreover, he insists that reacting
violently to violent white racism should be understood as self-defence rather than black racism.
Yet, despite these caveats, some Black Muslims, such as Malcolm X and Ali, believe anti-white
racism exists. According to Ali (2019), this contradicts the findings of CRT:
A critical race theorist would never accept the notion that he/she is being racist against
white people. That’s because the theorist has convinced him/herself that only whites can
be racist due to the fact that only whites have power. That is to say that racism can only be
racism if and when you have the power to oppress others. And, since only white people
have this power according to the critical race theorist, only they can be racist. This means
that even if I were to say, “White people are born with tails”; “The white man is the devil
incarnate”; Or, “White people smell like dogs when they're wet”, none of that is racist
because I'm black. And, black people have absolutely no power to oppress others (sigh). (3)
Denying everybody but whites any agency or power is morally problematic according to Ali, since it
implies that only white people wield power “absolutely,” and that any other type of person can only
wield “borrowed power.” For him, the implication that “all might and power belong to the ‘white man’”
is both “absurd and idolatrous.” He retorts that “that colored people all around the world have power,
many of them significantly more than millions of white people,” and that the correct Islamic belief is
that everybody is responsible for their actions before Allah (3). However, “[i]f the teachings of CRT are
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taken to their logical end, this would mean that not one dictator in the Arab world is responsible for the
carnage they create every time they massacre their people” (3-4). The same logic would apply to
oppressors from “any other person, group, or government represented by a particular ethnic enclave.”
Ali argues that everybody should be held accountable, including of course “the European political elite”
which has been guilty of “great carnage, oppression, and savage treatment of others for many
centuries” (4).
It should be noted that many of Ali’s arguments are a controversial contribution to a conversation
which is in part internal to the U.S. American Black Muslim community. His understanding of critical race
theory has been rejected as superficial and “replete with factual inaccuracies,” while his apparent denial
of structural racism, as an expression of “reactionary Black conservatism” has been met with the
accusation that Ali “shares no relationship with the political philosophy nor the dawah of Malcolm X”
[daʿwa is Arabic for invitation, in this case inviting people to Islam] (Muhammad 2019). However, the
aim here is not to enter the internal debates of the U.S. American Black Muslim community, but to learn
from their conversations and teachings.
One general lesson which can be learned from Ali (2019) is that an anti-racist approach rooted in
a traditional Islamic worldview has different implications than one rooted in postmodern secularism:
In Islam, all human beings are the children of the same mother and father, Adam and Eve.
Our only permanent and avowed enemy is Satan. And, Satan is not a man. We all are
susceptible to the same forms of vice and shortcomings; Our impulses, appetites, and
emotions make us malleable. And, our ignorance of objective fact and the moral path
expose us to manipulation. In other words, Islam assigns the same nature to every human
being. And, it considers every individual to be redeemable regardless of race, color, sex, sin,
religion, or political affiliation. Every person regardless of race can be guilty of racism, even
if we acknowledge that a racist with power is more dangerous than one without that
power. (4)
Ali’s conclusions are universal. He and others, such as Walid and Malcolm X, draw upon a very deep
intellectual heritage from which other communities can learn. Their teachings have value beyond their
immediate context. For instance, they are crucial for the development of North American Traditionalist
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Islamic decolonial theories which can help Muslims refute Eurocentric notions of race and resist the
modern/colonial racialization of Muslim identity.
Another decolonial lesson one can learn from Ali is that Black Muslims in North America have a
unique view of the modern/colonial world-system, which tends to lead them to different conclusions
about tradition and modernity than white Traditionalists or Muslims born in Africa-Eurasia. Descendants
of enslaved Africans, whose connection to the homeland was nearly completely obliterated generations
ago, have few collective memories of a premodern or precolonial past about which to romanticize or be
nostalgic. Ali (2018) explains to me that many in his community are still trying to acquire the very
benefits of modernity with which so many white people, from hippies to Traditionalists, have become
disenchanted. As he says, many African Americans are trying to “catch up” with white people in a
context which “makes white well-being the standard for the well-being of Americans overall, or the
people of the world overall” (ibid.). White weariness with modernity leads to conclusions Ali admits may
very well be true but do not generally resonate with African Americans. He makes his point humorously
but incisively:
I’m trying to get caught up and in the process of getting caught up, you know, then you tell
me that money is bad, home ownership is bad, you tell me that even corruption [laughter]
is bad! You told me that too. I say well that’s how you got ahead […] What I’m saying is that
a lot of the philosophical and moral arguments that people make against modernity, they’re
just not a concern for African Americans. […] It’s probably true but it’s hard for a people
who have never experienced any of those privileges to buy into it. (Ibid.)
Positionality matters. Modernity reveals a different face to those whose communities have never fully
enjoyed the benefits of life in the core of the modern/colonial world-system, than it does to those who
seem to have become satiated, and perhaps even nauseated with those privileges.
For instance, as a member of the European lower nobility, Burckhardt (1992 [1960]) fought to
preserve the traditions of “Fez, unalterable, indestructible Fez” (9) from the ravages of modernity,
whereas Ali (2018) appreciates both traditional and modernizing trends in the same city. Reflecting on
his time studying Islamic law at both the old and new campuses of al-Qarawîyyîn University, Ali muses
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about modernity and tradition. While affirming that tradition is still alive, dynamic, evolving, and
relevant at the oldest university in the world, he finds that many traditional Islamic scholars on the old
campus lack pedagogy in comparison to scholars from the new campus of the same institution.
Traditionally trained scholars are “like oceans of knowledge” but they are not the best at transmitting
that knowledge progressively to students (ibid.). However, “some of the best teachers were people who
really weren’t even classically trained, you know because they were very familiar with very modern
methods of teaching” (ibid.). The best of both worlds for Ali is when you find a teacher who is trained in
both “classical” and “modern” ways— both “shaykh” and “doctor” (ibid.).
Ali’s (2018) ambivalence towards modernity is not restricted to pedagogy. He finds the antimodern attitude “much more pronounced among Perennialists than it is among non-Perennialists who
are Traditionalists” (ibid.). Referring to scholars such as Nasr, Ali explains:
I’m not totally sure if I share the degree of their pessimism about modernity […] You can’t
go back, you know that once your modern you’re modern and all of us are affected by
modernity in one sense and being romantic about the past, you know, I guess it has its
benefits in certain ways but you know there are a lot of things about the present which are
very good as well. (Ibid.)
To be fair, neither Nasr nor any of the Traditionalist scholars I have discussed here deny the accidental
material benefits of modernity, which might have been attained without the essential flaws they
critique. Ali is using the term modernity differently from Nasr (1987b), who writes:
When we use the term ‘modern’, we mean neither ‘contemporary’ nor ‘up-to-date’; nor
does it signify for us something that is successful in the conquest and domination of the
natural world. Rather, for us ‘modern’ means that which is cut off from the Transcendent,
from the immutable principles which in reality govern all things and which are made known
to man through revelation in its most universal sense. Modernism is thus contrasted with
tradition (al-dîn); the former, as already mentioned, implies all that is merely human and
now ever more increasingly subhuman, and all that is divorced and cut off from the Divine
source. Obviously, tradition has always accompanied and in fact characterized human
existence, whereas modernism is a very recent phenomenon. (98)
This difference in vocabulary is not surprising, as Ali admits he is little engaged with Perennialists, in
comparison to others such as his colleague at Zaytuna, Hamza Yusuf. In the end, there is common
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ground. Despite his pragmatic appreciation for certain benefits of modernity, Ali (2018) “can see the
morally harmful aspects of modernity, even philosophically.”
Concerning modernity, Ali (2018) once again seeks to transcend the simplistic narratives he
observes on both the Right and the Left. Noting that people on the Left tend to have a very negative
attitude towards the current state of the world, and that people on the Right are more positive, he
concedes that life is easier for the poor today than in the past. In the United States, he observes that
even poor people eat meat and have homes with full refrigerators and various electronic devices.
However, he says, “I do definitely agree that modernity produces sort of a type of cognitive dissonance
you know for humanity overall […] sort of destroying collectivist type of culture” and has an impact on
“the family and traditional morality” (ibid.). Whereas Ali rejects the moral relativism he finds especially
common on the Left, he disagrees with those on the Right who tend to see the victory of Western
civilization and Enlightenment values as the result of philosophical debates in which Europeans were
simply more convincing. Such euphemism does not account for the imperial and genocidal historical
contexts in which ideas evolved. He calls this the Right’s “blind spot” (ibid.).
Moreover, Ali is critical of many political assumptions he observes among both the Eurocentric
Right and Left. Concerning the ubiquitous “assumption that democracy is good for everybody” (ibid.), he
remarks that most classical Greek philosophers thought otherwise. Then, he refutes both the notion that
democracy is universally applicable, and the presumption that certain contemporary systems of
government are truly democratic. On this issue, he comes to similar conclusions as Guénon (2001
[1927]), who writes:
If the word 'democracy' is defined as the government of the people by themselves, it
expresses an absolute impossibility and cannot even have a mere de facto existence—in our
time or in any other. One must guard against being misled by words: it is contradictory to
say that the same persons can be at the same time rulers and ruled, because, to use
Aristotelian terminology, the same being cannot be 'in act' and 'in potency' at the same
time and in the same relationship. The relationship of ruler and ruled necessitates the
presence of two terms: there can be no ruled if there are not also rulers, even though these
be illegitimate and have no other title to power than their own pretensions; but the great
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ability of those who are in control in the modern world lies in making the people believe
that they are governing themselves; and the people are the more inclined to believe this as
they are flattered by it, and as, in any case, they are incapable of sufficient reflection to see
its impossibility. It was to create this illusion that 'universal suffrage' was invented: the law
is supposed to be made by the opinion of the majority, but what is overlooked is that this
opinion is something that can very easily be guided and modified; it is always possible, by
means of suitable suggestions, to arouse, as may be desired, currents moving in this or that
direction. (74)
Guénon’s suspicion of modern political systems implies the existence of a deep state operating behind
allegedly democratic institutions led by politicians whose incompetence, according to Guénon, “seems
to have only a very relative importance” (74). His perspective coincides with the political pessimism Ali
(2018) asserts is common among African American theorists. It also coincides with the attitude of many
Sufis throughout Islamic history. Despite coming from different intellectual, cultural, and social
environments, Guénon and Ali both draw from a traditional Islamic discourse which itself engages with
discourses such as classical Greek philosophy. However, at least in the context of our interview, a format
based on spontaneous oral expression, Ali (2018) presents his case more pragmatically than
philosophically. He asserts that, if they are eating, working, and meeting their daily needs, “most people,
most citizens of any country couldn’t care less really what type of government they have,” an attitude
which contrasts with small groups vying for power, such as Western elites seeking to impose democracy
around the world.
Coloniality appears as an implicit theme throughout Ali’s discourse, as it generally does
throughout Traditionalist Islamic discourse, inside and outside the North American Black Muslim
community. Like Yusuf, Nasr, Murad, or Guénon, Ali does not explicitly theorize coloniality as do scholars
of the decolonial school. For instance, Hatem Bazian, one of Ali’s colleagues at Zaytuna, is a traditionally
trained Islamic scholar and a decolonial theorist, whereas Ali is an Islamic scholar who reflects critically
on race and tradition. During my conversation with Ali, I put forth my contention that the Right and the
Left are modern/colonial constructions which need to be decolonized, to which he responded “yes, right
totally!” (ibid.). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that without imposing this theoretical framework
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on Ali, a decolonial approach can draw generously on his work and that of other scholars deeply
committed to traditional Islamic ways of being, knowing, and behaving.

Cosmopolitan Traditionalism
Black Muslim scholars in North America who are positively inclined towards tradition are one
crucial strand of an inherently diverse discourse community, also composed of Muslims racialized as
brown, red, or white. And the diversity of positions on a variety of issues, among Traditionalist Muslims,
is not simply reducible to race, class, gender, or other “socially habituated subjectivities” (McCloud
2007, 168). A productive North American intra-Islamic conversation about tradition, modernity, and
coloniality must ultimately be multiracial, multiethnic, and cosmopolitan. Moreover, just as Muslims
can agree to disagree with non-Muslims on many issues while remaining open to dialogue, they need
not agree among themselves on every issue. Traditional Islam, as it is generally understood among
Traditionalists, encompasses multiple perspectives, which correspond to diverse contexts, as well as
individual sensibilities and temperaments. While unity is required on a few basic principles, diversity is
the general rule.
U.S. American Muslim scholar Umar Faruq Abd-Allah (2019 [2004]) writes that “[f]or centuries,
Islamic civilization harmonized indigenous forms of cultural expression with the universal norms of its
sacred law,” and that it is imperative to develop “a sound Muslim American cultural identity.” Murad
(2002) remarks that “[n]o pre-modern civilisation embraced more cultures than that of Islam–in fact, it
was Muslims who invented globalisation.” This pluralism is very different from the secular humanist
variety born in the modern/colonial Western core:
Muslims return from the mosques in Cairo in time for the latest American soaps. There is no
equivalent desire in the West to learn from and integrate into other cultures. On the
ground, the West is keener to export than to import, to shape, rather than be shaped. As
such, its universalism can seem imperial and hierarchical, driven by corporations and
strategic imperatives that owe nothing whatsoever to non-Western cultures, and
acknowledge their existence only where they might turn out to be obstacles. Likewise,
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Westerners, when they settle outside their cultural area, almost never assimilate to the
culture which newly surrounds them. (ibid.)
My observations of non-Muslim Westerners living and working in such places as Cairo or Casablanca
corroborate Murad’s depiction. Indeed, I have witnessed French and British expats in these cities making
very little effort to learn the local language or follow regional fashions, all the while complaining about
how Muslims in their home countries refuse to assimilate. Having worked in the language industry for
over two decades, I can affirm without a doubt that learning European languages is quite popular among
Moroccans and Egyptians, in both their home countries and in the West. There is no comparable trend
among Westerners to learn Arabic, Amazigh, or Nubian.
Murad (2002) insists that Islam “is more flexible than the West” and that Islamic laws and customs
“have been reshaped substantially by encounter with the Western juggernaut,” whereas “Western law
and society, by contrast, have not admitted significant emendation at the hands of another culture for
many centuries.” Although Murad does not support his claims with quantifiably verifiable data, his
conclusion, informed by uncontestable erudition, is ironic and thought-provoking:
From our perspective, then, it can seem that it is the West, not the Islamic world, which
stands in need of reform in a more pluralistic direction. It claims to be open, while we are
closed, but in reality, on the ground, seems closed, while we have been open. (ibid.)
However, what Murad labels “movement Islam,” is markedly different from the traditional Islamic
pluralism he describes in these passages.
The Islamicate world is much less pluralistic than ever before (Gelvin 2008, 234). Religious
pluralism has been seriously weakened by the rise of interreligious as well as sectarian conflicts in the
last century, ranging from the Armenian Genocide of 1915 to 1916 to the current war in Syria.
Meanwhile, Islamicate cultural diversity is challenged by the disappearance of languages, oral traditions,
arts, and crafts (Said and Sharify-Funk 2003, Michon 2008, 44, 87). But these trends are associated with
the forced integration of Islamicate societies as peripheries of the modern/colonial world-system; with
the rise of the colonial and so-called postcolonial nation-state; and with the pressures exerted on
413

Muslims by the ideological binary between modernism and fundamentalism, now better known as
Progressive Islam and Salafism. Rather than reject representatives of these competing ideological
currents, Traditionalism at its best—for it does have its rigid polemical moments—transcends the binary
by recognizing points of agreement and isolating points of contention.
One example of the traditional Islamic tendency to encompass rather than reject diversity is
illustrated by the Amman Message, a historically unprecedented agreement defining who is a Muslim,
who is an apostate, and who is entitled to issue legal Islamic rulings or opinions (fatwas). 184 Only a small
minority of those around the world who identify as Muslims are not encompassed by this broad
consensual declaration, summarized in the following three points, whose significance justifies a lengthy
quote:
(1) Whosoever is an adherent to one of the four Sunni schools (Mathahib) of Islamic
jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i and Hanbali), the two Shi‘i schools of Islamic
jurisprudence (Ja‘fari and Zaydi), the Ibadi school of Islamic jurisprudence and
the Thahiri school of Islamic jurisprudence, is a Muslim. Declaring that person an apostate is
impossible and impermissible. Verily his (or her) blood, honour, and property are inviolable.
Moreover, in accordance with the Shaykh Al-Azhar’s fatwa, it is neither possible nor
permissible to declare whosoever subscribes to the Ash`ari creed or whoever practices
real Tasawwuf (Sufism) an apostate. Likewise, it is neither possible nor permissible to
declare whosoever subscribes to true Salafi thought an apostate.
Equally, it is neither possible nor permissible to declare as apostates any group of Muslims
who believes in God, Glorified and Exalted be He, and His Messenger (may peace and
blessings be upon him) and the pillars of faith, and acknowledges the five pillars of Islam,
and does not deny any necessarily self-evident tenet of religion.
(2) There exists more in common between the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence than
there is difference between them. The adherents to the eight schools of Islamic
jurisprudence are in agreement as regards the basic principles of Islam. All believe in Allah
(God), Glorified and Exalted be He, the One and the Unique; that the Noble Qur’an is the
Revealed Word of God; and that our master Muhammad, may blessings and peace be upon
him, is a Prophet and Messenger unto all mankind. All are in agreement about the five
pillars of Islam: the two testaments of faith (shahadatayn); the ritual prayer (salat);
almsgiving (zakat); fasting the month of Ramadan (sawm), and the Hajj to the sacred house
184

The Amman Message and the Marrakesh Declaration discussed below are historically unprecedented in gaining
acceptance from a broad spectrum of Muslim authorities at a time when the community counts nearly two billion
souls. However, they do build on the legacy of earlier more authoritative documents, such as the several treaties
and covenants established by the Prophet Muḥammad (Morrow 2013, Lecker 2004).
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of God (in Mecca). All are also in agreement about the foundations of belief: belief in Allah
(God), His angels, His scriptures, His messengers, and in the Day of Judgment, in Divine
Providence in good and in evil. Disagreements between the ‘ulama (scholars) of the eight
schools of Islamic jurisprudence are only with respect to the ancillary branches of religion
(furu`) and not as regards the principles and fundamentals (usul) [of the religion of Islam].
Disagreement with respect to the ancillary branches of religion (furu`) is a mercy. Long ago
it was said that variance in opinion among the ‘ulama (scholars) “is a good affair”.
(3) Acknowledgement of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Mathahib) within Islam means
adhering to a fundamental methodology in the issuance of fatwas: no one may issue
a fatwa without the requisite personal qualifications which each school of Islamic
jurisprudence determines [for its own adherents]. No one may issue a fatwa without
adhering to the methodology of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence. No one may claim to
do unlimited Ijtihad and create a new school of Islamic jurisprudence or to issue
unacceptable fatwas that take Muslims out of the principles and certainties of
the Shari`ah and what has been established in respect of its schools of jurisprudence.
(Amman Message 2006)
This exceptional formulation of “traditional, orthodox Islam” presents itself as a “religiously legally
binding” consensus among Muslims. It has been endorsed by over 500 scholars from across the Islamic
world, including the highest religious authorities of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran, hardly known
for their agreement on religious issues (Amman Message 2006). Several prominent North Americans
known for their participation in Traditionalist forums have endorsed the Amman Message, including
Nasr, Yusuf, Mattson, Schleifer, Keller, and significantly Lumbard, who was once Special Assistant to King
Abdullah II for Interfaith Affairs. Indeed, the King of Jordan first released the Amman Message as a
statement in 2004 and led the effort to have it recognized and endorsed by leading Islamic authorities
internationally until 2006. It is no coincidence that this consensual enterprise was undertaken under the
auspices of the Jordanian monarchy, one of the global sponsors of traditional Islam.
Another relevant document is the Marrakesh Declaration, proposing a legal framework and a
call to action to ensure the rights of “religious minorities in predominantly Muslim lands” (Marrakesh
Declaration 2016). This declaration followed an international conference hosted in Marrakesh, under
the patronage of King Mohammed VI of Morocco, and attended by government officials and Islamic
scholars from several countries. It is important to note that this endeavour situates itself within a
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broader Moroccan strategy to position itself as a hub of traditional Islam countering the influence of
Islamic extremism and fundamentalism. As part of its strategy of “religious diplomacy,” Morocco
founded the Mohammed VI Institute in 2015, with the aim of training religious scholars and Imams in
Mâlikî jurisprudence, Ash‘arî creed, and Sunni (or Junaydî) Sufism (Baylocq and Hlaoua 2016). Students
are recruited from several Northwest African countries, including Mali and Tunisia, as well as from
France and countries outside Morocco’s usual sphere of influence, such as the Maldives and Chechnya.
The affirmation of traditional Islam by countries such as Jordan and Morocco is significant.
These two kingdoms, ruled by Sharifian monarchies, are considerably poorer than countries promoting
other Islamic currents,185 such as Saudi Arabia, home of Wahhâbism, or Iran, home since 1979 to a new
brand of Revolutionary Shia politics.186 Yet, they can garner support from across the Islamic world for
initiatives promoting an openly traditional, inclusive, and pluralistic vision of Islam. Such efforts arguably
represent signs of an internal decolonization of Muslims through a revivification of tradition. However,
one must remain critical and suspicious of politics on such a grand scale. Without questioning the
sincerity of the two declarations, their widespread endorsement must also be understood in the context
of the Global War on Terror and the ongoing pressure for Muslims to please the more politically
powerful West (Horsfjord 2018, Markiewicz 2018, Browers 2011). Politics involves posturing. Moreover,
official declarations celebrating tolerance, respect, and pluralism need to be accompanied by
corresponding actions. People of any religion, governed by despotic, intolerant, and corrupt Muslim
leaders are bound to interpret such declarations as empty formalism.
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This enormous difference in wealth can be observed in World Bank estimates of total wealth per capita in U.S.
dollars (Lange, Wodon and Carey 2018, 225-232). Total wealth is not limited to gross domestic product (GDP). It
includes factors such as natural capital and human capital. Based on statistics from 2014, Jordan’s total wealth per
capita is $49,287 and Morocco’s $40,488, whereas Saudi Arabia’s is $512,869, and Qatar’s a whopping $1,597,125.
This means Morocco’s wealth represents only 2.5% of Qatar’s and 7.9% of Saudi Arabia’s. Interestingly, no
estimate is given for Iran, but despite international sanctions the Republic’s oil reserves guarantee it a certain level
of wealth.
186
The historical conditions in which Iran and Saudi Arabia developed into regional powers in the twentieth
century are discussed in Chapter Six.
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One advantage to living in North America and other Western countries is that it is still easier to
express a range of critical opinions in the confident core of the world-system than it is in the fragilized
periphery. Although governments and civil society closely monitor the words and actions of Muslims in
the West for any signs of extremism, Muslim scholars generally remain capable, for the moment at least,
of keeping a safe distance from governments and criticizing them openly.187 This represents an
opportunity and a responsibility. After stating that the great Islamic jurists of the past had “all spent
time in government jails,” Yusuf spoke during a conference at Oxford University about his own
experience advising the U.S. American government after 9/11:
When I went into the White House, and I was just a guest, I wasn't...they didn't pay me you
know. I didn't get any money, you know. Maybe I should have asked for something,
because it just... But that did more to tarnish my reputation amongst a large segment of the
Muslim community, because Muslims are very wary of any scholar who associates closely
with a government, and they always have been. And there's a reason for that, because
governments never do that out of the graciousness of their goodwill. They co-opt. And
when George Bush made a reference to “we're not at war with Islam,” the CNN camera
immediately flashed on me. Which made me realize that was preplanned. (Yusuf and
Ramadan 2016)
Yusuf admits that his interaction with governments, at home and in the Islamicate world, is highly
problematic from a traditional Islamic perspective. And he has faced enormous criticism from Muslims
accusing him of supporting tyrants. However, he explains that in certain circumstances it may be
necessary to offer advice to political leaders “for the sake of God” and without seeking personal gain
(ibid.).
Perhaps because it is difficult to criticize those we wish to advise, Yusuf spends much more time
as a scholar and critical analyst than as an advisor. Although no believer in revolution as a solution to
political ills, Yusuf ardently condemns the colonial and imperial bases of Western exceptionalism:
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This freedom is under stress. For instance, in August 2018 the United States Department of Education
threatened to remove a $235,000 federal grant from the Duke-UNC Consortium for Middle East Studies because it
considered the program presented Islam in too positive a manner in comparison to other religions in the Middle
East (Meckler 2019). While the government eventually desisted, this saga demonstrates the potential for Western
governments to interfere with academic freedom when it comes to topics they deem sensitive, such as Islam.
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Two world wars in Europe have led to a certain way of looking at the world. The crisis that
happened in the West because of a hundred and eighty million people dying…we tend to
want the Muslim world to 'catch up' with us. ''What's wrong with you? Why can't you catch
up with us?'' And yet we don't realize that we have been through, in the West, so much
trauma to get to this point that we're at, and the Muslim world had a different set of
historical traumas, much of it in fact a result of colonialism. So, we have very different
historical circumstances. (ibid.)
And he is deeply critical of capitalism, accusing Westerners of concealing “their unease about corporate
hegemony and the real human implications of globalisation” (Yusuf 2002).
Nevertheless, as the President of a liberal arts college, Yusuf (2010a) considers it his duty to be a
responsible citizen seeking the common good and recognizing good in others. This entails building
strong Muslim institutions in North America:
The Muslim organizations, including Zaytuna College, have a fiduciary responsibility toward
their stakeholders, i.e. the Muslims we claim to represent and serve, as well as those who
are funding us. […] So the more organizations Muslims establish, the easier it will be for
people to see that normative Islam has nothing to do with what the militant extremists do.
We have a large number of Muslim doctors in America, and yet we are not serving the
underclass very well through free medical clinics, such as the Umma Free Clinic in Los
Angeles. I think our Muslim doctors should donate a day every two weeks to treat the
needy who have no medical insurance. In other words, Muslims need to enhance the
existing Muslim organizations and also create new ones, especially social service
organizations.
Operating in the context of the extremely invasive modern/colonial nation-state, it is difficult to
keep a critical distance from government. While individual scholars or activists have significant liberty to
express critical views, institutional leaders and managers might need to be more diplomatic in order to
accomplish their mission. Nevertheless, diplomacy should never entail obsequiousness. North American
Muslim organizations are part of civil society, not government, and should remain independent if they
are to build pragmatic coalitions which serve their interests and advance their core principles. As
mentioned by Ali (2018) and Walid (2018), this means cooperating with people and organizations from
both the Left and the Right, with both friendliness and suspicion, and without falling under their
umbrella. Yusuf (2010a) agrees:
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Seek common ground with conservatives too. As Muslims, we don’t have a political party.
We are morally committed to a sound ethical system that demands an uncompromising
adherence from us. The principles, ethics, and values that demand our allegiance do not fit
neatly into a particular political school of thought. Thus far, too many Muslims have tried to
ally mostly with the Left, but in the current dialectic, the Left is unlikely to win the battle for
the hearts of Middle America, especially when it comes to accepting Muslims as full-fledged
members of the American tapestry. But there are many intelligent and influential people
within the philosophical conservative movement, and some of them know what Islam is and
some don’t. We need to make strategic alliances with them and recognize that we share a
lot of common ground, as we are also concerned about losing moral foundations in an
increasingly secularized, and even worse laicized, world that is downright hostile toward
public faith. For example, the conservatives are as troubled as Muslims are about the
predominance of premarital and extramarital sexuality, the breakdown of the family, and
the proliferation of pornography and drugs. On the other hand, the truly progressive Left
and not mainstream Tweetle Dee Left to the Tweetle Dum Right, despite its moral
ambiguity on many such personal and social issues, has a far better track record of standing
firmly against warmongering, arms proliferation, and American aggression in countries
where we don’t belong – but there is also a progressive Right that we forget about best
embodied in Ron Paul,188 who is one of the most outspoken critics of warmongering and
American foreign wars and misadventures. So in some things, we are more with the Left
and in others we are more with the Right, which puts us somewhere in the middle, as we
comprise the Middle Nation.
In trying to maintain a traditional Islamic middle path which transcends, and I would argue
decolonizes the Eurocentric binary between Right and Left, scholars such as Yusuf, Ali, Walid, and Murad
tend to push harder against the Left. This is a logical response to what they perceive as the greater
tendency among Western Muslims to seek uncritical alliances with various movements on the Left.
However, Muslim suspicion of the Western Right is understandable. After all, much of contemporary
right-wing discourse is filled with implicit and explicit threats to physically eliminate Muslims living as
minority in the West. While the cultural and epistemic genocide which might result from an alliance with
many of the diverse currents associated with the Western and Westernized Left are immensely
concerning, physical genocide is more immediately alarming. After all, it is only possible for living
persons to reclaim their culture or ways of knowing. But one must remain aware of the danger that
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Ronald Ernest Paul champions the Libertarian cause within the U.S. Republican Party. He served as member of
the United Sates House of Representatives from 1976 to 1977, 1979 to 1985, and 1997 to 2013. In 1961, he earned
a medical degree from Duke University, in Durham, North Carolina. Apart from his involvement in politics, Paul is
an obstetrician and gynecologist.
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those on the Left with inclusive discourses may be pursuing policies which are similarly destructive of
Muslim bodies. Consequently, it seems reasonable to be equally suspicious of both the Left and the
Right.
This is my position: As a Muslim with many teachers and mentors who admittedly tend to have
leftist sympathies, I do not respect wolves for wanting to eat me; I seek protection from them. In no way
do I enjoy the brutal honesty of statements and policies which endanger the physical existence of my
community in Canada, the land of my birth, or elsewhere. And I wonder if certain Traditionalist Muslims,
living as a minority in the West, are currently choosing the most appropriate public intellectuals with
whom to push back against the potentially duplicitous alliances proposed by some on the Left. For
instance, despite having partaken in a fascinating conversation with Yusuf about the true meaning of
conservatism (Scruton and Yusuf 2018), British political philosopher Roger Scruton (1944-1920) deplores
that Hungary is facing “the sudden invasion of huge tribes of Muslims from the Middle East” and that
“each Chinese person is a kind of replica of the next one” (Weaver and Walker 2019). Rather than
seeking friends among conservative political philosophers and public intellectuals, perhaps Muslim
proponents of tradition would do better with traditional Christians and Jews (Murad 2014 [2006], Yusuf
2010b). In any case, the world of coalitions and alliances is never ideal, and some messiness is to be
expected, to the chagrin of purists on all sides.189
In a chaotic world, decolonization from a Traditionalist Islamic perspective logically sets personal
accountability to God and a robust internal conversation among Muslims as preconditions for the
difficult task of building coalitions with others. Considering the enormous diversity among Muslims
around the world and in North America, this internal conversation will take time. In fact, since it will
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For example, unusual coalitions have arisen against legislation in Quebec which denies women who veil their
faces access to various legal services, including employment by the state. Protest movements have united
“sometimes surprising figures, ranging from separatist politicians to Women’s Rights groups, Jewish groups,
lawyers, and a range of academics” (Sharify-Funk 2011, 148).
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probably never end, it would be unfruitful to wait for an internal consensus among Muslims before
engaging non-Muslims. The precondition mentioned above simply entails being deeply engaged with
one’s own tradition and community before reaching out.

Conclusion
Like all peoples, Muslims need to connect with their own community and its traditions if they
are to interact positively and constructively with other communities. Centuries of modern/colonial
violence have destabilized, fragilized, and wounded the umma. To heal collective and individual wounds,
Muslims need to engage in long, patient, and compassionate conversations. Such conversations have
begun in many places, including the shores of the Muslim Atlantic. North America is an especially fertile
ground for difficult discussions. It is home to Muslims of all origins and heritages, many of whom draw
upon generations of critical thought, deeply rooted in traditional Islam. Furthermore, scholars in places
such as Canada and the United States benefit from conditions in the core of the world-system which still
allow considerable freedom of expression, despite increasingly Islamophobic surveillance and
securitization practices by governments and civil society. These remain strategic locations for difficult
intra-Islamic conversations. Intertextual connections and critical contributions have been proposed in
this chapter to help advance the discussion on modernity, coloniality, tradition, and Islam.
My intertextual analysis reveals an awareness among many Muslim scholars that
modern/colonial conditions have seriously disrupted Islamic spiritual, intellectual, cultural, social,
economic, and political traditions. Simply put, traditional Islam has been colonized and needs to be
decolonized. Decolonizing tradition is a necessary step to decolonize Islam overall and to help Muslims
contribute to global decolonial efforts alongside other communities. I label this process Traditionalist
Islamic decolonization. It begins with a renewed understanding of tradition as an inspired dynamic flow
from the past into the present and future. Reconnecting with this flow composed of multiple flows is of
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itself a decolonial act in the face of modern/colonial historical forces which would annihilate all
traditional Islamic ways of being, knowing, and behaving. Traditional flows are inherently decolonial.
They challenge modern/colonial conceptions of being, knowledge, and interacting with others, which
include humans, animals, plants and all other aspects of reality. And they challenge power dynamics
based on modern/colonial formations of race, sexuality, and social organization. In some cases, these
flows have become so feeble in the modern/colonial drought, that it is hard to find the stream which
could become a river or reach an ocean once again. Sometimes in the desert you think you have found
water, but it is only a mirage, like when you discover your conservative attitude towards gender,
sexuality, and family was partly based on an earlier modern/colonial formation, not a traditional one.
You know you have been tricked, but the traditional approach remains elusive. Sometimes you realize
the way your parents and grandparents interact with other communities is based on internalized
colonial racism. This can be observed in the way many immigrant Muslims treat African Americans.
African Islam must be recognized as the historical source of Atlantic Islam. No decolonial effort
can succeed in the Muslim Atlantic without drawing considerably upon the traditions of African Muslims
and their descendants, as well as the broader African and African diasporic intellectual heritage. Most of
the figures presented in Sections Two and Three of this dissertation, who can serve as links in a
decolonial Muslim Atlantic lineage, come from Africa or are connected to African Islam. These figures
range from Sayyida al-Ḥurra and Nana Asma’u to René ʿAbd al-Wâḥid Yaḥyá Guénon, and el-Hajj Malik
el-Shabazz Malcolm X. Within this lineage, metaphysics and worship are widely presented as the priority
for all Muslims. But ethical conduct based on compassion and justice is also a form of worship. Today,
Walid, Ali, and other North American Muslim scholars critically engaged with the African spiritual and
intellectual American literary corpus, are developing a solid theoretical framework for Muslim activism,
rooted in tradition, which transcends the Eurocentric divide between Left and Right.
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North American scholars of African descent contribute significantly to Traditionalist Islamic
discourse, as do those of European descent, such as Gray, Mattson, Abd-Allah, and Yusuf, and those of
Asian descent, such as Nasr, many of whom are connected to African spiritual and intellectual lineages.
Moreover, North American Traditionalism is part of a global Islamic discourse community, as can be
observed in the work of Murad, or such endeavours as the Amman Message and the Marrakesh
Declaration. Ultimately, intra-Islamic conversations about tradition, modernity, and coloniality must
take place globally as well as regionally and locally. And they must lead to conversations with other
communities. Inter-epistemic decolonial conversations can best benefit from Muslims inspired by
traditions of beautiful and excellent being, knowing, and behaving, developed over centuries. Indeed,
Muslims who aspire to be the “best community” characterized by “enjoining decency, and forbidding
indecency, and believing in God” (Qur’an 3:110) can contribute to the decolonial struggles of all peoples.
And they have much to learn from others. Chapter Ten examines how Traditionalist Muslims can
participate in a conversation which is inter-epistemic, pluriversal, and decolonial.
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Chapter 10 - Pluriversalism and Inter-epistemic Conversations
ُ ۡاس ِا ﱠنا َﺧلَ ۡق ٰن ُكمۡ ِ ّم ۡن ذَك ٍَر ﱠوا ُ ۡن ٰثﻰ َو َجعَ ۡل ٰن ُكم
عل ِۡي ٌم َﺧ ِب ۡي ٌر
َ َ ارفُ ۡوۚاْ ا ﱠِن اَ ۡك َر َم ُكمۡ ع ِۡن َد ﱣ ِ ا َ ۡت ٰقى ُكمۡ ؕ ا ﱠِن ﱣ
ُ يٰۤ ا َ ﱡي َها ال ﱠن
َ َشعُ ۡوبًا ﱠو َق َبا ٓ ِئ َل ِلتَع
O mankind! We have indeed created you from a male and a female, and made you nations
and tribes that you may come to know one another. Truly the noblest of you in the sight of
God is the most God-fearing among you. Truly God is Knower, Aware. (Qur’an 49:13)
Decolonization requires critical introspection as well as dialogue. This chapter examines the
potential of decolonial conversations involving diverse epistemic communities. More specifically, it
examines how Traditionalist Islam can contribute to and benefit from global decolonial conversations.
Indeed, Muslims are not the only community whose spiritual, intellectual, cultural, social, economic, and
political traditions have been severely disrupted by the emergence of the modern/colonial worldsystem. This system has upset ways of existing and interacting developed for centuries, everywhere
around the world, by human and non-human communities, including animals and plants. Many of these
ways are now extinct and the ongoing march of modern/colonial processes now threatens all life on
earth. Surely, Muslims are not alone in needing to re-establish healthy relations with the cosmos and
rejuvenating flows between the past, present, and future. Although diverse communities experience
and approach reality in unique ways, they also share similarities, including being integrated into a global
world-system dominated by Western Europeans and their descendants. While rejecting both the idea of
a single teleologically determined modernity and the notion of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2002),
decolonial world-systems analysis acknowledges multiple experiences and positions within one
modern/colonial world-system. These positions are interconnected. Consequently, in order to revivify
their distinct heritages, diverse communities need to understand the specific ways in which they are
positioned in the global system, a process which inevitably requires some form of communication with
others.
Muslims have a long tradition of cosmopolitanism and an extensive intellectual production about
the art of skillful and respectful interaction and communication. They have long benefitted from their
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exchanges with other communities, who have in turn benefitted in many ways from their contact with
Muslims. Naturally, there have also been numerous instances of violence and disrespect between
Muslims and non-Muslims, but those are not the models from which to seek inspiration here. Rather,
the intention is to revisit Islamic traditions of etiquette and interaction based on compassion and
respect as well as strength and commitment to justice. Thus, Muslims can prepare to engage others in a
productive decolonial conversation. And perhaps others may be inspired and learn from Muslim
etiquettes of engagement.
But learning how to communicate is only part of the challenge. It is also necessary to choose who
to communicate with and about what. For example, there is surely much to learn from a dialogue
between Islamic and secular human sciences. Such a dialogue involves Islamic scholars in the epistemic
periphery of the world-system—some of whom live in its geographical core—and secular scholars in the
epistemic core—some of whom live in its geographical periphery. However, a decolonial project should
prioritize conversations on the epistemic peripheries. To restore some balance in the modern/colonial
global system of knowledge and learning, Western(ized) science needs to be provincialized, and the
universal dimension of peripheralized epistemic traditions needs to be appreciated. One important
periphery to periphery conversation to which this dissertation seeks to contribute is the emergent
dialogue between Traditionalist Islam and decolonial world-systems analysis.
Inter-epistemic conversations about decolonization can be extremely difficult. They occur in the
tense context of surviving within a world-system structurally predisposed to genocide. The aim is to
transcend the modern/colonial system in search of better futures. But the epistemic diversity such
conversations seek to protect and perpetuate can also be an obstacle since much of what unites its
participants is a negative experience of systemic oppression, rather than positive agreement on how to
be, know, and behave in a good and beautiful manner. Being united against a perceived threat is
different from being united around a common approach to reality. Of course, emphasizing unity can
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work against the very notion of diversity, but diverse communities surely need to appreciate both their
differences and similarities to survive in a now-globalized society. In any case, since inter-epistemic
conversations about decolonization are still very limited it is too early to determine specific dialogical
aims. These should be determined during the conversations. Here, the objective is simply to make
connections between diverse epistemic communities committed to the general objective of global
decolonization and to discuss guidelines for productive communication. Rather than presenting these
guidelines as a set of rules, which would be presumptuous at this point, this chapter begins by exploring
traditional Islamic etiquettes of engagement as an early contribution to this emerging conversation.

Etiquettes of Engagement
Compassion and politeness are fundamental principles guiding Islamic etiquettes of engagement
with others. They apply not only when communicating with friends, but also enemies. To illustrate this
point, it seems relevant to refer to the Islamic narrative of Moses engaging Pharaoh. This conversation
takes place in Africa, between a holy man seeking the liberation of his enslaved people, and a
paradigmatically oppressive figure. As I argue in Chapter Nine, African Islam is the most important
historical source of North American Islam, and decolonial thought in the Muslim Atlantic must draw
considerably upon the African and African diasporic intellectual heritage. Gilroy (1993) argues that in the
American context, “[t]he heroic figure of Moses proved especially resonant for slaves and their
descendants. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Marcus Garvey are only two of the most obvious modern
leaders who drew on the power of Old Testament patriarchy to cement their own political authority”
(207). And Malcolm X (2015 [1965]) asserts:
I believe that God now is giving the world's so-called “Christian” white society its last
opportunity to repent and atone for the crimes of exploiting and enslaving the world's nonwhite peoples. It is exactly as when God gave Pharaoh a chance to repent. But Pharaoh
persisted in his refusal to give justice to those whom he oppressed. And, we know, God
finally destroyed Pharaoh. (377)
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It is worth emphasizing that in the Qur’anic narrative, it is God, not Moses, who destroys Pharaoh, and
only after Moses has been sent to offer Pharaoh guidance. Although Pharaoh is portrayed in the Qur’an
as the greatest of all tyrants, with an ego so inflated that he claims to be God, Allah orders his servants
Moses and Aaron to speak gently with Pharaoh:
َ ُع ۡونَ إِ ﱠنه
َ ُطغ َٰﻰ فَق
وﻻ لَهُ قَ ۡو ۬ﻻً لﱠ ِّي ۬ ًنا لﱠ َعلﱠهُ َيتَذَ ﱠك ُر أ َ ۡو َي ۡﺧش َٰﻰ
َ ۡٱذ َه َبا ٓ إِلَ ٰﻰ ف ِۡر
Go the two of you to Pharaoh. Truly he has transgressed [the bounds]. And speak to him
gentle words that perhaps he may be mindful or fear. (Qur’an 20:43-44)
Walid (2018) comments that they go to Pharaoh “directly with these words, not going to the public
firstly to make proclamations about him” (48). If this is the divine command for speaking with the
greatest tyrant of all time, surely gentleness is required of Muslims speaking with oppressors of lesser
stature than Pharaoh, and even more with friends and coalition partners. But mustering the inner
strength to be both firm and gentle during difficult conversations and debates is not easy.
Certain preconditions are required to control one’s ego and communicate well, as illustrated in
the request made by Moses to Allah a few verses before the passage cited above:
ۡ ِ ّقَا َل َرب
َسانِﻰ َي ۡفقَ ُهواْ قَ ۡولِﻰ َوٱجۡ عَل ِلّﻰ َو ِز ۡي ًرا ِ ّم ۡن أَ ۡهلِﻰ َه ٰـ ُرون
ّ ص ۡد ِرى َو َي
َ ِّﻰ أَمۡ ِرى َوٱحۡ لُ ۡل ع ُۡق َدةً ِ ّمن ِل
َ ٱش َرحۡ لِﻰ
ٓ س ِۡر ل
ۡ
ۡ
َ
َ
َ
ۡ
ۡ
ۡ أَﺧِ ﻰ
ُ
ََس ۡؤلك
ۡ
ُ
ُ
َ
َ
ﱠ
ۡ
ۡ
ۡ
ۡ
ُ َصي ًرا قا َل قد ا ۡوتِيت
ِ ٱشد ُۡد ِب ِهۦۤ أز ِرى َوأش ِركهُ ف ِٓﻰ أمۡ ِرى ك َۡﻰ نُ َس ِّب َحكَ َكثِي ًرا ۙ َونَذك َركَ َكثِي ًراؕ إِنكَ كنتَ ِبنَا َب
س ٰﻰ
َ َي ٰـ ُمو
He said, 'My Lord, expand my breast for me. And make easy for me my affair. And undo the
knot upon my tongue, so that they may understand what I [shall] say. And appoint for me a
minister, from my family, Aaron, my brother. Confirm through him my strength and let him
share in my affair. So that we may glorify You over and over again and remember You over
and over again. Indeed You are ever Seeing of us'. He said, 'You have been granted your
request, O Moses!' (Qur’an 20:25-36)
Moses recognizes his limitations and fears not being able to convey his message properly. Despite
having been given a divine mandate to enter a conversation with Pharaoh, he is humble, requests divine
guidance and inspiration, and seeks assistance from another person. The opposite of his attitude would
be presuming to speak for others and going into a debate or conversation without support or a
mandate.
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From a Traditionalist Islamic perspective, a Muslim should be knowledgeable, qualified, and
humble before entering a constructive conversation with non-Muslims to build coalitions or friendships.
Moreover, waiting to be given a mandate before speaking is always wise, since mentors and peers are
best situated to decide who is best qualified in terms of knowledge and skills to represent a community.
Indeed, many individuals feel confident about their views but, unlike Moses, are unaware of their own
limitations as communicators. And even when given a mandate to speak, Muslims favouring a
traditional approach begin by asking God for guidance and inspiration. This type of etiquette applies to
conversations with friends and allies as well as when speaking truth to power in search of justice.
Often, the most important communication occurs before words have been spoken. Murad
(2014b) makes this argument when advising U.S. American Muslims on how to act as a minority
community in a tense context:
The believer’s greatest argument is his face. True religion lights up the face; false religion
fills it with insecurity, rage and suspicion. This is perceptible not only to insiders, but to
anyone who maintains some connection with unsullied primordial human nature in his
heart [...] Minority status is nothing new for Islam, and around the boundaries of the Islamic
world, Muslims have consistently shown themselves to be good citizens in contexts a good
deal less multiculturalist than our own […]
According to Murad, Muslims in the United States, and the West more broadly, should judge themselves
by high Islamic standards and consider their role as witnesses and potential spreaders of the faith. This
can only be done by being pleasant and courteous. During a talk in Ottawa about “spiritual activism,”
Gray (2018) also argues that Muslims should be people of light. She adds that “we’ve all had enough of
people of darkness. We’re all tired and exhausted from the people of oppression, and people who are
cranky and crabby. Cranky whining Muslims are the worst!” (ibid). Then, she asks Muslims some hard
questions:
How helpful are you? Are you added value to the human race or are you just soaking up all
the resources? […] Are you a great light for people, a great guidepost, a beacon of light so
that they can find some hope in the darkness of what it means to live in this time, in the
pain that people are living in in their homes, and in their economic situation, their political
situation… You know between refugees, and domestic violence, and First-Nation people,
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and racism, and sexism, and just all the “isms”, every single one of them, people are
miserable, people are really suffering. So how is it like for them to live with you? Are you
helpful? Where are you in this world? (Ibid.)
In order to become a light in this world and engage in Islamically guided social activism, Gray
argues for a return to the prophetic model described in the Qur’an (33:45-46):
ّ س ۡل َن ٰـكَ شَا ِه ًدا ﱠو ُم َب
ش ًِرا ﱠو َنذ ِۡي ًرا ۙ َودَا ِعيًا إِلَﻰ ٱ ﱠ ِ ِبإِ ۡذ ِنهِۦ َوس َِرا ًجا ﱡمن ِۡي ًرا
َ ﻰ إِ ﱠنا ٓ أَ ۡر
َي ٰـٓأ َ ﱡي َہا ٱل ﱠن ِب ﱡ
O Prophet! Indeed We have sent you as a witness, and as a bearer of good tidings, and as a
warner, and as a summoner to God by His leave, and as an illuminating lamp.
This model entails firmly warning people about their wrongdoings, and summoning them to God, but
also bearing good tidings and being a source of light. Gray (2018) appeals to tradition, affirming that the
Prophet began “a new tradition of spiritual activism that changed a lot of what had gone before and
began new traditions around non-violence, around questions of power and questions of justice, around
questions of humility.” However, “when arrogance enters into activism that’s when we lose the purpose
and we lose sight of the goal” (ibid.).
Traditionalist Islamic scholars differ on how Muslims should engage with others in the search for
justice, but they all insist that such engagement be done with gentle manners. Murad (2014b) asserts
that “[t]he early Muslims spoke well of the Christians of Abyssinia. More generally, we look in vain in the
scriptures for a polemic against Christian life. While unimpressed by Byzantine rule, the Companions
refused to demonise their citizenry.” Indeed, the premodern Islamicate civilization discussed in Section
One was the fruit of cooperation and interaction between Muslim, Christians, Jews, and other religious
communities. Furthermore, Murad contends that Muslims need to propose a viable other way inspired
by their tradition, rather than simply denounce their oppressors:
One step forward will be the realisation that Islamic civilisation was a providential success
story. Salafist and modernist agendas which present medieval Islam either as obscurantism
or as deviation from scripture will leave us orphaned from the evolving and magnificent
story of Muslim civilisation. If we accept that classical Islam was a deviant reading of our
scriptures, we surrender to the claims of a certain type of Christian evangelical Orientalism,
which claims that the glories of Muslim civilisation arose despite, not because of, the
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Qur’an. We are called to be the continuation of a magnificent story, not a footnote to its
first chapter. (ibid.)
Most urgently, according to Murad, Muslims need to revivify their spirituality:
It will not come easily until we reconnect with the religion’s history of spirituality. No other
religious community in history has produced the number and calibre of saints generated by
Islam. Jalal al-Din Rumi has now become America’s best-selling poet, an extraordinary
victory for Islamic civilisation and the integrity of its spiritual life which our communities are
scarcely aware of. Our spirituality is the crowning glory of our history, and the guarantor of
the transformative power of our art, literature, and personal conduct. Once we have
relearned the traditional Islamic science of the spirit, we can hope to produce, as great
Muslim souls did in the past, enduring monuments of literature, art and architecture which
will proclaim to our neighbours the quality of our souls, and our ability to enrich America.
(ibid.)
Scholars such as Walid, Gray, and Murad apply traditional Islamic precepts in determining how
best to engage with others today, in places such as the United States or Canada. Such engagement can
be confrontational or conversational. Hostile confrontation is portrayed in Traditionalist Islamic
discourse as the last recourse, when there is no longer any possibility of friendly conversation. The most
extreme form of confrontation is collective violence or war, which is arguably impossible to wage today
while respecting traditional Islamic rules of military engagement (Shah-Kazemi 2004, 121, Schleifer
1983, 122-124). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a successful modern military campaign which does not
make use of fire as a weapon or kill civilians indiscriminately. Facing the appalling destructiveness of
modern warfare, a scholar such as Yusuf (2003) rejects state violence and terror as well as violent
vigilante responses such as non-state terrorism:
In an increasingly violent world in which the individual can now inflict harm that armies of
the past were incapable of, religious people in particular must categorically reject and
condemn any vigilante retaliations for injustices and question deeply the compatibility of
modern warfare with religiously sanctioned military action that emanates from pre-modern
just-war principles in the Abrahamic faiths.
While it seems inevitable that in some circumstances victims of extreme oppression will respond to
violence with violence, and the purpose here is neither to condemn nor condone all forms of armed
struggle, any sincere Muslim should seriously ponder such Islamically grounded arguments against
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modern warfare. Furthermore, confrontation need not entail blowing people up. Other ways of
opposing injustice are possible.
There is a spectrum of engagement ranging from peaceful cooperation to outright war, and if
the conditions in which to respect the traditional rules of war no longer exist, other approaches must be
considered. Rather than military rules of engagement, these approaches require what I would call an
etiquette of engagement. The Traditionalist Islamic scholarship examined throughout this and the
previous chapter addresses this subtle etiquette extensively. It begins with the self-examination of the
individual Muslim considering engaging others in conversation. While the previous chapter focused on
conversational engagement among Muslims, the focus here is on conversations with non-Muslims. As
mentioned above in the discussion of how Moses prepared for his encounter with Pharaoh, a
Traditionalist Islamic framework insists that ideally Muslims engaging in conversation should be humble
and have a mandate. Such a mandate should ideally be entrusted to individuals recognized for their
knowledge of both Islam and the subject they will discuss, as well as their longstanding efforts at
cultivating beautiful excellence (iḥsân) in character.
Outsiders may be critical of Traditional Islamic understandings of qualified authority and,
without abandoning their worldview, Muslims should be attentive to external perspectives. Indeed,
many of the sick, weak, and uneducated are optimally positioned to perceive certain situations of
injustice and oppression. When circumstances are unbearable, they will raise their voices with or
without a mandate. And the basic ethics underlying both Traditional Islamic and decolonial scholarship
demand that the oppressed be heard attentively and responded to with respect, compassion, and
solidarity. Indeed, an arrogant or dismissive attitude towards them should be considered a factor of
disqualification for Muslim scholars or activists to represent the community. Traditionalists may find it
difficult to acknowledge that formalist and hierarchical understandings of expertise and authority can
perpetuate systems of injustice and oppression. However, as established in Section One of this
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dissertation, traditional Islam includes voices from the social margins which constantly challenge
institutions, thereby acting as safeguards against decadence and ossification. These voices include those
of people understood to have succumbed to the overwhelming power of divine attraction (jadhb) and
attained spiritual insight without going through a formal path. They have their place within the multiple
flows of tradition. But since their role is inherently unpredictable, it is destined to operate outside
formal conduits. Incorporating such people into official conversations would annul this necessary
unpredictability. Moreover, it would be ludicrous to suggest that, in any given debate, those who are
ignorant and unqualified are usually less privileged than the experts. For instance, a Traditionalist Islamic
scholar may very well be much poorer than a Muslim engineer or medical doctor discussing religious
matters.
From a Traditionalist Islamic perspective, while trying to avoid sterile formalism, the type of
scholarly conversation being considered here must respect certain parameters. Moreover, in the age of
YouTube, Facebook, and mass media dominated by market imperatives favouring sensationalism, the
autodidact and unqualified dominate public discourse. Although an inspired voice may occasionally arise
from among the autodidactic masses, a common concern within Traditionalist Islamic scholarship is that
zealots, ideologues, and extremists flourish in this context. Yusuf asserts that “one of the greatest
problems is we have what I call ‘Shaykh Google'; 'Weekend Muftis'. We have now a loss of authority in
our tradition. This has led to people like, what they call Shaykh bin Laden” (Yusuf and Ramadan 2016).
To those who see a religious authority in Bin Laden (1957-2011), the mastermind of the 9/11 terror
attacks against New York City and Washington D.C., Yusuf asks “who made him a Shaykh? Really. Who
made Shaykh Osama bin Laden a Shaykh? Osama bin Laden is an accountant” (ibid.). The same logic
applies to those loosely labelled “progressive” or “woke” Muslims, and sometimes perceived in
Traditionalist circles as contesting Islamophobia in a manner which contradicts basic Islamic etiquette
and demonstrates a superficial grasp of Islamic knowledge traditions. Loud, angry, rude voices, amplified
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by sensationalist media, make it difficult to hear nuanced analyses by soft-spoken scholars and experts
who have humbly and patiently undergone years of disciplined apprenticeship within intellectual and
spiritual lineages developed over centuries.
Promoting expertise and qualifications need not entail following the proverbial wisdom of
“staying in one’s lane” and avoiding transdisciplinarity. But we need to know our limits. Is it not tedious
listening to religious preachers venture into scientific, technological, sociological, cultural, or historical
issues about which they clearly know very little? Is there anything more pathetic than watching a lawyer
or historian talking about technical issues they know nothing about to impress a mechanic or
electrician? Experts in Islamic law, doctrine, or arts are also constantly subject to the empty talk of
ignorant interlocutors. This does not mean that every time a non-specialist and a specialist disagree the
former is correct. But we need to choose our battles. For instance, my expertise is in certain social
sciences and humanities, such as history, sociology, languages, and culture, and I have acquired some
knowledge after decades as an apprentice in a Sufi order. This does not qualify me to debate Saudi or
Iranian ulama about scriptural passages they have spent decades memorizing and studying. Nor does it
qualify me to debate the subtleties of Christian theology with the Pope. Unlike Moses, God did not give
me a direct mandate to communicate with anyone. So, perhaps it would be best for me to seek advisers,
interpreters, or partners in certain circumstances, since even Moses sought his brother’s help. This
would seem like good advice to any Muslim wishing to engage in conversations with non-Muslims: You
are not Moses; be humble. Moreover, Muslims engaging others would do well to consider the wisdom
imparted by Walid (2018), who is both a social activist and a scholar, in his discussion distinguishing
coalitions from alliances (51-56), and keep in mind the purpose of any given engagement. Is it to invite
others to Islam? To build a dam? To discuss history? To protest a racist law? Mixing one’s messages or
purposes can lead to failure on all fronts, as can thinking we are qualified to enter every conversation.
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Perhaps a Traditional Islamic etiquette of engagement can also be of value for non-Muslims. In
fact, since the present work does not solely or even primarily address Muslims, an examination of this
etiquette would not have been included here unless it were deemed useful to non-Muslims.
Conversations are futile unless there is some hope that different people can reach common ground on
one or more issues. Seeking agreement is essential. But appreciating differences is also crucial. If we are
not prepared to be different, or to agree to disagree with our interlocutors on a variety of issues, any
conversation risks becoming completely unproductive. Intolerance of disagreement and difference
frequently leads to neglecting areas of agreement and similarity. For instance, a Muslim and Hindu may
never agree on the theological implications of the metaphysics of Absolute Oneness or Non-Duality, but
perhaps they can agree that people deserve food and shelter, or that there are ongoing repercussions of
Western European colonialism in the periphery of the world-system. Some differences may even inspire
admiration in others. Why not? Is the fervour of zealots not worthy of admiration? Is there nothing to
learn from the diplomacy and flexibility of moderates? Can ascetics not appreciate the creativity of
artists and artist the discipline of ascetics? Hopefully then, a discussion of the etiquettes of engagement
for Muslims can provide non-Muslim scholars rich opportunities for critical reflection and even
admiration. Some level of mutual admiration is helpful in dialogue (Gustafson 2018).
Islamic and Secular Approaches to Reality: A Core/Periphery Dialogue
Dialogues between Muslims and people of other faiths or worldviews often involve secular or
Christian Westerners as interlocutors. This is because of the way modern/colonial communication and
exchanges are structured. As examined in the discussion in Chapter Four about shifting the locus of
enunciation, interactions tend to occur between the core and its various peripheries, but not so much
among peripheries, especially without the presence, arbitration, or even supervision of the core.
Asymmetric structural power dynamics which underlie core/periphery dialogues should be kept in mind,
even when the interlocutors are sincere and even though they cannot be reduced to their systemic
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positionality. For instance, Muslim theorists for over a century have nearly always formulated their
positions on art, society, economics, politics and even religion, in some relation to Western thought. 190
One rarely comes across Muslim intellectuals who do not at some point compare or contrast their ideas
to Western ones. Consideration of Theravada Buddhist, Mohawk, or other peripheral perspectives is
however rare. Moreover, despite abundant literature by non-Muslim Westerners on the relation
between Islam and the West,191 most Western intellectuals are not compelled to compare or contrast
their theories to those of Muslims or any other non-Western people. They often remain completely
Eurocentric. From a decolonial perspective, it is worth considering whether Muslims should focus less on
dialogue with the West, and more on the internal conversations examined in Chapter Nine, or
conversations with other peoples peripheralized in the world-system, as discussed further below. But
today it is virtually impossible to completely abandon dialogical engagement with Western civilization,
because of its global centrality and ubiquity. However, efforts can be made to decolonize core/periphery
dialogues after reconsidering the framework in which they occur. A first step in this decolonial process is
to question the language used to frame such discussions.
Core/periphery dialogues directly relevant to Muslims are often framed as dialogues between
Islam and the West, or between Islam and modernity. While such binaries do elicit familiar meanings,
they remain a form of indirect, metaphorical shorthand. The terminology used is in a way too polysemic
and vague to be useful in establishing a dialogue with clear objectives. Indeed, Islam, the West, and
modernity are incapable of sitting down to talk over a cup of coffee. Whether it is understood as an
inner state of surrender to God, a series of divinely prescribed acts of worship, a world religion, a
civilization, or even an ideology, Islam can be meaningfully spoken about, but it cannot speak. Likewise,
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No citations are provided for this affirmation as it is a general assessment about which there should be no
serious objection by anyone even moderately familiar with contemporary Muslim thought.
191
Once again, anyone familiar with the topic knows that the constantly increasing number of texts written on this
theme is too great for one to stay up to date. Citing a few such texts here would be futile.
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the West as a spatial direction, a civilization, or a position of power within a world-system, cannot
attend conferences, write papers, or chat with friends. As a synonym for contemporaneity, progress,
technical development, or colonial power, modernity is equally limited. Only living beings have
conversations. And the beings we are concerned with here are human beings. Admittedly, it can be
useful to utilize metaphorical shorthand in some circumstances, and I am the first to do so. Some form
of reification is necessary and valid to examine communities and their positions (e.g. national interests).
But one should at least be aware of these issues to avoid reductionism, vagueness, and stereotyping.
As a Muslim living in what is commonly referred to as a Western country, I can talk about Islam,
the West, modernity, and coloniality with Muslims and non-Muslims living in Western and non-Western
countries. I can speak about the West as a Westerner and Islam as a Muslim. And I can choose to write
academically about these subjects citing mostly non-Muslims living in the West, Muslims living outside
the West, or any series of other combinations using such categories. Typical works of colonial or
Orientalist scholarship usually cite very few living Muslims when discussing Islam. The result is a
Western or Westernized monologue about Islam, which by its very structure reinforces the racist notion
that the only Muslims worth engaging intellectually died centuries ago. And Muslims living in Africa or
Asia are quite capable of producing such Eurocentric scholarship. Conversely, a non-Muslim of European
descent can extensively cite both dead and living Muslims, including ones working outside the
Westernized academy, and enter a true dialogue with decolonial potential.
In addition to deciding with whom one wishes to converse, it is important to be specific about
the topic and aim of the discussion. Is the aim a political or economic agreement between a Muslimmajority country such as Morocco and a Western one such as Canada? Is it to have Moroccan Muslim
and Spanish Christian musicians discuss their craft and prepare a joint concert related to the theme of
divine love? Is it to write about promoting the legal rights of religious minorities? A dialogue is
proposed, in the following subsection of this chapter, between scholars drawing upon Islamic
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intellectual genealogies, secular ones, or a combination of both. The discussion is about Islamic and
secular perspectives on human sciences and the aim is epistemic decolonization. Rather than comparing
two distinct entities existing in isolation, this dialogue entails two ways of knowing which can be wholly
or partially espoused by people existing within the same world-system. Islamic sciences are ascribed
peripheral status within modern/colonial systems regulating the global flow of knowledge, whereas
secular ones are associated with the powerful core. People approaching reality from either perspective,
or a combination of both and even other ones, may very well enter a conversation with good intentions.
And part of the decolonial process is to give fair treatment to ideas from a variety of epistemic
genealogies. A good idea should be recognized as such whether it comes from the core or periphery of
the world-system. Ideally, well-intentioned individuals should be able to communicate without being
perceived solely or even principally as defending their systemic location. Individual agency should be
recognized as should the possibility of empathy and solidarity across power divides. Underlying power
dynamics are but one aspect of dialogue. But if it is to be transcended, this aspect needs to be
recognized and understood.
In a sense, traditional Islamic scholarship can address secularism as a type of speaking truth to
power, following the example of Moses and Pharaoh. Indeed, in the Qur’anic narrative, Allah tells Moses
to speak gently, not only to manifest good manners, but because it is conceivable that Pharaoh “may be
mindful or fear” (Qur’an 20:44). Even though this tyrant has enslaved and oppressed the Israelites and is
guilty of sins ranging from murder to idolatry, he must be given an opportunity to change his ways or
adjust his position through calm dialogue. While some Muslims may wish to convince their interlocutors
to abandon secularism and embrace Islam, I propose here the less ambitious and more nuanced
dialogical aim of inviting those educated in Western and Westernized institutions, many of whom are
believing Muslims, to consider traditional Islamic and secular knowledge from a decolonial angle. This
entails counterbalancing modern/colonial biases by contesting secular hegemony and decentring or
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provincializing secularism, while exploring the universal dimensions of Islamic thought. Some balance
needs to be restored, at least in terms of theoretical premises, before a productive decolonial dialogue
about secular and Islamic human sciences is possible. Decolonial and transdiciplinary critiques are
premised on the notion that no approach to reality is totally wrong. Even fundamentalists and extreme
bigots only disagree with certain ways others approach reality. For instance, a zealous commitment to
Buddhism never precludes that a Muslim or Christian might know the best way to cure a certain illness
or peel a certain type of fruit. Therefore, decolonizing secularism need not involve arguing that it is
wrong.
As mentioned in Chapter Five, Maldonado-Torres (2008b) contends that secularism has replaced
Christianity as the hegemonic discourse of the second modernity, reserving Christianity a simultaneously
privileged and contested status, somewhat like the status of Judaism in Christianity. This is not a
rejection of the various conceptions of the secular and the sacred, including in premodern Christian and
Islamic thought. Rather, it is a critique of secularism as an ideology which reformulates these notions to
legitimize modern/colonial power dynamics which leave the same usual suspects on the periphery of
the world-system as did early modern Christianity. Despite considerable change in the ideologies and
technologies enforcing Western power, those whose ways of being, knowing, and behaving draw from
non-Western traditions are peripheralized today, as they were in the long sixteenth century.
As discussed in Sections Two and Three, 1492 represents the symbolic birth of the age of
modern/colonial extinctions, which include ongoing ecocide threatening all aspects of life on earth. This
process of massive extinction accelerated considerably in the second phase of the modern/colonial
world-system, discussed in Chapter Five, during which secularism began to displace Christianity as the
hegemonic ideology. While secular knowledge progressively came to be presented in dominant colonial
discourse as the only truly rational and scientific approach to reality, all other approaches were
portrayed as religion, custom, mythology, magic, and a variety of other expressions with unscientific
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connotations. Powerful technologies, portrayed as beneficial for all humankind, were presented as the
proof that secularism is the basis of true science. Missionaries and colonizers from the core of the worldsystem once wanted to spread the divine truth to the diabolical pagans on the periphery, and some still
do. But for many decades, the main ideological justification has been to spread rational science
(including economic, political, and other social sciences) to the allegedly ignorant, superstitious,
religious people on the periphery. This global expansion of secularism can be labelled secularization.
Contrarily to the claims of dominant modern/colonial discourse, secularization is associated not
only with certain clearly beneficial technologies and modes of social organization, but with the
progressive destruction of environments, bodies, epistemologies, and cultures on a global scale. This
underside of modern/colonial secularism is easier to see from peripheral locations. Before considering
the Islamic perspective, an example from another peripheral location can serve to illustrate that the
issue is not simply one of comparing Islam and secularism, but central and peripheral epistemic
viewpoints. I return to Grosfoguel’s (2011, 8) suggestion, discussed in Chapter Four, that we consider
modern/colonial processes from the perspective of an Indigenous American woman. The documentary
film “Hija de la Laguna” (Daughter of the Lake) tells the story of Nélida Ayay Chilón, a Quechua woman
fighting an enormous gold mining project which threatens to dry out the Andean lakes providing water
to her people (Damián 2015). She speaks to the earth and water, convinced they are alive:
Mother Earth, you have gold inside you. Do you know why they take your gold out of you?
To have reserves of ingots in their banks. You can’t drink gold. You can’t eat gold. Now,
blood is being spilt for this gold. If it is so useful to the big and powerful, make them take it
out of their reserves and recycle it, but don’t let them destroy you anymore. If we take
good care of you, you can feed us forever. (ibid.)
In this poignant scene, it is difficult to deny the rationality of this woman’s ostensibly “enchanted”
worldview. On the other hand, the secular logic of modern capitalism appears as completely irrational.
Chilón is promoting life in the face of death and destruction. That makes sense. Destructive market
imperatives do not. Yet, such mining projects have been wreaking havoc in Peru for five centuries,
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legitimized first through Catholic theology, then through secular economics (Galeano 1997 [1971], 1150, Bentancor 2017). The ideologies have changed, but not the victims.
The colonial aspect of secularization also appears quite clearly from an informed Islamic
perspective. After all, hostility is usually perceived most clearly by those against whom it is directed, and
the main target of secularization today is Islam. It is widely portrayed as the great rival of Western
secularism, just as it was the great rival of medieval Christianity. Whether one is Muslim or not, intimate
knowledge of Islam can be mobilized to critique secularism as a modern/colonial ideology which
weaponizes various conceptions of the secular. Armando Salvatore (2006) discusses the pivotal role of
Islam in negatively defining European secularity, but also in its positive historical development:
The weight of proving one’s loyalty to the rules of the game is on Muslims’ shoulders. This
widely-held perception of Muslims in Europe and more generally the self-understanding of
Europe as a secular and post-Christian continent reposes on a willful ignorance of the fact
that long before colonialism and mass migration, Islam participated in Europe’s history,
both as an external competitor and as an internal political and cultural force. Therefore,
both the merits and the limits of existing arrangements of secularity can hardly be
understood without considering the external and internal presence of Islam in European
history. (555)
As mentioned in the introduction, Salvatore (2007) proposes a model of pluralism for Western societies
which welcomes people from different intellectual traditions to partake in conversations within the
public sphere without having “to translate their discourse to meet the other’s presuppositions about
what is rational” (258). While calling for the acceptance of differences, he also rejects the relativist
postmodern notion that incommensurable differences prevent dialogue and mutual understanding.
Various conceptions of the rational should be expected to be “partly overlapping and partly conflicting”
(258) in transcultural public discussions.
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2015, 2008) applies a deconstructive critique of secularism and religious
freedom in international relations. Like Salvatore, she asserts that Islam plays a central role in negatively
defining Western secularism:
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More than any other single religious or political tradition, Islam represents the “nonsecular” in European and American political discourse. This is because secularist traditions,
and the European and American national identities and practices with which they are
afﬁliated and in which they are embedded, have been constructed through opposition to
Islam. (Shakman Hurd 2008, 8)
Salvatore and Hurd provide nuanced contributions to a broader academic discussion
deconstructing the modern/colonial binary opposing the religious to the secular (Asad 2003, 1993,
Masuzawa 2005). Within this dichotomy, Islam is often presented as the epitome of irrational
parochialism whereas secularism is portrayed as universally rational. The pluralist political conversations
proposed by Salvatore and Hurd resemble the type of decolonial inter-epistemic discussions examined
further in this chapter. However, decolonial theorists tend to doubt that Western elites are generally
committed to pursuing the common good by sacrificing privilege, despite the sincere efforts of scholars
such as Hurd and Salvatore and the utility of their work. Inter-epistemic dialogue which does not undo
colonial power dynamics remains a pleasant formalistic façade concealing systemic violence and
oppression, albeit unwittingly for many participants. Since coloniality/modernity can arguably be neither
redeemed nor directly opposed, it may be wisest to transcend or transform it by delinking from
dominant discourses and ideologies, such as secularism, and changing the rules of the game. For
instance, Guénon’s trenchant critique of Eurocentric modernity, examined in Chapter Seven, which
draws from peripheral epistemic traditions, can help in this process.
Guénon’s depiction of the modern/colonial West as a monstrous abnormality leading humanity
towards destruction is less controversial today than it was in the first half of the twentieth century.
Decades of anti-colonial, postcolonial, postmodern, and environmentalist critiques have challenged the
notion that the modern West represents the highest example of human achievement. Hallaq (2018)
explains:
Colossal environmental destruction; massive colonialist and imperialist atrocities and
dehumanization; unprecedented forms of political and social violence; the construction of
lethal political identities; the poisoning of food and water; the extermination of alarming
numbers of species; increasingly worrying health threats; indecent disparity between rich
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and poor; social and communal disintegration; the rise of narcissistic sovereign
individualism and sociopathy; a dramatic increase in individual and corporate
psychopathologies; an alarming spread of mental health disorders; a “growing epidemic” of
suicide, and much more (the list is long enough to require, literally, an entire ledger)—all of
which aggregately constituting a phenomenon that calls attention to the revaluation of
modernist, industrialist, capitalist, and chiefly (though not exclusively) liberal values. The
increasingly proliferating and widespread understanding that the modern project, together
with its knowledge system, is unsustainable (even in the relatively short run) is in the
process of taking over center stage, and not only in Western industrialized countries.
Influential activist groups and prominent intellectuals in India, China, and several other
countries in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere have come to realize that a mass
restructuring, if not overhauling, of the paradigmatic systems of modernity is now in order.
The crisis affects the global village, and is not the concern of only particular groups or
countries, although the genealogy of the sources of destruction is widely recognized as
European and more recently Euro-American. (232-233)
The apocalyptic entanglement of various processes, including secularization, within the
modern/colonial world-system, may appear more clearly from peripheral epistemic locations, such as
Islam. Following Guénon, Nasr has been warning for decades about a global ecological crisis as a
symptom of modernity which can only be remedied by traditional sciences and spiritualities, such as
those found in Islam. He did so as early as 1966, during the Rockefeller Series lectures he gave at the
University of Chicago, entitled “The Encounter of Man and Nature,” which was later published in written
form (Nasr 1976). And this theme has continued to be central to his writing (Nasr 1991 [1972], 1996,
2019). From marginal and contested, his perspective has become much more widely accepted today.
Karim Crow (2010) also argues that the existential crisis in the world-system stems from a combination
of capitalism, scientism, and technological advancements, which are themselves connected to
Eurocentric notions of reason, and progress. Hallaq (2018) concurs:
Secular humanism, anthropocentricism, Enlightenment rationalism, and liberalism (all of
which rest on a mechanistic impulse and sovereign domination of the world) are
increasingly viewed as too costly to maintain and as an excessive and unjustifiable—if not
immoral—overreach, all this notwithstanding their benefits (undoubted benefits with
equally undoubted disastrous side effects). In fact, it is precisely these benefits—supposed
and real—that are directly tied to the pervasive destruction of nearly every aspect of
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modern human, animal, and insentient life (all of which, one can safely say, are
experiencing and living the modern condition).192 (234)
However, not all those in the periphery of the world-system reject discourses such as
secularism. As the dominant ideology of the modern/colonial world-system, secularism has justified and
facilitated neoliberal capitalism, industrialization, and a whole variety of other concrete processes which
have spread unevenly from the core to the periphery. Secularization has been welcomed by many on
the periphery who celebrate modernization. If we accept that modern/colonial secularism is an ideology
or worldview associated with the power, wealth, and prestige of global elites, secularization is utterly
predictable. Adopting a secular worldview and lifestyle is an attractive option if it confers privilege and
inversely helps people avoid marginalization and even oppression. Understanding why liberal secularists
rarely change worldviews—particularly those living in Western liberal democracies—also seems rather
straightforward: Why abandon privilege? From the periphery, secularization means crossing to the
epistemic core of the system, just as risking your life crossing the sea on an overcrowded lifeboat
represents the hope of moving from the geographic periphery to the core. It represents a form of
emancipation within the system—a will to privilege. Today, the secular white man is the ultimate model
of privilege, followed very closely by the Christian white man. Of course, the two are not exclusive. Since
we are dealing with unstable and shifting social constructs, it is quite possible to identify as both secular
and Christian (or indeed as a secularist Muslim). In any case, emancipation means trying to become like
the idolized white man. Secularization is one of many ways to achieve this end, as is for example trying
to become a successful entrepreneur. In contrast, decolonial liberation means delinking from the whole
system. This is not reserved to those in peripheral social locations. After all, even many white men do
not feel comfortable when they become aware of their privilege. Not everybody wants to be an idol.
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Acknowledging the benefits of modernity is essential to counter optimistic appreciations of modernity and
progress, according to which life on earth has never been better (Pinker 2019, 2011). The question then becomes
whether the negative effects are greater or lesser than these benefits.
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Fighting back is possible, but the situation is urgent. Colonized bodies and epistemologies are
still being destroyed. Languages are disappearing at an alarming rate. Life on earth is threatened by an
increasing variety of dangers ranging from nuclear weapons to the severe loss of biodiversity. From
below the colonial divide, the modern West appears as the civilization of unsurpassed death and
destruction. But coloniality cannot be defeated on its own terms. No amount of violence from below can
stop the violence coming from above. Only a celebration of life and diversity can hope to counter the
hegemonic discourses which justify death and destruction by choking diversity. Such hope drives the
decolonial project. However, as a colonial process linked to the hegemonic ideology of secularism,
secularization impedes such pluralism. Once again, the aim here is not to reduce all conceptions of the
secular to an ideology, nor to demonize all those who espouse conceptions of secular humanism rooted
in the European Enlightenment, but to decolonize secularism enough to make an inter-epistemic
dialogue possible. Such decolonization entails rejecting the binary opposition between religion and
secularism for a more pluralistic categorization.
I propose that all traditions be conceived as approaches to reality,193 rather than diverse
religions and mythologies arbitrated by a secular science emanating from the colonial core. In Islamic
terms, the Real (al-Ḥaqq) is one of the names of God. Reality or existence represents diverse
manifestations or creations only truly united in the Real. This is one approach to reality, as is secular
humanism. Moreover, all approaches are entitled to formulate universalist conceptions. Indeed, most
traditions consider that there is an internally diverse universal reality experienced in an indefinite
number of ways by an equally indefinite number of beings. Referring to this reality should not be
considered a sin. But it is in our best interest to recognize that although we are all entitled to consider
our approach superior, nobody engaged in an inter-epistemic discussion has an absolute and
comprehensive understanding of reality. Humility is key. We are all limited by our positionality despite
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More commonly used in French, this expression retains its meaning in English.
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our legitimate aspirations towards universalism. Recognizing this positionality is even more crucial for
those whose approach has been developed within the core of the modern/colonial world-system, often
by those seeking to legitimate privileges obtained through violence and oppression. Secular humanists
are in no position to arbitrate inter-epistemic discussions. In fact, to counterbalance the current default
biases, it would be helpful to emphasize the particularities of secular humanism and the universal
aspects of other approaches.

Islamic and Secular Human Sciences
Some dialogue between Islamic and secular humanist scholars is inevitable in the current
context. This dialogue can be more productive if its premises and framework are critically decolonized,
as attempted above. But to avoid a confrontation of two monologues disguised as dialogue, it is
necessary at some point to move beyond context and systemic power dynamics and actually exchange
ideas. Interlocutors must set aside their suspicions to a degree and cultivate trust, respect, empathy,
and genuine interest in the other.194 They should believe that they have something to learn from one
another. One scholar who discloses a subtle and often neglected dialogue between Islamic and secular
Western thought, and contributes to furthering this dialogue, is Ali Zaidi (2006, 2011). His work
examines connections, disconnections, similarities, and differences between human sciences within
these two scholarly discourses. Moreover, he includes the Traditionalist Islamic perspective of Nasr
among his main sources. Zaidi’s work therefore offers a useful starting point for a dialogical exploration
of human sciences drawing from Islamic and secular discourses or a combination of both.
Certain fundamental differences exist between Islamic and secular scholarship examining
humans individually and collectively. Islamic scholarship inevitably includes metaphysical considerations
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This entails setting aside, at least temporarily what Paul Ricoeur (1970 [1965]) (1913-2005) labels the school of
suspicion, whose masters are Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, opposed to the school of faith (32).
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which are deemed either unscientific or outside the domain of rational science by most secular thinkers.
Moreover, the colonial disruption of their communities has rendered it nearly impossible for many
Muslims to avoid a degree of resentment towards the West, which makes dialogue between Muslims
and non-Muslim Western secular thinkers uneasy. Such resentment is often referred to in philosophical
literature using the German and French term ressentiment (Zaidi 2011, 13-14). Occasionally, this
ressentiment is internalized so deeply that it leads to a sense of alienation in some Muslims who then
overcompensate for their inferiority complex by espousing an uncritically pro-Western enthusiasm.
However, Muslims promoting a rupture with their own intellectual traditions and a wholesale espousal
of secular thought may seem superficial to Western social theorists accustomed to critical thinking
rooted in skepticism and suspicion. Their enthusiasm is often better received by Islamophobic thinkers
in search of native informants and allies. In any case, scholars in the core tend to perceive intellectual
production from the Muslim periphery, in this fourth phase of the modern/colonial world-system, as too
emotional. Naturally, the sense of urgency in the periphery is not always shared by thinkers in the core
who sit comfortably in beautiful well-funded campuses theorizing about many difficult realities they
have never and will never experience. Dispassionate calm becomes associated in such conditions with
intellectualism. Intensity and emotion are considered decidedly unserious. Zaidi (2006) seeks to
overcome such dialogical obstacles:
Is a strong form of dialogue possible? I am under no illusion that disclosing such an implicit
dialogue will lead to a ‘fusion of horizons’ between Islamic reconstructions of knowledge
and Western social theory because there is, on the one hand, a repudiation of
secularization and disenchantment and, on the other, an increasing repudiation of
metaphysics, even an immanent metaphysics. Nevertheless, such a dialogue is the ﬁrst step
in giving voice to an-other critique and in taking seriously the validity of the Other’s truth
claims. The possibility for transformative understanding is there but it needs to be nurtured
by a particular dialogical attitude, one that Muslim intellectuals and the neo-revivalist and
revolutionary movements that follow them can again genuinely open up to after they
overcome the elements of nativism and ressentiment that have built up, and when they
disengage, not with power, but with the obsession with power. Conversely, the dialogical
attitude is one that is at risk in Western social theory, partly because of its hegemonic
position that permits it to pay little attention to Other voices, and partly because, when it
does pay attention to them, it increasingly regards them as entirely ideological and unable
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to contribute meaningfully to the dialogues internal to the West – which is, in effect, a form
of counter-ressentiment. (83)
The “obsession with power” Zaidi observes in many Muslim intellectuals is also present among
Western social theorists, many of whom may be sympathetic to Muslims as victims of colonial
oppression or Islamophobia. But this focus on positionality within power structures can become a
barrier to take the Islamic content of Muslim thought seriously, according to Zaidi (2011):
Is it possible for non-Muslim Western scholars to engage deeply with Muslim attempts to
re-enchant and re-construct knowledge without being dismissive of them? Even more
broadly, one wonders if it is possible in academia after the postcolonial and postmodern
moments, which coalesced in the wake of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) to displace the
political and to deal with large-scale questions about culture, knowledge, and society using
broad categories such as Islam, the West, and modernity? Since Said’s postcolonial critique
of Orientalism dovetailed with postmodernism’s critiques of unitary, totalizing thought,
thinking in broad terms about Islam and modernity has come to be regarded as an
illegitimate endeavor trapped in the discursive power relations of Orientalism and its
reverse, Occidentalism. But is it not possible to step outside of discursive power relations,
even if only partially, and to think broadly and dialogically about Islam and modernity, and
without regarding these categories as unchanging monolithic structures that predetermine
our thought? (14-15)
Of course, it is difficult to avoid thinking of power dynamics in a modern/colonial context
dominated by discourses which essentialize peripheral Others as inferior. This has led to an antiessentialist backlash in critical social theory:
Whereas the great error of the field of Orientalism, as perhaps of the human sciences in
general for much of the second half of the twentieth century, was to treat societies,
cultures, and civilizations as closed and essentially incomparable wholes, the antiessentialist response to it has been a refusal of broad categories altogether. The coalescing
of the postmodern and postcolonial moments has led some scholars to adopt a strong antiessentialist position that denies any form of holism […] But does one need to resort to an
extreme anti-essentialist position in order to avoid regarding Islam and modernity as
homogenous monoliths? This refusal of holism, which claims to free up thought from the
illusions of totality, itself mirrors the dogma that it wishes to overcome […] (15-16)
Bearing in mind Malcolm X’s warnings about foxes and wolves, discussed in Chapter Nine, it
should also be noted that the anti-essentialism commonly espoused in leftist intellectual circles
presenting themselves as anti-racist allies of Muslims, contradict some very basic Islamic tenets. For
instance, they often do not respect many of the traditional Islamic etiquettes discussed above, which
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include having a good intention about one’s interlocutors and trying to interpret their words in the best
possible way. Zaidi (2011) writes:
Although Marxist and other currents of positivist human science have rejected dialogical
understanding, recent forms of interpretive analysis, such as deconstruction or discourse
analysis, also pre-empt dialogical understanding because they suggest that what really
needs attention is what the Other is not-saying and is not-thinking or that the context of all
conversations is governed by relations of power and a discursive struggle for hegemony,
concealing the will-to-power. (17)
Zaidi (2011) offers some suggestions to overcome many of these theoretical obstacles. First, it is
important to recognize that even Muslim rejections of modernity which may be categorized as
fundamentalist and ideological “were crucial in giving voice to the alienation experienced under
increasing cultural penetration” (11). Acknowledging the intense resentment on the periphery must not
lead to scholars in the core dismissing “others” as weak and incapable of facing the challenges of
modernity. Second, there are deeply similar currents within both Islamic and Western secular sciences.
For instance:
Ibn Khaldun’s work is crucial precisely because it represents an important nexus in the
mediation of transcendent Islamic metaphysics and immanent human sciences and,
thereby, allows us to overcome strong dualisms and all the preconceived ideas about the
transcendent worldview of Islam and the immanent worldview of modernity. (14)
Third, Islam and the West are overlapping categories. There are Muslim scholars living in the West and
engaging with Western thought today, as there were in the premodern period. They have had an impact
on Western thought. The same reflections apply to the alleged dichotomy between Islam and
modernity. Although Muslims have been disrupted by modernity and its colonial underside, they have
responded dynamically to these challenges. Even anti-modern or Traditionalist critiques cannot be seen
as completely exterior to modernity, without which they lose any meaning. Therefore, scholars such as
Nasr should be taken seriously by Western social theory, as critics of modernity and the West who are
simultaneously internal and Islamic (79). They are not complete outsiders. They are not absolute Others.
Rather they are peers drawing simultaneously from different and same intellectual traditions.
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In fact, the familiarity with Western thought demonstrated by Nasr and many other Muslim
scholars, living both inside and outside the West, is a crucial element to consider, especially in
comparison with the general ignorance of Islamic thought among secular Western social theorists. It is
true that many Islamic scholars have only superficial knowledge of Western thought, and consequently
mount reactionary critiques which are hardly credible. But they are nevertheless engaging with Western
thought. However, only a few secular theorists engage at all with Islamic thought. This is also true of
many Muslims who have never visited a Western country but work in Westernized institutions. They are
often epistemically committed only to theoretical frameworks genealogically rooted in the European
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment. Such an imbalance is the normal outcome of a context in which
Western ways of being, knowing, and behaving are ubiquitous. Like all other peripheral peoples in the
world-system, Muslims are forced to engage with these Western modes by espousing, rejecting, or
adapting to them, in a selective process which is partly conscious and unconscious. For this reason,
Western secular social theorists have a lot more to learn from Islamic scholars than they have to teach.
At this point, a productive inter-epistemic dialogue between Western secular thought and any other
intellectual tradition should involve Western secular scholars listening more than they speak; not
because of some knee-jerk reaction to systemic power imbalances, but simply to help both sides come
to the conversation with at least some understanding of the other’s position. Western secularists have a
lot of catching up to do.
While recognizing these imbalances, Zaidi’s (2011) dialogical focus sometimes seems to suggest
that a symmetric exchange is possible. On the one hand, secular scholars of the human sciences should
“not simply dismiss out of hand Islamic metaphysics as mere speculation or as the residue of a
premodern and, hence, unenlightened, past, because the human sciences are themselves unable to
escape the metaphysical need” (19). On the other hand, Muslims should
not simply dismiss the immanent metaphysics of the human sciences as inevitably leading
to nihilism. If the threat of nihilism is present, Muslims would do well to point it out, but it
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behooves them also to recognize that an immanent metaphysics has led the human
sciences to lay bare the extent to which social reality is not naturally preordained but is
malleable and can be ameliorated. (19).
But this symmetry is abstract. Clearly, there are many more Muslims who recognize the utility of secular
human sciences developed in the West than there are secular academics ready to seriously engage
Islamic metaphysics.
Furthermore, the type of core-periphery dialogue examined by Zaidi should not conceal a much
greater weakness of Muslims, namely that while they are obsessed with comparing or contrasting
themselves with the West, discourses from other peripheral locations in the world-system are nearly
absent from contemporary Muslim thought. Muslims mostly need to engage more with Indigenous
Americans, Polynesians, and other peoples from the global periphery. Indeed, inter-peripheral
conversations can play a crucial role in ending the endless cycle of peripheral peoples constructing their
own identities through constant dialogue or comparison with the West. This is the type of decolonial
inter-epistemic and pluriversal conversation discussed in the next subsection.
Zaidi’s work provides insights which can be transferred from the context of core/periphery
dialogue to inter-peripheral conversations, and even to intra-Islamic discussions. Since secularism is the
dominant ideology in the modern/colonial core, it emanates throughout the entire world-system. The
West is everywhere, and its ways are inevitably internalized by others. Even a strict legalist Muslim who
considers music divinely forbidden may struggle to get a catchy U.S. American pop song out of their
mind after hearing it in a public space. Disney characters decorate fast food stands in Khartoum. And
Islamic scholars necessarily encounter Western secularism, even if indirectly through others who have
studied the texts. Thus, the dialogue between Islamic and secular social theory is present in the internal
discourse of Muslim individuals; it is present when Muslims meet; and it is present when nonWesterners representing diverse non-secular intellectual traditions meet. We must all come to terms
with our own secularism and learn to decipher its presence in other discourses presenting themselves as
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non-Western, anti-modern, or decolonial. Coming to terms here does not mean uncritically rejecting all
things secular but developing a critical decolonial awareness from the epistemic borders of the
modern/colonial world-system.
Zaidi (2011) explains how Nasr is empowered by his liminal epistemic position:
Nasr is quite open about acknowledging the influence on his thought of those Western
sources which are critical of modernity. What the various critics of reconstruction fail to
realize is that, even if the diasporic critique of modern knowledge seems to be
disconnected from other Muslim constituencies, the critique of modernity may best be
launched by those who sit at the interstices of the metropolis and the colony. Moreover,
while Nasr certainly exhorts Muslims to return to their tradition, his substantive critique of
scientism, and of modernity more broadly, is not meant solely for the benefit of Muslims
but is a general defense of traditional conceptions of the sacred. If the Muslim proponents
of reconstruction engage in the language of Western theory, it is not because these
intellectuals are working from the metropolis (i.e., have sold out) and have lost their
organic connections, but because the language of Western theory is necessary—both in the
metropolis and in the colony—to engage in a global dialogue.” (79)
In this passage, Zaidi is essentially examining the same “border thinking” described by decolonial thinker
Mignolo (2012 [2000]). As a Muslim social theorist, trained and employed in the Canadian academy, but
also sympathetic to Traditionalist Islamic thought, Zaidi occupies a similarly liminal position. The same
can be said of the author of this dissertation.
Theoretical tension, even discomfort, is inevitable in such liminal positions, as illustrated by
Zaidi’s (2011) recognition that his “dialogical models, hermeneutic and interreligious dialogue […] all
derive from Western sources,” and that this “admission is itself testimony to the lack of social theorizing
in the Muslim world” (29). However, I would argue that there is a wealth of social theorizing by Islamic
scholars such as the Traditionalists examined throughout this dissertation, and by Zaidi in his discussion
of Nasr. But the modern/colonial epistemic hierarchy makes it difficult for scholars operating within the
Western(ized) academy to access knowledge produced from other epistemic traditions. The question is
whether the academy can accept somebody such as Zaidi presenting Islamic texts as social theory. To
take “seriously non-Western sources of ideas and concepts in the social sciences” (Alatas 2006, 16), it is
necessary to accept these discourses on their own terms rather than impose modern/colonial notions of
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rational and scientific discourse on them. If the parameters of that which is considered science are
loosened somewhat within the Western academy, and the secular/religious binary abandoned for a
pluralist conception of diverse approaches to reality, it becomes possible to reveal a wealth of social
theorizing which was previously hidden in plain sight.
Zaidi’s critical but positive reading of Nasr reveals one such path to expanding our epistemic
parameters through a dialogue between traditional Islamic and modern secular thought. Admirative,
Zaidi (2011) describes Nasr as “the leading proponent of the Traditionalist School” (60). Moreover, he
writes favorably of “Nasr’s traditionalist critique of modern knowledge, which is the most trenchant but
also the most encompassing and conceptually compelling” (20). Admirers of other Traditionalists might
consider Zaidi is focusing too narrowly on Nasr and describing him with rather superlative language.
However, one must often select a limited number of representative thinkers when engaged in dialogical
work. And Zaidi’s choice of Nasr as an exemplary proponent of Islamic Traditionalism engaging with
modern thought is supported by evidence. Nasr’s education and oeuvre attest to his relevance:
A formidable grasp of both modern scientific principles and traditional Islamic cosmology
allows Nasr to stake out a very distinctive path in his defense of the traditional Islamic
legacy against the onslaught of modernity. A pioneer in the Islamic critique of scientism,
Nasr was also one of the first thinkers to recognize the threat to the environment arising
out of the modern worldview. By drawing upon the internal Western critique in the
philosophy and history of science, and connecting it to the Islamic criticism of materialism
and secularism, Nasr emerges as a radical critic of modernity. (59)
Like his predecessors, Schuon and Guénon, Nasr is implacable in his critique of modern secular
thought, even in its self-critical manifestations. Zaidi (2006) explains:
Nasr acknowledges the sacralizing, reactionary countercurrents, such as Romanticism,
within modernity, but he argues that, although salutary, they remain minor, unable to
overcome the culmination of a number of different reductionistic currents: the humanism
and anthropomorphism of the Renaissance, the rationalism and the mechanism of the
Scientiﬁc Revolution, the secularization inaugurated by the Reformation, and the
evolutionism of Darwinian biology that is extrapolated into a developmental theory of
History and of Man. (74)
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Moreover, modern secular thought represents a danger for its official proponents as well as Muslims
and others who selectively appropriate aspects of it:
According to Nasr, secularism and evolutionism represent the greatest philosophical threat
because they have been appropriated by Muslim intellectuals without realizing that
scientism extends the claims of evolutionism into the social realm, where it leads Man to
forget God since it suggests that Man can become perfect solely by processes of evolution
and ‘progress’ alone. Nasr is especially critical of Muslim attempts to appropriate Western
concepts and philosophical trends while neglecting Islamic metaphysics. (74)
From this perspective, Muslims appropriating modern secular notions of science and knowledge, are
equating idolatrous notions to Qur’anic ones:
According to Nasr, the process of reconstruction of knowledge must begin with the
realization by Muslims that they cannot merely absorb modern scientiﬁc knowledge into an
Islamic worldview, as if it were the ‘ilm, the knowledge, that the Quran repeatedly exhorts
the believers to seek. Rather, he argues that Muslims must realize that modern science is
the most anthropocentric form of knowledge possible since it makes human reason and
empirical data the sole criteria for the validity of all knowledge. By denying different orders
of reality, the natural and social sciences exclude all other possibilities of knowing and
destroy the sacred and metaphysical foundations of knowledge. (75)
Nasr’s description of the limitations of secular rationality is echoed in the Charter of Transdisiplinarity,
(see Appendix One), which does not start from an Islamic position. His is a perfect example of a critique
formulated within the parameters of a non-secular rationality, which can nevertheless be useful to
people from other intellectual lineages, including hopefully secular humanists.
While he admires Nasr, Zaidi (2011) remains critical. For instance, he finds Nasr’s rejection of
modernity too extreme. He points out instances in which Nasr oversimplifies or misrepresents the
position of modern scientists on topics such as progress or evolution. Moreover, he argues that Nasr
does not sufficiently acknowledge the inequities of pre-modern institutions and the positive impact of
modern egalitarianism (66-67, 151). Zaidi even writes that “Nasr’s retrieval of medieval hierarchical
modes of thought is marred by its reactionary opposition to modern notions of linear progress and
evolution such that he is unwilling to acknowledge the loss of legitimacy of hierarchical thought in the
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modern age” (151). Furthermore, Zaidi argues that Nasr does not recognize how strongly his views of
tradition are "reactivated" in reaction to modernity (151).
In the end, Zaidi agrees with much of Nasr’s critique of modernity and secular thought but
disagrees with his position that “modernity is both irredeemable and irremediable” (150). Zaidi
appreciates certain aspects of modernity and indeed modern secular human sciences whose
conceptions of the social construction of reality are well-argued and established:
In fact, it has been this gradual, pragmatic and realist elaboration of social and
psychological problems that has contributed to the amelioration of many social ills. The
grandiose, utopian and idealist conceptions of reality that too often derive from a
transcendent and religious view of the world have obfuscated the this-worldly aspect of
social relations. (152-153)
To be fair, proponents of tradition such as Nasr and Guénon recognize the relative merits of certain
productions of Western modernity. The same can be said of critics of colonial modernity from other
intellectual lineages, such as Césaire (1955). The question is if these benefits are worth it overall or
achievable in another way. As for grandiose utopias, the Traditionalist critiques examined throughout
this dissertation argue convincingly that they are more destructive in their modern secular incarnations
such as Marxism, fascism, and neoliberalism. But from a dialogical perspective, Zaidi understandably
needs to balance his criticism of both secular and Islamic thought.
Having examined the writings of scholars ranging from Ibn Khaldûn to Weber, and of course
Nasr, Zaidi (2011) offers some recommendations for a “dialogue between Islamic social thought and
modern human sciences” (159). To avoid an increasingly violent clash of civilizations, he thinks both
Muslim and Western scholars should nuance their positions. Muslims should go beyond the anticolonial
reflexes of nativism and ressentiment and become less obsessed with power. It might help them
relativize their current predicament to remember that the Qur’anic view of the rise and fall of
civilizations, concerns Muslims and others, including Western Christians and secular humanists. Ibn
Khaldûn applied this conception to his historical and sociological analyses centuries ago. Moreover,
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when assessing secular social theory, Muslims “need to acknowledge that much progress has been
made in ameliorating social ills and in laying bare the human construction of much of social reality, even
as the risk of nihilism has increased” (158). For their part, Western scholars should recognize how
ongoing Western hegemony complicates dialogue with Muslims and acknowledge that their privileged
position can make their choice to enter a dialogue or not even more impactful in improving or
aggravating the global human condition. And, as mentioned above, they should take Muslim truthclaims seriously. He explains:
An important first step in taking seriously the truth-claims of the Other would be to dull the
critical edge of the human sciences so that we do not simply dismiss the transcendent
metaphysics of a religious message as ideology, false consciousness or false hope, as was
the case for much of the twentieth century. (160)
However, this does not resolve the basic question asked above. Are Western thinkers generally
willing to question their hegemony and committed to truly engaging thinkers drawing from other
traditions? Even Zaidi (2011) is skeptical and fears that such a dialogue might be killed “before it starts”
(160). This explains why I suggest Zaidi’s advice is perhaps best addressed to anyone considering both
secular and Islamic ways of knowing, including many Muslims who draw upon both types of discourse. It
can also be useful for those drawing simultaneously upon secular thought and other knowledge
traditions, such as those commonly labeled world religions. Traditional Islamic etiquette of engagement,
discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter Nine, can help us follow Zaidi’s advice to “dull the critical
edge” of our positions when communicating with others, even if they are oppressors such as Pharaoh.

Conversations on the Periphery: Pluriversal and Decolonial
When does it become necessary to leave Pharaoh behind and seek new epistemic homelands?
After all, Muslims and others have been engaged with the West for centuries, and despite the good
intentions of many individuals, Western arrogance continues to dominate global life, including in
academic institutions. Perhaps this arrogance can best be countered by neglecting Western social theory
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for a time and engaging recognized scholars from intellectual traditions born outside the
modern/colonial core. Rather than a call for dialogue between Islam and the West, I suggest that while
Westerners should engage Islamic thought more, Muslims should focus more on non-Western
civilizations in their dialogical pursuits. One must look at results rather than get comfortable in the
formalist oases of intercultural dialogue, interfaith dialogue, peace talks, reconciliation processes, and
other contexts characterized by polite discourse and promises of reform. Regardless of individual
intentions, these discussions often serve the structural function of lullabies within the world-system.
This is not a rejection of dialogue with the West but of the—positive or negative—obsession with
hegemonic Western discourses. It is a call to devote less time, money, and attention to dialogues
between the periphery and the core, and more into inter-epistemic decolonial conversations on the
peripheries.
Concerning dialogue with powerful hegemons, el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz Malcolm X (1990 [1965])
offers some unsentimental advice:
Don't change the white man's mind—you can't change his mind, and that whole thing
about appealing to the moral conscience of America—America's conscience is bankrupt.
She lost all conscience a long time ago. Uncle Sam has no conscience. They don't know
what morals are. They don't try and eliminate an evil because it's evil, or because it's illegal,
or because it's immoral; they eliminate it only when it threatens their existence. So you're
wasting your time appealing to the moral conscience of a bankrupt man like Uncle Sam. If
he had a conscience, he'd straighten this thing out with no more pressure being put upon
him. So it is not necessary to change the white man's mind. We have to change our own
mind. You can't change his mind about us. We've got to change our own minds about each
other. We have to see each other with new eyes. We have to see each other as brothers
and sisters. We have to come together with warmth so we can develop unity and harmony
that's necessary to get this problem solved ourselves. (40)
His insight applies both to Black nationalism in the U.S. American context, and other situations of
ongoing oppression. For instance, Malcolm X writes enthusiastically about the 1955 Asian African
Conference of Bandung discussed in Chapter Eight:
At Bandung all the nations came together, the dark nations from Africa and Asia. Some of
them were Buddhists, some of them were Muslims, some of them were Christians, some
were Confucianists, some were atheists. Despite their religious differences, they came
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together. Some were communists, some were socialists, some were capitalists—despite
their economic and political differences, they came together. All of them were black,
brown, red or yellow.
The number-one thing that was not allowed to attend the Bandung conference was the
white man. He couldn't come. Once they excluded the white man, they found that they
could get together. Once they kept him out, everybody else fell right in and fell in line. This
is the thing that you and I have to understand. And these people who came together didn't
have nuclear weapons, they didn't have jet planes, they didn't have all of the heavy
armaments that the white man has. But they had unity. (5).
Colour-based racism as experienced in the United States informs Malcolm X’s formulation of
power dynamics even in global contexts, but he does adapt his discourse when presented with rational
counterarguments:
I was speaking with the Algerian ambassador who is extremely militant and is a
revolutionary in the true sense of the word (and has his credentials as such for having
carried on a successful revolution against oppression in his country). When I told him that
my political, social and economic philosophy was black nationalism, he asked me very
frankly, well, where did that leave him? Because he was white. He was an African, but he
was Algerian, and to all appearances he was a white man. And he said if I define my
objective as the victory of black nationalism, where does that leave him? Where does that
leave revolutionaries in Morocco, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritania? So he showed me where I was
alienating people who were true revolutionaries, dedicated to overturning the system of
exploitation that exists on this earth by any means necessary. (212)
Malcolm X is a quick learner and a pragmatic thinker, humble enough to be changed by one
conversation:
So, I had to do a lot of thinking and reappraising of my definition of black nationalism. Can
we sum up the solution to the problems confronting our people as black nationalism? And if
you notice, I haven't been using the expression for several months. (212)
In the end, this great Black Muslim accepted the help of white people in his struggle for justice and
freedom, but he rejected the idea that the oppressed or underprivileged should beg their oppressors to
love or accept them.
There are more non-whites than whites in the world, more non-secularists than secularists,
more poor than rich, and in short more people in the peripheries than the core. Moreover, there are
people in the messy interstices of these unstable modern/colonial categories. A true decolonial
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conversation must begin outside the core. Anyone situated socially in the core must be willing to
decentre their epistemic position and start by humbly learning from the peripheries, seriously and at
length, before proposing solutions. Through this recalibrating process, a more pluralist order may
evolve, in which ways of being, knowing, and behaving, developed by Western Europeans and their
descendants around the world, cease to represent a centre around which others gravitate.
Grosfoguel goes a long way in theorizing the parameters of such decolonial inter-epistemic
conversations on the peripheries (Grosfoguel, Hernández and Velásquez 2016, Grosfoguel 2012, 2011,
2010). These conversations may take the form of dialogues between two peripheral epistemic locations,
or multilogues drawing from multiple locations. Although other types of decolonization may be
discussed, the focus here is on the decolonization of knowledge which requires going beyond the
Western canon of thought. Modern intellectual dichotomies such as those between political-economy
and cultural studies need to be overcome through dialogue (Grosfoguel 2011). Moreover, serious
attention needs to be given to “the epistemic perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from
the Global South thinking from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies” (ibid., 4).
Although these processes are necessary to overcome Eurocentric modernity, Grosfoguel (2011) warns
that he is against “throwing away the best of modernity as many Third World fundamentalists do” (2).
Overcoming Eurocentric modernity is precisely what is intended by “transmodernity,” the utopian
project proposed by Dussel (Dussel and Ibarra-Colado 2006, Dussel 1996, 1995 [1992]). Since coloniality
and modernity are inextricably linked, both need to be overcome. Dussel argues for countering the
universal claims of European modernity with multiple responses from critical thinkers around the world,
rooted in diverse cosmologies and epistemologies. Transmodern responses to the global
modern/colonial world-system must also be global. But instead of being universal they should be based
in a common acceptance of plurality, described as pluriversality (Mignolo 2012 [2000]):
This is a new type of theoretical possibility which I call transmodern, a future utopia not
dominated by modernity but in constant dialogue with it. The aim is to build a pluriverse
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(not a universe) in which every culture can conserve its own identity and, at the same time,
assimilate the developments of this globalizing modernity. It will have its own criteria so
that each person can decide what it is and what one wishes to adopt from this modernity.
(Dussel and Ibarra-Colado 2006, 505)
When discussing the pluriversal aspect of Dussel’s transmodern project, Grosfoguel (2011) writes:
One implication is that the diverse forms of democracy, civil rights or women liberation can
only come out of the creative responses of local subaltern epistemologies. For example,
Western women cannot impose their notion of liberation on Islamic women. Western men
cannot impose their notion of democracy on non-Western peoples. This is not a call for a
fundamentalist or nationalist solution to the persistence of coloniality or to an isolated
parochial particularism. It is a call for critical decolonial thinking as the strategy or
mechanism towards a “decolonialized transmodern world” as a pluriversal project that
moves us beyond Eurocentrism and fundamentalism. (27-28)
Grosfoguel emphatically states that pluriversal decolonial critiques come from exterior spaces that “are
not pure or absolute.” In other words, “[t]hey have been affected and produced by European modernity,
but never fully subsumed or instrumentalized” (ibid.,28). This entails that people of European descent
can try to think from or at least with peripheral perspectives, just as non-European people can produce
knowledge from a Eurocentric perspective.
Another crucial point for Grosfoguel is that core-periphery relations are not reduced to simple
power dynamics between nation-states. They are complex and constantly changing. After finishing his
studies in the mainland United States, Grosfoguel could have returned to Puerto Rico as a member of
the island’s white elite. Instead, he became positioned as a racialized minority and colonial subject in the
North. The same body can go from being considered a projection of the centre in the periphery to a
projection of the periphery in the core (Grosfoguel, Negrón-Muntaner and Georas 1997, 2). This is also
true for Muslims. For instance, Muslim scholars, trained in modern/colonial social sciences, may
represent Eurocentric and Islamophobic epistemic perspectives quite unwittingly, while remaining
devout practitioners of their faith.
Just as Islamophobia is a constitutive element of the modern word-system, epistemic
Islamophobia is a constitutive element of the Eurocentric social sciences developed in the nineteenth
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century. Grosfoguel (2013, 2010) builds and sharpens Wallerstein’s (2004) critique of the artificial
separation of social theory into separate disciplines. As a leftist scholar trained in sociology, his
treatment of Karl Marx and Max Weber is particularly devastating (Grosfoguel, 2010). He demonstrates
how these pioneers of modern social science consider Islam a fundamentally inferior worldview
preventing Muslims from being rational and producing science. Marx argues that only Western powers
can liberate Muslims from ignorance and superstition by colonizing them and secularizing them by force.
Grosfoguel (2010) responds:
This secularist view of Marx was a typical colonial strategy promoted by the Western
Empires in order to destroy the ways of thinking and living of the colonial subjects and,
thus, impede any trace of resistance. By arguing that Muslim people are subjected to the
rule of a “religion,” Marx projected in Islam the cosmology of the secularized Westerncentric, Christiancentric view. Islam does not consider itself a “religion” in the Westernized,
Christianized sense of a sphere separated from politics, economics, etc. Islam is more a
cosmology that follows the notion of “Tawhid” which is a doctrine of unity, a holistic world
view, that the Eurocentric Cartesian modern/colonial world view destroyed in the West and
with its colonial expansion attempted to destroy in the rest of the world as well. The
practice of colonial Christianization in the early modern/colonial period and secularism
after the later 18th century colonial expansion was part of the “epistemicide” and
“religiouscide,” that is, the extermination of non-Western spirituality and ways of
knowledge implemented by Western colonial expansion. Epistemicide and “religiouscide”
made possible the colonization of the minds/bodies of colonial subjects. (36)
Building upon Grosfoguel, I argue that revitalizing traditional Islamic spirituality and knowledge (i.e.
spirituality and knowledge with premodern/precolonial roots) is a necessary step in global epistemic
decolonization.
In considering Islam a valid epistemology from which to think critically, Grosfoguel (2010) is not
calling for the rejection of Marx and Weber in favour of Muslim thinkers. His project to decolonize
Western social sciences is much more complex, involving multiple processes, not least of which is “to
expand the canon of social theory to incorporate as a central component the contribution of decolonial
European and non-European social theorists” (36). The inter-epistemic dialogue he envisions is both
global and horizontal:
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This is not a call for relativism but to think of universality as pluriversality, that is, as the
result of the inter-epistemic interaction in horizontal mode rather than the current
universalistic social sciences of mono-epistemic imperial/colonial interaction with the rest
of the world. (36)
Grosfoguel’s analysis can be applied to all areas of the human sciences, including the comparative study
of religion and Islamic studies. Although it stings, I believe we need to take seriously his accusation that
“an artillery of epistemic racist ‘experts’ in the West talks with authority about Islam” (36). Decolonizing
Islamic studies entails talking from or with a Muslim epistemic perspective about major contemporary
issues, rather than talking about Muslims in relation to issues such as terrorism, immigration, human
rights, and democracy. Grosfoguel is adamant:
The underlying Western-centric view is that Muslims can be part of the discussion as long
as they stop thinking as Muslims and take the hegemonic Eurocentric liberal deﬁnition of
democracy and human rights. Any Muslim that attempts to think these questions from
within the Islamic tradition is immediately suspicious of fundamentalism. (36)
This needs to change. And scholars of religion are well suited to help bring about such change. We are
accustomed to respectfully exploring diverse worldviews using a variety of methodologies. The question
is how seriously we are willing to consider epistemic decolonization as an academic project. In any case,
a pluriversal decolonial conversation can very well take place outside the confines of the Western(ized)
academy. And Traditionalist Islamic scholars have much to contribute to such a discussion.
But how much can be expected from a decolonial conversation theorized by scholars with leftist
intellectual genealogies, trained within secular academic institutions? Walid’s warnings about building
alliances with the Left, discussed in Chapter Nine, may be useful here. For instance, how well can
Muslims with traditional views of sexuality, gender, family, and social hierarchy be received by
decolonial scholars with leftist genealogies? Are decolonial world-systems analysts too obsessed with
power dynamics, as Zaidi suggests many critical theorists are? Are they too established in
modern/colonial institutions to pursue their desired inter-epistemic conversation? While Traditionalist
Islamic scholars are generally educated and trained in both traditional Islamic and secular institutions,
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many decolonial theorists remain deeply entrenched in the modern secular epistemologies from which
they intend to break free. For example, they often espouse materialism and socialist utopianism.
Perhaps these shortcomings can be overcome by drawing on sources of knowledge which are
premodern or produced from outside the Western academy, such as Sufi teachings (Sparkes 2015). But
delinking does not happen over night, and it is safe to say that all decolonial thinkers need to keep
questioning their own Eurocentrism. This critique extends to Grosfoguel.
Despite having argued throughout this dissertation that Grosfoguel is relevant for Traditionalist
Islamic scholarship truly interested in decolonization, it is now necessary to point out certain aspects of
his approach which may be problematic and alienate potential participants to his inter-espistemic
conversation. For instance, his approach to the inter-epistemic encounter between decolonial theory
and Islamic thought is not fully reciprocal and horizontal. Clearly, he is open to epistemologies rooted in
Islamic cosmology and based on the holistic doctrine of unity. However, his research remains firmly
framed by Western modes of knowledge production. While he decries the colonial social sciences
produced in Western and Westernized academic institutions, he nearly exclusively cites thinkers trained
within such institutions. It is true that he suggests it is possible to decolonize the Western academy. But
why not engage more with scholars and shaykhs working within the indigenous institutional framework
established well before 1492? Institutions such as the Sufi orders continue to exist alongside Western or
Westernized ones.
Just as Grosfoguel asks what modernity looks like from the perspective of an Indigenous woman in
the Americas, it is worth asking how his work might look to a Sufi metaphysician. For instance, we might
ask how the Algerian Sufi and anti-colonial warrior ‘Abd al-Qâdir, whose life is discussed in Chapters Two
and Six, would read Grosfoguel. If we espouse ‘Abd-al-Qâdir’s vantage point, many of Grosfoguel’s
premises seem quite foreign. To begin, situating the Islamic world at the periphery or even semiperiphery of the global world-system contradicts the notion that Mecca is the centre of the world.
462

Moreover, considering Europeans more powerful than Africans or Asians goes against the fundamental
Islamic belief that there is no power but the power of Allah. In ‘Abd-al-Qâdir’s approach to reality, the
modern/colonial world-system and Western power are not false, but they are secondary and ephemeral
manifestations of a deeper cosmic order completely dominated by divine might. ‘Abd al-Qâdir’s
perception of ongoing Muslim defeats at the hands of Christian Europeans is framed Islamically. He
understands worldly phenomena as manifestations of various divine names and attributes, and he
believes that when Muslims lovingly and respectfully followed the teachings of God’s beloved Prophet
Muḥammad, they were under the protection of the divine name al-Rabb (the Lord). But when their love
and respect waned and they turned away from these teachings, Muslims fell under the influence of
names such as al-Khâdil (He who abandons) and al-Mudhill (He who humiliates) (Makhlouf 2012). From
this perspective, European political and economic power are nothing but secondary manifestations of a
cosmic affair. Neither Muslims nor their enemies have any true power. This should not be mistaken for
fatalism. ‘Abd-al-Qâdir fought anyway. And he wrote. And he talked. Which leads us to the question of
inter-epistemic dialogue.
If we consider dialogue from ‘Abd-al-Qâdir’s perspective, it is hard to accept the position that “intercultural North-South dialogue cannot be achieved without a decolonization of power relations in the
modern world.” (Grosfoguel, 2011, 27). Since Muslims think of Islam as a divine mercy for all
humankind, it is their duty to share this mercy with non-Muslims. Postponing opportunities for dialogue
with non-Muslims is a sin against compassion and love. And since Sufis consider themselves custodians
of spiritual knowledge rooted in divine love and compassion, a man like ‘Abd-al-Qâdir would surely not
agree with Grosfoguel’s statement. Although the Algerian saint fought colonial rule, he always
maintained open and respectful dialogue with his enemies, because compassion motivated his actions
even in times of war. He did not accept to be a subaltern of the French since, from his perspective, they
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were the needy souls in need of the spiritual wealth with which he had been blessed. This is very
different from Grosfoguel’s view of North-South power dynamics.
Likewise, ‘Abd-al-Qâdir’s teaching that worldly phenomena are manifestation of divine theophanies
differs considerably from ‘’an emergentist materialism that implies multiple, entangled processes at
different structural levels within a single historical material reality (which includes the
symbolic/ideological as part of that material reality)” (Grosfoguel, 2011, 20). Such materialist utopianism
makes sense to people trained in Western or Westernized universities, familiar with Marx, Foucault, and
Wallerstein. But the further one is removed from this epistemic context the more foreign and
unintuitive many of Grosfoguel’s arguments become. ‘Abd-al-Qâdir is not motivated by a belief in
human progress towards a material utopia in some uncertain future. His decolonial struggle is a form of
worship in the present. Nevertheless, the implications of ‘Abd-al-Qâdir’s dialogical perspective should
also lead us to look past Grosfoguel’s limitations, admire his work, and trust that he can be truly open to
Traditionalist Islamic positions with which his views partly overlap.
Grosfoguel (2011) states his interest in a conversation involving people with different ethical and
political views:
It is from the geopolitics of knowledge of this relative exteriority, or margins, that “critical
decolonial thinking” emerges as a critique of modernity towards a pluriversal transmodern
world of multiple and diverse ethico-political projects in which a real horizontal dialogue
and communication could exist between all peoples of the world. (28)
Pluriversality is a key concept here, since it represents a decolonial middle way between exclusive
universalism, such as Eurocentric science or Islamic fundamentalism, and the postmodern attack
on rationality. It is a call for epistemic pluralism, in which people drawing upon diverse types of
rationality communicate and work towards a future beyond Western-centric modernity. Dussel
(1995 [1992]) describes the conditions for such decolonial conversations:
Such a dialogue endeavors to construct not an abstract universality, but an analogic and
concrete world in which all cultures, philosophies, and theologies will make their
contribution toward a future, pluralist humanity […] Such a theory should not (1) fall into
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the facile optimism of rationalist, abstract universalism that would conflate universality
with Eurocentrism and modernizing developmentalism, as the Frankfurt School is inclined
to do; nor should it (2) lapse into the irrationality, incommunicability, or
incommensurability of discourses that are typical of many postmoderns. The philosophy of
liberation affirms that rationality can establish a dialogue with the reason of the Other, as
an alterative reason. (132)
This dissertation contributes one voice to this pluriversal decolonial conversation and hopes to
encourage Traditionalist Islamic scholars, and others from the global periphery to contribute as well.
Of course, inter-epistemic discussion is neither easy nor comfortable. A Latin American
decolonial theorist might be extremely uneasy with certain socially conservative aspects of Traditional
Islam and with its frequently quietist political stances. And Traditionalist Islam might appear to neglect
the systemic aspects of global modernity/coloniality. Likewise, many aspects of decolonial worldsystems analysis can seem problematic from a Traditionalist Islamic perspective. Moreover, pluriversal
discussions on the peripheries of the world-system are inevitably messy and asymmetric. For instance,
Islam is one of the world’s major traditions, encompassing numerous civilizations. Today, there are
Muslims in every country on earth. It makes it easy for Muslims to consider their perspective central
despite ostensible Western hegemony. Indeed, since the fall of the Soviet Union Islam has often been
perceived as the only truly global counter-narrative to Western liberalism. As one of the main normative
discourses of a global religion, Traditionalist Islam has much broader reach than decolonial worldsystems analysis.
Yet, I contend that inter-epistemic discussions are both possible and desirable despite these
differences, which should neither be ignored nor exaggerated. For instance, Grosfoguel now
collaborates with an increasing number of Muslims, including Zaytuna College’s Bazian (2019) who
presents himself as a “de-colonial Islamic thinker.” Craun (2013), a student of Grosfoguel whose
contribution is discussed in Chapters Four and Five, has written an excellent article combining decolonial
theory and critical Muslim thought, drawing in part from major figures associated with Traditionalist
Islam. And Lumbard (2016) proposes a decolonial approach to Qur’anic studies from a Traditionalist
465

Islamic perspective. There is reason to hope that alliances or at least coalitions can be built among
scholars from diverse traditions aiming to decolonize the world-system.

An Emergent Dialogue: Traditionalist Islam and Decolonial World-Systems Analysis
A recent development in the dialogue between Traditionalist Islam and decolonial world-systems
analysis is Hallaq’s (2018) new publication, Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge,
written “from within the field of Orientalism” (ix). Interestingly Hallaq and Traditionalist Islamic scholar
Murad, taught a course in London to launch this book, along with decolonial Muslim theorist Salman
Sayyid (see figure 6). Morevoer, Hallaq cites decolonial world-systems analysts in several passages and
devotes an entire chapter to Guénon and his Traditionalist Islamic perspective. He thus pursues the
systematic critique of modernity begun in The Impossible State (Hallaq 2013), which argues that
Islamdom, like other premodern civilizations, had nothing which resembled a modern state and its
totalizing power structures. Restating Orientalism interrogates the epistemic foundations of modern
sovereignty. An analysis of Edward Said’s Orientalism serves Hallaq (2018) as an entry into a much
broader critique of modern Western thought as sovereign knowledge which attributes “the White man”
the capacity to make reality what he “said it should be” (207). However, “the White man” is not “a
categorical term for all white men or all white women or all white children” (207). 195 Some white men,
such as Guénon, even reject modern epistemology.
In a surprising reversal of conventional wisdom, Hallaq (2018) presents Guénon as a subversive
Orientalist author, who challenges the entire modern/colonial project, and Said as a merely dissenting
modernist anti-Orientalist author, whose critique ultimately reinforces the modern/colonial project
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I would add that many women and non-white men have since internalized this mindset and now eagerly
participate in the broader project of dominating the world and all its life forms.

466

Figure 6—Book Launch Course for Wael Hallaq’s Restating Orientalism (All Events in London 2019)
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(171-177).196 Hallaq criticizes Said for focussing on the colonial aspects of Orientalism, as a literary
discourse, without fundamentally questioning the central domains of modern thought. For Hallaq,
literature represents a peripheral domain within the modern paradigm. He argues that “academic units
of the central domain undertake a division of epistemological labor in the creation of sovereign
knowledge and practice,” and that “their overall effect dwarfs that of Orientalism” (24). Crucial to
Hallaq’s argument is his categorization of various disciplines within the modern paradigm as central or
peripheral:
I have noted that the sciences, in which I include biology, medicine, physics, and chemistry
(in all their subdivisions), belong to the central domain, just as do philosophy (including its
moral variant), law, psychiatry, education, journalism, history, archaeology, and even
mathematics. To the peripheral domains belong such departments as religion/divinity,
literature, art, and music. (194)
These central and peripheral domains, which are different in other paradigms, organized the core
project of the Enlightenment:
Under the command of human reason finally divorced of traditional principles of morality,
the project would aim to create a universal civilization, one premised upon a particular
notion of rationality, materiality, individualism, autonomy, and, crucial for us, domination
over nature. (36-37)
Novelists, poets, and other specialists from the peripheral domains exert much less direct colonial
power than do lawyers, judges, and engineers, but Said is concerned with literature. Hallaq (2018)
portrays Said throughout as a liberal New Yorker unengaged with non-Western cultures:
Said’s concerns begin and end in the metropolitan centers of Western Empire, in their
cultural and political constitutions and manifestations […] his preoccupation is, at the end
of the day, the West’s metropolitan cultural and scholarly production, the world that Said in
reality knew and the world that in effect formed him in almost every way, despite any
articulation of his identity as a Palestinian. (53-54)
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Hallaq does not however situate Guénon within the broader discourse on tradition discussed here. Some
mention of his diverse intellectual inheritors alive today would have been useful to avoid focusing exclusively on
one dead white man within this intellectual linage. In contrast, Hallaq does cite several living Latin American
decolonial scholars.
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This is a tough critique from a fellow Palestinian, also working at Columbia University, a generation later.
Hallaq acknowledges Said’s talent and significance as a scholar who seriously challenged Orientalist
discourse. But ultimately Said was too embedded in the modern paradigm to be truly subversive.
For Hallaq, a subversive critique must come from a decentered position. A “paradigmatic
critique of capitalism, for instance, cannot issue from within capitalism itself as a central domain” (66).
He echoes decolonial world-systems analysts for whom the optimal perspective for critique is “border
thinking” (Mignolo 2012 [2000]) or “relative exteriority” (Grosfoguel 2011, 28). Hallaq (2018) agrees that
epistemic decolonization entails drawing upon epistemologies developed geographically and historically
outside the modern/colonial West. Consequently, he suggests traditions such as Buddhism, Islam, and
Hinduism can act “paradigmatically” to “provide sharp contrasts to modernity” (11). Here, his thought
also intersects with that of Guénon. In Restating Orientalism, the Guénon case study demonstrates that
Orientalism can provide, from within its own domain, a subversive discourse structurally
critical of both colonialist and mainstream Orientalism, a critique that is more profound and
meaningful than Said offers and one that derives its power from the fact that it goes, unlike
Said’s, to the heart of the central domain. (140)
Guénon’s epistemic positioning opens many critical avenues. He is significant because “with all
the esotericism and unusually unconventional thrust of his critique, he went against Orientalism and all
that which produced it, and still managed to leave a legacy” (143-144). Hallaq even thinks it “is of no
relevance here” if Guénon’s “ideas are esoteric in the extreme and at times outright objectionable”
(143-144). One may retort that if it is pertinent to qualify Guénon’s ideas in such a manner, it is surely
relevant to at least briefly mention why. But Hallaq finds it more significant that “[a]lthough written a
good half-century before Said, Guénon begins where Said ends, taking for granted much of what the
latter endeavored to show in detail” (144). The heart of the matter is that
translated into the idiom of the twenty-first century, and transcending its eccentric and
unconventional style of expression, Guénon’s critique synoptically captures much of the
best in recent social theory, Critical Theory, and cultural criticism, but without admitting the
legitimacy of the system on which these critical theories exist. […] Guénon had the
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intellectual courage to delve deep into modernity and reach the most negative conclusion
possible about it: that it needs to go. (145)
Especially fascinating for our purpose is Hallaq’s (2018) observation of parallels between how
Guénon and Dussel analyse the processes of modernity:
Guénon sees all this as a systemic phenomenon, one in which a colossal dialectic is at work,
producing—out of the massive interactions of economy, science, philosophy, progress,
nationalism, and much else—a civilization that is not aware of itself. […] It is instructive that
Dussel characterized the blindness of Europe (and, later, of modernity in general) to its
mythic quality as one that continues to carry on irrational process concealed even to itself.
(158-159)
The complementarity of Guénonian and decolonial critiques is a central argument of mine here and
elsewhere (Sparkes 2015). Despite their vastly different genealogies, Guénon and Dussel challenge the
entire edifice of modernity. In contrast, for Said all modern problems
were political, essentially related to empire and its malevolent power. That these were
sourced in the deep epistemic structures of the modernity that gave him his own secular
humanism and liberal values is a question that he seems to have never entertained.
Guénon the Orientalist, on the other hand, having dug deep into the overall phenomenon
of modernity, was able not only to offer a formidable critique of it but also to formulate
solutions that were just as profound as the powers that made the “anomaly” of modernity
possible. (Hallaq 2018, 166)
The solution for Guénon is to abandon the modern outlook, whereas even Dussel’s transmodern utopia
still seeks to retain the positive aspects of modernity. Hallaq (2018) appreciates Guénon’s depth:
Note here that the target of the attack is not Orientalism, colonialism, materialism, politics,
philosophy, or science, or any “institution” that the “West” has produced. For Guénon, all
these are expressions of a much deeper problem: an “outlook.” […] This outlook must be
made to vanish, and nothing less; and to accomplish this goal, the central domains of
Western modernity must be abolished, changed, or transformed. (167)
While Hallaq (2018) seems to consider it less thoroughly subversive than Guénonian
Traditionalism, he does discuss decolonial world-systems analysis in several passages throughout
Restating Orientalism. Hallaq’s project overlaps considerably with that of the Latin American decolonial
school, as attested by an admirative review of his monograph by Mignolo (back cover). However,
Hallaq’s consciously internalist (19-21) and “Eurocentric” (21) analysis does not present colonialism as
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the central factor which gave birth to modernity, but as a major symptom of an unhealthy European
mindset. Like Guénon, Hallaq portrays all premodern civilizations, including Europe, as having had
certain spiritual, intellectual, epistemic, and ethical “benchmarks” which limited or framed their actions.
Once Europe did away with its own premodern Christian benchmarks, it became unique in its capacity to
unleash unparalleled destruction. Other civilizations were capable of horrible violence, but there was
something terribly different about the new, European, male subject who saw himself as possessing
sovereign knowledge and power over all other types of existence, including humans, animals, plants,
and minerals. This slightly decentres the role of colonialism in modernity:
For the European colonists to be able to exploit the Haitians, the Amerindians, and untold
others in the manner that they did, to subjugate them as machines rather than as humans
(or, for that matter, as human labor), to subject them to unprecedented forms of slavery
and to merciless conceptions of property, to develop these experiments into a system of
coercion and discipline in a Foucauldian fashion, and to turn all this around and further
colonize the world with a view to enriching their coffers and in the process reengineering
them as new subjects (which will be one of the main arguments of this book), to cultivate
genocide as a new weapon when all else fails, to do all this, they must have already been in
possession of, or in the process of possessing, a worldview that did away with that
benchmark. Had that benchmark been eliminated in Qinq dynasty’s China, China would
have most likely evolved a “project” similar or nearly identical to European modernity.
Similarly, had material, scientific, and economic developments been a sufficient initial
condition for the rise of a modernity, Islam too, with its colossal premodern economy and
advanced sciences, would have become modern before Europe did, especially between the
tenth and fifteenth centuries. (20)
Commenting on this passage, Hallaq remarks, “the work of such scholars as Mignolo and Dussel
intersects with my arguments” (276). However, he considers the colonial expansions of the long
sixteenth century to be “protomodern.” Rather than in 1492, Hallaq situates the birth of modernity in
the seventeenth century Enlightenment and the rise of secularism. These prepared the way for what he
considers the entirely modern colonialism of the nineteenth century.197 The question is whether this
represented an intensification and globalization of modern processes or a transition from
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It is worth noting that Hallaq’s native Palestine was colonized much later than the Americas. This may explain
some differences in perception. My own periodization considers the experience of Muslims around the Atlantic.
Position is important.
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protomodernity to modernity. Guénon’s similarly internalist argument about European exceptionalism
situates the spiritual and intellectual roots of modernity earlier than Dussel and Mignolo, rather than
later as Hallaq does. Renaissance humanism, which is not sufficiently accounted for by Hallaq, is
arguably the beginning of the protomodern period leading up to 1492. In any case, the differences
between Hallaq and the Latin American decolonial school are mostly a matter of nuance and emphasis:
That colonialism is not merely a derivative of modernity but one that constitutes
modernity’s very structures, resting squarely on what the semiotician Walter Mignolo
called ‘colonial difference,’ is a proposition that I take for granted. But it will not do to
argue (as certain Latin American transmodernists have) that because modernity’s selfreproduction rests on the fabrication of its own exteriority through the process of
dehumanizing the Other, the experience of the Other as a production of colonialism and
Orientalism should become the axis for modernity’s critique. For such an argument is in
effect tautological: colonialism and Orientalism, being processually productive of the Other
par excellence, structure modernity because modernity is structured by colonialism and
Orientalism! My overall interrogation is then this: the uniqueness in world history of the
modern forms of colonialism and imperialism, and of their handmaiden Orientalism, brings
up the question of where this particular form of imperialism, colonialism, and Orientalism
came from. The ‘Oriental’ Other cannot be granted an active agency, for to do so is in fact
to argue for the Other’s colonizability. Subtracting this agency from our calculation would
then have to lead us back to the forces that underlie colonialism and Orientalism, forces
embedded in the European structures of thought that cannot be allowed to conscript the
Other in its genealogy and narrative. None of this, however, should imply that by centering
our critique on Europe we replace the Others or flatten their experience as victims. If
anything, this book insists, just as The Impossible State did, that a heuristic moral retrieval
of the Other’s traditions and histories, as well as their dehumanization by modernity,
provides fertile grounds for modernity’s critique.” (21)
To be fair, Hallaq does not do justice to the arguments he is countering in this passage. For the
Latin American transmodernists he cites, the immensely asymmetrical power dynamic, between
Western Europeans and Indigenous Americans inhabiting an enormous territory, was an unprecedented
historical event which profoundly altered the European mindset. It led to the establishment of a
genocidal structure, a new world-system. This argument may be incomplete or flawed, but it is not
tautological. Moreover, the role described in Chapter Three of the Muslim Other in the premodern
development of European hatred, including self-hatred, can complete the internalist arguments
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presented by Hallaq and Guénon. Ultimately, chicken and egg controversies about ideas and material
conditions are probably unproductive and best avoided.
In the end, despite minor discrepancies, Hallaq’s work complements the Latin American
decolonial world-systems analysts in many ways. He contributes a much deeper understanding of
premodern Islamic epistemology, which allows for a more incisive epistemic critique of modernity. And
he expands the decolonial critique to thought structures which allow for the massive destruction of nonhuman lifeforms, thereby correcting the anthropocentric bias of a focus on colonialism. Rather than a
coin with modernity on one side and coloniality on the other, perhaps we should envision modernity as
the coin and its two faces as coloniality and domination of nature. Hallaq (2018) writes:
My account of colonialism as sovereign knowledge generated by Orientalism with the
support of European academic learning in general is situated within a larger dialectic in
which the political projects of conquest and modern knowledge stand within still larger
formations whose foundations are firmly anchored in a particular view of nature.” (22)
The philosophical separation of (European) man from both God and the cosmos, which began in the
fourteenth century remained tentative until the seventeenth century and the rise of modern secularism.
Without this process, the modern project could not have developed in Europe. That is why it never
developed elsewhere, including Islamdom.
Throughout The Impossible State and much of Restating Orientalism, Hallaq presents
premodern Islam as a monotheistic paradigm which could not have given birth to the current global
structure of modernity. In a truly Guénonian spirit, Hallaq (2018) writes that “Islam in premodernity
acted more or less like any other civilization, leaving modern Europe as the exception” (72). Living in a
cosmos dominated by a sovereign God who “literally owns everything” (81), scholars cannot aspire to
sovereign knowledge, rulers to unconstrained power, or merchants to unqualified ownership of
property. Modern sovereignty is unthinkable because of the “presumptive basis of this rationality”
according to which “humans live in the word, not above it, just as anyone or anything else, sentient or
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not, does” (81). This “nonanthropocentric” worldview “refuses, on strict principle, to accept the premise
of man’s domination over nature” (81).
Just like their Muslim rivals, premodern Christian Europeans could be oppressive and violent,
but they could not conceive of themselves as free, unconstrained, sovereign beings ruling over the
cosmos. Secularization allowed them to progressively rid themselves of such restrictive thought
structures:
Europe’s very transformations into the domain of the secular stand for an index of the
perceived need to liberate the European Self from the constrictions that Christianity
imposed […] If Christianity was too constricting for such ambitions, and was thus reinvented
and expanded as secularism, it is because it did not possess all the right and necessary
conditions. (86)
Pursuing his engagement with the Latin American decolonial school, Hallaq comments:
These considerations somewhat problematize the arguments of several Latin American
scholars and intellectuals, such as Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, and Nelson MaldonadoTorres, who regard the “long sixteenth century” as the spatiotemporal site in which
modernity and its peculiar forms of colonialism originated. Yet, insisting on Christianity as
having fulfilled only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition would simultaneously allow
for their and my narratives to stand not only intact but also in complementary and mutually
supportive ways. It is not essential for my account to deprive the “long sixteenth century”
of the thrust of a protomodern colonialism, but it is clear that the later forms of colonial
sovereignty transcended and qualitatively complicated those articulated in that century. It
can hardly be argued, for instance, that the forced conversions of the Muslims and Jews in
Andalusia possessed the same structures of domination as those embedded in juridicality
and education in the nineteenth century, however particularly brutal these conversions
were. Forced conversions surely existed for millennia and were practiced by several
empires throughout Asia, but did not result in cultural, epistemic, or structural genocide.
(298)
However, it seems to me that Maldonado-Torres (2008b) successfully addresses the issue of how
secularization represented a major qualitative shift which intensified and expanded the modern/colonial
world-system born in 1492. Moreover, the argument that “the Castillian project was not yet racial, for
integration was still a viable, if not desirable option” (Hallaq 2018, 86) no longer applies after the
fifteenth century. Once race replaced religion as the primary identifier of people, conversion became
futile in the emerging modern nation-state of Spain characterized by the bureaucratic rationalization of
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violence. The situation in Spain did in fact “result in cultural, epistemic,” and “structural genocide!”
Muslims and Jews were persecuted, eliminated, and exiled, even after converting to Catholicism,
precisely because of the new racial formations prompted by the power dynamics in America. In the end,
it is not surprising that Hallaq is more familiar with colonial experiences on the shores of the Eastern
Mediterranean, where he was born, than those on the shores of the Atlantic. This demonstrates the
importance of decolonial conversations involving different peripheral perspectives which are
complementary and together offer a more complex, nuanced, and detailed picture.
Hallaq’s (2018) most significant contribution to this decolonial conversation is his analysis of
epistemic sovereignty:
It is my argument that domination over nature was not an event but a structure 198 and a
systematic process of thought that made domination a way of living in and seeing the
world, an attitude, which explains why the destructiveness of nature and subjection of
human beings to its force were thoroughgoing and commensurably systematic. (88)
While it can be argued that premodern, non-Western societies were also terribly violent and
destructive, Hallaq counters that the scales are so immensely different that “[t]he comparison borders
on the absurd” (88). Moreover, it is unfair to emphasize the uniqueness of modern Western
accomplishments, but globally distribute the blame for modern crises. Implacable, Hallaq argues that
the detachment of the sovereign white male self from the cosmos makes the rest of the cosmos,
humans included, objects to be studied, in order to be dominated and controlled. Objectivity and
detachment are organizing principles behind the panoply of modern scientific disciplines. “In all these
disciplines, the scholar can study the Other (who is an integral part of nature) dispassionately, without it
making any value-laden or moral demands on him” (96). This helps explain why, in Western academic
institutions, peripheralized scholars are frequently dismissed as too passionate, and their moral
commitments too ideological. They threaten the unspoken rules of epistemic sovereignty.
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In this passage, Hallaq draws upon and expands the concept of settler colonialism as a structure rather than an
event (Wolfe 2006).
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In Hallaq’s (2018) critique of modernity, the key concept of sovereignty is different from mere
domination:
The term “domination” does not articulate the meaning of unbounded will to control and
influence someone or something else, nor does it exclude external restraints or higher
moral or ethical considerations that define the field of play and its range. Domination can
still obtain when ruling a subject population while being restrained by political and even
moral principles. Islamic empires and kingdoms are a case in point: they dominated the
subject populations, but under the constraints of a “law” that was not, as we saw, of their
own making and that constrained them in multiple ways. Sovereignty, however, does not
only rule over principles, but makes them, as it goes, at will. Even when it decides to adopt a
principle or a set of principles, the decision is the result and, indeed, manifestation of
sovereign will. Substantively, and this is my main argument, mere domination would be
egregiously out of sync with the real effects of environmental destruction resulting from
this attitude, and importantly, with the concomitant political phenomena that the very
same developments in Europe produced. (97)
States and corporations, whose practices are theorized in academic disciplines such as political science,
economics, business, history, and law, view themselves as wielding sovereign power based on sovereign
knowledge:
In other words, sovereign domination over life and death has been the common
denominator of both state colonialism and its subordinate associate, the corporation, the
latter having complicated the phenomenon of this sovereignty by resorting to sophisticated
economic and political techniques that can command the right over life and death almost
imperceptibly. But when these techniques fail, the corporation, like a miniature state,
invokes the state of exception with the right to kill. (190)
Colonial power in all its manifestations is “inherently genocidal,” and modern academic
disciplines, especially of the central domain, are “inherently disposed to laying down the discursive and
material foundations of colonialist genocidal practice” (197). Such “genocidal acts” may or may not be
executed, according to circumstances, to maintain the sovereignty of the colonialists (210). Following
Hallaq’s logic, switching back and forth from biological to cultural or epistemic racism is not
contradictory since the perpetuation of modern/colonial sovereignty sometimes requires welcoming
westernized non-Westerners as honorary whites; sometimes it does not. In short, modern Western
power is instrumentalist, and serves only its own sovereignty. All else can change or be adapted at the
risk of seeming, but only ostensibly, incoherent. Commenting on the application of this sovereignty
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during the colonial dismantling of Islamdom in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hallaq (2018)
writes:
It cannot escape us that sovereignty over the colonized—as over anything else—does not,
in the full meaning, obey any particular rules or principles. That economic and material
exploitation contradicted the spirit of the declared mission civilisatrice suggests the real
meaning of sovereignty: the colonized can be used, abused, exploited, enslaved, freed,
civilized, or not; but in the process, and if they survive the whims of subjection, the purpose
is to transform them, continually, perpetually, just as progress itself is a never-ending
process. Nothing in all of this is contradictory, and everything remains within the realm of
the possible. This was real sovereignty. (122)
Sovereignty, therefore, is not “a logically structured domain, but rather a system of tactics and
strategies that operate under specific conditions in a specific manner, changing course and tactics as the
situation requires” (198). Modern power is unique as “instrumentalism meshed with, backed by, and
fronted by force,” whereas “[p]remodern power was sheer force, backed and fronted by
instrumentalism, but it was not meshed with it” (198). Premodern domination was not sovereign since it
“operated under the benchmark constraints of higher principles” (199). Hallaq recognizes that the
implications of his critique, which echo those of Guénon, are terrifying. “To dig that deep, to the
intolerable, is to discover that evil—the metaphysical hatred of the human for the human and for
nature—was an art perfected and consummated in, and by, modernity” (227).
Yet, neither Hallaq nor Guénon are pessimists. They both offer solutions. As discussed in Chapter
Seven, Guénon thinks Western civilization can avoid dragging itself and other civilizations towards a
cataclysmic end only by producing a spiritual elite attached to traditional initiatic orders. This elite can
act as a spiritual bridge between East and West (or the West and the Rest), and influence society in a
subtle but highly beneficial way. The crucial role of experiential metaphysical knowledge, pursued
through attachment to traditional lineages such as the Sufi orders, is also recognized by many of the
contemporary Traditionalist Islamic scholars discussed throughout this dissertation. They generally insist
that metaphysical knowledge does not exclude worldly science and erudition. It is unclear whether
Hallaq (2018) believes the Islamic matrix still exists in which such traditional education and training are
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possible. In fact, much of his scholarly production describes “the exquisitely bookish and erudite Islamic
civilization,” he asserts “came to an effective end upon the colonial encounter in the nineteenth
century” (69). Perhaps this is an overstatement. However, if it is correct, the Traditionalist Islamic
project is futile. There is nothing left to fight for but memories which can serve as analogical models for
a future civilization. But this dissertation seeks to demonstrate that, although the Islamicate world has
indeed undergone a massive structural genocide, traditional Islam is not dead. It is severely disrupted
and beaten up, but not dead.
Rather than attachment to traditional Islamic lineages of discipline and learning, Restating
Orientalism proposes “refashioning Orientalism” (229-267). Hallaq calls for redirecting the Orientalist
gaze from evaluating non-Western intellectual traditions to critiquing modern Western thought. He
argues that, since it is positioned to represent the Other within academia, Orientalism can become a
critical bridge allowing non-Western thought to challenge the genocidal and ecocidal structure
influencing all the domains of modern Western thought (240-241). Such a bridge is necessary to affect
the epistemic core of modernity with no less ambitious an objective than avoiding global extinction. Life
on earth is threatened unless there is an overhaul of modern Western forms of knowledge, which
represent “nothing short of an epistemology, a conscious, deliberate, and fairly consistent way of
understanding, interpreting, and living in the world”(233). Of course, self-criticism and awareness of
Orientalism’s role in the modern crisis is crucial for Hallaq’s project to be productive. And Hallaq never
suggests a redirected Orientalism can save the world alone. It needs to be part of a broader effort.
Orientalism in its current incarnations, such as Islamic studies and much of religious studies, includes a
variety of voices, often critical of Western colonialism and neocolonialism, and sympathetic to Muslims.
But most of these scholars, even the Muslims, remain infused with an “epistemic self-confidence (and
often arrogance) that still assumes—consciously or not—the validity of the Euro-American modern
project, especially as it has been guided by the paradigmatic principles of the Enlightenment” (239). For
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the Other to become a source of knowledge rather than simply an object, this sense of epistemic
superiority must be abandoned. Indeed, since “the Other, human and nonhuman, has been the means
to, and instrument of, the formation of imperialist and colonialist modernity, then it is the Other that
must be retrieved as the critical center in the project of transcending modernity” (239-240). Just as
knowledge of the Other helped Orientalism reinforce the modern colonial genocidal project, as
observed by Said (2003 [1878]), it can provide a subversive platform “precisely because of its proximity
and access to the traditions and experiences of the Other” (244). Western and Westernized humans
need non-Western traditions to learn to live in the world again, rather than try to live above it.
In brief, Hallaq (2018) wants Orientalism to reverse directions in order to harness “Islamic and
other ‘Oriental’ heritages for self-constructive techniques and projects.” This entails understanding “the
ways in which Oriental cultures of premodernity—in their organicist view of the world and their
reflective ways of living in it—can provide heuristic sources for articulating new ways of thinking the
world and living in it” (246). However, I would caution that it is crucial for scholars to unpretentiously
listen to contemporary experts from these traditions, which I insist are still alive. If not, Hallaq’s project
could be misunderstood and lead to appropriation rather than humble learning. Western and
Westernized scholars, including many Muslims, need to admit that they need help from other traditions.
And the traditions drawn upon should also include other non-Oriental peripheralized ones, such as the
extremely diverse Indigenous American ways of being, knowing, and behaving.

Conclusion
Human interaction is an art. Difficult conversations need preparation, effort, discipline, as well
as considerable compassion and patience. This is true whether the discussion occurs within a
community, between communities, or even inside one person’s mind. In fact, as discussed in Chapter
Nine, it is best to have some level of self-discipline and communicate well with those who are closest to
479

us before engaging in conversations with other communities. Moreover, individuals with a high degree
of self-knowledge and knowledge of their own heritage(s) are best suited for the type of inter-epistemic
and pluriversal discussion discussed in the present chapter. For instance, knowing traditional Islamic
etiquette can help Muslims contribute to and benefit from global decolonial conversations. Living
experts in Islamic sciences, such as Gray and Walid, explain in contemporary terms a traditional
etiquette of engagement which combines respect, compassion, and a firm commitment to core
principles. But serious communication should also have a clear purpose. It is important to choose who to
speak to, at what moment, and about what. For example, a discussion of Islamic and secular human
sciences may be deeply enriching, but it can reproduce colonial power dynamics if it is limited to a
conventional core/periphery dialogue.
Secularism needs to be decolonized. So does dialogue. Without rejecting the complex
understandings of secularity which exist in many traditions, including Islam (Salvatore 2019), any interepistemic discussion today should involve some critique of secularism as an ideology which legitimizes
modern/colonial power dynamics. The starting point of such a critique is rejecting the role of secularism
as a universal and rational arbitrator of diverse religions, customs, myths, and beliefs. Western
secularism should instead be viewed as one of many approaches to reality, including Islam. However,
disrupting the colonial framework of inter-epistemic dialogues, such as those between Islamic and
secular scholars, is only a first step. Eventually, people need to engage in sincere, respectful,
empathetic, and open dialogue, without constantly focusing on systemic power.
However, there is reason to doubt that most scholars who are socially or epistemically situated in
the hegemonic core are presently willing to sacrifice their privilege and address representatives from
other traditions as intellectual peers. Therefore, I suggest that scholars epistemically representing the
core need not be present to usefully pursue the dialogue between Islamic and secular human sciences
examined by Zaidi. Most Muslim scholars are already constantly engaged in such a dialogue and draw
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upon both intellectual heritages. Other scholars from the periphery also tend to draw from their
traditions and Western secular thought.
A decolonial approach to secularism and other modern/colonial formations must prioritize
conversations on the peripheries. While secular humanists have much to learn from other traditions,
scholars of peripheral traditions have more to gain from one another at present. For instance, Muslims
on Turtle Island should engage more with Indigenous intellectuals. Naturally, any inter-epistemic
discussion is difficult. Despite sharing similar positions within the modern/colonial world-system,
peripheralized scholars have an immense diversity of heritages with approaches to reality which often
conflict. And they experience different intersections of oppression and privilege. Such differences should
neither be ignored nor exaggerated. Pluriversality is a key notion in this respect. And in any case, if
alliances cannot be built, decolonial coalitions surely can.
One conversation on the global periphery, or at least at its borders with the core, is the emergent
dialogue between Tradionalist Islam and decolonial world-systems analysis. Hallaq enters this
conversation with force. Drawing considerably upon Guénon and several decolonial world-systems
analysts, Hallaq attacks the epistemic foundations of modernity. Like Guénon, he contends that it is
necessary to learn from non-Western and premodern traditions, such as Islam and Hinduism, to counter
the devastating consequences of modernity. He further argues that Europe was unique in abandoning
the spiritual, epistemic, and moral “benchmarks” which limited the actions of all premodern peoples.
Modern, European, male subjects generally see themselves as possessing sovereign knowledge and
power over all other types of existence, including animals, plants, minerals, and other humans. This is
precisely what is implied by the notion, discussed in Chapters Four and Five, that the white man has
become a false god in the modern/colonial system. From his supposedly sovereign position, this idol
creates ostensibly sovereign political systems with the pretension of ruling the world from above rather
than responding skillfully to the challenges of living as social beings inside the cosmos. Premodern
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civilizations could be dominating and destructive, but they saw themselves as existing not above the
world but in it. Muslims saw themselves under the sovereignty one omnipotent and omniscient God.
They had no pretentions of sovereignty in the modern sense. By including the massive extinctions of
non-human life in his analysis, Hallaq corrects the anthropocentric bias of decolonial theory, while still
acknowledging that colonialism is a constitutive aspect of modernity. His analysis supports my
contention that ecocide, genocide, coloniality, and modernity are inextricably connected.
Hallaq shares with Traditionalist Muslims and decolonial world-systems analysts a common
concern that action must be urgently taken to prevent modernity leading to the annihilation of life on
earth. His project is to “refashion Orientalism” into a critical bridge allowing non-Western thought to
penetrate, challenge, and transform Western thought. Scholars of Islam and other non-Western
traditions are the new Orientalists who could participate in saving the world by overhauling modern
forms of knowledge. But this would require a radical decolonization of Islamic Studies, Religious Studies,
Middle Eastern Studies, and other specializations within the Western(ized) academy. Rather than
learning about other peoples to dominate them and their ancestral lands, the new Orientalists would
have to completely reverse direction and humbly learn from others to transform the West. Perhaps this
dissertation is a step in this direction. But trusting modern Western institutions to fundamentally
transform themselves is rather optimistic. Epistemic decolonization will also have to occur outside the
modern academy, in other places of learning. Guénon or Nasr would surely propose traditional
institutions of Islamic learning are ideal locations for such a pursuit. Sufi lodges come to mind, as do
universities such as al-Qarawîyyîn in Fez.
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Conclusion
ِف
ٍ س َمآءِ َما ٓ ًء فَأ َ ۡﺧ َرجۡ نَا ِبهِۦ ث َ َم ٰر
اأَلَمۡ ت ََر أ َ ﱠن ٱ ﱠ َ أَنزَ َل مِ نَ ٱل ﱠ
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ف أَ ۡل َوٲنُهُ ك َٰذلِكَ ؕ ِا ﱠن َما َي ۡﺧشَﻰ ٱ ﱠ َ مِ ۡن ِع َبا ِد ِه ٱ ۡلعُلَ َم ٰـٓ ُؤاْ ِإ ﱠن ٱ َﱠ
ِ
ُ ُأ َ ۡل َوٲنُ َہا َوغ ََرا ِب ۡيب
ٌ
ُ ِ َٰ
َ ِ َ َ ِ
غفُ ۡو ٌر
َ ع ِز ۡي ٌز
َ
Have you not seen that God sends down water from the heaven, wherewith We bring forth
fruits of diverse hues. And in the mountains are streaks white and red, of diverse hues, and
[others] pitch-black? And of humans and beasts and cattle, there are diverse hues likewise.
Indeed only those of God’s servants who have knowledge fear Him. Truly God is Mighty,
Forgiving. (Qur’an 35:27-28)
Decolonization must occur on a global scale because the modern/colonial world-system has long
been global. As Hallaq observes, Western and Westernized elites continue to act as sovereign agents
with the mandate of dominating all life on earth. They act as if they live above rather than within the
world and its dizzying diversity of people, animals, and other life forms. And they tend to consider their
parochial views and habits as universally applicable. Critical Muslim scholars such as Jackson, Craun, and
Bewley describe their behaviour as that of false gods who claim the authority to destroy whomever or
whatever opposes their supposedly sovereign will. In the early sixteenth century, some Aztec scholars
correctly interpreted the arrival of the conquistadors as announcing the end of the world. Since then,
the universe of many other human and non-human beings has been destroyed by the modern/colonial
project. As Kyle Whyte (2018) reminds us, “Indigenous peoples everywhere have been through repeated
apocalypses” (238). For some, this is a post-apocalyptic world; for others, the end seems near as the age
of extinctions races onward.
This dissertation purposely responds to these global crises by looking at the big historical,
geographical, and theoretical picture. It has the ambition of energizing emergent conversations and
opening avenues for further research. Broad theoretical arguments are proposed which are radical
insofar as they attack the very roots or epistemic foundations of Eurocentric academic approaches.
However, this project is less bold when it comes to details about such issues as what to discuss during
inter-epistemic conversations. These specifics must be negotiated collectively through diverse
conversations which will produce varying results according to context. Some degree of humility is crucial
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here, as is acknowledging that the several limitations of this study are invitations for further research,
only some of which I can hope to accomplish.
For instance, the big picture presented in this dissertation can be completed, nuanced, and
complemented by other studies which deal with smaller scales, such as the region, community, or
individual. Contemporary or historical case studies are needed which examine the intersection of Islam,
tradition, and coloniality in specific Muslim Atlantic contexts, such as Casablanca, Dakar, Montreal, New
York, or on the seas, airways, and roads connecting these locations. One especially significant site
worthy of further research from a decolonial angle is the Strait of Gibraltar. As established in Sections
One and Two, this waterway has long been a strategic intersection for the flow of people, ideas, and
goods between Africa and Europe, and between the Mediterranean and Atlantic worlds. In antiquity,
several Mediterranean powers claimed it was the limit of the world, yet sent traders along the
Northwestern shores of Africa, and as far as the Canary Islands and British Isles. Already, this zone was a
limit for some but a passage for others. In the eighth century, the Muslim general Ṭâriq ibn Ziyâd
crossed the Strait northwards with an army, just as Hannibal the Carthaginian had five centuries earlier.
Portugal opened the age of modern European colonial expansion in 1415, by crossing the Strait
southwards and colonizing Sabta. Today, the city is still occupied by an Iberian power: Spain. People with
European passports enter and leave Africa through Sabta with ease, as do tonnes of legal and illegal
commodities, ranging from drugs to laundry detergent. Immense cargo ships can be seen from there,
crossing the Strait east and west and connecting continents. But migrants coming from across Africa,
and even as far as Syria, see Sabta and the Strait as formidable barriers to be broken, even at the cost of
their lives. In the small Moroccan town of Fnideq, just outside Sabta, where my wife was born and
raised, fishermen complain about the corpses they keep finding in their nets. And Moroccan authorities,
generously financed by the European Union, regularly raid refugee camps in the mountains visible from
the balcony of our family home. The Strait of Gibraltar is an ideal place to investigate the various
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historical currents and countercurrents of the modern/colonial world-system from the perspective of
Muslims. Human migration is an important aspect of this story.
But the Strait of Gibraltar is only one node in the modern/colonial world-system, and there is still
a need to make connections between multiple locations. While the intertextual analysis of Section Four
focuses on North American Traditionalist Islam, the global aspect of this discourse merits further
exploration. Also, there is a need for more collaborative decolonial research projects surrounding
Muslim experiences and critical thought in the Atlantic world. The recently established Muslim Atlantic
research institute, which focuses on the United States and the United Kingdom, is an early step in this
direction. Soon, a transnational academic network will hopefully grow to include scholars of Islam in
Western Europe, the United States, West Africa, the Caribbean, South America, and indeed Canada.
Writings in languages other than English, prominent in the Muslim Atlantic, should be included—Arabic,
French, Spanish, and Portuguese come to mind. Moreover, some of the findings in this dissertation may
be useful for studies of other regions, such as the Pacific World, Eurasia, and other parts of Africa. And
they may be of interest to scholars exploring other peripheral perspectives within the modern/colonial
world-system, such as Hinduism or Buddhism.
Another limitation of this study is the somewhat superficial treatment of Islamic currents
critiqued within Traditionalist discourse. They deserve closer examination with better attention to their
internal diversity and complexity than could be achieved in this study of Traditionalist Islam.
Furthermore, the overlap between discourses needs to be addressed.199 For example, so-called Salafists
and Traditionalists generally agree about the importance of preserving normative Islamic practices such
as the technical aspect of rituals. Traditionalist and Progressive Muslims also share many concerns.
Whereas many twentieth century modernist Islamic currents depicted Sufism and much of popular
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The same can be said of anti-colonial, post-colonial, and decolonial approaches which can be read collectively as
a critique of colonial power. Although it is useful to examine the distinctions between these discursive currents,
they do significantly overlap.
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religious culture as superstitious, self-identified Progressive Muslims (Safi 2003) tend to follow the
postmodern tendency to reject such triumphalism and intolerance. Today, they are among the most
active promoters of traditional Islamic spirituality, art, and cultural practices. Moreover, Progressive
Muslims are generally critical of Western colonialism and imperialism, despite being accused by
Lumbard of having “unwittingly surrendered the ground of intelligence to a secular humanist tradition”
and collaborating in the “inversion of Islamic thought and the destruction of Islamic civilization”
(Lumbard 2004c, 68). Such bold statements are useful. They reveal important discursive boundaries.
However, they need to be complemented by more nuanced assessments when it comes to specific
thinkers. Esack (2018), who is explicitly targeted in Lumbard’s (2004c, 68) critique of Progressive Islam,
has recently distanced himself from the terms “Progressive Muslim” and “Progressive Islam.” His
decision comes as a response to what he considers the co-optation of these terms by supporters of the
American-led project “to reshape the contours of contemporary Islam to ensure more pliant Muslim
subjects for the larger Global North’s ideological agenda” (Esack 2018, 81). Apparently, Esack and
Lumbard share many concerns about coloniality, as do many Salafists, despite being generally associated
with different discursive communities. Furthermore, the focus here is on Sunni discourse, but Shia
responses to the modern/colonial challenge could be analysed using a similar theoretical approach. It
would be interesting to verify, for example, how well the categories of fundamentalism, modernism, and
traditionalism apply in Shia contexts.
Zaidi (2011) suggests that we read the Muslim debate about modernity and its colonial dimension
“collectively as a critique of secular-cultural modernity” while noting “its internal differences” (p.78).
Obsession with ideological differences can lead us to “miss the opportunity to engage with these
discourses in a broad, open, and sincere manner” (78). Indeed, very similar critiques of Western
colonialism and cultural imperialism can be found in the works of Muslims labelled as Salafist,
Traditionalist, or Progressive. In fact, Zaidi demonstrates that a broad variety of thinkers are engaged in
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Muslim reconstructions of knowledge.200 They are responding to the crises imposed by the
modern/colonial context. Moreover, in deploring the materialist and anti-spiritual aspects of modernity,
these Islamic discourses converge with currents within Western Romanticism, conservative Catholicism,
Beat poetry, and a myriad of other non-Muslim discourses. Therefore, my focus on Traditionalist Islam
should be understood as one entry point into complex discursive networks as well as the individuals and
communities which produce them. Other entry points should be examined.
This dissertation has also purposely focused on the concept of tradition as it is formulated within
a specific discursive community to critique modernity and its colonial dimension. A greater
understanding of the term tradition and of its semantic range could be gained by relating Traditionalist
formulations to those developed by other prominent scholars. For instance, Talal Asad (1986, 2015) has
been reflecting on Islam as a discursive tradition for many decades. Drawing on several thinkers,
including Asad, Salvatore (2007, 2009) also proposes rich reflections on tradition in relation to Islam,
Christianity, and liberal secularism. It would be fascinating to examine how these and other scholarly
discussions about tradition overlap with and depart from the Traditionalist Islamic discourse presented
here.201
Another dialogical connection which I dearly hope to see pursued more actively is a respectful
and productive decolonial relationship between Muslims and the First Nations of this land we continue
to map using Eurocentric terms such as North America. I and other Muslims in settler communities
simply need to listen much more to Indigenous voices, including but not limited to those of Native
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Zaidi presents the work of specific scholars in a dialogical manner and explores their divergences and
convergences. For instance, he situates the thought of Nasr alongside that of Ismail al-Faruqi (1921-1986). In the
second chapter of his book Zaidi (2011, 53-80) clearly situates Nasr as a proponent of traditional Islam and alFaruqi as a modernist whose Islamization of knowledge is a project deeply influenced by Western rationalism as
well as Islamic Salafism and Wahhâbism. But Zaidi is less concerned with the typology of discursive communities
than I am in this dissertation.
201
A list of scholarship on tradition could be endless, but works by Edward Shils (1971, 1981) come immediately to
mind, as do the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre since his publication of After Virtue (1981).
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Muslims. It is crucial to remember that “decolonization is not a metaphor” (Tuck and Yang 2012) for
various projects aimed at improving settler society:
It is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it is not a
philanthropic process of ‘helping’ the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a generic
term for struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes. The broad umbrella of social
justice may have room underneath for all of these efforts. By contrast, decolonization
specifically requires the repatriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization is not a
metonym for social justice. (Ibid., 21)
Muslims living on occupied land should remember that ultimately
decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land
simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been
differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is
precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity.
(Ibid., 7)
Likewise, Indigenous scholars and activists may benefit from the perspective of Muslims whose
heartlands continue to exist under a global regime of Western-centric coloniality despite having been
officially repatriated from European occupiers. This regime affects all societies, including those which
were never formally colonized, such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Under the current nation-state system,
dominated by institutions such as NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and of course the U.S.
American armed forces, repatriation and sovereignty are the metaphors and coloniality the concrete
reality. When Muslims of any race or origin transgress the boundaries of the peripheral position allotted
to them in the world-system, they are met with detentions, bombs, drones, sanctions, and any other
means necessary to restore the colonial order. Genocide is always an option. In Africa and Asia, Muslims
do not enjoy the full benefits of national sovereignty, and many risk their lives leaving their allegedly
postcolonial homelands, to seek sanctuary in the lands of their colonizers. The painful irony of this
situation is surely not lost on decolonial Indigenous scholars in settler colonies such as Canada. And my
contention here has been that true decolonization anywhere can only happen if diverse peripheralized
communities around the world share knowledge and combine their efforts. Solidarity on the peripheries
is the worst nightmare of those wishing to perpetuate the modern/colonial world-system. This is as true
488

today as it was in the fifteenth century, when the Spanish forbade contact between Muslims and
Indigenous peoples in their American colonies, as discussed in Chapter Four. Only a glimpse of what
such decolonial contact could achieve has been offered in this dissertation. Many other pages need to
be written on this topic, hopefully after multiple and extensive decolonial and inter-epistemic
conversations.
More pages also need to be written concerning the delicate issues of Muslim sexuality, gender,
and family structure, as well as the difficulty of discussing these topics in today’s globally Islamophobic
and colonial context. These questions deserve much more attention from compassionate and nuanced
decolonial scholars. More women need to be heard, especially. Nevertheless, this dissertation does
include the voices of several women whose life and work may serve as inspiration for further research
on gender in relation to Traditionalist Islamic decolonization. Figures such as Sayyida al-Ḥurra, discussed
in Chapter Four, and Nana Asma’u, discussed in Chapters Four and Five, provide historical depth to the
work of contemporary women resisting modern/colonial power structures, and revisiting the Islamic
tradition, both respectfully and critically. Scholars such as Schimmel, Murata, Lebbady, Mattson, Gray,
my mentor Sharify-Funk, and other women cited throughout this dissertation have written texts which
can provide an excellent gateway for future research projects. Nevertheless, I have cited far more men
than women. Traditionalist Islamic scholarship and decolonial world-systems analysis remain
overwhelmingly male-dominated discourses, and I chose to cite whichever source seemed most relevant
throughout the dissertation, without keeping count of how gender would be represented in the
bibliography. The result is embarrassing. I should have done better.
However, I believe this project makes a useful contribution despite, and perhaps at times because
of its limitations. To my knowledge, this is the first research project devoted to a critical inter-epistemic
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dialogue between Traditional Islamic and decolonial critiques of modernity.202 It is a relevant topic for at
least four reasons:
1. it helps better understand the position of Traditionalist Islam within North American religious
diversity;
2. it presents critical scholarly insights about broad societal, even civilizational issues, from the
perspective of North American minorities;
3. it makes a unique contribution to religious studies, more particularly Islamic studies;
4. and it makes a unique contribution to history, world-systems analysis, decolonial theory,
modernity studies, and global studies.
To sum up, this dissertation contributes a decolonial critique of the world-system from the
longue durée perspective of the Muslims living in the Atlantic world. It expresses its critique with
Muslims, about modernity and coloniality, to anybody interested in decolonization, rather than speaking
about Muslims from some allegedly objective Eurocentric viewpoint. Drawing on the North American
Traditionalist Islamic discourse, which contributes to and is affected by a similar transatlantic and
increasingly global discourse, I suggest that at least in this context tradition can be understood as an
inspired dynamic flow from the past into the present and future. This internally diverse flow is
comprised of many conflicting and complementary subcurrents, flows, and counterflows. In a sense,
tradition serves as shorthand for unique ways of being, knowing, and behaving, ranging from
metaphysics to the art of bathing or eating. Traditionalist Islam, as a discourse on traditional Islam, is
distinct from other discourses, such as Salafism and Progressive Islam. It explicitly affirms the value of
the diverse traditions disrupted by the modern/colonial project. As such, Traditionalist Islam is
decolonial. Moreover, based on extensive historical evidence, it is possible to situate Traditionalist
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Hallaq (2018) and Lumbard (2016) address this topic, but do not focus on it.
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Islamic anti-modernism in a long tradition of Muslim anti-colonial and decolonial struggles in the
modern/colonial world-system.
Section Four elaborates the two main contentions of this dissertation, namely that (1)
traditional Islam still needs to be decolonized, and that (2) Traditionalist Islamic perspectives should
contribute more to the global decolonial conversation. These two main contentions take as premises
three other contentions, progressively established in Sections One to Three: (1) that in the
premodern/precolonial period, a specific type of traditional Islam developed in the Western
Islamicate; (2) that the disruption and colonization of traditional Islam by European powers was a
constitutive aspect of the early modern/colonial world-system; and (3) that traditionalism developed
as a response to this disruption. These long-term historical processes can be summarized as progressing
through three stages: tradition, disruption, and traditionalism. Decolonization represents a fourth
stage, which is concerned with the present and future, although it has been present since the fifteenth
century as a necessary countercurrent within the modern/colonial world-system.
The new theoretical framework I describe as “Traditionalist Islamic decolonization” begins from
the premise that Muslims must revisit their tradition to re-establish dynamic flows between past,
present, and future, and counter the modern/colonial forces working to annihilate their unique ways of
being, knowing, and behaving, developed over centuries. It is to be understood as one of many scholarly
discourses contributing to global decolonial conversations which are inter-epistemic and pluriversal.
Indeed, Muslims are one of many peoples within the same global system, and others share similar
decolonial aspirations. All peoples have much to learn from our respective struggles.
North American Muslims can make a unique contribution here. For centuries, they have been
engaged in the broader struggle against modern/colonial genocide in the Muslim Atlantic. Special ties
connect the North American Islamic tradition to the distinct Islamic tradition which began to develop in
Northwest Africa and Southwest Europe in the eleventh century but was severely disrupted by the
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emergence of the modern/colonial European project in the fifteenth century. Although this disruptive
project did not annihilate the Muslim Atlantic, it continues to pose an existential threat to Muslim
bodies, societies, cultures, epistemologies, and spiritualities. While armed resistance against the worldsystem may seem futile and counterproductive today, other forms of resistance exist. In fact, Muslim
Atlantic resistance has always involved an enormous range of efforts to protect and perpetuate the
unique ways of being, knowing, and behaving of Muslims, as well as other communities living with
Muslims, such as Andalusian Jews or non-Muslim Africans enslaved in the Americas.
One such form of resistance can occur through a refashioned Orientalism as proposed by Hallaq. I
enthusiastically wish to participate in the radical decolonization of Islamic studies, religious studies,
Middle Eastern studies, and other related fields. And I invite other scholars to join us. This effort may
not lead to the widescale transformation of the modern Western university, but it is surely useful to
work towards such an end in the margins of the academy. It is also important to have decolonial
conversations in other learning spaces, such as Islamic institutions, non-governmental organizations,
and artistic collectives.
This dissertation joins a nascent conversation between Traditionalist Islam and decolonial worldsystems analysis. It endorses the call made by thinkers such as Dussel and Grosfoguel for multiple interepistemic conversations about how to move ahead and beyond the modern/colonial system. For these
conversations to succeed, each voice must be considered on its own terms as well as dialogically.
Participants who are deeply knowledgeable of their own epistemic traditions can best discover
commonalities and respect differences when engaging others. The framework proposed in the Charter
of Transdisciplinarity, reproduced in Appendix Two, can help scholars process such complexity with a
diversity of epistemic tools not limited to rationalism or empiricism. Multiple ways of learning from
diverse beings need to be embraced. We have so much to learn from one another. More importantly,
our survival may depend on this learning. Let’s remove the barriers and go with the flow.
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Appendix I
The Charter of Transdisciplinarity
(adopted at the First World Congress of Trandisciplinarity, Convento da Arrábida, Portugal,
November 2-6, 1994)
Preamble
Whereas, the present proliferation of academic and non-academic disciplines is leading to an
exponential increase of knowledge which makes a global view of the human being impossible;
Whereas, only a form of intelligence capable of grasping the cosmic dimension of the present conflicts is
able to confront the complexity of our world and the present challenge of the spiritual and material selfdestruction of the human species;
Whereas, life on earth is seriously threatened by the triumph of a techno-science that obeys only the
terrible logic of productivity for productivity's sake;
Whereas, the present rupture between increasingly quantitative knowledge and increasingly
impoverished inner identity is leading to the rise of a new brand of obscurantism with incalculable social
and personal consequences;
Whereas, an historically unprecedented growth of knowledge is increasing the inequality between those
who have and those who do not, thus engendering increasing inequality within and between the
different nations of our planet;
Whereas, at the same time, hope is the counterpart of all the afore-mentioned challenges, a hope that
this extraordinary development of knowledge could eventually lead to an evolution not unlike the
development of primates into human beings;
Therefore, in consideration of all the above, the participants of the First World Congress of
Transdisciplinarity (Convento da Arrábida, Portugal, November 2-7, 1994) have adopted the present
Charter, which comprises the fundamental principles of the community of transdisciplinary researchers,
and constitutes a personal moral commitment, without any legal or institutional constraint, on the part
of everyone who signs this Charter.
Article 1:
Any attempt to reduce the human being by formally defining what a human being is and subjecting the
human being to reductive analyses within a framework of formal structures, no matter what they are, is
incompatible with the transdisciplinary vision.
Article 2:
The recognition of the existence of different levels of reality governed by different types of logic is
inherent in the transdisciplinary attitude. Any attempt to reduce reality to a single level governed by a
single form of logic does not lie within the scope of transdisciplinarity.
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Article 3:
Transdisciplinarity complements disciplinary approaches. It occasions the emergence of new data and
new interactions from out of the encounter between disciplines. It offers us a new vision of nature and
reality. Transdisciplinarity does not strive for mastery of several disciplines but aims to open all
disciplines to that which they share and to that which lies beyond them.
Article 4:
The keystone of transdisciplinarity is the semantic and practical unification of the meanings
that traverse and lay beyond different disciplines. It presupposes an open-minded rationality by reexamining the concepts of "definition" and "objectivity." An excess of formalism, rigidity of definitions
and a claim to total objectivity, entailing the exclusion of the subject, can only have a life-negating
effect.
Article 5:
The transdisciplinary vision is resolutely open insofar as it goes beyond the field of the exact sciences
and demands their dialogue and their reconciliation with the humanities and the social sciences, as well
as with art, literature, poetry and spiritual experience.
Article 6:
In comparison with interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity is multireferential and
multidimensional. While taking account of the various approaches to time and history,
transdisciplinarity does not exclude a transhistorical horizon.
Article 7:
Transdisciplinarity constitutes neither a new religion, nor a new philosophy, nor a new metaphysics, nor
a science of sciences.
Article 8:
The dignity of the human being is of both planetary and cosmic dimensions. The appearance of human
beings on Earth is one of the stages in the history of the Universe. The recognition of the Earth as our
home is one of the imperatives of transdisciplinarity. Every human being is entitled to a nationality, but
as an inhabitant of the Earth is also a transnational being. The acknowledgement by international law of
this twofold belonging, to a nation and to the Earth, is one of the goals of transdisciplinary research.
Article 9:
Transdisciplinarity leads to an open attitude towards myths and religions, and also towards those who
respect them in a transdisciplinary spirit.
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Article 10:
No single culture is privileged over any other culture. The transdisciplinary approach is inherently
transcultural.
Article 11:
Authentic education cannot value abstraction over other forms of knowledge. It must teach contextual,
concrete and global approaches. Transdisciplinary education revalues the role of intuition, imagination,
sensibility and the body in the transmission of knowledge.
Article 12:
The development of a transdisciplinary economy is based on the postulate that the economy must serve
the human being and not the reverse.
Article 13:
The transdisciplinary ethic rejects any attitude that refuses dialogue and discussion, regardless of
whether the origin of this attitude is ideological, scientistic, religious, economic, political or
philosophical. Shared knowledge should lead to a shared understanding based on an
absolute respect for the collective and individual Otherness united by our common life on one and the
same Earth.
Article 14:
Rigor, openness, and tolerance are the fundamental characteristics of the transdisciplinary attitude and
vision. Rigor in argument, taking into account all existing data, is the best defense against possible
distortions. Openness involves an acceptance of the unknown, the unexpected and the
unforeseeable. Tolerance implies acknowledging the right to ideas and truths opposed to our own.
Article final:
The present Charter of Transdisciplinarity was adopted by the participants of the first World Congress of
Transdisciplinarity, with no claim to any authority other than that of their own work and activity.
In accordance with procedures to be agreed upon by transdisciplinary-minded persons of all countries,
this Charter is open to the signature of anyone who is interested in promoting progressive national,
international and transnational measures to ensure the application of these Articles in everyday life.
Convento da Arrábida, 6th November 1994
Editorial Committee
Lima de Freitas, Edgar Morin and Basarab Nicolescu
Translated from the French by
Karen-Claire Voss
(Morin, Nicolescu and de Freitas 1994)
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Appendix II
Biographical Notes
Biographical notes are provided below for scholars from the contemporary period, mentioned in the
body of the text (not citations and footnotes). Entries are longer for scholars upon whose work this
dissertation draws extensively. Moreover, the biography of historical figures is included in the body of
the text and in footnotes rather than here.
Abd-Allah, Umar Faruq
Born in Columbus, Nebraska, Wymann-Landgraf became known as Umar Faruq Abd-Allah after
converting to Islam in 1970. He holds a PhD in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, from the
University of Chicago, having written a dissertation on Mâlikî legal theory (Abd-Allah 1978). He has
taught at several universities, including the University of Windsor, in Ontario, and King Abdulaziz
University, in Jeddah. And he studied for several years with traditional Islamic scholars in many
countries. He has been a prominent proponent of traditional Islamic learning in the United States since
2000.
Alatas, Syed Farid
Alatas is Associate Professor of Sociology at the National University of Singapore. His fields of expertise
include the sociology of Islam, social theory, and religious dialogue. He holds a PhD from John Hopkins
University, in Baltimore. His work on epistemic decolonization connects with the goals of this
dissertation.
Ali, Abdullah bin Hamid
Since 2007, Ali has been Assistant Professor of Islamic law and Prophetic Tradition at Zaytuna College, in
Berkeley California. He holds a PhD in Cultural and Historical Studies in Religion from the Graduate
Theological Union, in Berkeley California. In his doctoral dissertation his name is spelled Abdel Ali (2016).
He also holds a BA in Islamic Law from al-Qarawîyyîn University of Fez, Morocco. He is the founding
director of the Lamppost Education Initiative, an online educational platform for U.S. American Muslim
intellectual and social leaders. Moreover, he accepted to be interviewed for this dissertation.
Albanese, Catherine Louise
Albanese is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and former
president of the American Academy of Religion (1994). She holds a PhD from the University of Chicago.
She specializes in U.S. American religious history.
Asad, Talal
Asad is Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate
Center. His research interests include Islam, tradition, discourse analysis, political theory, and the
discursive binary between religion and secularism. Born in Saudi Arabia, he has held several research
and teaching positions in places such as Oxford, Khartoum, and Berkeley. He holds at DPhil from Oxford
University.
as-Sufi, Abdalqadir
As-Sufi, born Ian Dallas, is the Scottish leader of a Western branch of the Moroccan Habîbî Darqawî
Shâdhilî Order. He is founder of the Murabitun World Movement which has established mosques in
England, Spain, and South Africa. Initially a scriptwriter and actor, he became Muslim in 1967, at the
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Qarawîyyîn Mosque in Fez, Morocco, and was initiated into Sufism by Shaykh Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥabîb
al-Darqâwî (c. 1876-1972).
Azuonye, Chukwuma
Azuonye is Professor of Africana Studies at the University of Massachusetts Boston. He is both a scholar
of African and African diaspora literatures and a widely published author of poetry and short stories. He
holds a PhD in African Literature from the University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies.
His career path has led him from his native Nigeria to England and, since 1991, to the United States.
Barstow, Llewellyn
Barstow is a U.S. American historian born in 1929, in Jacksonville, Florida. She holds a PhD from
Columbia University, in New York City. From 1971 to 1991, she was Professor of History at the State
University of New York, Old Westbury. She was also Adjunct Professor at New York University, in New
York City, from 1971 to 1973.
Bazian, Hatem
Bazian is Co-Founder and Professor at Zaytuna College, as well as Teaching Professor in the Departments
of Near Eastern and Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He founded the
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